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Editorial Note

Welcome to the summer 2013 issue of the *Peace and Conflict Review*, the 2
nd issue of our 7
th volume. We have prepared another eclectic collection of articles for you, covering a wide range of theoretical and thematic content, which we hope will contribute to the on-going consolidation and expansion of our discipline with insights from psychology, cultural studies, history, business, and of course the political and social sciences.

In terms of overarching themes, our first three articles engage with the various challenges of building peace within the boundaries of three particular nation states – Cyprus, Nigeria, and Bangladesh, respectively – each divided internally along deeply entrenched ethnic or cultural lines, and each situated in its own dynamic regional and international context. Intercultural relationships and the creation of multicultural national identities thus form a common subtext across these three articles, despite their clear distinctions in theory, methodology, argument, and style.

The last two articles widen the unit of analysis, first to the region of sub-Saharan Africa – exploring links between resources and civil conflict across several different countries in an attempt to identify common patterns – and then to analysis itself, with a reflection on the “great quantitative vs. qualitative debate” within the social sciences. This latter article is our first purely methodological paper and thereby opens a new line of inquiry that I hope we will continue to develop in future issues.

The conference paper and book reviews we have included bring in many more themes and address many more questions, such as, how to make businesses more responsive to consumer values, how to understand Hezbollah, and how to avoid a nuclear apocalypse, as well as drawing interesting links between all of these issues and new understandings of how social movements network and adapt.

To speak of more internal matters, it is important to note that this is yet another milestone issue for the *Review*, one that brings with it a certain degree of sadness, as we say goodbye to our long-time Executive Editor, Dr Amr Abdalla, and also one of new opportunity, as we consider ways to restructure our editorial team, hopefully broadening out to offer even more issues per year, explore new ways to speed up the peer review process, and engage more fully with our colleagues as we continue to share research and exchange arguments on the central issues of our discipline, peace and conflict.

Again, I am grateful to all of our contributors, our board of editors, and, of course, to you, our readers. As always, comments and contributions are more than welcome; please direct all correspondence to editor@review.utpeace.org.

Ross Ryan
Managing Editor
Border Creation in Cyprus:  
Contested History and the Psychodynamic Perspective of Vamik Volkan

Sezai Ozcelik *

This paper applies the psychoanalytical concepts of social group formation and distinction developed by Vamik Volkan – externalization, minor differences projection, chosen trauma and glories, dehumanization, victimization, and ethnic identity – to analyse the historical, psychological and political barriers between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. This discussion serves as both an application and an illustration of Volkan’s work in relation to the Cyprus conflict. The paper concludes that historical and psychological barriers among the conflict parties will have to be addressed in order to achieve a political solution like the Annan Plan and to establish a lasting peace.

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Introduction

This work examines the psychological, historical and political barriers between Turkish and Greek Cypriots from a psycho-historical point of view. The basic concepts – narcissism of minor differences, suitable target of externalization, projection, chosen traumas and glories, dehumanization, the egotism of victimization, the need for the enemies and allies, and ethnic identity formation – are the product of Vamik Volkan’s psychodynamic approach. In addition to these, the paper will draw on Nietzsche’s psychology of power, otherization and psychological DNA as they relate to the analysis of borders and barriers between ethnic groups. The case of the Cyprus conflict presents good laboratory conditions to apply and illustrate these concepts.

First, the paper briefly describes the history of the Cyprus conflict. Then, it examines the historical and political sources of the barriers between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The church dominance, Ottoman’s millet system, fragmented ethnic education, antagonistic national loyalties, political polarization and the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ have been factors that all contributed the creation and continuation of barriers and borders between two Cypriot communities. The historical and political barriers have led to the exaggeration and emphasis of cultural similarities and differences and the emergence of the psychological barriers. In the following section, the paper investigates the psychoanalytical approach of the border issues between the two communities drawing on Volkan’s application of Freud’s psychoanalysis concepts into the ethnic conflicts in general the Cyprus conflict in particular. The article concludes with a discussion of the effects of the barriers on the efforts to resolve the Cyprus conflict.

Background

Cyprus is strategically located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea and is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, after Sicily and Sardia. These three geographic characteristics -location, size, and the fact that it is an island- have been important factors in the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. The island is about 42 miles (65 kilometers) south of Turkey, 64 miles (103 km) of Syria, 240 miles (386 km) of the north of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and 500 miles (800 km) of south-east of the Greek mainland (Joseph 1997; Sonyel 1997: 1). It has an area of 3,572 square miles (9,851 square kilometers) and the island is divided between the Greek Cypriot South and the Turkish Cypriot North. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) controls an area of 1,295 square miles (3,355 square kilometers) which covers 37 percent of the island. The island also contains two British sovereign military base areas of 99 square miles (254 square kilometers). According to the census of 1960, the population of the island was about 77 percent Greeks, 18.3 percent Turks and 4.7 percent other ethnic groups, such as Maronites, Armenians, and Latins (Necatigil 2). The total population of Cyprus is estimated to be 792,604 (July 2008) (Worldfacts, 2008). According to the 1998 census in the North, the population there is 200,587, constituting just over 24 percent of the total population of the island (Dodd 1998: 1). The Greek Cypriots are Orthodox Christians and speak Greek. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots are in Muslim faith and speak Turkish.

As the following sections will demonstrate, the Cyprus conflict can be analysed on different geostrategic levels, each with cross-cutting historical and psychodynamic implications. At one level, it is an inter-communal conflict that began as a colonial struggle against British rule. At another level, it is a regional conflict because of the relationship between Greece and Turkey over territory and resources in the eastern Mediterranean as well as their relationships with the two communities in the island. It is also an international conflict that involves superpower politics and involves international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union.
History of the Cyprus Conflict

Because of its position on the main routes between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has been the focus of both political conflict and cultural interaction. Cyprus was colonized in about the thirteenth century BC by Aegean and Greek settlers. Despite many invasions and periods of foreign rule, Greek language and culture became dominant. During the Medieval period, Cyprus was held by the Western powers. In 1571, the island was conquered by the Ottoman Turks. Under Ottoman rule, the Greek and Turkish populations lived relatively peacefully and collaborated to protest against Ottoman rule when it was accused of excessive taxation (Bahceli 1990: 23; Dodd 1993: 2).

In 1878, Britain leased Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to be used as a base from which to protect the Ottoman Empire against the ambitions of Russia. In 1914, the island was annexed by Britain on the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire. After Cyprus became a “Crown Colony” of Britain in 1925, the Greek Cypriots began their long and intense struggle against British rule to achieve the Megali Idea (Great Idea): Enosis (unification with Greece) (Dodd 1998: 8). During the early period of British administration (1878-1925), the two ethnic communities lived in relative functional harmony with physical intermixing and social tolerance but without cultural integration (Fisher 1992: 2). Between 1925 and 1960, the Cyprus conflict can be described like this: the Greek Cypriots agitating for Enosis, the Turkish Cypriots opposing the movement, and the British Government replying in the negative to the Enosis demands (Sonyel 1997: 4).

In 1950, Makarios, who would later become the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, was elected Archbishop. Under the auspices of the Greek Orthodox Church, an island-wide plebiscite called for an overwhelming support for Enosis (96 percent). (Bahceli 1990: 33; Dodd 1998: 11). With the establishment of the EOKA (Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-National Organization of Cypriot Combatants), an underground guerrilla organization, the Greek self-determination campaign began in 1955 (Dodd 1999: 5). Because of their strategic interests in Middle East, the British resisted self-determination and Enosis. The British eventually concluded that their interests could best be served by retaining the sovereignty of their military bases on the island and by achieving a political settlement that would satisfy the interests of the majority Greek community on the island while protecting the interests of the minority Turkish community (Hampson 1996: 40). Prior to 1955, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots never actively participated in the politics of Cyprus. However, the immediate danger of Enosis forced them to reexamine their interests in Cyprus. In particular, Turkey expressed its concern about the future of a Turkish minority under the majority of the Greek Cypriot rule. Moreover, Turkey had strategic concern about the extension of Greek territory under “its nose”. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves with the British, adopted taksim (partition) as a counter to Enosis, and formed a paramilitary organization (TMT-Turkish Resistance Organization) to defend their interests (Fisher 1992: 3).

After the intense and violent intercommunal fighting and the anti-British struggle by the Greek Cypriots, a solution was negotiated by Britain, Turkey and Greece and resulted in the London and Zurich Accords in 1959 and 1960. The accords prohibited Enosis and taksim and introduced a bi-communal/federal solution for the island. Britain, Greece and Turkey had a right to intervene, unilaterally or together, in order to restore the state of affairs in the island. The constitution of Cyprus was designed by three powers. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot. There would be a Council of Ministers (7 Greeks, 3 Turks) and a House of Representatives (70 percent Greek, 30 percent Turkish) elected by a universal suffrage for a term of five years. The Republic of Cyprus was eventually come into existence on 16 August 1960, with Makarios its first president.
After the independence, the two communities continued celebrating the national holidays of Greece and Turkey, many of which reflected the historical antagonism between the two. Moreover, the official flag of Cyprus appeared only at certain places, such as Makarios’ presidential palace. On other places and occasions, the Greek and Turkish national anthems and flags were used during these celebrations. Describing the attitudes of Cypriots toward the official Cypriot flag, Vamik Volkan writes:

When my artist brother-in-law was asked to design a flag for the newly-constituted Republic of Cyprus, he was told that he could use white, which appears both the Greek and Turkish flags, but that he had to avoid using red, which appears on the Turkish flag, and blue, which is used on the Greek flag. Accordingly, he used yellow with some green, these relating to no country in question. This yellow-green-and-white banner is still the official flag of Cyprus. When the Republic was established, however, Cypriot Turks raised the red-and-white flag of Turkey, and the Greeks flaunted the blue-and-white one of Greece. The official yellow-green-white one appeared only at certain locations, such as Makarios’ presidential palace-as an ornament. The story of a Cypriot flag, designed for an imaginary Cypriot nation, and the population’s response to it, indicates that Realpolitik found no echo in the psyche of either Cypriot Turk or Cypriot Greek (Volkan 1989: 308).

By the end of 1963, the intercommunal violence caused an imminent threat for the stability of the island. Nicosia (Lefkoşe), the capital of the Republic, became a battleground and physical segregation of the two communities intensified. Between 1963 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in enclaves on their own in overcrowded slum conditions. They have lived in 5 percent of the island’s territory and 25,000 Turkish Cypriots have become refugees. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council decided to send a peacekeeping force. A buffer zone marked by the “Green Line” was drawn between the conflicting groups. Since March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has deployed to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of normalcy to the island.

The history of the island took a dramatic turn when the Greek-sponsored coup engineered against the President of Cyprus, Makarios in July 1974. Because of the fear of Enosis, Turkey decided to intervene unilaterally and seized 37 percent of the island. Cyprus was divided into northern (Turkish) and southern (Greek) section by the “Attila Line”, running from through Nicosia (Lefkoşe) to Famagusta (Gazimagusa). The Turkish intervention caused huge personal and social tragedies. Approximately, 180,000 Cypriot Greeks became refugees, fleeing to the south and abandoning their possessions behind. There was also 6,000 dead and 1615 missing person on the Greek side (Yilmaz 1998: 66).

After the coup and war of 1974, the efforts of peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict have been increased at the intercommunal level as talks and negotiations between the leaders of the two communities. Between 1974-1990, the major third-party has been the UN Secretaries-General. They have attempted to mediate the intercommunal talks: Denktash-Makarios (1975-1977), Denktash-Kyprianu (1977-1988), Denktash-Vasiliu (1988-1993), and now Denktash-Klerides. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and the European Union began to play more important roles in the negotiation process.

Both sides see political reconciliation and the solution of the conflict differently. The Turkish Cypriot community demands the recognition of its separate political status, which culminated in the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. On the other side, the Greek Cypriot community sees the solution of the Cyprus problem only in the context of a bi-communal
solution that allowed for the “three freedoms”: freedom of settlement, freedom of property ownership, and freedom of movement. The removal of Turkish forces from the island was another Greek Cypriot precondition for settlement. Furthermore, other issues had to be dealt with such as the question of Turkish settlers on the island, international guarantees to replace the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, economic reconstruction, exploitation of resources, and development of infrastructure on a joint rather than unitary basis (Hampson 1998: 40).

In 1993, the United Nations initiated a new attempt to obtain agreement that produced the confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs essentially involved the opening of Nicosia (Lefkoṣe) International Airport (closed since 1974) and the permission of the Greek Cypriots to reoccupy Varosha/Maras lost in 1974. They failed miserably.

In 1997, the UN tried to bring the two sides together in two meetings, one in New York, the other in Switzerland. In 1998, the European Union (EU) opened membership negotiations with the South despite the unresolved issues on the island. As a result, the question of the sovereignty of the North became a crucial issue. In 2001, Turkey threatened to annex North Cyprus unless a long-lasting settlement was reached before the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union. With the possible EU membership, the UN-sponsored intercommunal negotiations have intensified. In November 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan introduced a comprehensive peace plan (the Annan plan) that proposed a federation with two parts and a rotating presidency. In December 2002, the EU invited the South to become a member in 2004.

In February 2003, the South elected a new president, Tassos Papadopoulos. The two communities failed to agree on UN reunification plan in March. After the failure of the Annan Plan, the North opened all its borders with Greek Cyprus. The Greek side followed the initiative and opened its borders. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots crossed the borders and crossed the dividing “green line” for the first time since 1974. In April 2003, twin referendums were held on the island. The Turkish side strongly supported the Annan Plan, but the Greek side overwhelmingly rejected it. On May 1 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became one of 10 new members to join the EU. On April 2005, Denktash presidency ended and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat elected TRNC president.

The island’s political history has clearly been affected by Turkish–Greek relations. The establishment of a Joint Defence Doctrine between Greece and the South has alerted Turkey about the strategic importance of the island. Also, the EU accession talks with Turkey have fixed on the resolution of Cyprus issues. Although the earthquake diplomacy between Turkey and Greece has created a détente between the two countries, the elimination of historical and political barriers have not achieved the elimination of psychological barriers. In the language of cognitive theory, the consistency principle is still in effect. The need for an enemy and the maintenance of alliances are still defined by Turkish–Greece relations. However, the recent developments between two countries as well as the systemic changes in the international system have created new enemies and alliances. But despite the honeymoon between Turkey and Greece after the earthquakes in 1999 have not materialized for the resolution of the Cyprus, Aegean Sea and minority conflicts. The political barriers have started to crumble down, but the psychological barriers are still in effect.

**Historical and Political Barriers**

The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have been divided along linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious lines. The Greek Cypriots speak Greek and identify with the Greek nation, Greek culture and the heritage of classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire, putting more emphasis on “the chosen traumas and glories” of the Greek nation. Almost all of them are members of the Orthodox Church, which has had a central place in politics, education, and the cultural development
of the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and identify with the Turkish nation, Turkish culture, and the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Virtually all of them are Muslims of the Sunni sect.

One of the historical-structural barriers between two communities is the Ottoman millet administrative system, a form of communal self-government that distinguished between the two groups on the basis of religion and ethnicity. Non-Muslim communities were institutionalized in accordance with their religion and allowed to govern themselves on certain administrative issues, although they were ultimately responsible to the Ottoman government. According to this system, each religious ethnic group was treated as a distinct entity. After the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, the autonomy of the Orthodox Church was confirmed and the archbishop was recognized as the religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriot community. As a result, the church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity for the Greek Cypriots and it helped them preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural and political identity. On the other hand, the millet system contributed to the polarization of ethnicity. When the British took control over Cyprus, the millet system was not completely abolished. Although a modern bureaucratic administration was established and the two communities introduced some modern concepts and processes to create a common identity-Cypriot identity, religious institutions retained control over matters of religion, education, culture, personal status, and communal institutions.

The British colonial policy of “divide and rule” maintained and reinforced the ethnic, administrative, and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period. Unfortunately, the British administration made no effort to create a unifying Cypriot identity and political culture. The two communities were treated as separate groups for administrative purposes and antagonism between them was stirred. The maintenance of a psychological and administrative gap between the two ethnic groups was instrumental in securing British control over Cyprus.

In fact, the political barrier of the Cyprus conflict was based on the London and Zurich accords and the constitution. The agreements were signed on the behalf of the Cypriot people by Turkey, Greece and Great Britain. Similarly, these foreign powers developed the constitution of Cyprus as part of the accords, and it was never submitted to a referendum. From the beginning, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the island were limited by the presence of foreign military forces and their interference in its domestic affairs.

Ethnic dualism was institutionalized in all sectors of public life. A political framework conducive to ethnic separation was established. Although Enosis and the partition of the island were prohibited by the constitution, the alternative system did not promote integrative politics that cut across the political boundaries. This “paralysis state” reinforced and preserved the past practice of the ethnic and political cleavages through institutionalization. Public institutions that may have helped to build a common identity and bureaucratic class promoted particular ethnic interests instead. As a result, the system paralyzed most vital organs and functions essential for a state and a society. For example, there were disproportional partitions of the public service, the police, and the army, as well as a veto right in the government matters, and a separate majority vote in the parliament, all of which intensified the ethnic tension.

Physically, the two population groups lived in separate villages and in separate quarters of towns. In his study on the political geography of Cyprus, Richard Patrick has provided statistical evidence that indicates a substantial decline in the number of mixed villages containing both Greeks and Turks from 1881 to 1931 (Patrick 1976: 8-12). After 1931, the decrease of mixed settlement became even more pronounced, reflecting at the very least the preference of people of both
communities to live in areas where there was ethnic kinship. According to the 1960 census, there were 114 mixed villages out of a total of 634 (395 were entirely Greek and 121 entirely Turkish) (Yilmaz 1998: 52).

During the intercommunal conflicts in 1963, both communities accepted a truce that arranged a cease-fire line, now known as the “green line”, patrolled by British forces. With the deployment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), this line became a permanent border between two communities. After the 1974 intervention, a new border was formed in which both sides were physically separated from each other, the arrangement that has persisted up until now. Interestingly, this line is called as the “Attila Line” that reminds both sides different chosen traumas and glories. For Greeks, Attila was a barbarian who invaded Rome and destroyed the Roman civilization that was the continuation of the Hellenistic culture. On the other hand, Attila represents the times of Turkic-Mongol glory for Turks. From outside, they seem similar to in some extent, but still they still have “minor differences.”

The segregation of education that inherited from the Ottoman millet system and the British colonial era has reinforced and sustained the ethnic cleavage. During British rule, the two communities had separate schools which were controlled by their respective religious institutions. In this period, Orthodox priests and Muslim clergies were also schoolteachers. Moreover, they virtually established dependent relations in educational area to their motherlands. The curricula and textbooks used in Cypriot elementary and high schools were mostly imported from the two mainlands. As a result, they have focused on their religious, national, ethnic heritage and values and imported the long history of Greek-Turkish rivalry into the island. Because of the lack of the colleges and universities, both communities’ youths have gone to other institutions in Turkey, Greece, Great Britain and other countries. This situation has created a lack communal interaction in educational and intellectual fields and reinforced a one-sided “ethnic way” of thinking among the two communities. For example, the first university on the island was established in 1992, the University of Cyprus, which has educated Greek Cypriots since its establishment. The result has been a growing gap in perceptions and attitudes held by the two communities about each other.

The two communities also have their own newspapers and other publications that have mostly produced a media war between two sides. The local press, together with imported items from Greece and Turkey, emphasizes Greek-Turkish antagonism and enhances mutual fears and stereotypical perceptions.

The above factors – church dominance, the Ottoman millet system, the British policy of ‘divide and rule’, physical segregation, fragmented ethnic education, and political polarization – contributed to the preservation of ethnic identities among the two Cypriot communities and the generation of a political schism between them. Four centuries of geographic proximity has not produced a common Cypriot identity, but has actually emphasized and entrenched religious, administrative, educational, social, and cultural differences.

Psychological Barriers

The differences described above are closely related to psychological processes of group differentiation. This includes the lack of a common Cypriot identity and the continued emphasis of Turkish and Greek identities. Although both communities have lived on the same island for over 400 years, they have maintained their Turkishness and Greekness. As discussed earlier, this is reflected in common attitudes towards national symbols such as flags and anthems.
These invisible borders are made manifest in attention to physical borders. When neighbouring groups are not in conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their investment in them. For example, crossing border between Canada and the United States is little more than a formality since no threat is involved in moving from one large group’s territory to the other’s. Under conflict situations, however, physical borders serve a double duty: they provide practical physical protection, and they are “psychologized” to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groups from being contaminated (Volkan 1997: 105).

Therefore, psychological borders often underlie and make effective a physical one. Physical borders are successful when they represent a sufficient psychological one. When clear physical demarcations do not contribute to an effective psychological border, an anxiety and regression within large groups in conflict and any possibility of interpenetration has to be defended against it. This principle can be closely observed when someone visits exaggerated physical borders, such as the Green Line in Cyprus, or demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Along such borders, elaborate rituals are common, including ceremonious changing of guards, constant monitoring and maintenance, and complex protocols and practices (Volkan 1999: 232). When members of large groups feel that their psychological borders are threatened, they may consider killing out-group members rather than continuing to live under the anxiety. In such a climate, chosen traumas and glories, mourning difficulties, and feelings of entitlement to revenge are reactivated.

Some mental borders take the form of a shared mythical belief in a fantasized physical structure that protects the group, like an invisible wall that keeps dangerous elements out. For example, Cypriot Turks living in the Nicosia (Lefkoşe) enclave surrounded by Cypriot Greeks between 1963 and 1968 believed in a great weapon that was located on the mountain in the enclave (Volkan 1979: 98).

Such barriers in attitude and group psychology can be approached from the psychoanalytical perspective by applying an analysis of defence mechanisms typically used by individuals to protect themselves from perceived psychological danger, including externalization and projection, to a broader analysis of group dynamics (Volkan 1988; Volkan 1990: 81-93). Externalization and projection are ways of getting rid of unpleasant self-images, feelings, thoughts, and impulses which cannot be integrate with the image of the self, and are thus attributed to the external world. In other words, they involve transferring and projecting unconscious and unacceptable impulses, thoughts, and characteristics into an outgroup so that the individual/ingroup can maintain an acceptable and cohesive sense of self (Volkan 1988; Ross 1995: 523-544; Fisher 1992).

Erecting a psychological border between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group’s externalizations and projections from reflecting back onto the in-group is one purpose of such rituals. Without a psychological border, each ethnic group would become a replica of the other. In that situation, the externalization and projections needed to provide cohesion for group identity would be unstable.

Volkan (1988) maintains that this dynamic reflects a need to maintain and preserve identity (both individual and collective) from contamination with enemy images. Referring to his studies of problem-solving workshops, Volkan (1997) calls this the “accordion phenomenon”. At first, the group experiences a period of closeness and aligns themselves physically and emotionally with the other group (out-group). This illusionary sense of brotherhood is related to the mechanism of reaction formation (unconsciously doing something contrary to one’s true but hidden wish), eventually producing a defensive move in which the distance is reestablished. The togetherness becomes too much to tolerate. The extension and contradiction of the accordion gradually became
less pronounced and the accordion keeps playing to a lesser degree, continuing to challenge and reaffirm group distinctions (Volkan 1997: 102; Fisher 1992: 111).

Another psychoanalytic concept that helps us to explain ethnic conflict is the *narcissism of minor differences* (a term introduced by Freud). This can be explained in terms of two major principles that govern enemy-ally relations between one large group and another. The first principle deals with the *sameness* between ourselves and our enemies, between their ethnic group and ours. Although the opposing ethnic group is a reservoir of our psychic material, there is an unconscious perception of a certain likeness. Such likeness must be denied and never permitted to enter our consciousness in order to keep our projections, externalization, and displacement stable and the identity of our group and ourselves cohesive. The second principle concerns the need for a psychological gap between rival groups. When two ethnic groups live side by side, they do not want to acknowledge a total likeness, so they focus on or create minor differences. Volkan gives two examples of such minor differences in Cyprus. Until 1974, Cypriot Greeks and Turks could differ themselves from each other at a glance by insignificant details for the visitor from other countries. For example, Greeks usually preferred the brand of cigarettes that were in blue and white, the Greek national colours. Turks, on the other hand, smoked the red and white package of cigarettes, the Turkish colours. In the villages, the Greeks wore black trousers and shirts, the Turks red (Volkan 1990: 108; Fisher 1992: 111). In time of peace, these differences are exhibited by relatively innocuous distinctions in dress, dances, speech patterns, and the like. In time of hostility, however, these minor differences assume major emotional importance; some people have even given up their lives rather than abandon them (Volkan 1990).

Another psychodynamic process that affects the formation of psychological borders between two groups is the concept of chosen traumas and glories. As discussed earlier, this process refers an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group (Volkan and Norton Itzkowitz 1994: 7). For example, the Greeks, as a group, psychologically reach back to the fall of Constantinople as their prime chosen trauma. Every suffering since then is condensed with the event of 1453 and its mental representation. It affects the Greeks’ international relationships, especially their relationship with Turkey (Volkan and Norton Itzkowitz 1994: 181).

Because both nations have forged their national identities by defining themselves against each other, the major historical events discussed at the beginning of this paper interact with psychological processes, as Volkan has pointed out, to contextualize and reinforce the social process of group differentiation.

**Concluding Remarks**

Although the psychological barriers between Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks were formed during the Greek and Turkish war of independence, it hardly came to an end with the physical and more psychological division of Cyprus. The Greek-Turkish conflict has been psychologized – contaminated with shared perceptions, thoughts, fantasies, and emotions (both conscious and unconscious) related to past traumas and glories. Modern Greece came into existence after the Greek war of independence (1821-1829) when the new Greek State separated from the Ottoman Empire. Modern Turkey was born in the early 1920s after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the defeat of Greeks in Anatolia (Asia Minor). The process of the formation of the Greek and Turkish identity still influences the present-day nationalism and psychological factors of the conflict.
It is clear that the past chosen traumas live on powerfully in the Cyprus conflict. The Greek Cypriots are outraged by the “invasion” of 1974 and the losses it caused them. Many of them regard the island as historically theirs. The Turks believe, on the other hand, that they have as much right to be there as the Greek Cypriots. For them, Cyprus never became part of the Hellenic world. The Greeks traditionally dislike and fear the Turks. They have also believed that being in a large majority in the island gives them to right to rule. The Turkish Cypriots were not long ago the rulers in Cyprus and are outraged at attempts to treat them as a mere minority. History has left them with a deep distrust of mediators, like the UN. Although the political, strategic, and military issues play an important role in the conflict psychological and historical barriers are real issues to need to address by the conflict resolution practitioners.

The reason why the political solutions such as the latest Annan Plan has failed is that the mutual distrust between two communities is still alive. Without addressing the comprehensive solutions including psychological, cultural and structural changes, the political and economic changes are alone not enough for the lasting peace.

The barriers between the two Cypriot communities show that they have similarities and differences in terms of psychoanalytical processes. The resolution of the Cyprus issue rests upon third parties, outside intereners, as well as the two Cypriot communities themselves, by understanding and engaging with the psychodynamic processes that reinforce the border that separates them.

References


Harnessing the Peace-Development Nexus: Overcoming Cultural Barriers to Peace in Nigeria

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

This paper explores how Nigeria can harness the peace-development nexus by overcoming cultural barriers to peace. It draws attention to the neglect of cultural constraints to peace in peace building policies, and makes the point that understanding this is important for conflict resolution in the country. The paper, within the framework of social integration, suggests the adoption of a combination of voluntary and compulsory policies and legislations to enhance cohesion and help reduce cultural barriers. The voluntary policies are expected to be driven by incentives, while sanctions will be the basis of compulsory policies. The article notes that efforts to overcome cultural barriers will be faced with enormous challenges, prominent among which are the culture of politics and structure of federalism.

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Introduction

Although contradictions have been noted, empirical evidence has been amassed by scholars to demonstrate the positive association between peace and development. The United Nations (UN) equally agrees with this, and links with the democracy-development nexus which sees societal reconciliation, democratization and economic reconstruction as mutually reinforcing factors in peace building and development (Santiso, 2002).

For this reason, democracy has been put forward as a vehicle for development, just as conflict resolution and peace building in conflict ridden countries have been pursued with vigour. But challenges to democratization and peace building have hindered the achievement of development through peace in several countries, including Nigeria. This paper focuses on the challenges/barriers to peace in Nigeria; in particular, cultural barriers. The justification here is twofold. First is the observation that “culture and cultural identity have become key elements in ethno-political conflicts” (Bierbrauer, 2006, p.1). Second is the point that, in spite of obvious challenges, concerted efforts are on to improve on democratic practice in Nigeria, but this is not applicable to issues of culture and identity that have been overlooked in the peace building process. Since the 2007 general elections, considered to be the worst in the country’s history, the Nigerian government has taken steps to improve on the conduct of elections. Examples include the setting up of an electoral reform panel, the Justice Mohammad Uwais Electoral Reforms Committee, the various amendments of the countries Electoral Act in 2010 and 2011, and initiatives to improve the work of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Although the expected gains are yet to be fully actualized, the 2011 general elections were seen to be much better than the 2007 elections, and it is also not in doubt that the Nigerian government and civil society have continued to show heightened concerns to improve on the country’s democratic credentials.

However, the same cannot be said of the cultural barriers or challenges to peace in the country. Ethnic suspicion, fear of domination by minority ethnic groups, and national discriminatory-beneficial policies such as quota systems, state of origin requirements for access to privileges and rights such as contesting for election into public office, discriminatory school fees in state-owned tertiary institutions, etc., have not been attended to with the same vigour. These factors have therefore continued to inhibit peace, robbing the country of the development benefits that peace could bring. The objective of this paper is to highlight the point that understanding this is important for conflict resolution in the country, and to make the case that overcoming cultural barriers to peace is an essential requirement for the country’s development.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first reflects on theoretical and conceptual issues in peace, development, peace-development nexus, and culture, identity and conflict; and is intended to locate the theoretical context of the discourse. The second discusses the roots of conflicts in Nigeria, and highlights the interface between culture, identity and ethnicity. The analysis brings into focus the cultural barriers to peace in the country. The third section explores policy issues in overcoming cultural barriers to peace, while the fourth highlights the possible challenges and prospects.

Theoretical and Conceptual Issues

The discussion here is organized under four sub-headings; 1) peace, 2) development, 3) peace-development nexus, 4) culture, identity and conflict.
(a) Development

Scholars, practitioners and development agencies have examined development from different perspectives, giving rise to different definitions and measurements, but with convergent interests or focus. For example, Rodney (2005) has noted that:

Development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being [...] At the level of social groups [...] development implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships (pp.1-2)

This highlights development as, 1) a process, 2) improvement of the material well-being of people, and 3), capacity to control the environment. Rodney’s definition provides conditions of development such as the acquisition of skills, capacity, and creativity, and responsibility of the individual which enhances productivity and quality living. The measures of development include reduction in inequality, unemployment and poverty; satisfaction of basic needs, enhanced education, access to clean water, high life expectancy and political freedom (Onuoha, 1999; Omotola, 2006; UNDP, 2006).

For several decades, the literature has linked the absence or poor state of development in some countries, particularly those in Africa, to external factors such as capitalist exploitation, expressed as the slave-trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism (Offiong, 1980, Onimode, 1983). Scholars who chose to locate the problem internally have focused on demography, culture, lack of adequate capital for investment, poor education, corruption, ethnicity, and lack of good governance, in particular, non-democratic governance (Ake, 1996; Onuoha, 1999). Recent discourse transcends this internal/external divide to some degree by focusing on violent conflict as a fundamental obstacle to Africa’s development; thus suggesting the need for peace as a condition for development.

(b) Peace

Peace has been described as a relative condition of tranquilized conflict (Otite, 2001:1-5); a process involving activities that are linked to increasing development and reducing conflict (Ibeanu, 2006:10); justice and development, respect and tolerance between people, harmony with the ecosystem, tranquility or inner peace, ‘wholeness’ and ‘making whole’ and the absence of war (Mall, 2000). Scholars have disagreed sharply on what constitute peace, thus leading to different perspectives. However, a useful contribution is made by Ibeanu (2006) who has identified seven perspectives and contexts of peace that enhances understanding of what it means. These points are that peace: 1) Relates to existing social conditions, rather than an ideal state or condition; 2) Is a dynamic process, and not a static condition; 3) Is not a finished condition, but always a “work in progress”; 4) Increases and decreases depending on objective socio-economic and political conditions; 5) It is reversible, that is, it is possible to move from higher levels of peace to lower levels; 6) Is not a linear, unidirectional process, but it is complex and multifaceted; and 7) it can be measured (p.11).

The points noted by Ibeanu indicate conditions that can be described as peace, but perhaps the most significant is his assertion that peace can be measured. The question that arises is: how can peace be measured? One approach is to measure peace by relative reductions in direct, structural or
cultural violence. The absence of war, civil disturbance and murder, and conditions of justice, tolerance and plenty (Rivera, 2004) can also be used as a criterion to measure peace. Furthermore, indicators of conflict and vulnerability – mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees and IDPs; chronic and sustained human flight and brain drain; uneven economic development along group lines; poverty, Sharp and or severe economic decline; progressive deterioration of public services, rise of factionalized elites, and suspension of the rule of Law and widespread violation of human rights (FFP, 2011, pp. 6-18) – can offer a measure of how peaceful a country or society is.

For the purpose of this paper, peace is considered to be achievable through a number of means which include the rejection of violence, the tackling of the root cause of conflicts, and the resolution of grievances through dialogue and negotiation (Rivera, 2004).

(c) Peace- Development Nexus

The interface between peace and development can be seen from two perspectives: peace as a requirement for development, and/or development as a requirement for peace. Although there is contestation in the literature on these points, it appears to be a case of what you are looking at. Asiedu (2008) captures it thus:

The relationship between conflicts and poor development can go both ways. Economic and social hardships, particularly when accompanied by sharp inequalities across groups and areas, can bring about violence. Similarly, conflicts are often major causes of weak economic development, leading to health crisis and destruction of infrastructure among others (p.14).

Poverty, one of the central measures of development, has been noted as a push factor in conflict because it aggravates grievances (Nafziger, 2006). Thus if development is enhanced and poverty is reduced, it will most likely reduce poverty related grievances that trigger or worsen violence. Conversely, the quest for development can induce conflict, if the development process is not managed properly. For example, development-induced environmental degradation can destroy livelihoods and worsen poverty, or contribute to resource scarcity that is linked to violence, including wars.

Thus development can trigger structural violence or create peaceful symmetrical structures (Hettne, 1983). The other point in the peace and development interface, which informs the analysis in this paper is the view that violence constrains development; making peace a necessary condition for development. This highlights the peace-development nexus which is aptly captured by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) when it identified violence as one of the ten limiting factors to sustainable development in the 2002 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Weinstein and Imai (2009) have highlighted this by noting that violence destroys the growth of the capital stock, as it destroys social and economic infrastructure, reduces investments, and induces depreciation of the capital stock. The above captures the crux of the argument of the

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1 Direct violence refers to physical, emotional, psychological and counter value violence, while structural violence implies deliberate policies and structures that cause human suffering, death and harm, deprivation, exclusion, and oppression. Cultural norms and practices that create discrimination, injustice and human suffering defines cultural violence (Ibeanu, 2006; Francis, 2006)

2 Negative peace

3 Positive peace
peace development nexus. The point is, unlike violence, peace creates a conducive environment for development.

Data generated on Africa by Hoeffler (2008) and Asiedu (2008) indicates that countries that have experienced violent conflicts (civil war) are poorer than those that have not, supporting the link between conflict and low development in some countries in Africa. Hoeffler’s study entitled “Dealing with the Consequences of Violent Conflict in Africa” provides economic, health and education indicators of development in 53 African countries, divided into peaceful and war/post-war countries. The peaceful countries were 38, and the war/post-war countries were 15. The data indicates that the peaceful, countries fared better in the ranking of the development indicators. For example, while average life expectancy was 53 years in the peaceful countries, the war/post-war countries recorded 47. Similarly, while the peaceful countries recorded infant mortality of 75 (per 1000 births), the war/post-war countries recorded 112 (p.24).

It is important to note a critical point in the causal link between conflict and poor development. This relates to the fact that some countries still make progress in development despite being in conflict. Why? Asiedu (2008) has attributed this to two reasons. First is “good policies that continue to provide services to all citizens even in times of conflict”, and second is the point that “conflicts often do not involve the entire country but are restricted to specific parts, and thus the effects of war may not be reflected in national social indicators” (p.14). The differences in development indicators provided for violence and non-violence affected parts of Colombia and Nepal highlights the second point. It shows that in “Colombia, the HDI (2003) was lowest (I less than 0.710) in some of the areas where conflict was the most violent as against HDI of 0.77 in the other parts of the country in Nepal, low HDI (less than 0.200) were located in the northwest and some parts in the north, where the Maoist uprising is based (Asiedu, 2008, p.14). Hoeffler (2008) has noted that “these countries may have experienced some violent conflict but this did not reach the intensity of civil war according to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset” which sees “civil war as causing a minimum of 1000 battle deaths” (p.1). But whether violence leads to 1000 deaths or not, the damage caused to socio-economic infrastructure, human development, etc., certainly constrains development.

(d) Culture, Identity and Conflict

Although “culture” has been given different connotations, its definition in the social sciences and humanities generally falls into one of two interpretations: 1) “the sum of social practices in the form of, for example, religion, language, education and social and family practices”, or 2) “as artistic expression in the form of, for example, literature, dance, music and films” (DMFA, 2002); which shapes attitudes, values, behaviour or personality (Mbakogu, 2004). The first view of culture noted above, and its implications for peaceful coexistence and development, is the definition used in the analysis of this paper.

Conflict literature has explained conflict from different theoretical standpoints, including psycho-cultural theories, which attribute conflict to “enemy images created from deep-seated attitudes about human action that are learned from early stages of growth”, related to the “fear of extinction”, “fear of dying”, and “fear of the future” (Ademola, 2006, p.50). This indicates a correlation between cultural differences and conflict, but Avruch (nd) has pointed out that “the mere existence of cultural differences is not necessarily the primary cause of conflicts between groups”. In this regard, LeBaron (nd) has counselled that the perception of “we and them” is crucial in understanding the link between culture and conflict. Culture shapes identities and creates
boundaries which are often mobilised for political contest and struggle for resources, thus providing conditions for conflict/violence.

The ties between culture and conflict have been seen from international and domestic perspectives. On the international perspective, Gartkze and Gleditsch (2006) have identified various linkages between culture and conflict to include: 1) differences in culture and the formation of deep psychological distrust or enmity, 2) Cultural differences which inhibit effective communication, leading to international misunderstandings and violence, and 3) Identity and collective action under the security dilemma Group relations, in particular when a given group is dominant in one state but a politically repressed or under-represented minority in another state. However, the authors make a critical observation that is a significant point of reference for this study. According to Gartkze and Gleditsch, in the study entitled “Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide” (2005):

Our analyses linking ethnicity, language, and religion to interstate dispute behaviour suggest that cultural traits and identity influence dispute patterns, but in ways that run counter to conventional beliefs. Most notably, we find little evidence of clashes between civilizations, or that conflict is generally more common between states where the dominant groups possess different cultural affinities, broadly defined. Indeed, if anything, our results suggest that ties of similarity rather than difference more often give rise to conflict: Violence appears to be more likely within than between civilizations or groups of similar states, even when controlling for other factors affecting the risk of disputes (p.2).

While this may appear to be the case from an international perspective, domestically, the view that ties of similarity trigger conflict, as opposed to differences is not entirely convincing. Ethnocentrism, the love for one’s cultural/ethnic group and the development of implicit negative attitudes towards other cultural/ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1980; MacDonald, 2009) cannot be easily divorced from conflict. Related to this are factors identified by MillHouse (2009) as cultural-related causes of conflict. These include: 1) Ethnocentrism and national pride at the expense of “aliens” or difference, 2) demonization of one cultural group by another, 3) culture of competition among different cultural groups, 4) misunderstanding cross-cultural communication, and 5) unwillingness or inability to accept other cultures due to avoidance, lack of information, and fear.

The literature indicates further linkages between culture, identity, ethnocentrism, ethnicity and conflict (Nnoli, 1978; Bierbrauer, 2006; Avruch, nd). Avruch has noted, for instance, that culture defines symbols that create group identity and social boundaries that are used as instruments of political organisation and mobilisation. Further, Avruch distinguishes culture from ethnicity by noting that whereas “culture constitutes a broader class of differences that subsumes ethnic ones, ethnicity refers to high conscious perception of differences and distinction, and a resource that is mobilised by individuals and groups for political purposes”. Nnoli (1978) has also pointed out that ethnocentrism and ethnicity do not mean the same thing, but explains that they interact to give rise to ethnic identity and conflict. The characteristics of ethnicity identified by Nnoli (1978) highlights the culture-ethnicity-conflict nexus. These include: 1) Common consciousness of being one in relation to other ethnic groups as a result of a common struggle against other hostile groups or a particular environment, and inter-ethnic competition for scarce socio-economic resources; 2) Exclusiveness, which results in interethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, admission into educational institutions, etc; and 3) Conflict triggered by interethnic competition for scarce socio-economic resources (pp.6-8).
Looking at the characteristics of ethnicity from a different perspective, Avruch (nd) has opined that culture frames the context of conflict in three ways. One is by “indicating the type of resources that would be objects of competition, or objects of dispute in relation to high value placed on them or relative scarcity”. The second point is that “culture provides the rules for contest between groups”, while the third is that it “provides individuals with cognitive, symbolic and affective frameworks for interpreting behaviour and motives of others and themselves”. All these are indications of the culture-conflict nexus, which makes addressing cultural barriers a critical requirement for peace building.

The Roots of Conflicts in Nigeria: Reflections on Culture, Identity and Ethnicity

The process of colonisation and policies of the colonial government in Nigeria created conditions for the emergence of cultural identity and ethnic consciousness. The British policy of indirect rule, separate administration of the southern and northern parts of the country, and exploitative/discriminatory socio-economic policies which created a scarcity of socio-economic resources, ensured a strong sense of ethnic identity and consciousness among the over 250 ethnic nationalities in the formative years of Nigeria (Ademoyega, 1981; Coleman, 1986, Nnoli, 1978; Enegwea& Umoden, 1993; Egosa & Suberu, 2005; Ekanola, 2006). The colonial urban centre encouraged the formation of ethnic associations to “cushion the insecurity, instability, alienation and competitiveness of colonial urban life” (Egosa & Suberu, 2005, p.16), thus strengthening “primordial affiliations for identity, loyalty and security” (Ekanola, 2006, p.280). This was reflected in the ethnic character of the nationalist movement, as evidenced by the formation of the three dominant political parties in the twilight of colonialism.

The three parties, Action Group (AG), Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had their roots and dominant membership in the West, North and East respectively; the ethnic homelands of their founding fathers and leaders – Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello and Dr. Nnammidi Azikiwe. As independence approached in 1960, the ethnicisation of politics and resultant ethnicity-based political domination became visible in governance, culminating in the fears of domination by the minority ethnic groups and the subsequent establishment of the Willinks Commission in 1957. This Commission was established to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill founded. The fears expressed by minority groups in each of the three regions are presented in Table 1, and they clearly indicate that they are culturally related. It also shows that the issues in contention remain the points of suspicion and dispute among the different ethnic nationalities.

Table 1: Fears Expressed by Minorities in the former three Regions of Nigeria as Documented by the Willink Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Fears Expressed by the minorities</th>
<th>Region/Fears Expressed by the minorities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>Northern Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) The Mid-West: Fears of Yoruba domination</td>
<td>(a) Fears of Autocratic Government</td>
<td>(a) Fears and Grievances Regarding Traditional Rulers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The maintenance of public order</td>
<td>(b) Public Posts and Services</td>
<td>(b) Social Fears and Grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Discrimination in the economic field</td>
<td>(c) Economic and Social Discrimination</td>
<td>(c) Fears of Political Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Local Government and</td>
<td>(d) Fears Regarding Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<th>(d) Discrimination in the Provision of Public Services</th>
<th>Chiefs (e) Changes in the Legal System (f) Public Order</th>
<th>(e) Relations with Native Authorities (f) Public Order (g) Fears of Religious Intolerance (h) Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willinks Commission Report, 1958, pp.1-86</td>
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</table>

The fears expressed by the minorities in each region are clearly underpinned by economic survival, and the protection of the identity of each group. Whereas these fears were expressed before independence, they have remained the source friction between and among the different ethnic nationalities. In addition to these concerns are new primordial identities that have deepened the cultural differences and identities of Nigerians. Eghosa and Suberu (2005) capture these as:

 [...] contestations over citizenship [...] ‘Indigenes’, ‘non-indigenes’, ‘migrants’, and ‘settlers’. These categories have ethnic, communal, religious and regional origins, and have evolved from an entrenched system of discriminatory practices in which non-indigenes, migrants and settlers are shunted out or denied equal access to the resources, rights and privileges of a locality, community, town or state, to which ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ have first or exclusionary access. The system produces and sustains a hierarchical, unequal, and ranked system of citizenship that has provoked violent conflicts all over the country (p.8).  

The issue of non-indigenes requires some explanation as its definition is not always culture or ethnicity bound. State or local government of origin is the central determinant, and in this case, people of the same ethnic or cultural group can be distinguished on the basis of indigene and non-indigene. Only recently, the Abia State Government in south-eastern Nigeria relieved non-indigenous civil servants of their jobs, in spite of the fact some of them belong to the same Ibo ethnic group as the Abia State people. Also, although Bayelsa State is the only homogenous Ijaw State in the country, Ijaws who are not Bayelsa State indigenes are discriminated in terms of employment and political appointments. Significantly, this was not the case when Bayelsa State was still part of the old Rivers State. Then, Ijaws from other States in the country conveniently claimed to be indigenes of communities from the Bayelsa area to become indigenes of Rivers State. With the creation of Bayelsa State however, Bayelsans began to resist this, and openly challenged such persons and in some cases protested against appointments given to non-Bayelsa Ijaws.

Why? After the creation of Bayelsa State, characterised by poor development, the competition for scarce resources forced people to recognise the political boundaries despite belonging to the same ethnic group. However, cultural identification also determines an individual’s status as an indigene or not. For example, an Ijaw man living in any of the south-eastern states will not only be discriminated against on the basis of not being an indigene of the state, but also on the basis of not belonging to the Ibo ethnic nationality. In any case, one criterion for identifying an indigene is the ability to speak the language of the group an individual claims to originate from. Thus culture cannot be dissociated from primordial sentiments of indigene or non-indigene. A non- 

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4 Nigeria is a federation of 36 states including Abia, Bayelsa, and Rivers States
5 The present government in the State led by Chief Seriakke Dickson is consciously addressing this with the appoint of Ijaws from Delta and Rivers States into the State Executive Council
6 Bayelsa State was part of the old Rivers State from until 1996 when the General Sanni Abacha Government created Bayelsa State
indigene is an “alien in his own home land”, and consequently, denied certain rights of citizenship. Thus when a large number of people from the same ethnic group settle in a state or locality which is not their cultural or ethnic homeland, the exclusions and discriminations they face create frustrations which support conditions for violence. Conversely, when people who are considered to be non-indigenes begin to dominate a place, either politically or economically, it triggers settler-indigenes conflict. Such identity-based conflict has been noted as one of the causal factors of the Jos crisis, for instance (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Egwu, 2004).

Related to this is the fractionalisation of the ruling elites in Nigeria along ethnic lines, and consequently, the use of state power to promote the interests of one ethnic group at the expense of others (Ekekwe, 1986). The allocation of national resources is usually skewed in favour of the group that controls political power, resulting in the denial of other groups of a fair or equitable share of state resources. This creates uneven development and also denies citizens their rights; for example, the right to development. Significantly, this is usually a rallying point of mobilisation in the context of the oppressed and oppressor, thus creating images of hate, suspicion, and distrust; pitching one ethnic group against the other.

Uneven development is linked to horizontal inequality (HI), or inequality along the lines of ethno-cultural groups, which is noted to be a critical source of violent conflict between and among different cultural groups. Stewart, Brown and Mancini (2010) have noted in this regard that “group inequality provides powerful grievances which leaders can use to mobilise people for political action, by calling on cultural markers (a common history or language or religion) and pointing to group exploitation” (p.8). No doubt, this has been a major cause of conflict/violence in the country, as evidenced by the proliferation of ethnic militias such as the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, and the numerous groups in the Niger Delta such as the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), who are united by the common objectives of self-determination and freedom from repression, marginalisation and ethnicity-based political domination (Agbu, 2004; Osaghae, Ikelegbe & Okhomina, 2007).

The discussion here indicates that the most critical cultural barrier to peace in Nigeria is culture-based identity politics and interactions that have hindered national integration by making the various nationality groups to hold on rigidly to their cultural identities and boundaries. The evidences include the following: 1) The north-south divide; 2) the middle belt-north divide; 3) federal character and quota; 4) low mobility of labour along cultural lines; 5) low ethnic mix of staff (both academic and non-teaching) and students in tertiary institutions (Universities, Polytechnics, Monotechnics, and Colleges of Education) located in different states/ethnic homelands; 6) the “alien status” of Youth Corps members in their host states/communities during the compulsory one year National Youth Service Scheme (NYSC); and 7) the “alien status” of Nigerians who live outside their ethnic homelands, even when they were born and raised in their places of residence.

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7 This occurs at all levels of government (Federal, State and Local) in Nigeria. Even when a state appears to be homogenous, dialectical differences in the language spoken or differences in clan, etc., becomes the basis for identification and creation of boundaries that reflect in uneven resource distribution and discriminatory policies or programmes.

8 For example, a University located in the south-east (Ethnic homeland of the Ibo) has staff and students dominated by people of Ibo Origin. The same occurs in Universities located in South-west (Yoruba land), northern Nigeria, and the South-south. What is significant here is that this happens not only in Universities owned by State Governments, but also those established by the federal Government.
Overcoming Cultural Barriers to Peace: Exploring Policy Options

The paper argues here that overcoming cultural barriers to peace in Nigeria requires putting in place policies and programmes that will ensure national integration, that is, national cohesion or homogenous political community (Mohammad, 2007; Ojo 2009). National integration addresses the problems of inter-ethnic diversity or plurality of cultures, and is predicated on a number of conditions; including abandoning or shifting primordial ethnic loyalties to focus on a national image, the “identification of citizens with nation that supersedes identification with ethnic, cultural or religious group”, and raising the political awareness of citizens (Alapiki, 1998; Amienyi, 2005). Given the problems of political instability and poor development associated with inter-group disharmony, plural societies have always engaged in efforts to advance cohesion.

First is what is termed the “cultural assimilation” or “cultural syncretisation” which seeks to create a central culture by assimilating sub-national cultures. The second, the development of “multiple identities” or “unity-in-diversity” targets a dual goal of cultivating a feeling of political unity among diverse ethnic groups, while at the same time retaining the social structures and cultural norms that make the groups disparate. One major instrument of this strategy is “the principle of ethnic balancing; that is, the policy of reflecting the federal character” (Amienyi, 2005). The second approach is the strategy in Nigeria. The use of federal character, quota system, and zoning of political offices, meant to prevent the dominance of one group over another, has not only failed to achieve this goal, but created more suspicion that has aggravated ethnic differences. It has deepened the divisions between the ethnic groups in northern and southern Nigeria, and different nationality groups in particular States of the country (the Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ijaw in Delta State, for example). The issue of “indigene” or “non-indigene” and the use of a Local Government Identification Letter as a criteria for access to privileges and rights has further reinforced primordial ethnic loyalties.

Many of the negativities associated with the implementation of the “multiple identities” strategy in Nigeria appear to be related to the use of policies of ethnic balancing rather than ethnic understanding and acceptance. Enegwea and Umoden (1993) have drawn attention to the fact that, beyond ethnic balancing, the use of policies which de-emphasise the differences or points of dispute among ethnic groups are options under the “multiple identities” strategy. They note the use of compulsory and incentive driven voluntary policies that will either encourage people/institutions to abandon inappropriate behaviours that undermine inter-ethnic harmony or engage in harmonious inter-ethnic relations, as vehicles for fostering inter-ethnic understanding and harmony. Following Enegwea and Umoden (1993), an argument can be made for the use of compulsory and voluntary

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9 National cohesion is measured with factors/issues such as “mutual perception between immigrant group and the majority group; the degree to which minorities are not discriminated; the degree to which members of immigrant and indigenous communities are prepared to repose trust in one another in social agencies (including governmental institutions); the degree to which different ethnic –cultural groups feel safe in one another’s neighbourhood; and the degree to which ethnically diverse groups actively care for another’s well-being (RKNCIP, 2011).

10 An identification letter obtained from the local government council to establish where an individual hails from.

11 The Nigerian government tried this approach with establishment of Unity Schools (Federal Government Colleges) and the National Youth Service Corps Scheme; designed to enhance the living together of persons from different ethnic groups with view to promote understanding and eliminate ethnic prejudices. But such policies do not stand alone to achieve integration, and the apparent failure to recognise this has made them to achieve insignificant results.
policies to achieve integration and overcome cultural to peace. Noting the role of inequality and struggle for the preconditions for existence/ resources in inter-ethnic conflict and the Nigerian reality, the following section locates the analysis in social integration, an aspect of national integration that emphasises equality of opportunities for all socio-cultural/ethnic groups in a country.

Social Integration

Narrowing the gap in regional and socio-cultural inequalities is the central theme here. The paper posits that the use of voluntary policies and compelling legislations can ensure social integration, and thus help the country to overcome some of the cultural barriers to peace. Following the prescriptions of Cruz-Saco (2008) on social integration, it provides policy options that can be applied to achieve this objective. The analysis proceeds with a tabular presentation of social integration goals, objectives and broad policy options that can be adopted in Nigeria.

Table 2: Objectives of Social Integration and Policy Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Specific Objectives</th>
<th>Policy Issues/Options*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Create secure and productive employment.</td>
<td>(a) Use legislation to ensure that the reward and burdens of citizenship are shared on the basis of equity. This requires review of the criteria for revenue allocation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduce poverty.</td>
<td>(b) Encourage pro-poor public expenditure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Review public finances.</td>
<td>(c) Develop economic infrastructure and encourage mobility of labour across cultural boundaries</td>
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<td>Ensure sustainable social protection systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Acknowledge difference</td>
<td>Use voluntary and compulsory policies to encourage cultural mix in schools, communication, conflict resolution and building of national identity.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Welcome diverse experiences.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Affirm diverse identities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improve communication systems.</td>
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<td>Build communities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop inter-group conflict management.</td>
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<td>Review educational programs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Renew leadership.</td>
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<td>Secure access to high quality services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Create spaces for voice.</td>
<td>Use legislation to encourage cultural mix in political institutions and reduce culture based identity politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote dialogues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instil sense of ownership.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in decision making.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercise democratic rights.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Recognize diverse cultural and traditional values.</td>
<td>(a) Use legislation to recognise all languages as against the present three.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect and celebrate difference.</td>
<td>(b) Encourage inter-cultural marriages by granting dual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the policy options noted in Table 2, the adoption of a combination of voluntary and compulsory policies and legislations would seem to enhance cohesion and help reduce cultural barriers. The voluntary policies are expected to be driven by incentives while sanctions will be the basis of compulsory policies. Suggestions on the nature and components of each category of policy are provided below.

(a) Voluntary Policies

The focus here is on the use of incentives to encourage cultural mixing in educational institutions, immigrant-indigene relationships, and the mobility of labour across cultural boundaries. These would include:

1) Grants to universities that encourage inter-ethnic or socio-cultural diversity among staff (academic and non-academic) and students. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) which provides grants to tertiary institutions can be used as the vehicle of implementation. TETFund can include a level of cultural mix of staff and students as criteria for accessing some funds. This would mean that the agency will set aside a percentage of funds that accrue to it for this purpose.

2) The Federal and State governments can encourage cohesion by providing accommodation/housing grants and scholarships to children of individuals who choose to work outside the boundaries of their ethnic homeland.

3) Individuals who choose to school outside their ethnic homelands should be encouraged with scholarships, grants, or loans.

4) Spouses of inter-ethnic marriages, in particular, those from different States of the country can be given full rights in both States. In order words, the wife will be seen as an indigene of the husband’s home State and vice versa. Wives who learn the language of their husband and vice versa should be celebrated with awards by the relevant State government. An annual “speak your spouse’s language” competition can be introduced by Federal/State ministries of culture or other agencies of government such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) to achieve this goal.

(b) Compulsory Legislative Provisions

Compulsory legislative provisions will seek to end practices that encourage exclusive cultural identity, and promote those that will foster national identity. These would include:

1) Prohibition of discriminatory school fees in public schools owned by State governments.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) TETFund is an agency of the Nigerian government which collects education tax fund from companies, etc doing business in Nigeria, and administered such funds through interventions in tertiary institutions owned by both the Federal and State Governments

\(^{13}\) In several States in Nigeria, non-indigenes either pay higher school fees that are more than the indigenes, or pay school fees when the indigenes do not pay at all.
2) compelling governments at all levels to set aside a specific percentage of public funds for pro-poor policies. The point here is that reduction in poverty and adequate provision of basic social amenities and employment will reduce inter-group competition or contest for scarce resources, and by extension inter-group rivalry and perceptions of domination, exclusion, and marginalisation that are rallying points of ethnic mobilisation.

3) Universities in the country can be compelled by law to attain a level of ethnic diversity in policies regulating staffing and admission of students. The National Universities Commission (NUC), the regulatory body of Universities in the country can be used to achieve this. The NUC can introduce ethnic mix of staff and students as criteria for institutional accreditation. This will require three things. First, the enforcement of provisions of the law on principles of federal character which seeks to ensure equity in appointments into state institutions. Second, revision of sections of the laws and regulations on principles of federal character which reserves lower levels of employments (from salary grade level one – six) in federal institutions to indigenes of the area/state within its area of authority. This is important as experienced as shown that it is those citizens who occupy the fringes of society or who have poor socio-economic status that are usually mobilised by the political elites; thus, encouraging this category to work and live together can reduce ethnic prejudices that can make ethnic mobilisation difficult. And third, revision of laws on admissions based on quota.

4) Prohibition of Local Government Identification Letters as a requirement for documentation in public and private institutions.

5) Prohibition of hate preaching against religions and cultures.

6) Legislations to support ethnic/cultural mix in political representation at all levels of government. This can take either of the following forms: reserving quotas of elective and appointive political offices in States and Local Governments for individuals who have resided there long enough to contest elections; and/or compelling political parties to reserve a percentage of their nomination of candidates (flag bearers) into the legislative arms of States and Local Government councils for non-indigenes who are qualified to contest elections.

Problems and Prospects: Concluding Remarks

It is not in doubt that overcoming the cultural barriers will be faced with enormous challenges, prominent among which are the existing structures of local politics and state federalism. The state in Nigeria has been widely seen as a means of promoting private and parochial interests by the custodians of political power (Ekekwe, 1986, Aaron, 2006; Ake, 2001, a & b). A significant outcome

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14 The federal character principle was principally meant to prevent the dominance of ethnic group or persons from one particular State in governmental institutions and agencies. Thus appointments and employment into State agencies (at the federal, state and local council) are expected to reflect the diversity of the people.

15 This may appear contradictory given the earlier point made by the paper that the operation of the federal character principle has also helped to deepen socio-cultural differences. However part of the problem is abuse of the principle to the disadvantage of minority groups, and the reluctance of some ethnic groups to fill their quota in federal institutions due factors related to religion, family ties, better remuneration in home states, among others. But the implementation of the principle in relation to appointments can help to encourage staff mix as Universities will be forced to employ people from ethnic groups outside their catchment location.

16 This requirement has strengthened ethnic consciousness and identity as even persons who are born, raised and lived in a State/local government (no matter the number of years) that is not indigenous to them are required to travel to their local government/state of origin to obtain such identification letters.
of this has been the mobilisation of ethnic power for electoral contest and struggle for access into state/national resources; leading to ethnicity based political domination, feelings of neglect and marginalisation, perceptions of ethnic hate and ethnic animosity. Overcoming cultural barriers to peace therefore requires ending the use of political power for the pursuit of private interests. Here lies the challenge. Will the political elites who benefit from the present situation agree to end it? Probably not. But neither does it appear to be an intractable situation.

There are two likely approaches or conditions that can ensure transformation of the culture of politics from private interest to common interests driven politics. First is the emergence of a new generation of political class that is willing to commit “symbolic suicide” by subordinating their personal interest to the public good (Wilmot, 1980). Second, is the mobilisation of the citizens by civil society organisations to demand for good governance. To this end, the establishment of the link between poverty/deprivation and corruption and the riches/conspicuous consumption by public office holders can be used as instrument of mobilisation. There is adequate data to demonstrate that the wielding of political power by the political elites of ethnic groups benefit the custodians of power and not the common citizens. For example, northern Nigeria represents one of the extreme conditions of poverty, in spite of the fact that elites from that area have governed the country for the better part of its history. Also in the Niger Delta, evidence of political power benefiting the political elites is ubiquitous, as huge oil revenues have barely touched the lives of those living in poverty. Whereas poverty and deprivation have been on the increase, political office holders have engaged in the unrestrained accumulation of wealth; building magnificent residential buildings and hotels, and driving luxury cars. Mobilisation of citizens along this line can whip up cross-cultural solidarity, reduce ethnic boundaries and primordial loyalties and help build national consciousness and identity.

The second most prominent challenge is the country’s federal structure, characterised by the centralisation of governmental powers and national resources in the central (federal) government. In addition to controlling all mineral resources and huge proportion of tax revenue, the constitution also vests 68 powers in the exclusive legislative list in the federal government, which also shares 33 functions on the concurrent list with the state governments. This makes the federal government attractive as the state in Nigeria plays a dominant role in resource distribution and allocation. Against the backdrop that the custodians of state power use it to pursue private and sectional interests, the quest to control the central government has resulted in inter-group struggle predicated on the mobilisation of ethnic power. In this regard, the restructuring of the Nigerian federal system is imperative. This issue has attracted national attention, and a number of restructuring approaches have been suggested. However, the interest here is the centrality of ethnicity to the preferred restructuring methods (Naanen, 1995) and the objectives of restructuring.

Three objectives of political restructuring in the federal system have been identified by Amuwo and Herault (1998) to include: 1) defining or giving focus to issues in collective identity and distributive politics; 2) laying an institutional foundation for equitable political participation by diverse ethnic or cultural groups; and 3) the promotion of tolerance and respect for the civic and civil rights of aggrieved or marginalised ethnic nationalities; either majority or minority groups (p.6).

It is clear that the suggested approaches to restructuring include using cluster of ethnic groups as federating units; the use of the six geo-political zones (North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South) made of cluster of states as federating units; transfer of resource ownership and control (minerals and mineral oil) from the federal government to the federating states; devolution of powers from the federal government to the states and local government councils and reduction of federal government share of national revenue and transfer of same to the states and local government councils.
Clearly, either objective of political restructuring noted above addresses the ethnic concerns that define the approaches to restructuring that have been called for. Achieving these objectives are thus critical to reducing cultural barriers to peace, as they most likely will whittle down fears and perceptions of domination of minority ethnic groups by the majority groups and also reduce inter-ethnic competition for national resources and political space that is closely linked to ethno-political conflicts in the country.

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The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) failed to recognize the separate identity and special rights of indigenous peoples in the constitution of 1972, creating unrest and grievance that eventually turned into a prolonged insurgency lasting from 1976 to 1997, with the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord. Although the Accord has been successful in stopping armed conflict, it has failed to reduce communal riots, structural violence, human rights violations, mistrust, misunderstanding and tensions between local indigenous peoples and Bengali settlers. This paper is an attempt to study the causes of continued tensions in the post-Accord period as well as the uncertain future of the process of implementing peace through a systematic analysis of the society, ranging from civil society and bureaucracy to military and political parties, to identify and understand the major challenges for implementing peace.

* Mr. Islam (Assistant Professor) and Mr. Chakma (Lecturer) are both in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka.
The effectiveness of a peace accord is variable, with some conflicting parties turning again to violent confrontation and others seeking lasting peace. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), the success of a peace agreement depends on the commitment of the signing parties, being durable as long as the signatory parties maintain its provisions. In his article titled “The Challenge of Peace Building in the 21st Century”, John Paul Lederach observes that in many of the peace agreements have been concluded in the last fifteen years, direct violence stops but the structural violence remains, and the fundamental issues that led to the rise of hostilities are often not addressed well. Thus, he opposes the mainstream language of governments and military according to which a “peace accord” is considered an end-game scenario. For Lederach, peace accords open a door into a whole new labyrinth of possibilities for the parties to continue in the process of redefining relationships, with a wide variety of practical outcomes. The argument of J. Grussendorf and L. R. Kurtz is also notable here, that a peace agreement is an understanding among the conflicting parties that military conflict no longer satisfies their goals and that alternative means to violence must be established. The implication here is that peace agreements do not only terminate armed conflict, but initiate broader peace processes that often include the reconstruction of the economy and civil society as well as the construction of confidence-building measures and peaceful relations with adversaries. In the language of Christine Bell (2006), reaching a peace agreement is not an end rather a beginning for implementing peace.

This paper assesses the obstacles to peace agreements in the resolution of intra-state conflict, taking the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as a case study. At the very outset, it should be noted that Bangladesh, since its emergence as an independent political entity, has been experiencing a prolonged ethnic conflict in its south-eastern part called the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), an area which is home to 14 different ethnic groups with distinct cultural and social systems. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) denied the separate identity and special rights of these groups in the constitution of 1972, leading to widespread unrest and grievance in the area that culminated in the armed conflict that lasted from 1976 to 1997, when the CHT Accord was signed (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 2000: 7-9). While the Accord has been successful in ending the insurgency, it has failed to reduce structural violence, tension between local indigenous peoples and Bengali settlers, and mistrust amidst the government and indigenous peoples. The researcher came to know from his study that local people are not, at present, confident and hopeful regarding the establishment and sustainability of peace at the social level as thought to be produced by the Accord. A deep level of frustration is found in the society that, according to the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanhati Samiti (political organization of indigenous peoples), is a response to the systemic violation of the Accord by the government. However, a broader study of the issue reveals that the challenges of the post-Accord period are manifold, with different obstacles or conflict resolution located in various levels of society ranging from civil society and bureaucracy to military and political parties.

Literature Review

Solutions for a conflict are basically of five types: (i) victory of one party at the expense of the defeat of the other, (ii) destruction of one party, (iii) avoiding or withdrawing of one party from the conflict, (iv) settlement or accommodation and (v) resolution (Mitchell, 1981: 253). In the personal view of researcher, the “resolution” of conflict can take various forms, including the other solutions in Mitchell’s typology, such as when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) was thoroughly defeated and destroyed by the Sri Lankan Army in 2009. It can be assumed, however, that “resolution” refers in this context to non-military aspects of conflict resolution involving dialogue, mediation, and negotiation between conflicting parties to resolve perceived incompatibilities or grievances and whereby both parties achieve mutual gains.
Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1997) have further classified the resolution of conflict into three types: peace agreements, victory, and other outcomes (for instance, cease-fire). They have conducted a survey of conflict termination in the period between 1989 and 1996 and found that 19 conflicts were resolved through peace agreements, 23 conflicts by victory of one side, and 24 by other outcomes (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1997: 342). Since 1990, peace accords have proliferated in response to internal conflicts and, interestingly, more than fifty percent of the world’s conflicts have been resolved though peace accords in the post-cold war period also called “the decades of peace agreements” (Bell, 2006: 1-7).

The study of these peace agreements by scholars and academicians, primarily from the disciplines of political science and peace and conflict studies, has produced a huge literature in which they have defined the concept of peace agreement in different ways. According to Peace Accords Matrix (PAM):

a peace accord or agreement is a written document produced by the process of negotiation involving two dimensions: (1) the major parties to the conflict are involved in the negotiation process and (2) substantive issues underlying the conflict are addressed.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines a peace agreement as:

a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.

The existing literature indicates that a good number of conflicts, notably the conflicts of Northern Ireland, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Mozambique, and the Zapatista rebellion (Mexico) have been resolved through the signing of peace accords. According to Kroc Institute, hundreds of peace agreements including 35 comprehensive peace accords have been signed all over the world only in the post-cold war period.¹ Table 1 provides a long list of peace accords signed around the world since 1989.

Table 1: Peace Accords (1989-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflict Starting Date</th>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Date of Peace Accord</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Intra-state</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹See http://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nature of Conflict</th>
<th>Year of Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Intra-state Conflict</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territorial)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Bosnia – Herzegovina</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Intra-state (Government)</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Intra-state (Territory)</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) Developed by Kroc Institute (See: http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/matrix/).

Scholars have also pointed out the limitations of peace agreements in the resolution of conflict and implementing peace. Fen Osler Hampson, Ho-Won Jeong, Christine E. Bell, and Stephen John Stedddman can be noted here. As stated by Fen Osler Hampson (1997), peace agreements have not led to lasting peace, as demonstrated by the breach of Versailles Peace Treaties that followed World War I and a series of peace agreements signed in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Angola, the West Bank of Israel and Gaza, Somalia, and Cambodia. He outlines several reasons for the ineffectiveness of the
peace accord: (i) Peace agreements can not anticipate the new dimensions, new actors and new context of the post-accord period. As a result, they lose credibility and support of the concerning populations. (ii) Without proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, peace accords can be violated and ultimately cannot prevent the continuation of violence and bloodshed. He also cites the findings of Stephen Stedman (1989) according to which 11 out of 65 civil wars fought in the period of 1900-1989 were resolved through negotiated settlements. According to Stedman (2001: 11-12), the likelihood of failure of the accords is related to: (a) the presence of factions or leaders who oppose the peace agreement, and (b) neighboring states that oppose may undermine the agreement through assisting the factions. He also discusses factors such as: (i) the proliferation of warring parties, which may make it difficult to address the concerns and interests of all of the parties, as in cases of Somalia and Liberia, (ii) the lack of state capacity for implementing peace, (iii) the availability and easy accessibility of natural resources, which may provide parties with a means for the continuation of war, (iv) the issue of national sovereignty (a non-negotiable goal), and (v) the lack of international recognition or support for the agreement. Table 2 is concerned with cases of peace implementation.

Table 2: Peace Implementation Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Principal Implementer</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1987-89</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990-98</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1991-94</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1992-94</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>1994-99</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1995-</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As argued by Ho-Won Jeong (2006), peace processes vary according to the intensity, gravity, and nature of the conflict. This is true for the CHT peace building, which is different from others in some respects. From the survey results and personal observations, the researcher came to know that the CHT Accord has gained credibility and support from both Bengali community and indigenous peoples. But ironically, there is lack of coordination among the members of implementation committee. International development assistance is going on through the works of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) including many national NGOs. The development assistance has also created its own political dynamics and is now under controversy. For instance, the employment in these organizations, in some cases, is done through lobbying and recommendations instead of directly recruiting talented and energetic candidates. The big portion of budget of UNDP and other development partners goes to the sector of maintenance and salary of staff. Only a small portion of
the budget is invested in development programs. Therefore, local peoples say that UNDP, including the development organizations, are helping a particular class of the society to raise their living standards, but not the majority. For some, implanting peace in the CHT is just a slogan, not a matter of political commitment to justice and equity based development. From the study, the researcher observes that the peace building process has been ultimately frustrated by multi-dimensional factors ranging from unequal development, strong military opposition, and a lack of political commitments.

Method of Data Collection

This research is based on random sampling techniques, covering peoples of different religion, ethnicity, professions, educational and economic status from three hill districts of CHT. Because of time constraints and financial hardship, the researcher gathered reliable data from 30 survey respondents. These survey results were enriched by the author’s own experience of the area. From the very beginning of his life, he has experienced and witnessed the conflict, including forced displacement, killings, and persecution. Thus the researcher makes use of the observation method as a tool of data collection here, alongside the survey results. Moreover, he has talked much with the ordinary peoples and ex-combatants about the conflict, the peace accord, and the future of the CHT. These informal discussions were very friendly and full of sincerity. The respondents were very amicable and talked without any type of hesitation. To further enrich the study, the researcher has also made use of existing literature. Data from secondary sources (reports, journals and newspapers) have been used.

The Peace Accord

The CHT Accord was signed between the government of Bangladesh and PCJSS on the behalf of indigenous peoples with an eye to resolve the prolong conflict with win-win solution. The Accord is divided into four parts. The part I of the Accord is concerned with the general provisions. The most important clause of this part is the establishment of implementation committee which will be composed of three members: a member nominated by the Prime Minister, Chairman of the Task Force and President of the PCJSS.\(^2\) The part II of the Accord deals with Hill District Council. The definition of ‘non-tribal permanent resident’ has been addressed in this part.\(^3\) Article-4(d) of the Part-B furthers that whether a person is a non-tribal shall be determined, along with the identity of non-tribal to which he belongs, by the concerned Circle Chief on the provision of submission of certificate from concerned Headman/Pourasabha Chairman/Union Parishad Chairman and no person can be a candidate for the office of the non-tribal member without a certificate from the concerned Circle Chief in this behalf. This is an important clause in this sense that non-tribal peoples who are called ‘Bengali settlers’ living in the CHT have come in the region after 1975, will be rehabilitated from the CHT. Therefore, it will create tension if it is not determined as to who would

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\(^2\) In the Article A (3) it has been stated that with an aim to observe the implementation process of this agreement an Implementation Committee shall be formed with the persons stated below

a. A member to be nominated by the Prime Minister - Convenor
b. Chairman of the Task Force formed under this agreement - Member
c. President of the Parbatty Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti – Member.

\(^3\) Article-B(3) states that who is not a tribal and possesses land legally in the Hill District and generally lives at a certain address in the Hill District he shall be meant ‘non-tribal permanent resident’.
be an outsider according to the provisions of the Accord. The part III of Accord is concerned with the formation, functions and power of CHT regional Council which is the supreme administrative and political unit of the region.\(^4\) The part IV focuses on the rehabilitation of displaced peoples, general amnesty for combatants and other matters. The Article 4 and 5 of this part are the most important clause not only of this part but for the whole Accord.\(^5\) These articles are solely devoted to settlement of land disputes. Existing literature and personal observation of the researcher confirms that land dispute is the centre of the conflict. For this reason, land disputes must be resolved for facilitating the peace building process in the CHT. In brief, the main features of the CHT accord are – regional autonomy for CHT with the formation of the elected Regional Council, the supreme administrative and political unit of region, withdrawal of non-permanent military camps, removal of the Bengali settlers from the CHT, general amnesty for ex-combatants, and repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission Report, 2000:8).

Results

The majority (90%) of the respondents of this research has basic ideas on these previous issues related to the 1997 Accord with 63.33% have read the Accord. 73.33% of respondents give their opinion that the Accord is successful to stop armed conflict while 63.33% argues that the Accord has failed to address the issues of structural violence. 73.33% accuses the government for the lack of commitment for implementing peace while 23.33% does not think so (see the Table.3).

\(^4\) Article-9 (a) states that the Council shall supervise and co-ordinate the subjects vested under the Hill District Councils including co-ordination of all development activities conducted under the three Hill District Councils. Besides these, if there is found any lack of co-ordination and inconsistency among the three Hill District Councils in discharging their responsibilities the decision of the Regional Council shall be taken as final.

\(^5\) The Article-4 of the part-D states that a Commission (Land Commission) headed by a retired justice shall be formed for settling land disputes. This commission, in addition to settle disputes of lands of the rehabilitated tribal refugees, shall have fullest power for cancellation of ownership of those lands and hills which have been so far illegally settled and occupied. No appeal can be made against the judgement of this commission and decision of this commission shall be final. This (arrangement) shall be applicable in case of fringe land also. The Article-5 is concerned with the formation of the Commission. This commission shall be set up with the following members:

a. Retired justice  
b. Circle Chief (concerned)  
c. Chairman of the Regional Council/representative  
d. Divisional Commissioner/Additional Commissioner  
e. Hill District Council Chairman (concerned).

The Article-6 deals with tenure and rules of business of the Commission.

a. The term of the commission shall be three years. But the term of it can be extended in consultation with the Regional Council.  
b. Commission shall settle disputes according to the existing rules, customs and usages of Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Table 3: Peoples’ Consciousness and Concerns about the CHT Accord

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>No Comment (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you know the Accord was signed in 1997?</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you read the Accord?</td>
<td>63.33</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it successful to stop armed conflict?</td>
<td>73.33</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was it effective enough to reduce structural violence and tensions?</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>63.33</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the Government insincere in the case of implementation?</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>73.33</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shortly after the signing of the Accord, the PCJSS, one of the signing parties, expresses its frustration and deep level of disappointment because of the delay of the implantation of the Accord. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (2000: 8) reports that:

Today, after almost three years, few of the decisions and measures agreed in the Peace Accord have been implemented, mostly due to delaying tactics by the government. On top of this, divisions among the Jumma people themselves have also led to several killings and kidnappings. Reconciliation between the two rival groups is urgently needed. Although there is now an official peace accord, the situation in the CHT is still far from peaceful.

It is also notable that ethnic leaders at a regional dialogue on Sunday urged declaring roadmap for full implementation of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) peace accord. After coming to power, the present Awami League-led grand alliance government did nothing for full execution of the peace treaty although the same party government signed the deal in 1997, they said (Daily Star, 2012, April 3). This study has also covered the people’s opinion about the present status of the Accord. 53.34 % of respondents of this study say that the Accord has been implemented partially while 10% and 23.33 % claim ‘fully implemented’ and ‘non-implemented’ respectively (see the Table.4s).

As stated previously, signing of a peace accord does not mean that sustainable peace has been achieved. Peace accords, therefore, can be said a turning point from where a new beginning may start. It creates opportunities for belligerent parties to transform their hostile relations to friendly and amicable relation. A friendly relationship is built upon good understanding, mutual cooperation, trust and confidence. This constructive relationship facilitates the process of social transformation. The variable of social transformation depends on the politics, environment, financial capacity, behavior and roles of the signing parties. Social transformation does not take place shortly after the Accord rather it takes a long time. At any point of post-conflict period, peace process can also be obstructed. Confrontation and volatile situation may re-emerge if any of the party withdraws from its commitment, if the underlying issues of conflict are not addressed.
Table 4: Peoples’ Opinions about the Status of the Accord

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fully Implemented</th>
<th>Non-Implemented</th>
<th>Partially Implemented</th>
<th>No Comment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>23.33%</td>
<td>53.34%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 (above) helps us to understand peoples’ perception regarding the effectiveness of peace accord. 76.67% of the respondents accuse the insincerity of the government for ineffectiveness of conflict resolution. A leader of PCJSS during informal talk has told the researcher that “political regime is also a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the Accord as Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), one of the largest political parties of the country, including many Islamic parties have opposed the treaty and demanded the cancellation when the Accord was being signed. It was observed that some secondary clauses of the Accord have been implemented during Awami League (AL) regime (1997-2001). But the treaty became deadlock during the BNP led four party alliance government (2001-2006). During the caretaker government (2007-2008) the implementation status of the treaty was the same. Presently, the AL led grand alliance is in the power but the implementation is very slow.” The survey also reveals the slow pace of implementation of the treaty as stated by 80.00% respondents. According to them, land disputes, the most contentious issue of the conflict, is out of concentration of the government. In the question of security and safety, the basic pillar for social reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, 83.33% report that there is the absence of security and safety in the post-Accord period (See Table 5).

Table 5: Peoples’ View regarding Post-Accord Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>No Comment (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government is responsible for ineffectiveness of the Accord</td>
<td>76.67%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The issues related to maintenance of peace, for instance, rehabilitation of refuges and IDPs, settlement of land disputes have been addressed</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>80.00%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and safety</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any peace process entails activities ranging from stopping violence, demilitarization, and security sector reform, dispute resolution on property ownership, rehabilitation of refugees and other displaced groups to promotion of human rights, dignity and social justice and acceleration economic and social progress. A peace process cannot produce durable and lasting peace until and unless these issues or needs are not met. Ironically, these issues have not been addressed in the
CHT. As a result, peace is still a far cry for the CHT. The following report titled “An Urgent Appeal to Help Develop the CHT Situation and Implement the CHT Accord” made by Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) indicates the same thing:

Now the CHT is passing through a serious crisis, as the situation has deteriorated significantly because of government’s complete negative policy towards the CHT Accord of 1997 and the indigenous peoples of the CHT region, further land occupation by the Bengali settlers and intensification of the ‘Operation Uttoron’, the Military rule against the indigenous people and the PCJSS.

The survey denotes the same thing as the report: 80.00 % of the total respondents of the survey claim that human rights are being violated whereas 86.67 % report the militarization of the CHT is still going on. According to 66.67 %, the Accord is systematically violated with increase in sporadic violence resulting from land disputes as stated by 83.34 % (See Table 6).

Table 6: Basic Tenets of the Post-Accord Period according to Peoples’ Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>No Comment (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross human rights violation</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization</td>
<td>86.67</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic violation of the Accord</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land dispute and sporadic violence</td>
<td>83.34</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The challenges of the post-Accord period are manifold, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. Different obstacles or problems are coming from multi-level of the society ranging from civil society and Bureaucracy to military and political parties. 80.00 % of the respondents view opposition of political parties as the major obstacle for implementing peace while 90.00 % count strong military opposition, 40.00% contradiction with the constitution, 90.00 % land dispute, 63.33 % Bengali settlers’ resistance and 60.00 % inter-group hostility (see table 7).

Table 7: Obstacles to the Accord

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacles</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>No Comment (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition of Political Parties</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Military Opposition</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the CHT Commission’s report (2000: 17), the future of the conflict resolution is uncertain; conflict and widespread violence may re-emerge at any time:

Although there is now an official peace accord, the situation in the CHT is still far from peaceful. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission is gravely concerned about the present situation and considers the peace process itself to be in serious danger.

The statement of Santu Larma, Chairman of the CHT Regional Council and President of the PCJSS is another warning to the government about what might happen in future:

the situation in Chittagong Hill Tracts might go beyond control within the next five to six months if the government did not show “visible” progress in implementing the CHT peace accord (Daily Star, May 29, 2012).

The CHT Commission report and the straight-cut statement of Shantu Larma and the results of survey can help us to predict the future of conflict resolution and the CHT. If the government delays the process of implementing peace accord, there is a chance of reemergence of past history, the situation may go back to the stage of confrontation and crisis as stated by 70.00 % of the respondents. 56.67 % believes that armed conflict would be reinforced by political instability, inter-group polarization (63.34 %) and widespread violence (86.67 %) (See table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>No Comment (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Armed Conflict</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>56.67</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Group Polarization</td>
<td>63.34</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widespread Violence</td>
<td>86.67</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Peoples’ Opinion about the Future of the CHT
Discussion

The Accord has been successful to stop insurgency but ultimately has failed to reduce structural violence, gross human rights violation, land grabbing, sexual harassment, communal riots, inter-group hostility (Bengali settlers vs. indigenous peoples) and mistrust amidst the government and indigenous peoples. Based on the results provided above in a set of tables, the researcher has assessed the role of peace accord in the resolution of intrastate conflict. The researcher has examined the claim that different obstacles or challenges from multilevel of the society ranging from civil society and bureaucracy to military and political parties are the major hindrance for conflict resolution.

The CHT Accord has certainly created both opportunities and challenges for social transformation. In personal opinion of the researcher, challenges can be addressed by how the opportunities are utilized. The major opportunities of the Accord for social transformation include the scope of negotiation, cooperation and confidence building which are considered as the building blocks of peace building, in narrow sense, reconciliation and conflict transformation. The Accord can be considered as a turning point from where the government and leadership of indigenous peoples can start a new beginning. Before the Accord, there was no scope for reducing gap and distance amidst the parties but the Accord has created the chance of sitting, meeting and discussing the incompatibilities and adopting joint measures, adapting the treaty keeping consistency with the demand and time at the same moment. If the opportunities cannot come into practice from words and written document, post-Accord challenges or problems may increase day by day and the situation becomes more complex and volatile as the consequences of increase in mistrust, suspicion and misunderstanding amidst parties.

The results of the survey are very disappointing because the opportunities for social transformation, stable and durable peace are not being utilized. The underlying issues of conflict have yet been addressed rather different types of critical issues have emerged in the post-Accord period. In brief, the challenges of the post-Accord period are manifold, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. Different obstacles or problems are coming from multi-level of the society ranging from civil society and Bureaucracy to military and political parties. The following paragraphs deals with this issue.

The major challenge for implementing peace in the CHT is coming from the concept of traditional security which is also called military-centric security. The majority respondents (86.67 %) of this study report that militarization is still in force in the post-Accord period (see table 6). According to perceptions of 90 % respondents, strong military opposition is one of the largest challenge for implementing peace (see table 5). The military manipulates the government decision by the logic of perseveration and protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty with the presence of military. The national security would be under threat at any time if the military camps are withdrawn. The most reliable secondary sources of data also reveal the fact. Table 9 is concerned with the increased militarization.
Table 9: Militarization in the Post-Accord Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deployment of army at Bilaichari camp withdrawing APBN (17 October 2003); similarly APBN of Sakrachari and Gachkabachara camps were replaced with army camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9,560 acres of land acquired for extension of Ruma cantonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>183 acres of land acquired for extension of Bandarban brigade headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30,000 acres of land acquired for establishment of artillery training centre in Bandarban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>26,000 acres of land acquired for establishment of air force training centre in Bandarban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>50 acres of land acquired for extension of Longadu army zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>143 acres of land acquired for extension of Panchari army zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Army camp re-established at Gokulmoni Karbari Para under Matiranga upazila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>New army camp established on the land of Priti Bikash Talukdar and Sadan Bikash Chakma at Ghilachari Mukh Talukdar Para of Ghagra in Kaukhali (16 June 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Army camp re-established at ward no. 9 of Batnatali union under Manikchari upazila (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Army camp re-established at Banyachhola of ward no. 9 under Laxmichari upazila (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Army camp re-established at Khiram area under Kaukhali upazila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>New army camp established at Betchari of Tarasa union under Rowangchari upazila (January 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>New army camp established at Bangalhalia bazar under Rajasthali upazila (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>New army camp established at Dantkupya area under Khagrachari sadar upazila (2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Military opposition has been viewed a major obstacle for several reasons as argued by some people in informal discussion at the tea stall. Firstly, indigenous peoples do not feel secure and safety in the presence of military personnel as the military abuse power and a symbol of persecution to them. Secondly, militarization is intimately integrated with gross human rights violation. In the previous studies especially in the CHT Commission’s report, the human rights violations by the military personnel and Bengali settlers have been highlighted. The international Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission is still receiving reports of human rights violations and communal riots. The CHT is still fully militarized and Bengali settlers have reportedly been instigated by the
security forces to attack indigenous people several times. Table 10 indicates the human rights violation in the post-Accord period.

Table 10: Human Rights Violations (1998-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of atrocity</th>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Bengali Settlers</th>
<th>SF+BS</th>
<th>UPDF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of person killed</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person tortured</td>
<td></td>
<td>709</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person arrested</td>
<td></td>
<td>348</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person harassed</td>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person against whom case lodged</td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of house set fire</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of house looted &amp; destructed</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of house searched</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of woman raped</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of woman sexually harassed</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person kidnapped</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>307</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of person whose land grabbed</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>4755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second challenge stems from the political culture of Bangladesh. AL has concluded this agreement and BNP has opposed and rejected it as BNP does not support what AL does. For this reason, the Accord is implemented although very slowly when AL comes to the power. But the Accord becomes deadlock during BNP regime. Furthermore, the national politics is divided into two poles – pro-Accord and Anti-Accord political alliance (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, 2000: 8). Therefore, the personal observation of the researcher is that lack of political commitment of ruling elites is mostly responsible for ineffectiveness of conflict resolution.

Civil society and Bureaucracy are not also out of the politics of division and polarization centering the Accord. Many academicians and researchers of the country’s leading universities criticize the Accord and call the Accord as a conspiracy against the national interest. They present numerous logics. For instance, the Accord has created a country within a country. The government of Bangladesh cannot take any decision regarding the CHT without discussion and consultation with the CHT Regional Council.

The fourth challenge takes root from the inter-ethnic (Bengali settlers vs. indigenous peoples) tension and hostility which is increasing in an alarming rate and ultimately posing threats to the CHT Accord. The main center of increase in inter-ethnic hostile relations is land disputes. In the post-Accord period, a dozen of communal riots have taken place (see table 11).
Table 11: Communal Attacks on the Indigenous Peoples by Bengali settlers with the Help of Military (1999-2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of houses</th>
<th>No. of person killed/missing</th>
<th>No. of person injured</th>
<th>Raped/sexual harass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghaihat Attack</td>
<td>4 April 1999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babuchara Attack</td>
<td>16 Oct 1999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boalkhali-Merung Attack</td>
<td>18 May 2001</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramgarh Attack</td>
<td>25 June 2001</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
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The fifth challenge for resolution of conflict is associated with land grabbing and the rehabilitation of displaced groups. After the signing of the Accord, around 12,222 refugee families come back to Bangladesh from Tripura, India. Among of them, 9,780 families have not got back their land, orchards or gardens and homesteads. 890 families have not provided money for buying
bullocks for cultivation as a part of returning to normal life. In addition to, 7 temples area and 40 villages of indigenous peoples are still under the illegal occupation of Bengali settlers.⁶

The sixth challenge is integrated with the reintegration of the ex-combatants into the society. The government declared general amnesty, nevertheless, the members of the PCJSS who, were charged in criminal cases during the period of insurgency, are still being subjected to systematic harassments in various ways. Long ago in 1998 a list of 839 (out of 999) cases, filed against the 2,524 PCJSS members and other persons involved in the PCJSS activities, was submitted to the government for withdrawal. Decisions to withdraw 720 cases out of 839 cases have been taken. However, the decision is yet to be implemented. In addition, cases pending in martial court are yet to be withdrawn. A report on the issue is given in table 12:

Table 12: Cases Decided to Withdraw and yet to Decide to Withdraw

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>Cases decided to withdraw</th>
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<td><strong>720</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
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</table>


Above all, the post-Accord situation has become more complex than ever past involving a wide array of critical issues from state’s security phobia to inter-ethnic hostility. New dimensions, new dynamics and new actors have come into surfaced. This study can be summarized as follows:

Conflict resolution through peace agreement remains ineffective until and unless the challenges from multi-level of the society ranging from the civil society and bureaucracy to the military and political parties are addressed by appropriate policies and operations. Firstly, the feeling of territorial insecurity by the state mechanism must be removed. Secondly, strong political commitment is necessary for implementing peace. Thirdly, the military, civil society, bureaucracy, political parties and media must realize that stable and durable peace can be achieved through guarantee of the rights for the dissatisfied groups as implementing peace and promotion of respect for human rights are very interrelated, without one, the other cannot be imagined. Denial of rights will ultimately be opposed and such opposition often begins as a non-violent protest, but, in the face of denial and violent repression, may become armed struggle (Fisher, Abdi, Ludin, Smith, Williams & Williams, 2000; 52).

Conclusion

There is still scope for renegotiation, open discussion and reducing the gap and distance between the parties. This chance would be remote if the conflict recurs. The researcher has observed in that physical safety and security are significant concerns and must be prioritized firstly. Moreover, many refugees who returned from India have not received their old land back, nor received any compensation as promised (CHT Commission Report). The needs of these displaced populations must be addressed for facilitating the process of conflict resolution.

Long-term development policies designed with discussion and consultation of local peoples must be formulated. Institutions (Regional Council, District Councils), as stated in the Accord, must be democratized and decentralized. The parties should meet, sit, discuss the issues and adopt joint activities on a regular basis. They should inform and co-operate each other about the advancement of their actions. The period may be one or three months-break between two meetings. The parties should refrain from blame game; rather they should become each other’s friend instead of enemy and respect each other. They should not involve in destructive politics. They should work together amicably for solution if there arises any dispute. They should make discussion about the merits and demerits of their actions with the mass people so that people become aware of any conspiracy. For this task, they can arrange seminars, round-table discussion, and broadcasts these seminars and discussions in media.

Much of this parallels the recommendations of Fen Osler Hampson to make the CHT peace building process durable and sustainable. These are as follows: the civil society must be reconstructed at both local and national level along with the establishment of participatory political institutions; the displaced populations must be reintegrated into the society and economy; communities must be built up by bridging the gap between emergency assistance and development; the police and military must be redefined for the task of maintaining law and order; the special needs of women and children must be addressed, and; the rule of law and respect for human rights must be established (Hampson, 2008: 617-626).

References


This paper presents the results of an analysis of data covering the period from 1986 to 2003, exploring the heterogeneity of land resources and the implications on civil conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, with consideration of both the frequency and the intensity of civil conflict. The study considers the different characteristics of resources in terms of their production and marketing, vis-à-vis the commercial relationships involving the stakeholders in resource wealth. The study finds that: one, food dependence and mineral and metal dependence contribute more to the frequency of civil conflicts; two, though it ranked low in its prominence in determining the frequency of civil conflicts, dependence on oil makes civil conflicts most highly intensive; and three, the dependence on mineral and metal is highly prominent in determining both the frequency and the intensity of civil conflict.

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Many Sub-Saharan African countries have either survived a past civil conflict; or are currently involved in ongoing rebellion or war. In a region that is marred by widespread poverty and lack of growth, it is unfortunate that civil war has become another characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) revealed that the median African country can be expected to experience a civil war in any 5 year period with a probability of 0.11; and that in any given year about 8 African countries are expected to be in civil war. More than 2 million people have been killed in different types of violence, while about 10 million have been victims of forced migration and starvation.

For those countries currently at war, the task of reaching peace looks so hard; perhaps, the more complex task is how to sustain peace after a conflict experience. Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) show that on the global scale, within the first 10 years of the end of a conflict, 31% of them have resumed. The study shows that, to restore peace is particularly more problematic in Africa where half of peace reinstatement last less than one decade. Why are Sub-Saharan African countries so prone to civil conflict? And why is peace restoration in Sub-Saharan African countries so difficult to sustain?

Earlier literature has placed emphasis on social, political and anthropological factors, with issues like ethnicity, clan and kinship, religion and language differences dominating the discourse. In more recent literature on the other hand, increasing attention is being drawn to economic and institutional causes. This perspective focuses on two inter-connected factors, namely: state failure, that incorporates weak institutions and poor governance; and economic development failure, that includes the role of natural resources. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier (2000) propose that rebels are motivated by greed, and conflicts are induced by the availability of lootable resources.

Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) affirmed that more African countries are closer to the peak of natural resource dependence, which maximizes the threat of war.

In his address to the 70th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, the UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Amoako stated that, civil conflict is inextricably related to inequitable sharing of natural resources. Similarly, but taking an empirical approach, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) confirm that natural resources increase the likelihood of civil war. Also, Malaquias (2001) remarked that through a blend of coercion and corruption UNITA in Angola directed its efforts to plundering the country’s resources: first Ivory, timber and gold and later diamonds and oil.

Natural resource causes civil conflict by providing the incentives and the finance of civil conflicts. Collier (2000) defined predatory behaviour as the use of force to extort goods from their legitimate owners. He noted that natural resource causes civil wars because it makes it easier for nascent rebel group(s) to fund the start-up costs of rebellion by engaging in resource looting. He opined that the same characteristics that makes natural resources easy for government to tax makes them easy for rebels to loot. Hence, the availability of lootable commodities makes predatory rebellions profitable. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) took it further by asserting that the probability of war and its sustenance are functions of the gains from rebellion and the costs of rebellion. They defined the incentive for war as the product of the probability of rebel’s victory and the resulting benefits, and maintained that natural resources have big influence on both the probability and the incentives for civil war. De Soysa (2000) also finds stimulating results confirming that natural resources influence civil conflict.
The literature is growing really fast, but in what ways are natural resources actually associated with civil conflicts? Ross (2003) highlights four major ways: (i) natural resource harms the country’s economic performance; (ii) it makes the government weaker, more corrupt and less accountable; (iii) natural resource gives the people who live in resource-rich regions an incentive to form an independent state; and (iv) natural resource helps in financing rebel movements.

Although the literature on the association of resources and civil conflict is expanding, but analyses have been highly concentrated on natural resources as an aggregate factor, leaving a wide gap on how the impacts may change when the heterogeneity of land resources are considered. The aim of this study is to bridge the gap by investigating the ways through which different resource types influence civil conflicts. The major problem with the use of aggregate resource dependence or aggregate land resource endowment relates to its underlying assumption that all resource types tend to produce similar conflict effects. However, given the fact that virtually all Sub-Saharan African countries are resource dependent, but with different conflict experiences; this study aims to examine the mechanism through which different natural resources play their roles in civil conflicts. By disaggregating resources in this study, the axiom of land resource homogeneity is relaxed.

### Land Resource Heterogeneity and Resource Disaggregation

Four major approaches for classifying natural resources have emerged in the literature. The first classification highlighted by Collier (2000) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) is based on the characteristic features of natural resources in terms of their production and trade. Collier (2000), and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) noted that primary commodity production does not depend upon complex and delicate networks of information and transactions, compared with the production of manufactured goods. Thus, production can survive predatory taxation. Yet for export, it is dependent upon long trade routes, usually originating from rural locations. This makes it easy for an organized militant group to impose predatory taxation by targeting these trade routes (Collier, 2000). The question to ask is about the extent to which these characteristics effectively match all resource types? Taking a visual observation, one can argue that this generalisation of resources falls short by failing to recognise the complex production process, the network of transaction and market information required for a meaningful trade in resources like oil for example relative to diamonds or agricultural commodities.

The second classification proposed by Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2001) is based on relative spread or geographic concentration of natural resources. Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2001) Classify resources into two types: ‘point’ and ‘diffuse’ resources. Point resources are non-renewable, geographically concentrated, and their extractions require little labour inputs e.g. oil, diamonds, gas, gold, etc. Diffuse resources on the other hand, are renewable, geographically spread, and they are used in the production of crops and livestock, usually mobilising large amount of labour e.g. timber, cattle, coffee, bananas, etc. They submit that countries that are abundant in point resources are more likely to experience conflicts than countries that endowed with diffuse resources. This analysis is significant, albeit it offers limited guide, because significant examples exist of countries highly endowed with ‘point resources’ without civil war experience, even in Africa- e.g. Botswana, Zambia, Gabon; while, many countries classified as endowed in ‘diffuse resources’ have experienced terrible conflicts- e.g. Burundi, Rwanda, Chad.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recognizes two ways of classifying primary products. The first classification by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) gave narrow definition of primary products by excluding processed primary
products, while the second classification provided by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) offers a broader definition. This study uses the SITC definition to examine the conflict effects of four major groups of resources: Agricultural Food, Agricultural Raw Materials, Mineral and Metal and Fuel or oil.

**Note:**
1. Agricultural Food includes Generally foodstuff and tobacco, including meat, dairy product, eggs, fish, wheat, barley, maize and other cereals, rice, vegetables, fruits, nuts, sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea and mate, non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco, groundnuts, soya beans, cottonseed, sunflower, palm oil, castor oil and olive oil
2. Agricultural Raw Materials include Leather, hides and skins of cattle, sheep and goats; rubber, wood, pulpwod, silk, cotton, jute products, wool and other fine animal hair, animal oil and fat.
3. Mineral and Metal includes Fertilizer; crude minerals: stone, and gravel; iron ore and concentrates; Uranium and thorium; copper, nickel, aluminium, lead, zinc, tin, manganese, tungsten, diamonds, silver, platinum and gold.
4. Fuel or Oil include Coal, coke and briquettes; crude petroleum and petroleum products; residual petroleum products and natural gas.

Table 1 shows the dependence of Sub-Sahara African countries on natural resources of different types for the periods 1989/91; extracted from UNCTAD Report (1995). The 1989/91 data is considered reliable because it represents the correct composition of economic activities before the epidemic of civil conflict in the 1990s. The attempt here is to delineate the resource dependence that results from the collapse of industry following the incidents of conflicts and wars. As shown in Table 1, based on the dependence on their 3 major commodities, all Sub-Sahara African countries covered in this study are heavily dependent on natural resources. The least resource dependent country being Cameroon with 42%; and the most highly resource dependent are Nigeria and The Republic of Congo each with 97%.

Appreciable number of countries depend highly on a single leading resource sector. Table 1 reveals that the degree of dependence on a single leading resource sector varies according to the type of natural resource. For countries dependent on Food as the leading sector, the average level of dependence is 71.89%; in this group Cameroon has the minimum dependence, 39% and the maximum is Seychelles 98%. For countries dependent on Agricultural Raw Materials as the leading resource sector, the average level of dependence is 51.13%; the minimum dependence is Central African Republic’s 40%, while Benin has the maximum, 57%. For countries that have Mineral and Metal as the leading resource sector, the average level of dependence is 67.70%; The Gambia and Mauritania are both at the minimum 44%, while Zambia has the maximum, 93%. In the case of countries that have Oil as the leading resource sector, the average level of dependence is 85.75%; with 78%, Gabon has the minimum, while Nigeria has the maximum, 95%.

**Civil Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The conflict data was extracted from the dataset of Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) of the Department for Peace Research, Uppsala University. Conflicts were coded in three categories on the basis of their intensity: (i) minor where there are more than 25 battle-related deaths per year in the conflict period; (ii) intermediate where there are more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths; and (iii) war where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year for every year of the conflict period.
The conflict experience of Sub-Saharan African countries is presented in Table 2. Out of 40 countries studied 18 had no civil conflict recorded, and the number of civil conflicts between 1986 and 2003 in the remaining 22 countries range between 1 and 10. With 10 incidents, Angola has the highest civil conflict experience, followed by Liberia, Rwanda and Uganda, each with 7 civil conflicts. Table 3 shows the distribution of civil conflicts of Sub-Saharan African Countries over their dependence on different natural resources.

The number of conflicts that were freshly started or ongoing between 1986 and 2003 is 85. Of these, dependants on Food and Agricultural Raw Materials accounted for 35 and 14 respectively; while countries dependent on Mineral & Metal and Oil accounted for 24 and 12 respectively. There were 49 major conflicts or civil wars between 1986 and 2003. 21 of which was from countries dependent on Food sector, 6 from countries dependent on Agricultural raw Materials, and 11 each from countries dependent on Mineral and Metal and Oil. From the foregoing descriptive analysis, there are indications that conflict impacts vary from one resource type to another.

Table 1: Resource Dependence in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Source: Report by UNCTAD Secretariat July 1995
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Agricultural Raw Materials</th>
<th>Mineral and Metal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rep of Congo</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data extracted from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Agricultural Raw Materials</th>
<th>Mineral and Metal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Civil conflicts (1960-2003)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of civil conflicts in (1986-2003)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Major civil wars (1986-2003)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Conflict data extracted from Uppsala Conflict Data Program; UCDP Resource dependence data sourced from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Econometric Approach

The most common analytical models applied in social sciences are those implied by ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) used the OLS to corroborate theoretical stance on violence against civilians in civil wars. Buhaug H and Gates S (2002) also used OLS single equation model to test various hypotheses about the location and scope of conflict. Under a set of assumptions, the OLS provides an unbiased linear estimator; however, there are serious problems in using the OLS regression model in a research where the important dependent variable is the count of events such as civil conflicts. The OLS assumes a linear relationship that is implausible for two reasons. One, it can result in an estimate of event counts that are less than zero, and therefore meaningless. Two, the OLS assumption that the difference between zero and one event occurring in a particular time interval is the same as the difference between, say, 10 and 11 events is misleading; see Long J S (1997) for more details of the limitations of the OLS model.

For more reliable results, a derivative of the Poisson model, the negative binomial regression analysis is used. Thus, the probability of an event is determined by a Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is a function of the independent variables. Let $C$ represent a random variable indicating the number of times that the event of civil conflict has occurred during an interval of time; then $C$ has a poisson distribution with parameter $\mu$ ($\mu > 0$). If $\mu_i$ represents $\mu$ of civil conflict for countries dependent on natural resource $R_i$, then the number of civil conflicts $C$ has a probability distribution with the conditional mean that depends partly on the country’s characteristics and partly on the land resource characteristics according to the following structural model:

$$
\mu_i = E(C_i / R_i) = e^{(R_i \beta)} \quad \cdots \quad (1)
$$

This study recognized that civil conflicts may be influenced by factors other than natural resources. Two famous non-resource factors: ethnicity and history of previous conflicts were included in the regression analysis, to verify their influence and ascertain their importance relative to resource factors. The result as shown in Table 4 confirmed that different resource groups are highly significant and positively associated with the expected counts of civil conflicts. However, with different coefficients and statistical significance, the resource types vary in their contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Regression Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Of Civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIS_PRV_CONF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHN_FRCTN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_FOOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_ARM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R_OIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Food dependence $R_{FOOD}$ has the highest coefficient $\beta = 0.10$, followed by Mineral and Metal Dependence $R_{MM}$, with $\beta = 0.095$; next is Agricultural Raw Materials whose coefficient is $\beta = 0.086$, and Oil with $\beta = 0.083$. The resource factors dominate the non-resource factors in their levels of statistical significance. On the basis of statistical significance, from High to Low, the resources ranked as Food (with $z = 4.35$), Oil (with $z = 4.28$), Mineral and Metal (with $z = 4.20$), and Agricultural Raw Materials (with $z = 3.82$).

The Marginal Effects, Factor Change and Percentage Change

The partial derivative of $E(C/R_i)$ with respect to $R_k$ can be described as the marginal effect of natural resource $R_k$, and this can be computed using the following expression:

$$\frac{\partial E(C/R_i)}{\partial R_k} = \frac{\partial e^{(R_i \beta)}}{\partial R_i \beta} \frac{\partial (R_i \beta)}{\partial R_k} = e^{(R_i \beta)} \beta_k = E(C/R_i) \beta_k$$

... (2)

Because the model is non-linear, the value of the marginal effect depends on both the coefficient of $R_k$ and the expected value of $C$ given $R_i$. The larger the value of $E(C/R_i)$, the larger the rate of change in $E(C/R_i)$, i.e. $\delta E(C/R_i)$. Also, since $E(C/R_i)$ depends on the value of all dependent variables, the common practice is to compute the marginal effects when all variables were at their means. Thus, holding all variables at their means, the marginal effects of different resources on civil conflict counts in 1986-2003 is presented in Tables 5. Food dependence and Mineral and Metal dependence both have high marginal effects on civil conflicts, 0.153 and 0.146 respectively; while the marginal effects of Agricultural Raw Materials and Oil are 0.132 and 0.126 respectively.

Table 6 presents the factor changes and percentage changes. The table shows that, if the dependence on a resource increases from $R$ to $R+10$ the expected count of civil conflicts increases by 145.62% and 135.75% respectively if the resource $R$ is Food and Mineral and Metal respectively; while the count increases by 116.76% and 110.41% if the resource is Agricultural raw Material and Oil respectively; holding other variables constant,

Factor change

The Factor change in the expected count can be computed from the parameters of the model. The regression equation (1) can be transformed as:

$$E(C/R_i, R_k) = e^{(\beta_0)} \cdot e^{(\beta_1 R_1)} \cdot e^{(\beta_2 R_2)} \ldots e^{(\beta_k R_k)} \ldots (3)$$

If $R_k$ changes by $\delta$, then

$$E(C/R_i, R_k + \delta) = e^{(\beta_0)} \cdot e^{(\beta_1 R_1)} \cdot e^{(\beta_2 R_2)} \ldots e^{(\beta_k R_k)} \cdot e^{(\beta_\delta \delta)} \ldots (4)$$

The factor change in the expected count for a change of $\delta$ in $R_k$ equals (4) divided by (3) as shown below:

$$\frac{E(C/R_i, R_k + \delta)}{E(C/R_i, R_k)} = e^{(\beta_\delta \delta)} \ldots (5)$$
This can be interpreted as, for a change of \( \partial \) in resource \( R_k \), the expected count increases by a factor of \( e^{(\beta_k \partial)} \) holding other variables constant. If \( R_k \) changed by 1, the interpretation becomes, for a unit change in \( R_k \) the expected count changes by a factor of \( e^{(\beta_k)} \) holding all other variables constant.

### iii. Percentage change

The percentage change in the expected count for a \( \partial \) unit change in resource \( R_k \), holding all other variables constant can be computed by 100 \( \times \) \( \frac{(4) - (3)}{(3)} \) divide (3) as follows:

\[
100 \times \frac{E(C / R_{i}, R_k + \partial) - E(C / R_{i}, R_k)}{E(C / R_{i}, R_k)} = 100 \times \left[ e^{(\beta_k \partial)} - 1 \right] \ldots \ldots (6)
\]

The results in table 6 shows that for a 15 units increase in the dependence on a resource, i.e from \( R \) to \( R+15 \), or in other words say from 60% to 75%, the expected count of civil conflict increases by a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Factor Change and Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Based on number of Civil Conflicts 1986-2003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor increase in Expected counts If R change to R+5:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor increase in Expected counts If R changed to R+10:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor increase in Expected counts If R changed to R+15:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in expected count for 5 units increase in R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in expected count for 10 unit increase in R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in expected count for 15 unit increase in R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Table 5: Marginal Effects based on No of Civil Conflicts (1986-2003)**

\( Y = \) Predicted No. of Civil Conflicts (1986-2003) = 1.5301502

| variable | dy/dx | Std. Err. | z | P>|z| | [95% C.I.] | X |
|----------|-------|-----------|---|------|----------------|---|
| HIS_PR-T* | .7624095 | .59519 | 1.28 | 0.200 | -.404145 - 1.92896 | .410256 |
| ETHN_F-N | 1.428001 | 1.27123 | 1.12 | 0.261 | -1.06357 - 3.91957 | .676485 |
factor of 4.5 and 4.2 respectively, if the resource is Food, or Mineral and Metal; while the factor increase is 3.6 and 3.45 if the resource is Agricultural Raw Material or Oil respectively; holding all other variables constant.

The analysis produced a mixed result for the percentage change. If conflict counts were based on the number of all civil conflicts from 1986 – 2003, a 10 units increase in resource dependence yields 116.7 % and 110.4% increase in the expected conflict counts if the resource is Agricultural raw Material and Oil respectively. However, if the counts were based on only major conflicts, a 10 units increase in the dependence on Oil is expected to increase the counts of major conflicts by 204.1%, while a corresponding increase in the dependence on Agricultural raw Materials causes the counts of major conflicts to increase by 176.4%.

Analysis of Conflict Intensity

When a variable can be ranked from, say, low to high; weak to strong; or minor to major; but the distance between the adjacent categories are unknown, such variable can be described as ordinal variable. Conflict intensity described as Minor, Intermediate, and War, shows conflict intensity as an ordinal variable. Hence, Ordered Regression Model (ORM) is the appropriate analytical tool.

The annual intensity data was extracted from Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) for Sub-Saharan African conflicts between 1989 and 2003. The intensity index is on the scale one-to-three defined by battle death threshold, where 1-represents minor conflict year with an estimate of about 25 battle-related deaths; 2-represents intermediate conflict year, when estimated battle deaths are more than 25 but fewer than 1000; and 3-is for the year of highly intensive conflict or total war with estimated battle death of at least 1000. A total of 140 conflict years was observed from 17 Sub-Saharan African countries24 between 1989 and 2003.

Using the Ordered Regression Model, the odds of an outcome being less than or equal to \( m \) versus being greater than \( m \) have the equation:

\[
\Omega_m(X) = \frac{\Pr(y \leq m \mid X)}{\Pr(y > m \mid X)} = e^{(\tau_m - X\beta)}
\]

... (7)

Taking the log results in the logit equation

\[
\ln \Omega_m(X) = \tau_m - X\beta
\]

where \( \tau_i \)'s are the threshold or cutpoints. Long (1997 p.116) defined the extreme categories 1 and j by open-ended intervals with \( \tau_0 = -\infty \) and \( \tau_j = \infty \); he remarked further that when \( j = 2 \) the measurement becomes identical to a binary system. The Ordered Logit Regression model was performed, to estimate the impacts of different natural resources on conflict intensity, the results is shown in Table 7. With higher coefficient (0.158) and z-ratio (2.93), dependence on Oil contributes more than other resources, and it has the highest statistical significance. The next is Mineral and Metal, and Food with the coefficients 0.147 and 0.135 respectively. Of all the resource groups dependence on Agricultural Raw Materials has the lowest coefficient. All coefficients are statistically significant at 95% level of confidence, except Agricultural Raw Materials.

---

Similar to the analysis of factor change discussed earlier, if \( X_k \) changes by \( \xi \), then

\[
\frac{\Omega_m(X, X_k + \xi)}{\Omega_m(X, X_k)} = e^{(\xi \beta_k)}
\]

which is interpreted as: for an increase of \( \xi \) in \( X_k \) the odds of an outcome being less than or equal to \( m \) will change by the factor \( e^{(\xi \beta_k)} \) holding all other variables constant. Hence, if \( X \) change by 1, then the odds ratio will change by \( e^{(\beta_k)} \). From this analysis, 1 unit change in the dependence on Oil, will change the odds of minor or intermediate conflict versus major war by a factor of 0.85; while a unit change in Agricultural Raw Material dependence will change the odds by a factor of 0.91. For 10 units increase in the dependence on Oil, and Mineral and Metal, the odds of minor or intermediate conflict versus major war will increase by a factor of 0.21 and 0.23 respectively holding other variables constant. However, a corresponding 10-unit increase of the dependence on Food and Agricultural Raw Materials will increase the odd of minor or intermediate conflict versus major war by a factor of 0.26 and 0.384 respectively, holding other variables constant.

Note that the inverse of the odd of minor or intermediate conflict versus major war is identical to the odd of major war versus minor or intermediate conflict. Hence, a lesser factor increase in the odd of minor or intermediate conflict versus major war implies that the associated resource(s) makes major war more likely. Thus, dependence on Oil or Mineral and Metal makes highly intensive conflict more likely relative to the dependence on Food or Agricultural Raw Materials.

**Policy Implications**

The policy implications of this study can be approached from two inter-related fronts: the first is the need to strengthen state capacity and the second rests on reducing the incentives for civil conflict derived from natural resources. Scholars operating from rational actor and state-centred perspectives have emphasised the need for resource abundant countries to build state capacity and promote institutional reform. Such processes will facilitate policies that prevent growth collapse and resource misuse that usually form part of the basis for grievance and violent conflict (Karl 1997; Auty 2001, 2004). For instance, rather than trying to reduce the economic role of the state in resource abundant countries, Karl (1997) argues that the focus should be on professionalising the civil service and reducing corruption; this would reduce rent-seeking and make institutions more friendly to

---

**Table 7: Ordered Logit Result for Conflict Intensity Analysis**

|                  | Coef.   | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|------------------|---------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| Foods           | 0.1352  | 0.0522    | 2.59  | 0.01 | 0.033 - 0.2374       |
| Agric Raw Mat   | 0.0957  | 0.0535    | 1.79  | 0.08 | -0.009 - 0.201       |
| Mineral & Met   | 0.1475  | 0.0527    | 2.80  | 0.01 | 0.044 - 0.251        |
| Fuel or Oil     | 0.1580  | 0.0539    | 2.93  | 0.00 | 0.052 - 0.264        |
| Cut1            | 12.13   | 4.95      | 2.43  | 0.01 |                     |
| Cut2            | 13.96   | 4.99      | 2.73  | 0.01 |                     |

---
producers and investors. Similarly, Auty (2001) argued that: policy success (including the policies to reduce the incentives for civil conflict derived from natural resources) requires institutional reinforcement that encourages the growth of a developmental state. Such institutional initiatives need to be supported by measures to build social capacity, political consensus and transparency in governance. Capacity strengthening also includes measures to diversify the economies and reduce the dependence on natural resources.

Using Sierra Leone to illustrate, Diamonds was a key factor in fuelling the internal armed conflict. The rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led a campaign of terror against civilians from 1991 to 2002, including killings, torture and abduction. The RUF has controlled the diamond-producing areas of the country and used the profits from diamond sales to procure weapons and other military assistance. To reduce the incentives for civil conflict derived from diamond, the Sierra Leone government adopted the UN-approved certification system for diamond exports. However, controls are still needed within the country to track diamonds from the point they are mined.

The relevance of state capacity cannot be over-emphasised as it can act as a deterrent for the escalation of violence. It has been observed that organized crime and political violence can undermine state capacity by creating production externalities for one another. Using Sierra Leone’s case for example, criminal activities created violence-related physical and human capital; and the civil war diverted the state’s attention away from fighting crime. At some points, the rebels and criminals were indistinguishable from one another as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) recruited illicit diamond diggers while fighting the state. Thus civil war economy creates constituencies that benefit from the civil conflict, and violence is sustained by the logics of profiteering that support criminal activities; and those that hold the rights of the aggrieved, in a way that spurs further violent actions.

Ensuring accountability is another way to strengthen state capacity. This involves developing a transparent fiscal system to track money received from natural resources and ensuring that all revenues are published. Systems of accountability for the proceeds of natural resource exploitation should be put in place, and monitored effectively. Providing clarification of all taxes that are supposed to be levied on natural resource production, sale and export; ensuring that these are collected and that taxes and revenues due to resource rich regions are returned, as set out in national legislations. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) provides a useful instrument in this regard. However, the initiative needs the support and involvement of all relevant government departments to develop its public work plan.

A key impediment to policies, particularly those that centre on behavioural, institutional or social changes at the domestic level, relates to their political feasibility. The policies largely follow from the analyses of resource curse that posit a rather deterministic relationship between natural resource abundance, (e.g. irrational behaviour by policy elites; rent-seeking by social groups; weak institutions), and various negative developmental outcomes (poor economic performance, civil war, authoritarianism). It is thus unclear how the changes might be brought about – indeed, most analyses of the resource curse suggest that changes cannot happen, at least, as long as countries remain dependent on natural resources. It will only be by further exploring the dynamics underpinning the variation in resource abundant countries’ development performance that we are likely to uncover potential levers that might be employed to trigger the required policy for behavioural, institutional and social change.
Conclusion

This study shows the ways in which different types of natural resources contribute to civil conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Food dependence and mineral and metal dependence contribute more to the frequency of conflict. Though it ranked low in its prominence in determining the frequency, dependence on oil makes civil conflicts most highly intensive. Mineral and metal e.g. diamonds is highly prominent in determining both the frequency and the intensity of civil conflict.

Civil conflict can be viewed as a product of greed stimulated by the availability of lootable natural resources. This perspective sees natural resources as the primary underlying factor determining other proximate causes of conflict. For instance, Frynas and Wood (2001) observes that in the decades of civil war in Angola without the oil and diamond revenues, the government and UNITA would have found it more difficult to continue the war. Oil and diamond revenues actually shaped the character of the war by allowing both sides to continue a capital-intensive warfare. Rather than using handguns and light artillery as in many other conflicts in Africa, both sides were able to afford expensive jet aircrafts, attack helicopters and tanks. According to Frynas and Wood oil revenues, are relatively easily obtained. The number of taxable subjects is small in number, but the revenue is huge compared with general taxes from other sources.

On the other hand, civil conflict can be perceived as a product of the friction between socio-demographic pressure and scarce natural resources. For instance, the risks of food dependence can be traced to the links between Sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture and demographic structure. A World Bank’s study in 1994 authored by Kevin Cleaver and Gotz Schreiber highlighted three crucial areas of the linkages: population growth, agricultural performance and environmental degradation. In terms of population, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lags behind other regions in its demographic transition; the total fertility rate (TFR) that measures the number of children the average woman has in a lifetime for SSA as a whole has remains around 6.5 for about 25 years, while it has declined to about 4 in all developing countries taken together. The agricultural performance measured as the average per capita food production has declined in many countries. Per capita calorie consumption had stagnated at very low levels, and roughly 100 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are food insecure, while food aid has gone up by 295 percent between 1974 and 1990 (Cleaver and Schreiber 1994). The study emphasises the key linkages in the traditional crop production and livestock husbandry methods; the land tenure and land use practices; and traditional methods of utilizing woodland and forest resources. The agricultural practice that is driven by people’s survival needs has brought increasing strain on fragile land resources; and with rapid population growth, tension is aggravated. The systems have been inadequate in the face of highly intensive pressure of more people on finite stocks of arable land.

Moreover, as much as half of Sub-Sahara African farm land is affected by soil degradation and erosion, and up to 80 percent of its pasture and range areas show signs of degradation. The heavy dependency on wood for fuel and building material has combined with rapid population growth and contributed to accelerated forest and woodland destruction. Soil degradation has severe implications for local and regional climates and hydrological systems. Hence, for rural dwelling people, environmental degradation threatens not only their lifestyles and livelihood systems, but their very survival.

Shifting or long-fallow cultivation and transhumant pastoralism would be the appropriate solution under conditions of slow population growth, and abundant land. As long as land was abundant, mobility provides the key to maintaining both the ecological and the economic
equilibrium because more land could be gradually brought into the farming cycle to accommodate the growing populations. But in most of Sub-Saharan Africa the scope for further expansion of crop land is tapering drastically. The World Bank findings reveals that on average, per capita arable land declined from 0.5 ha per person in 1965 to less than 0.3 ha per person in 1990.

The poor transport infrastructure throughout most of SSA; inappropriate agricultural marketing and pricing as well as dismal exchange rate policies; and poorly conceived and poorly implemented agricultural policies and projects have contributed immensely to the persistence of rural poverty. For detailed analysis of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa see Ali and Thorbecke (1997)\textsuperscript{25}. Food dependent countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had bitter experiences of civil conflicts.

One important determinant of rebels’ incentives to launch rebellion and the ability to sustain them is the gain from the rebellion. This gain reflects the monetary and material effectiveness of participating in insurrection; it is influenced by factors such as: the degree of lootability of the available resource, weight-to-value ratio of resource output, required entrepreneurial skill, initial capital required, e.g cost of the equipments and tools for production and looting, ease of logistics for marketing and availability of market information, etc. All of these vary across resource types. The gains are high for mineral and metal such as diamonds; and countries largely endowed with them have greater likelihood of conflicts that are related to looting and greed.

Why is oil associated conflict most deadly? Three lines of argument can be raised on why oil dependence produces the most deadly conflicts: one, huge lump sum war rents are available to purchase highly sophisticated weapons; two, lack of alternative economic opportunities; and three, weak institution and poor conflict management that generates internally increasing returns to conflict. Since the payments are usually huge and often made directly by the clientele network comprising of few firms; if access to this tap of wealth are gained during war, the rents provides a great opportunity for rebels to maintain combatants and to purchase weapons; the higher the number of armed combatants, all things being equal the higher would be the fighting efforts.

Conflict mat be explained either by greed, that is, resource appropriation, or by grievance, such as feelings of ethnic marginalisation (Collier and Hoeffler 1998); but Humphrey (2005) highlights different variants of the mechanisms of greed and grievance and the complex ways in which they interact to form the antecedents of conflicts. The analysis shows that many aspects of the variants have significant resource content.

Building a rebel army is a costly undertaking; but the presence of some resources can make the financing of rebellion easier. For instance, civil conflicts in Niger and Mali have been difficult to sustain, because the regions occupied by insurgents are not wealthy enough to support a protracted struggle (Humphreys 2005); but the story is different in country like Angola or Sierra Leone. The UN report on the role of diamonds in Angola argued that the rough gems are critical to the ability of UNITA to sustain its challenge to the government. Diamonds, according to the report, allow the rebels to buy weapons, acquire friends and external support, and serve as a store for wealth (Panel of Experts, 2000). Also, expropriation of some resource itself often requires a scale of violence; therefore, expropriation perpetrates and prolongs the war.

Further on why civil conflict get prolonged Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2001) discuss a sort of conflict-breeds-conflict scenario. They emphasized that the risk of conflict is likely to be high in societies with a history of past violence because the initial risk factors made them atypically prone to further conflicts. The initial risk factors are likely to have persisted and indeed the past conflict is likely to have caused them to deteriorate further. Also, the past conflict changes the consequences of a given set of pre-conflict risk factors; while some risk factors have different effects after a previous conflict. Three types of risk factors are identified: one, the extent of natural resource rent; two, lack of alternative economic opportunities; and three, ethnic dominance.

On the impacts of natural resources, cognizance should be given to the degree of dependence; rather than the ordinary fact that a country depends on a type of natural resource. The data analysis in this study shows that Agricultural raw Materials contribute less to the frequency of civil conflict. To explain why this category of resource is less risky, some observations worth mention: one, there are no cases of over-dependence on Agricultural Raw Materials; two, Agricultural Raw Material production has greater linkages with other economic activities like processing and manufacturing – hence, income circulates more. The points raised in one and two also suggest that alternative economic opportunities gain more grounds in Agricultural Raw Material dependent economies.

It can be argued that the presence of certain natural resources causes low economic growth that generate grievances and civil conflict; nevertheless, natural resources do not make conflict inevitable. There are probably some lessons for other Sub-Sahara African countries from country like Botswana. Contrary to being a curse, diamonds have transformed Botswana’s economy by providing a level of economic and political stability that is rare in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite some adverse initial conditions, Botswana has maintained the highest rate of per-capital growth in Sub-Saharan Africa for more than 3 decades. The country has been able to sustain good institution for managing national resources that seems to be politically not feasible in typical Africa. What did Botswana do to make a different? The key is the adoption of the institutions that protect the property rights of actual and potential investors, sustained political stability, and ensuring that the political elites are constrained by a political system that permits a broad based participation of the cross-section of the society.

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Inspiring QCA: An Alternative Approach for Security Studies

Michal Mochťak

The goal of the paper is to present Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a functional alternative to the mainstream research methods in social science, particularly, security studies. The main argument tries to initiate greater sympathy in the approach and to elaborate the opportunities that the technique offers. On the basis of re-linking the core methodological debate in social sciences with the security studies disputes, the outcome presents the possible application of QCA in security sector and advocates for its usage. In this context, QCA is perceived as a real alternative to conventional practices. Through the analysis of mainstream methodological discussion (KKV versus George and Bennett) and the debate about formal models in security studies, the paper reveals possible pitfalls in social science research. To cope with these limitations, QCA is presented and evaluated in a way of alternative approach.

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The research of security has faced an important turnover in the last two decades with a subsequent initiation of change that can be seen in a way of thinking and planning of scientific work (Croft, 2008, p.501-503; Krause, Williams, 1996, p.229-231; see also Buzan et al., 1998; Jervis, 1999; Waltz, 2000). In this context, the discussion about the methodological problems became an integral part of the scientific debate that follows people in academia every day. It raises new questions with more complex motivations for their answers. To respond properly, alternative approaches are designed and applied in order to respond to the research tasks more soundly. Many of these tools can be seen in a way of answers that try to face the requirements that have been created within the theoretical framework. During the years, the practice has requested their application and asked for their continuous development (compare Walt, 1991, p.222). Moreover, the practical provision of these “revolutionary” approaches is to fulfil the expectations that are linked to the proper scientific work and basic conditions of generating knowledge.

If we talk about methodology in the research of security, it is important to mention that the core ideas of debate do not differ from the mainstream methodological arguments that have been occurring in the social sciences for decades now (Haftendorn, 1991, p.12; Walt, 1991, p.222; Croft, 2008, p.509-510; see also Walt, 1987; Nye, Lynn-Jones, 1988). In this notion, the qualitative and quantitative branches still persist to generate disagreement that concerns the proper form of scientific work. Despite the significant attempts to conciliate both traditions that made a huge step towards the goal of epistemological unity, the formal dispute still persists (see George, Bennet, 2005, p.3-4, p.6).

Generally speaking, methodological debate in the research of security can be considered as a reflection of the meta-discussion in the social sciences as a whole. For instance, disputes about the so-called formal models raise similar concerns about the validity, reliability and repetitiveness of scientific inquiries as those raised in the social science mainstream (Walt, 1999a; Walt, 1999b; Zagare, 1999; Mesquita, Morrow, 1999; Niou, Ordeshook, 1999; Powell, 1999). In this regard, social scientists call for approaches that can cover the complexity of social reality and at the same time to present clear and transparent information in a way of formal outcomes. In accordance with this argument, the goal of the paper can be delimited as an effort to present an alternative approach for scientific inquiries that is relatively new, however, well equipped with the analytical capacities (Vis, 2010, p.37; see also Kangas, 1994, p.346-364; Epstein et al., 2008: p.67-90; Pennings, 2005).

In this context, the paper presents Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an alternative scientific approach and advocates for its usage in the research of security. The main idea of QCA comes from the effort to merge the best elements from both “methodological worlds” which implies a complex qualitative insight and a proper quantitative formality (Ragin, 2008a, p.82). Qualitative Comparative Analysis is based on the Boolean algebra and logic that can be covered by the label “set-theoretic approach”. The technique was designed by Charles Ragin back in 1980s as an effort to provide "principled alternative" to quantitative analysis, which assumes away from casual complexity, and qualitative case-based methods, which lack tools for generalizing across cases (Vaisey, 2009, p.308). Ragin’s followers believe that the approach combines the strength of both quantitative and qualitative methods, while transcending their limits.

The stimulus for writing this paper comes from the motivation to at least partially overcome the weaknesses of quantitative/qualitative division and to offer a functional alternative for the research. On the background of a brief description of methodological disputes in the social sciences, the paper presents basic information about QCA as an approach and as well as a technique for scientific inquiries. It is subsequently interconnected with the formal reasoning that galvanizes the arguments about the relevancy and the usefulness for the security studies as an academic field. In
other words, the main outcomes of methodological disputes are linked to the capacities of QCA and the conclusion formulates possible advantages of the application in the research of security. The formal research question of this paper can be therefore set as follow: What are the possibilities of application of QCA in the security studies and research of security as a whole? In this context, the text does not try to provide methodological explanations and applications in their full range, rather to show a bit of a taste that can QCA in the area of security studies offers.

The paper itself is divided into three main parts. The first one briefly describes on-going debate concerning the division between quantitative and qualitative traditions. Despite the progress and an effort to overcome the formal disputes, the main arguments still operate within the framework of positivistic and interpretative approaches. As an example of the dispute, the work of King, Keohen and Verbe, on the one side, and George and Bennette’s reply, on the other, is presented with an intention to demonstrate the complexity of debate (King, Keohen, Verbe, 1994; George, Bennette, 2005). Of course, many papers and books have been written related to the topic in the past two decades; however, these two works reveal the core ideas that are needed for a simple illustration of the debate (compare Mahoney, 2010). On the basis of today’s manifestation of this classic intellectual contention, the discussion about formal models in security studies is subsequently presented. It is done so because of the internal logic that is similar to the putative conflict of qualitative and quantitative traditions and an effort to demonstratively link the security studies with the great debate.

Second part of the paper is aimed at the brief introduction of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as an analytical tool that bears significant capacities to cope with the core arguments of both methodological traditions. The idea here comes from the assumption that QCA as a scientific technique can help overcome at least some of the lacks that main research traditions are not able to cope with. Therefore, brief summary of the approach is presented and implication evaluated in order to prepare the background for the arguments why the QCA as an approach is beneficial for the research of security as a whole.

The last and most important part of the paper presents the possible application of QCA in the research of security in its various branches. On the basis of theoretical arguments, researchable topics and problems are identified with an aspiration for analysis through the scope of set-theoretic approaches. This is done in order to cover the dimensions of formality and social complexity that create the core values of QCA. It interconnects the previous two parts and subsequently enhances the methodological debate with practical implication for the real world problems. Except the answer to the question set at the beginning of the paper, the conclusions of the article provide simple overview of possible usage that can motivate readers for further scientific inquiries.

Social Sciences and the Great Debate

The previously mentioned gap between two main traditions in social science research can be seen as more of a systematic than a generic dispute. Attempts to overcome it have been made by various authors and traditions for more than four decades, however, the cleavage still persists (King, Keohen, Vrba, 1994, p.3-7; George, Bennett, 2005, p.3). The discussion itself is characteristic of distinctions that come from the positivistic revolution in social sciences. The major shift in the second half of 20th century created sharp borderline that has been challenged only in relatively small, successive steps with many arguments against the rapprochement.

The notable and nowadays often cited perspectives that defined one of the most important epochs in the methodology debate and its progress can be found in the work of King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV) Designing Social Inquiry (1994). Authors in the book present comprehensive approach
to the study of social phenomenon in methodologically coherent way, with its universal logic applicable in the qualitative as well as the quantitative research design. Their perspective is according to many authors valued as path-breaking. Despite the critique that has emerged as a reaction to the presented arguments, we can argue that the influence of the work on nowadays social sciences is remarkable (Mahoney, 2010, p.120). One of the most important reasons comes from an idea of epistemological unity, the one that tries to improve the qualitative research designs through the application of well-established norms (the inspiration comes from regression models) (Mahoney, 2010, p.121; compare King, Keohane, Verba, 1994, p. 91-114). The theoretical perspective in basics covers general improvements in the area of research questions, application of theory and the usage and quality of original data or already existing datasets.

Despite the revolutionary attempt to cross the methodological barriers in order to present one coherent framework of scientific inquiring, certain arguments pose the sceptic overview that can be summed up as a “simplification of reality”. George and Bennett criticize KKV’s argument as too formalistic and question the predefined steps in a way of rigid tutorial how to make science. They criticize, besides the other things, one of the key logic that is found in the original work of King, Keohane and Verba, an argument that recommends expanding the number of qualitative studies (N) in order to achieve a determinate research design with possibilities for causal inference. Even though George and Bennett agree with KKV on the importance of certain level of standardization, the approach is not always suitable for every type of design and every scientific question in a real world. For example we cannot just create a new state in a region if we need more unites of analysis in our comparative study (e. g. the comparison of constitutional frameworks at the national levels) (George, Bennett, 2005, p.11-15).

The problem with the applications of KKV’s recommendation can be seen more clearly in the closed environment, where a strict level of analysis, without any possible option of enlarging the sample exists. Political Science and Security Studies often cannot cross the limitation that environments provide. In this framework, it is more than important to recognize and to take into account all the benefits of various approaches that combine different logics in different stages of research (George, Bennett, 2005, p.13). George and Bennett provide a rhetorical defence that advocates for the usage of single case studies as well as process-tracing approaches. In their conceptualization, the purely qualitative tools can perform heuristic functions as well as generate new variables or hypotheses without any serious pitfalls. They further argue that KKV overlook various advantages that come from the sequences of observed events (Georg, Bennett, 2005, p.13-14). Despite the fact that such methods (especially process-tracing) cannot be associated with the logic of regression analysis, according to George and Bennett, it is appropriate to recognize their benefits.

The intellectual discussion between King, Keohen and Verba on the one hand and George and Bennett on the other presents only a small piece of complexity that belongs to the never-ending debates of methodologists. As we try to interpret the main features that could be subsequently extracted from the academic discourse into usage of QCA, it is plausible to distinct two main approaches in the social science research. They have been until recently vaguely known as qualitative and quantitative traditions and lacked proper delimitation and definition. Both of them have proponents and critics that formulate arguments about sufficiency of particular method in concrete research task; however, none of them is perfect (see Mahoney, 2010, p.124). The first one, the data-set observation approach refers to a common statistical view in KKV’s sense with aspiration for causal interference. A typical formal model refers to a data rows in a rectangular data set with scores for a given case on all measured variables. By contrast, a causal-process observation approach is described through a well-informed insight that provides information about context, process, or
mechanism, as well as contributes to distinctive leverage in causal inference (Collier, Brady, Seawright, 2010; Seawright, Collier, 2010).

As a reaction to the major success of KKV’s approach, George and Bennett stress the importance of qualitative methods that are not inevitably subordinated to quantitative standardization. KKV’s recommendations undoubtedly enrich the variable-oriented research; however, the case-oriented design can also follow pure qualitative logic without any change of epistemological boundaries (George, Bennett, 2005, p.13). This statement was not well formulated in the time of publishing the book Designing Social Inquiry but it has been developed step by step in a discussion of scholars in the past two decades. Qualitative methodologists have created a host of new procedures for identifying and generalizing the causes of outcomes in individual cases. They have made an important step for further progress in social science’s methodology that is multiparadigmatic in its nature (compare George, Bennett, 2005, p.11-15; Gerring, 2007, p.183).

Security Studies and the dispute about formality

Disputes and arguments that delimit the framework of inquiries in the field of Security Studies are closely related to the on-going methodological discussion in the social sciences as whole. As already mentioned, the clash between formality and complexity creates an arena where scientists argue for the preferred tradition and epistemological beliefs. This contestation of ideas can be evidenced through the many debates\(^1\), one of which is the dispute about the position and value of formal models in the fields of International Relations and Security Studies. For the demonstration purposes, the position of Stephen Walt in his article “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies” from 1999 is presented with an intention to reflect his arguments about the formality in Security Studies. The reactions of his opponents that were published thereafter clarify practical implication of the meta-debate and formalize the conflict in terms of methodological dispute. The goal of this short illustration is an effort to interconnect purely theoretical arguments that exist in the methodologists’ debate with more applied ideas in the field of Security Studies. On the basis of outcomes, the main arguments are perceived as a background for the last part of the paper where the main points of both sides are consider and reflected through the scope of QCA.

Back in 1999, the journal International Relations published a paper written by Stephen M. Walt – Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies. The core idea that was presented in it refers to the critique of formal models and rational choice theory that emphasize certain types of work over others. He criticized the privilege of certain questions at the expense of others and the prizing of certain analytical talents over the others (Walt, 1999a, p.7). His critique was aimed at the use of technical or formal proficiency as a surrogate for professional competence, and the efforts of formalists to determine what the legitimate scholarship in particular fields of study is. This, he continues, affects the basic nature of social science and the allocation of funds for certain types of research. Thus, Walt argues that formal models have become sine qua non of scientific inquiry, which punishes those academics and scholars who do not use them. As a result, the scientific work that does not fit in the pattern of formal approaches is marginalized within the respective field (Walt, 1999, p.7 and further). Walt points out that:

[...] the aim of social science is to develop knowledge that is relevant to understanding important social problems. Among other things, this task requires theories that are precise, logically consistent, original, and empirically valid. Formal techniques facilitate the construction of precise and deductively sound arguments, but recent efforts in security studies have generated comparatively few new hypotheses and have for the most part not

been tested in a careful and systematic way. The growing technical complexity of recent formal work has not been matched by a corresponding increase in insight, and as a result, recent formal work has relatively little to say about contemporary security issues (Walt, 1999a, p.8).

Walt’s paper thus criticizes the formal rational choice theory as an approach that is defined more by the method of theory construction than by the content of its theories. The set of mathematical (statistical) axioms derives propositions from the set of basic inputs which may generate logical errors or vague predictions. His arguments can be linked to the main methodological debate where the emphasis on the formal provision presupposes general conditions of generating quasi-objective knowledge. In other words, following certain rules can assure certain level of scientific proficiency (Walt, 1999a, p.9). As was already mentioned through the work of George and Bennett, rigid formality lacks informed insight that cannot be substituted by any logical tool. Walt goes further and criticizes the whole rational choice logic (see Walt, 1999a and Walt, 1999b), repeating the main axioms above, that have relevancy for the whole scientific field.

The publication of this paper provoked a strong reaction leading to a reconciling approach on one side as well as an aggressive defence of formal models on the other. Most of the authors oppose the simplistic arguments that criticize the formal rational choice logic and emphasize the many benefits of formality in social science. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, for example, agree that “[social science] requires theories that are […] logically consistent,” and that “formal techniques facilitate the construction of precise and deductively sound arguments” (de Mesquita, Morrow, 1999, p.56; Walt, 1999a, p.8); however, they stress the key argument about the superiority of logical consistency over the degree of originality, and empirical validity. In their arguments “logical consistency is the first test of a theory because consistency is necessary, though not sufficient, for understanding how international politics works” (de Mesquita, Morrow, 1999, p.56-57). They admit that formalism as an approach is not necessarily the most suitable tool for all research questions, but assert that formal models “assist […] the research community examine the logical consistency of arguments” (de Mesquita, Morrow, 1999, p. 72-73).

Lisa L. Martin agrees with de Mesquita and Morrow and refers to Walt’s worries as unfounded. She tries to diminish his critique via three main arguments that are formulated in defence of formal models. Martin assumes that social science, particularly Security Studies, would be severely impoverished if formal work is discouraged (1). In her justification of application, the formal models posses the ability to generate linked, coherent sets of propositions and insights which subsequently enhance validity and reliability (2). Moreover, it is possible to recognize the benefits of formalizing the insights of informal rational choice that prevails in logical consistency (3). Martin further questions the motivation of Walt’s worries and shows that there is no apparent danger of formal work becoming dominant in the field of Security Studies (Martin, 1999, p.74-75). Niou and Ordeshook continue with this notion and go further to label Walt’s discussion as “wrong-headed and counterproductive to his objective of sustaining a policy-relevant subfield of security studies”. Moreover, they accuse him of failing to understand the basic premises that come from proper scientific work. Walt devotes, they continue, his attention to the ill-motivated belief that originality and empirical validity are more highly valued than logical consistency and precision in scientific procedure (Niou, Ordeshook, 1999, p85-87). Niou and Ordeshook strongly disagree with Walt in many aspects of the discussion and their arguments are intensified as a defence of formal models and their position in social science (1999, p.93-96).

The debate itself is not only about the formal models and putative dominance of rational choice logic in security studies. All the positions and arguments replicate the contentious situation,
an arena that can be characterized as a dispute about proper scientific method. Formal models represent the quantitative branch of social sciences with the emphasis on technical proficiency and logical consistency, while Walt’s position belongs to the qualitative (inductive) tradition. Throughout this discussion, the strong similarities of these positions to the larger methodological debate in the social sciences were presented intentionally (see Walt, 1999a; Walt, 1999b; Niou, Ordeshook, 1999; Martin, 1999; de Mesquita, Morrow, 1999).

QCA as a further step

The methodological disputes discussed suggest the need for functional alternatives that, in terms of addressing at least some of the technical challenges, would be able to satisfy both traditions in social sciences. Before we start to talk about the QCA as an approach that is potentially capable to satisfy this need, we should say something about the set-theoretic tradition, a group of methods that QCA belongs to. Methodological tools that can be labelled as set-theoretic share common ground in at least in three dimensions: first, they work with membership scores of cases in sets; second, they perceive causal relations as set relations; and third, these set relations are interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity, as well as forms of causes that can be derived from them (see more in Schneider, Wagemann, 2012, p.4-6). Moreover, the core ideas of the approach are closely related to the propositional logic and Boolean algebra, the fields of mathematics where usage of supersets and subsets relations is an integral part of calculations. Closer look at the logic reveals another important fact – the idea of set-theory is not a new element in social science and many applications across the field can be identified. In this notion, Mahoney argues that many comparative case study approaches apply a set-theoretic reasoning in an informal and intuitive manner (Mahoney, 2007, p.135).

QCA, as a member of the set-theoretic group, distinguishes itself from the other approaches mainly through its aim at causal interpretation. In its technical provision, the framework uses truth tables, a logical feature that helps researcher to visualize and to organize information into a coherent dataset. It provides the opportunity to analyse subsequent elements of causal complexity, such as equifinality\(^2\), conjunctural causation,\(^3\) and the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of outcome. In terms of formality, the QCA analyse the information that were added into truth table and in accordance to logical consistency, logical minimization is applied. It is a process by which empirical information is expressed in a more parsimonious yet logically equivalent manner by looking for commonalities and differences among cases that share the same outcome (Schneider, Wagemann, 2012, p.8-9). Moreover, the whole framework is supported by substantive theoretical knowledge and deep-insight familiarity with the inquired cases.

The idea of making use of set theory approach for the interpretation and analysis of social science data (in QCA) has been put forward by Charles Ragin, Professor of Sociology and Political Science at the University of Arizona back in 1980s (Ragin, 1987). He has created a doctrine that is dedicated to the principled alternative in social research with a modest aspiration for addressing the disputes that exists in methodological debate. In his book *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* Ragin claims that he tries to offer a “real alternative to conventional practices” that “is not a compromise between qualitative and quantitative” but rather “transcends many of their respective limitations” (Ragin, 2008a, p.6). His work comes as a reflection of previously mentioned debate that

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\(^2\) The outcome may result from several different combinations of conditions. Usually, these alternate paths are treated as logically equivalent (Ragin, 2008, p.54).

\(^3\) In order to find perfect set relationships, one might need to refer to various combinations of sets, where single conditions do not display their effect on their own, but only together with other conditions (Schneider, Wagemann, 2012, p.8-9).

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criticizes lack of complexity on the one hand and formal weaknesses on the other. Traditional linear models are problematic because of the assuming that starts away from the complexity with an intention to look for linear, additive, and independent causal forces. On the other hand, case-based methods do cover the dimension of complexity but lack the formality that is needed in case of validation and repetition (see above).

According to Ragin, this shortage can be overcome if the scientific inquiries can follow the set-theoretic approach in the case-based research that is supplemented by the extension of quantitative analysis through the application of Boolean algebra laws. The benefits that come from this constellation can be utilised if we think about cases as a configuration of conditions rather than single unites of analysis with certain level of uniqueness or simple linear product of independent causal forces. Moreover, the whole approach can be seen as a powerful and productive alternative capable of detecting patterns that are invisible to standard techniques (Ragin, 2008a, p.1).

QCA as a scientific approach in this notion stands on the frontier between qualitative and quantitative approaches with a relatively substantive aspiration for enrichment of existing discourse. The application of Boolean logic in cross-cases analysis delimits the framework of analysis in order to establish potential relations of necessity and sufficiency between alleged causal conditions and selected outcomes. QCA in its core therefore tries to identify and subsequently to explore the pattern of causes (some sort of recipes) that are sufficient or quasi-sufficient for the traced outcome. The whole idea is very similar to former approaches in qualitative sociology that was oftenly used as a combination of analytical induction and grounded theorising (see Hammersley, Cooper, 2012). The added value that can be identified, besides the already presented arguments, is the fact that the initial assumptions do not necessarily start by the axiom that all social science is inevitably hermeneutic in its nature (Cooper et al., 2012). Furthermore, its usage does not prevent any attempt for interpretive aspiration (see Rantala, Hellström, 2001). The motivation of QCA is more aimed at unravelling the causally complex structures in terms of equifinality, multifinality, and asymmetric causality.

Despite the general thought that QCA is limited to small N designs, the truth is that the approach itself does not possess serious limitations in terms of applicability. The more appropriate discussion should be aimed at suitability of the technique for particular design if there is any suspicion or uncertainty (see more in Ragin, Fiss, 2008; Ragin, Bradshaw, 1991). As Ragin stresses, while standard statistical techniques are good at distilling the net effect of single variables, QCA, by virtue of giving premium to causal complexity, seeks to detect different conjunctions of conditions (configurations) that all lead to the same outcome (Grofman, Schneider, 2009, p.663; see Ragin, 2008b, p.176-189).

The main argument that should be taken into account if we consider the best practices of QCA is the fact that the phenomenon can be described and understood in terms of set relations; that is, theoretical statements can be rearranged in terms of subsets and supersets dependency. This condition is even more important than the sample size which often comes – especially in comparative studies – from the real world limitations and cannot be overcome by simple increase in number of cases. The idea stands in opposition to the main recommendations of proper usage of statistical tools that are designed in order to identify the net effect of independent variable. As

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4 The outcome may result from several different combinations of conditions. Usually, these alternate paths are treated as logically equivalent (Ragin, 2008, p.54).
5 A situation where the very same condition may lead to different end-effect (outcome).
6 Asymmetric causality refers to situation when the proportion of Xs that are also Ys need not be the same as the proportion of Ys that are also Xs (see example on the next page).
Schenider and Wagemann note, the motivation for usage of QCA shall be led by the researcher’s interest in set relations rather than number of inquired cases (Schneider, Wagemann, 2012, p.13).

QCA similarly to the linear models has the capacity to handle the causal inference. The difference comes in a way how the methods approach to multiple causes of event. QCA sees for causal recipes whose individual conditions are jointly sufficient to produce an outcome with at least some degree of regularity. The linear models begin with a null hypothesis of causal simplicity but might be persuaded (if asked) to include some complexity with interaction terms; QCA, by contrast, begins with the null hypothesis of causal complexity and can be simplified only with positive evidence (Vaisey, 2009, p. 310).

Despite the different logic that Qualitative Comparative Analysis bears, the approach in fact utilises the idea of correlation better than yet classic regression models which are predominantly based on the traditional way of understanding the symmetry. In other words, the general meaning of correlation in linear models refers to the fact that the \( r_{XY} \) (correlation between X and Y) is the same as \( r_{YX} \); the order does not matter because the correlation is symmetric. Set-theoretic approach assumes an asymmetric logic with an important emphasis on the way how things actually happened. That is, the proportion of Xs that are also Ys need not be the same as the proportion of Ys that are also Xs. For better understanding, if the theory formulate that the developed countries are democratic, in essence, it only says that the group of developed countries is a subset of the set of democratic countries. The fact that there are also less-developed countries that belong to the group (set) of democracies does not undermine the set-theoretic claim that was said. If it had been formulated symmetrically, such a claim would undermine the correlation between development and democracy and count against the stated argument (Ragin, 2008a, p.15).

In contrast to traditional statistical approaches, QCA uses calibrated values that refer to the membership of delimited set. For the purpose of better understanding what does it mean “membership of delimited set”, it is plausible to briefly present the two most applied members of QCA family that are similar in logic; however, different in accomplishment. As was indicated, the QCA as research approach consists of more than one technique. The main two variants are crisp-set QCA (csQCA) and fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) (see more about multi-value QCA and temporal QCA in Caren – Panofsky, 2005; Ragin, Strand, 2008; Cronqvist, Berg-Schlosser, 2009). csQCA operates exclusively on the binary values of membership where one (1) stands for fully membership of the set whereas zero (0) indicates the non-membership of the very same set. fsQCA applies the same logic; however, the cases are allowed to have gradation of their set membership – it can vary from 0 to 1. For better understanding let me provide a quick example of application: a country can be a partial member of the set of democracies and this membership is indicated through the fuzzy set score, let’s say 0,9. The value of the membership provides us with information that the case can be perceived as more of a democracy than a non-democracy; however, with certain shortcomings that affect the ability of fulfilling all the criteria for a full-fledged democracy (see more Rihoux, De Meur, 2009; Ragin, 2009).

In contrast to the measured variables characteristic for the linear models that are arbitrary units (e. g. kilograms or Euros), calibrated sets, on the other hand, reflect each case’s membership (0 or 1) or degree of membership (from 0 to 1) in predefined conceptual categories (e. g. religious or developed). Set membership values are therefore concept-relative as well as case-relative. In its essence, the calibration is the process of translating a variable into a set using a function derived from the substantive knowledge (compare Rihoux, De Meur, 2009; Ragin, 2009; Vaisey, 2009). During calibration of fuzzy-sets, the researcher decides when a case is “fully in”, “fully out” and when it is “neither in nor out” of the set (the so-called cross-over point) using external criteria,
particularly, theoretical and substantive knowledge (Ragin, 2000, p.169; Ragin 2008a, chapter 4 and 5). This approach translates information into numbers that can be analysed with QCA algorithms (with QCA software – fsQCA, Tosmana, R with QCA module) in order to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the event (outcome). In other words, calibration is a way how to decide where to put the concrete case and which value it should have in regard to the definition of set. As was already mentioned, the case can have membership 0,8 which means that it more belongs to the group than it does not; however, the case with the value of membership 0,9 has stronger relation to the set even though does not fully belonged to it either (fully membership must have the membership score 1.0). Both cases therefore reflect the relation towards the superset as well as their mutual difference (see more Schneider, Wagemann, 2012, p.27-29).

The core values that make QCA potentially a very powerful tool are not exclusively related with the formal precisions that comes from logical narratives of Boolean algebra. The Q in QCA stands for the qualitative which implies deep understanding of examined cases that should be known before the initiation of research. The process of coding and calibration comes from the informed insight that affects the quality of information that is further processed. Ragin refers to this process as the back-and-forth model between ideas and evidence (Ragin, 1987; see also Rihoux, Lobe, 2009). Schneider and Wagemann stress in a very similar way that the researchers’ insights, and the knowledge they have acquired before and after the analytic moment are crucial for making the results of the analysis both robust and plausible. Such knowledge is particularly needed if the aim consists of drawing “causal inferences” (2012). Moreover, this approach can face the problem of complexity in the real world, where equifinality – the situation in which there is more than one way in which a specific outcome can come about – is more than possible. It also possesses a certain superiority over the in-depth case studies that can deal with the complexity of phenomena but lack the aspiration for formality. However, the approach is not almighty and the researcher should be aware of the limitations and difficulties. Regarding the generalization of findings and further interpretation of the results, the scholars should bear in mind preliminary goals and avoid the simplistic assumptions which were not intended to address (Vis, 2010, p.29-30).

All these features of QCA are perceived in a strategic way and as will be shown in the next part of the paper, the application can enrich the security studies for many reasons. First of all, the approach is more or less capable to combine the best of qualitative and quantitative techniques. In essence, it allows the replication of findings as well as capturing qualitative changes in terms of securing the requirements of complexity and formality (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, p.13). Moreover, QCA has many of the virtues of conventional interval-scale variables, especially their ability to make fine-grained distinctions and at the same time to permit set theoretic operations (Vis, 2010, p.31).

Security Studies: Application and Implication of QCA

Axioms of social research that enhance the acceptance of formulated statements are inevitably connected with the technical proficiency. It does not matter if the research design has inductive or deductive logic; the process of generating of knowledge has to be conducted systematically and transparently. In terms of disciplinary orientation, the largest proportion of QCA applications – more than two-thirds – can be found in political science and sociology (compare Ragin, Rihoux, 2004, p.5). In this context, the field of security studies is still behind the advancement. The position may come from the very nature of security environment where lack of information, secrecy and decisions under pressure do not allow to whole spectrum of actors to properly approach the research of security issues (see Walt, 1991).
As previously mentioned, QCA as a research technique offer a whole new range of possibilities for social scientists and security experts in order to address real-world complexity as well as technical provision of formality. Although it does not allow addressing all the problems of methodological concerns, the alternative that it brings can be seen at least as a beneficial approach for those researches that are willing to consider arguments of both traditions in social sciences.

The usage of QCA in political science generally and in security studies particularly does not provide sufficient numbers of studies that would demonstrate the full strength of the approach in terms of application. However, a few of them exist and QCA shows a huge potential especially in comparative studies with sample size in range from 10 to 50. Applications that have occurred lately include topics like third party intervention that followed after the integrity transgression (van der Maat, 2011); intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe (Thiem, 2011); social entropy theory as an explicit theoretical approach for an empirical assessment of security (Mitar, 2010); insurgent violence (Metelits, 2009); far-right strength in contemporary Western Europe (Veugelers, Mangan, 2005); war termination (Chan, 2003); success of coercion (Harvey, 1999); ruler autonomy and war in early modern Western Europe (Kiser, Drass, Brustein, 1995) and relationships between revolt and war (Kiser, Drass, Brustein 1993). Of course, this is not the entire list of security related papers using QCA, the number of them is not so much higher (see Compasss.org). However, the shortlisted examples demonstrate the possible variation of topics that QCA can be applied to, particularly its application in security studies.

In broader terms, Berg-Schlosser et al. mention five main aims that are linked to the possible usage of QCA (2009, p. 15-17):

- To summarize data;
- To check the coherence of the data with claims of subset relations;
- To test existing hypotheses and theories;
- To overview quickly the basic assumptions of the analysis; and
- To develop new theoretical arguments.

Schneider and Wagemann provide one more possible application (compare with Schneider, Wagemann, 2010, p.3-4; Kvist, 2006; Kvist, 2007):

- QCA as a means for creating empirical typologies.

All these utilizations are suitable for further development of QCA in security studies. Therefore, the paper provide a more focused analysis of each of them – one by one – in a manner of better understanding of all the possibilities that the technique offers (see Berg-Schlosser et. al., 2009, p.15-17; Kvist 2006; Kvist, 2007).

Summarization of data with claims of subset relations. QCA in its technical proficiency provides powerful tool that helps the researcher to systematize data in a coherent and what is more important in a complex way. Summarization as a procedure that processes data does not provide any explicit scientific benefits; however, the approach is very important in further inquires and enables potential repetitive testing of gathered conclusions. The reason why is this so comes from the need to present collected data systematically with logical consistency and scientific transparency which is one of the primary goal of scientific work. Truth tables offer a great opportunity to systematize data and despite the fact that at first glance it looks like standard data-matrix, the
provided content is more complex and systematic. Similarly to conventional data matrices, each truth table’s column denotes different variable, or better to say a set. Each row refers to logically possible AND combinations between the conditions. Since single condition can occur either in its presence or its absence, the total number of truth table rows is calculated by the expression $2^k$, where $k$ stands for number of involved conditioned. This provides us with extremely complex formula, where all logically possible outcomes are considered.

**Coherence of data.** Logical consistency, a condition that is oftenly mentioned as a blame of qualitative approaches, QCA addresses in a very decent way without any violation of all the benefits that inductive (qualitative) approach provides. Moreover, it faces the concerns of formalists (see above) that see the consistency of data as a test, though not sufficient, for understanding how international politics works (compare Mesquita, Morrow, 1999). The element of coherence within the QCA constructs some sort of relations that can be vice versa contextually traces back to the model in which they are embedded. Simultaneously, they can evaluate the coherence of the model as a whole. It helps better understand the complexity and consistency in terms of logical constructs without any evident pitfalls. Application in security studies therefore provides a great deal of benefits that directly associate the coherence with summarization in case of necessity to interpret the collected data.

**Testing of existing hypotheses and theories.** Social sciences, as a multiparadigmatic field of research, have to deal with an extreme level of complexity which brings many problems in terms of theory testing. QCA brings two main advantages to this task and addresses both traditions in social science (quantitative; qualitative) in a coherent and well-founded way. Security studies as well as other fields of political science can enhance formal procedure with a dimension of complexity (1). As was already mentioned, the research approach operates within the field of alternatives that cover the whole spectrum of possible outcomes. It means if research would like to examine the causes of war and subsequently identifies certain conditions of the events, each of the prospect “recipes” is equally reviewed. Based on the available data, there is no space for alternatives that are not taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the complexity does not reduce the reality of social phenomenon and still provides broad space for interpretations (2). Especially in the security studies where the size of sample can impede the effort to conduct proper test of stated arguments, QCA brings the option of theory testing based even on a small number of cases.

**Quick overview of the basic assumptions of the analysis.** Logical consistency that comes with the mathematical proficiency is also evident in process of overviewing the preliminary statements. It is related with the fact that summarization and data coherence create a system of logical configuration that can be utilised whenever it is needed. If the outcome of analysis does not follow the logic that was modulated in theory, the formal assumptions can be immediately overviewed and according to proper rules of conduction of scientific work modified. It is possible because of the systematic processing of input data that are arranged in the truth tables. Together with the outcome formulas (so called recipes; see above) the analysis can be conducted back and forth.

**Developing new theoretical arguments.** QCA as a research technique can be utilized also as a theory building approach with all the advantages that have been already mentioned. It means that on the basis of acquired data and subsequent analysis, the new theoretical arguments can be formulated. As Rihoux and Lobe notes, [cs]QCA allows one to elaborate new assumptions or theories: the minimal formula ultimately obtained can be interpreted – i.e. confronted with the cases examined – and lead the researcher to formulate new segments of theory (see Rihoux, Lobe, 2008, p.225).
QCA as a means for creating empirical typologies. Based on the formalization, the truth tables provide an opportunity to identify natural categories that come from analytical property space defined by particular conditions. For instance, three possible conditions that putatively lead to a certain outcome (e.g., occurrence of organized crime group) offer eight options \(2^3\) of alternative paths to the followed phenomenon. These “alternative paths” cover the whole property space where any of the studied cases can be identified – no alternatives are left. In other words, those eight possible models can be perceived as edges of a cube where each edge represents an ideal typical location in the analytical framework.

These applications can be perceived as possibly powerful approach in terms of development of scientific research in regard to the security studies and the methodological disputes that still persist. Moreover, it is plausible to mention that further scientific inquiries in accordance with logic of QCA can help to develop deeper substantive knowledge about various problems in social reality and to enrich methodological framework that is still being formed.

Conclusion

Methodological tasks and intentions that stimulate the development of knowledge need to be addressed in a coherent and scientific way. This notion is reflected in a never-ending discussion that concern complexity and formality in the social research and inspire social scientists for decades. Moreover, the great methodological debate that affects the core logic of social inquiries is somehow universal for all social sciences and security studies are not an exception. In this context, the goal of the paper was therefore to present a kind of fresh approach in the field of research of security that can help to face certain methodological problems related to proper scientific work and also to reveal new possibilities of analyzing everyday reality.

As mentioned earlier, the matter of formality is crucial for the scientific inquiries where the ability to replicate the research, increases the value of the results. It is important to recognize validity as a key factor that should lead the research from the beginning, and which is sometimes hardly addressed in a more case oriented way of research. On the other hand, this disadvantage is balanced with reliability element that is directly linked to inquiries that can be labelled as complex. This dichotomy is crucial for understanding the benefits of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA as an answer to methodological disputes has been discussed here in such a way as to capitalize the strong sides of both approaches and to limit their weaknesses.

Security studies in this notion seem to be a perfect application field where the limited diversity and sometimes lack of exact (numeric) information usually prevent the application of two sides of the same coin – in other words, the elements of complexity and formality. The mathematical precision of Boolean algebra provides a great deal of opportunities to present substantive but predominantly qualitative knowledge in a way of transparent assumptions. At the same time, the logical reduction is not estranged from the rich sum of qualitative data. The application subsequently provides the opportunities to (re-) consider some of the social problems that are addressed by contemporary scholarship.

Some of the possible usage can be linked to the research of conflict and peace studies (causes of war and peace); research of extremism (causes of occurrence of extremisms); research of organized crimes (causes and conditions of success of criminal groups); research of international interventions (conditions of success of the intervention); research of political violence (conditions of the usage of excessive violence) and more (see above). It is very important to think about QCA as a functional alternative that offers great deal of complexity with an intention to consider all the
possible sources that can lead to the outcome. So called alternative paths to the outcome include
the plurality of possible interfering conditions (variables) as well as plurality of explaining paths.

In this context, the paper tries to present QCA as an alternative to the mainstream of social
research and provides basic ideas that can initiate greater sympathy in the approach. On the basis of
re-linking the core methodological debate in social sciences with the security studies disputes, the
outcome of the effort can be seen in the presenting of QCA to the security studies community and
advocating for its usage. Despite the fact that the method was designed back to 1980s, the
application is still limited which open a significant space for utilization.

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Carrotmob: Where Values Meet Profit

Kevin Kester and Nico Koenig

Businesses work towards making a profit by selling products and services. They are often willing to change the way they operate if they perceive a potential increase in their revenues. On the other hand, green consumers want to decrease businesses’ environmental impact. Such consumers are often willing to reward a business with profits if the business commits to the consumers’ demands. This process of consumer-values-directed rewarding of businesses is called boycotting, and the link that connects the motivations of businesses to become more environmentally and socially responsible to the value-driven green consumer boycott could be the profit created through an emerging method of activism called Carrotmob. This article reviews the concept of Carrotmob within the theoretical constellations of greening business, consumer boycotts and political consumerism, offers a reflection on the authors’ experience organizing Toronto’s first Carrotmob, and poses pending challenges for Carrotmob as a methodology of social change.

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Businesses work towards making a profit by selling products and services. They are often willing to change the way they operate if they perceive a potential increase in their revenues. On the other hand, green consumers want to decrease businesses environmental impact. Such consumers are often willing to reward a business with profits if the business commits to the consumers’ demands. This process of consumer-directed values that seek to reward businesses is called *buycotting*, which is the opposite of a boycotting campaign. Furthermore, the link that connects the motivations of businesses to become more environmentally and socially responsible to the value-driven green consumer buycott could be the profit created through an emerging method of activism called Carrotmob. Carrotmob uses a large group of consumers to purchase goods and services from a business that pledges to become the most environmentally friendly among a group of businesses it competes with to win purchases from green consumers. By doing so, businesses earn profits and consumers earn the eco-change they demand.

This article explores the brief history of Carrotmob, its associated issues and terminology relevant for understanding the relationship between greening business, political consumerism and buycotts. The paper begins by introducing Carrotmob and then summarizing research focused on the driving motivations for greening business that buycotts use to their advantage. Next, the concept of buycotts, their relation to boycotts, and recent examples of consumer buycott campaigns will be shared. Finally, the paper will review the Toronto-based Carrotmob the authors’ organized in 2010. The concluding remarks offer pending challenges to further utilization of Carrotmob as an approach to social justice activism.

**What is Carrotmob?**

Carrotmob is an amalgam of two social movement concepts: buycotts and flash mobs. Buycotts will be detailed later in the article. A flash mob is a recent 21st century occurrence. According to Anne Duran (2006), a flash mob happens when “strangers come together in a public place, perform an unusual behavior and randomly disperse.” Bill Wasik began the trend in 2003 by e-mailing 50 people and asking them to gather at a shop in downtown Manhattan in search of a “love rug” (Shmueli, 2003). A recent flash mob included a sporadic choreographed dance routine during the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (Stueck, 2010), as well as a flash mob dance to promote boycotts of San Francisco hotels in 2010, and a number of others performed on university campuses across the United States.\(^{32}\) Due to the surge in social networking applications, flash mobs are usually coordinated via Internet applications such as Facebook, Twitter, or blogs (Duran, 2006). The trend of using social networking sites as the primary means of organizing a large group of people to one location was also witnessed in a more substantial matter during the Arab Spring (Ghosh, 2011).

Founder of Carrotmob, Brent Shulkin, spent a few years after graduating Stanford University considering how to use social networking to address environmental and social issues (Wiener, 2010). He stated that these issues were present because “corporations would do anything for money” (Carrotmob, 2008). He suggested that consumers engage the for-profit aspect of business in order to make these businesses more environmentally and socially responsible. Using the concept of rewarding with a “carrot” versus the punishment of a “stick”, he termed his boycott campaign a “Carrotmob” (Carrotmob, 2010). A Carrotmob is defined as:

\(^{32}\) Many of these are viewable on YouTube, including the 2010 San Francisco boycott “Don’t Get Caught in a Bad Hotel” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79pX1IOGPU), the “Trang and Nam proposal” at UCLA in 2011, (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0dGRDvomO54) and a choreographed dance at Ohio State University in 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UJux_VTITF0). In the latter two cases it is evident that flash mobs do not necessarily carry a political agenda.
A type of consumer activism in which businesses compete at how socially responsible they can be, and then a network of consumers spends money to support whichever business makes the strongest offer. [Carrotmob] harnesses consumer power to make it possible for the most socially-responsible business practices to also be the most profitable choices. It’s the opposite of a boycott. (ibid, n.p.)

The first Carrotmob was organized in the city of San Francisco, California, during March 2008 (Wiener, 2010). According to O’Connor (2008), Shulkin asked 23 liquor stores to make bids on a percentage of sales that owners would be willing to put back into their stores to pay for energy efficient renovations. The highest bid was from K&D Market that offered twenty-two percent in winning the right to host the first Carrotmob. Shulkin started a campaign on Facebook, and advertised to friends the specific day to arrive at K&D Market in a large group. Several hundred people arrived during a Saturday afternoon, spending a total of $9,400, with $1,840 of this amount used to change the store’s light bulbs and make fridges more efficient (O’Connor, 2008).

Following the initial event, a promotional video was created outlining the concept and encouraging others to form their own Carrotmob (Carrotmob, 2008). The main website[33] offers Carrotmob community organizing advice and a free Carrotmob website blog for anyone who wants to start their own campaign (Carrotmob, 2010). Within its first two-year history, there were over 50 Carrotmob events in Australia, Thailand, Finland, Mexico and Canada (ibid), and by 2012, at the time of writing, there have been over 60 campaigns (Carrotmob, 2012). According to Carrotmob (2010), the majority of Carrotmobs have attempted to raise funds for energy efficient renovations similar to the initial event in San Francisco. The highest bids to date have been by Ramin Café in Mikkeli, Finland, and Matching Half Café in San Francisco, both offering 200% of their revenue for energy efficient renovations and reusable food storage containers, respectively. The stores, in other words, matched what customers spent. Other bids have included store pledges for waste reduction, recycling processes, eliminating Styrofoam, providing fair trade flowers (Carrotmob, ibid), and, in the case of our own campaign in Toronto, the introduction of local foods to the shop.

Greening Business

Businesses are encouraged for many reasons to become environmentally sustainable. Carrotmob emerged from a specific interaction of four of these motivating drivers: the lack of external pressure; management’s personal values; profits due to energy efficient renovations and profits due to increased consumers. Each of these themes will be discussed, beginning with clarity of the term environmental sustainability.

Environmental sustainability is a concept with many meanings. The definition provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization – copying the original definition by the Brundtland Report – describes environmental sustainability as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (FAO, 2005; UNWCED, 1987). The Earth Charter expands on this concept to describe a “sustainable global society founded on respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace” (Earth Charter Associates, 2000). In addition, Willard (2005) includes a number of similar concepts of environmental sustainability such as sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. This article uses

[33] http://carrotmob.org/
the associated terms environmental and social responsibility, environmentally friendly, eco-friendly and “green” interchangeably to describe practices that aim for environmental sustainability.

The threats of losing the legal and social license to operate are external pressures that motivate businesses to manage their environmental impact. Government-imposed regulations attempt to keep minimum environmental, health and safety standards for businesses to operate (Willard, 2005). These regulations can be in the form of environmental taxes (Revell & Blackburn, 2007), criminal penalties, or social sanctions such as diminished reputation (Hoffman, 2001). Revell and Blackburn (2007) explain that these kinds of pressures are the strongest driver of environmental sustainability practices within small and medium enterprises. As well, the minimum environmental standards have become more rigid over the past few decades (Howard-Grenville, 2006). In addition, poor reputation can diminish sales (Hoffman, 2001) and shareholder value (Willard, 2005). Willard (ibid) describes that one environmental incident can damage an entire industries image. He uses the examples of Greenpeace’s successful missions, which created a damaging public opinion of oil and gas companies. These aspects encourage businesses to keep away from lawsuits by the state and society by complying with set environmental standards. However, Willard points out that these regulations “drive laggards” and “do not promote best practices” (2005, p.65).

Businesses can also be drawn to green issues due to internal factors such the management’s personal commitment and green partnerships. Harrison (2009) explains that executives are personally worried about global warming and the approaching uncertainty. Willard (2005) offers the view that some businesses begin with a founder’s personal pledge to environmental values such as the Body Shop and Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Ice Cream. A management style focused towards environmental sustainability can also influence corporate actions (Howard-Grenville, 2003). For example, a manager with an environmental mindset can identify potential green market opportunities (Backer & Clarke, 2008) and strongly influence and direct sustainability policy (Howard-Grenville, 2003). In addition, professional networks and partnerships can strengthen or create environmental values (ibid). For instance, eco-friendly values were shared in the partnership between the oil company Shell and the eco-conscious Vestas (Backer, 2007). Businesses that have the environment in mind will act accordingly and are more likely to reach the environmental demands of Carrotmob.

Companies that increase their environmental efficiency are able to reduce expenses and thus generate increased profits (Willard, 2005). Two financial benefits that DeSimone and Popoff (1997) explain relate to reducing the current and future costs of poor environmental performance. They point out that costs incurred by waste reduction and dematerialization can be substantial. In addition, an effective environmental standard lowers future environmental liability risks and insurance costs. Willard (2005) adds that efficient energy and water usage will develop long-term savings for businesses. He explains that the costs of creating energy efficient green buildings are recovered due to the savings that occur within the first few years. However, Revel and Blackburn (2007) claim that many small business manager-owners perceive the high monetary costs of energy efficient renovations and waste minimization as not yielding enough financial benefit. Accordingly, the majority of Carrotmob campaigns have focused on funding energy efficient renovations to small businesses that otherwise believe they could not afford the increased costs. During the authors’ efforts toward organizing Toronto’s first Carrotmob, small-business owners often expressed that energy efficient renovations were too expensive, yet it was ultimately a small shop interested in these changes that received green customers from Carrotmob. In this case, an endogenous motivation of the shop owner in synchronicity with the values of green consumers led to a win-win outcome for the participating shop.
Growing numbers of consumers are making purchases based on ethics, values, and political beliefs (Micheletti, 2003). Accordingly, there are political consumers who are making their buying decisions based on the social and environmental impact of their purchases. These “green” consumers are concerned about a wide variety of issues such as climate change, fair working conditions of farmers and protection of resources (Willard, 2005). Multinational corporations have been following these types of consumers and have promoted their products as eco-friendly (Chitra, 2007). In such cases, businesses want to gain a positive reputation from green consumers in hopes that it will increase their sales (Backer & Clarke, 2008). Not only are green consumers interested in eco-friendly brands, they have more income to spend (Neilson & Paxton, 2010), are more educated (Neilson & Paxton, 2010), and are willing to pay a premium for green products (Willard, 2005). Businesses may therefore be motivated to make environmental sustainability issues a priority if there is potential for increased profit from green consumers. The changing of values, both institutionally and in the public eye, however, must be done earnestly and carefully; otherwise, businesses that appear to be profiting from false environmental “practices”, or “greenwashing” (Laufer, 2003; Dahl, 2010)

34 There are many efforts online to raise awareness toward “greenwashing”, including howstuffworks.org, greenwashing.net, and stopgreenwash.org, the latter of which is under the direction of Greenpeace.

This brings us to the issue of political consumerism.

Consumer Boycotts

Michele Micheletti (2003) describes political consumerism as “actions by people who make choices among producers and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices” (p.2). Micheletti explains that consumers evaluate the social and ecological context of these purchases, and deliberately decide what to buy and what not to buy. Another way of framing this definition is that political consumers are willing to “vote with their dollars” for a change they want to see (Youde, 2009). When political consumers organize themselves in a coordinated effort to change the policies related to their purchases, Micheletti defines this as an individualized collective action (Micheletti, 2003). She states that collective actions can be seen in traditional and unconventional methods of activism such as consumer boycotts and buycotts.

Boycotts are a popular collective tool used by political consumers. They are “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace” (Friedman, 1999, p.4). Monroe Friedman (ibid) suggests that there are three characteristics of boycotts: a focus on individual consumers; using marketplace means to secure what may or may not be market ends; and urging consumers to withdraw selectively from participation in the marketplace. Gene Sharp (1973) also states that consumer boycotts involve a “refusal by consumers to purchase certain goods or services. There may be many reasons for such a boycott...which may be economic, political, social, or cultural, or a combination of these” (pp. 221-222). Boycotts put pressure on institutions and make the public aware of an issue that concerns everyday consumers (Micheletti, 2003).

Boycotts have been documented widely as used by diverse groups such as labor organizers, minority associations, religious communities, and environmental activists (Offen, Smith & Malone, 2005). In their research, Micheletti (2003) and Friedman (1999) make reference to the bus boycotts of the southern United States. The most popular of these emerged after the arrest of civil rights activist Rosa Parks in Montgomery, Alabama – a case that brought national attention to the
American civil rights movement (Friedman, 1999). Sharp (1973) additionally documents a bus boycott by black Africans in the “township of Alexandra outside of Johannesburg on January 7, 1957” in objection to an increase in bus fares (p. 223). Boycotts are an oft-used method of civil resistance.

Monroe Friedman’s book Consumer Boycotts (1999) offers one of the few academic discussions on the alternative to boycotting – “buycotting”. According to his book, buycotts attempt to “induce shoppers to buy the products and services of selected companies in order to reward them for behavior which is consistent with the goals of the activists” (p. 201). Friedman warns that the term boycotting may be not be a popularized term as it has also been represented as “girlcott”, “procott”, “reverse boycott”, “anti-boycott”, and “white-listing.” Boycott has also been used synonymously with boycotting. For example, a women’s activist group once called for all women to boycott (meaning “buy nothing”) on a specific day (Balares, 2004). Additionally, the “prototyping campaign” was a boycott related process created by Greenpeace that had customers sign purchase intention declarations to encourage companies to develop new environmentally sound products (Friese, 2000). Therefore, it is clear that boycotts have different meanings to different groups, but for the purpose of this article the authors discuss boycotts in the vein of “political consumerism” as defined by Friedman.

The choice of the boycott or buycott method depends on the perspective of the activist and its impact may be interpreted differently by the effected business. Friedman offers the example of the “Buy American” consumer buycott of American goods. He argues that this is a positive emphasis; however, others may perceive it as a boycott of all Japanese products (Friedman, 1999). In addition, boycotts and boycotts may take place in one business at the same time by opposing consumers. An example of this was when progressive political groups called for a boycott of Whole Foods after political views of the company’s CEO, John Mackey, became public (Anonymous, 2009). Conversely, the Nationwide Tea Party launched a buycott of Whole Foods to show their support for the views of John Mackey. In a similar situation, the Boycott Israeli Apartheid Campaign attempted to protest Israeli-made goods that were being sold at The Mountain Equipment Co-op (MEC) (Arnold, 2009), and a countering buycott was initiated by pro-Israel groups to encourage local Jewish people and their supporters to buy as many Israeli products as they could from the co-op.

Accordingly, boycotts, like boycotts, can be organized as “a call for” or “an actual organized campaign.” Monroe Friedman defines “calls for” boycotts as public pleas by individuals or organizations toward media networks (Friedman, 1999). These could be found in the form of lists of goods or services recommended by a specific organization. Another example is Buycott Inc, which offers a list of Canadian businesses described as socially responsible and eco-friendly (Buycott, 2010). The Carrotmob boycott is an organized campaign to purchase items identified by the boycotters. Friedman (1999) suggests that a highly publicized and organized campaign favors success for both the boycott and boycott approach.

Another distinction between boycotts relates to the target of the boycotters campaign. Similar to a boycott, a boycott may target an offending party directly or indirectly (Offen, Smith & Malone, 2005). Friedman labels indirect boycotts as surrogate boycotts because they have a proxy within their targets (Friedman, 1999). The MEC boycott is an example of a surrogate boycott, as the intended target is Israel’s solidarity through the surrogate of MEC. Offen, Smith and Malone (2005) identify a ‘perimetric boycott’ that exhibits similarities to surrogate boycotts. Within a perimetric concept, active boycotting consumers expect their indirect surrogate target to disengage from their primary target. They offer the example of San Francisco’s Tobacco Free Project that rewarded cities
with valuable convention contracts for becoming smoke free. In this case, there existed an incentive to the surrogate to disengage from the primary target, which was the tobacco industry. Finally, buycotts can also be single-target or multiple-target campaigns. An example of a single-target would be the buycott of Whole Foods. Product Red on the other hand is an example of a multiple-target campaign. It is a holding brand that partners with multiple-target brands such as Motorola, Converse and Apple, to produce Red products (Davies, 2006). A percentage of Red sales are then donated to the Global Fund, an international financing organization that raises funds for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria programs.

Friedman (1999) speaks of Carrotmob in his book, without naming it as such, as a useful trend of activism. He names single-target buycotts, but confirms they are a very unusual occurrence. This may be due to the public’s uncertainty about the consumer group’s motives for partnering with a for-profit business. He explains that consumer buycotts are rarely used as campaigns to serve the protests of activists. Friedman suggests that one reason boycott campaigns remain ignored is because “organized activist groups tend to favor protests (boycotts) over praise (buycotts) as a means for effecting change” (ibid, p. 203). However, Carrotmob emerged due to influences that did not exist during Friedman’s research. These recent factors include the increased accessibility and use of online social networking applications and the growing trend of green consumerism.

Enter Carrotmob Toronto

In 2010, the authors organized Toronto’s first Carrotmob in conjunction with several partners, including the Transformative Learning Centre at the University of Toronto, Local Food Plus, and the Windfall Ecology Centre. Organization for the event occurred over a six-month period from November 2009 to April 2010. After identifying G’s Fine Foods through competitive bargaining as a small business interested in being “mobbed”, the organizers enlisted fellow students from the University of Toronto to join an expanded Carrotmob committee to make preparations for the event. Nearly 30 students assisted the campaign through a variety of sub-committees including public relations and advertising, educational initiatives, and street theatre.

The various sub-committees spread the word in courses across the university, connected civil society groups willing to help, sent advertising materials to The Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail, spoke on local radio stations, organized educational talks and conferences, and visited shopkeepers in the area to advocate for and promote Carrotmob participation. In addition, a professional environmental consultant associated with the Windfall Ecology Centre met with the selected shopowner to provide professional advice on responsible and effective measures to take toward sustainability in his business. This ensured an appropriate effort toward sustainability, since many of the student participants and community members were not professionally trained in environmental renovations.

Throughout the process of community organizing, the committee expanded its original concept of Carrotmob from a single emphasis on energy efficiency to an enhanced Toronto campaign for local foods (Roberts, MacRae, and Stahlbrand, 1999). Carrotmob Toronto worked in this vein with Local Food Plus, a charitable non-profit, to promote local sustainable food systems in

35 http://www.joinred.com/
36 http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/
37 http://tlc.oise.utoronto.ca/
38 http://www.localfoodplus.ca/
39 http://www.windfallcentre.ca/
Ontario. The result was the establishment of a partnership between G’s Fine Foods and Local Food Plus that continues today, and efforts toward enhancing the relationship between the selected business and local farmers.

In respect to community development and education, the Transformative Learning Centre led talks and dialogue circles on the values and purposes of environmental activism and participatory democracy as learned through movements such as Carrotmob. Accordingly, with colleagues at the Toronto Food Policy Council\(^\text{40}\) (Roberts, 2008), and in sustainability courses at the University of Toronto, the Transformative Learning Centre and Carrotmob set out to raise awareness toward issues at the intersection of food and sustainability in Toronto communities. The authors estimate that the talks and awareness raising campaigns reached approximately 3,000 residents of Toronto via radio, television, social networking sites, and street canvassing.

In total, nearly 300 community members from across the city participated in Carrotmob Toronto and spent over $9,500 CAD at G’s Fine Foods during the one-day event (Pett, 2010). The majority of participants came from the neighborhood in which Carrotmob took place; however, several activists came from other areas because they heard about the event on national radio the day before and wished to join in solidarity. Following the Carrotmob there was an evening fundraising event at a local pub, where a local theatre troupe trained participants in social justice theatre techniques. At G’s Fine Food, the committed energy efficient renovations and local food items have since been implemented, however the owner has expressed concern with his ability to maintain and grow the number of local foods.

Conclusion

There exists little completed academic research that specifically attempts to explain the concepts that underline Carrotmob, assess its impact, and evaluate the learning that takes place among participants (Hoffman and Hutter, 2013). This paper has aimed to fill that void and concludes by offering issues that challenge the future of Carrotmob as an inclusive method of social change. Three points worthy of further thought and research include:

1. **Can Carrotmob affect multinational corporations, or is it limited to small-scale change among local business?** All previous Carrotmobs have campaigned for small to medium sized independent businesses that can be influenced by a sudden influx of customers. A Carrotmob that brings a few hundred extra customers to a large business chain may not persuade management to commit to any kind of environmental demands, since the proportion of consumers is less significant. In addition, winning Carrotmob stores have previously made pledges based on trust with Carrotmob organizers. Smaller businesses tend to fulfill these commitments because of the negative media and backlash that would ensue if they did not. Can this leverage be utilized with large business? And how? In larger corporations, there may be a need for a legal binding document to be arranged before the Carrotmob can be successful.

2. **Is Carrotmob a privileged form of activism?** As described previously, political green consumers often have more income and education. Would Carrotmob be as effective in an area of high poverty? What types of issues would be most important to consumers in such an area that a Carrotmob would be appropriate to effect? Are there other constraints, other than financial, on participation in low-income neighborhoods that need to be addressed initially? Lower income

\(^{40}\) [http://tfpc.to/](http://tfpc.to/)
consumers concerns may be to have the cheapest goods available, which green consumers may perceive as harmful to the environment. How might these seemingly exclusive interests be bridged? The intersections between sustainability and class must be further explored in the development of critical literature on Carrotmob and boycotting.

3. How much demand can really be negotiated with business owners? It seems that most businesses are willing to receive funds for improving their energy efficiency. However, if a Carrotmob demands their local convenience store become fully organic, the owner may not perceive a long term financial return from such a change and will not be willing to meet the demands. Carrotmobs must offer a long-term financial incentive to all businesses. In this respect, how much change is possible without becoming a long-term financial burden on business owners? The demands of consumers need to be thoroughly researched so that green consumers definitely promote sustainable practices among business.

These are three critical questions that must be grappled with in the process of improving Carrotmob and other emerging forms of social activism, so that political consumers might avoid co-optation of social justice interests by the profit motive. The challenge is to conduct Carrotmob while engaging citizens across intersections of class, race, and gender – among other cross-sections of identity – and between industry, academic, and non-profit sectors. It is the hope of the authors that Carrotmob address these issues in promoting a more democratic forum for social change. In doing so Carrotmob could act as a kind of ‘school for democracy’, where participants learn the values and techniques of participatory social change through the creative act of community organizing for social and environmental justice.

References


There are recurrent irritating elements about the vast majority of books that have ever been written about the Lebanese Hezbollah: the westerner who expects a medal for having “interviewed” Hezbollah officials a few times to the “peril” of his/her life; the academic who does not feel the need to master Arabic language, and even less some of the basic concepts of Shi’a Islamic jurisprudence; the “award-winning” journalist who surfs on the “terrorism” wave to sell a few more books; or the Lebanese scholar who seeks approval from colonial centers of knowledge through a dualistic oversimplification of the Party. For any reader who has always wanted to transcend those academically dishonest clichés, Joseph Alagha’s Hizbullah’s DNA and the Arab Spring comes not only as a long-awaited relief, but also as a practice of how academic research can be expressed as a decolonizing agent.

For far too long, Lebanese studies have been the specialty afforded to the chosen few, either from the global North or the Westernized elites of the global South, themselves contesting the existence of a North-South intellectual divide, since it would raise obvious questions on the situation of knowledge concerning this particular “field” of study. Conferences on the topic have seen their fair share of experts who play sorcerer’s apprentices on what the country needs, what it will become, and often on those occasions, the existence of the Hezbollah comes as a recurring mantra against the idea of Lebanon as the remaining Switzerland of the Middle East. In this context, the Hezbollah is often seen as an Iranian avatar, not a Lebanese entity in its own right, as if the presence of the Shi’a community in Lebanon was just an accident of history, the embarrassing barefooted cousin at a family reunion. The strength of Alagha’s book is to wipe away that myth in its careful and meticulous analysis of the deep political layers and complexities of the Hezbollah, not only as a Lebanese socio-political entity with its own monopoly of violence, but also as a cultural community.

This book does exactly what its cover says: it answers all the questions that I always wanted to ask about the Party’s origins, and never had the capacity to research in detail from my own vantage point as a Western academic mercenary, only able to spend a little time in Beirut before retreating to my place of intellectual privilege. Alagha’s book provides ample evidence and primary sources to support his claim that the Hezbollah is a complex and adaptive organization that never ceases to reinvent itself as part of its national and regional political reality. What came as a hunch to few scholars is for the first time carefully laid out, in every possible detail, with meticulous expertise.

One of the most notable features of the book is its dense chronology, displaying all key elements of the Hezbollah’s complex adaptation over the years, and making an obvious case for the book’s connecting thread. Another long-awaited feature is Alagha’s systematic evaluation of academic and journalistic works on the Party to date, offering a critique that stems from a genuine search for academic excellence, and a dissection of the many inconsistencies of the existing literature in order to re-establish a strong basis on which further scholarship can emerge. In this sense, it represents a notable paradigm shift in Hezbollah literature, a shift from the “terrorism” wave to that of understanding it as a complex adaptive organized network.

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The connections between the Hezbollah and the Arab Spring, and their implications for the current Syrian civil war, are also carefully analyzed. While the book was written at a time when it was difficult for most observers to make sense of the Syrian situation, Alagha’s thorough primary research and analysis capacity allowed him to look ahead and formulate an analysis that stands the trial of time. The dilemmas that have been faced by Hezbollah’s leadership are well exposed and evaluated. Should the Party remain focused on Lebanon, should it risk its pan-Islamic aura, or should it engage in a proxy-war against the regional interests of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to the risk of giving into the fitna or division that it has always managed to avoid within a Lebanese context? All those questions are carefully posed in the book’s final chapter. As the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has proven, it is often counter-productive to engage in any speculation on the immediate and long-term future of the region. This book abstains from this in all academic humility, yet formulates questions that can only lead to one conclusion: that the fitna mentioned in US-embassy cables at the time of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is no longer a Washington-hoped divide and rule scenario, but a painful reality in Syria.

Alagha states that the Party’s Secretary General, Sayyid Nasrallah, declared only to resort to fighting in Syria in case of extreme necessity. The fact that the Hezbollah has publicly acknowledged its involvement in Syria ought to raise alarm bells for all “experts” across/on the region. Given that Alagha’s book demonstrates how politically astute and capable the Hezbollah political leadership has been over the years, for Sayyid Nasrallah to make the extreme decision to be involved in Syria, a decision that he knows will probably be fatal to its party’s stand on the Lebanese political scene, ought not to be dismissed as just a political mistake, but as a suicide mission, a last cartridge to counter what is certainly perceived as a deadly force against Shi’a Islam’s survival in the region. Perception here is a word of great importance, because as Alagha states, while a phobia of Sunni Islam may well be over-rated, the reality that it generates is what will have to be dealt with in the region’s immediate future, a seed planted more than ten years ago in newly-“liberated” Iraq. Once again, blinded by their own racism, most Hezbollah “experts” have retreated to their comfort zone in misunderstanding the urgency of Nasrallah’s perception surrounding Syria, privileging a narrative of Arab impulsiveness and inherent political senselessness over one of survival.

Alagha’s book is a testimony to academic excellence and humility, and an important step towards the decolonization of academia. The fact that it is published in India shows that where Alagha walks, his books talk. Hizbullah’s DNA and the Arab Spring has clearly transcended North-South intellectual boundaries in all respects and is a welcome addition, not only to the literature on Hezbollah and the region, but to the whole field of peace and conflict studies.
This book is a welcome addition to the material available regarding the teaching activities and practices of university lecturers, most especially those involved in the delivery of complex abstractions that deal with disarmament and non-proliferation. *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World?* is comprehensive in its coverage of disarmament and non-proliferation issues, but stays within the confines of the state paradigm. There is nothing about international terrorism. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT are referred to intermittently in some of the Lodgaard’s chapters, but not discussed at any length. The focus is on the other pillars, disarmament and non-proliferation. According to Lodgaard, disarmament initiatives must attend to the interests of the emerging powers and to the hopes, doubts and scepticisms of states on all continents to be effective, the initiatives must be aligned with ongoing power shifts in the international system (p.30).

In “Power shifts and nuclear weapons”, Lodgaard tries to situate the functions of nuclear weapons in the context of systemic change, reviewing contemporary power shifts and geopolitical orientations and discussing their implications for nuclear disarmament (p.65). He then opines that the Cold War left important legacies that continue to influence nuclear weapon policies. Particularly noteworthy is the continuation of threat-based policies and nuclear deterrence doctrines, extended deterrence and policies of first-use included. To Lodgaard, President Clinton focuses on the benefits of globalization as much as on how to avert threats, but when the period of opportunity of the early 1990s was over, the politics of fear picked up again. To the extent that specific threats no longer sufficed to justify the maintenance of strong nuclear postures, they were arguably needed to defend against the unknown. In the mindset of the Cold War, uncertainties about the future had to be met by the strongest of weapons and later, 9/11 put the terrorist threat up front; Saddam was turned into a threat beyond proportion and Iran became a strong driver of threat-based policies (p.59). Lodgaard argues that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence therefore outlived the global rivalry and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union they were adapted, but in essence maintained (p.44, 61).

On “The legacies of nuclear history and the requirements of a new consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament”, Lodgaard takes a review of these legacies (The first nuclear era), followed by an examination of nuclear-weapon state (NWS) doctrines (Post-Cold War doctrines). He asserts that the obligation to disarm is inscribed in Art. VI of the NPT. Legally speaking, failure to take “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” does not necessarily amount to non-compliance by any particular state (p.38), and progress depends on the seriousness of all negotiating parties and is arguably beyond the powers of any single participant. However, Lodgaard reveals that the political process that led to the NPT clarifies that Art. VI was conceived as part of a dynamic bargain to be implemented over time, erasing in due course the distinction between NWS and NNWS (pp.66-67). To him, converging...
expectations were created and a review mechanism was set up to facilitate abolition. Although no timeline was given, “cessation of the arms race at an early date” left a sense of urgency (p.85, p.111). Art. VI therefore calls for negotiations in good faith. Attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of it and to make the commitments more explicit, binding and tangible. Another part of the grand bargain is the one in the title of the NPT: non-proliferation has held up better than expected.

In addition, he also provides the five NWS recognized by the NPT, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons (p.211). Throughout the nuclear age, more than 20 states did “something” in the direction of a nuclear weapon capability at some point or other, (p.133) but dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks. The first half of the 1990s was the golden age of non-proliferation: Russia became the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; South Africa abandoned its weapons and joined the NPT; NPT membership increased considerably; the Conference of Disarmament agreed on a mandate for negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); and by the time the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was convened, a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) was in sight. The US and Russian nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced (p.175).

Under “A global consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament” Lodgaard focuses and admits that Review Conference therefore came at the end of a period of good news, facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. At this point in time to him, non-proliferation seems to be a winning proposition. Lodgaard now argues that the Review Conference turns out to be flawed analysis and India, Pakistan and North Korea went on to test, and Iran became a state of growing proliferation concern. Proliferation concerns grew, disarmament negotiations came to a halt, big power relations deteriorated, and more functions were assigned to nuclear weapons in national military doctrines. The grand bargain from 1968 that led to the NPT came apart until a new US government with high disarmament ambitions opened a new window of opportunity to revive it. It ends with an overview of the basic requirements of such a consensus (p.96).

In the aspect of “Proliferation problems and the role of nuclear disarmament” Lodgaard starts with an analysis of the three-state problem (India, Pakistan, Israel), and of the nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India in particular (p.95-96). He then continues with a review and summary of lessons learnt from 27 cases of nuclear rollback, (pp.117-120) i.e. of states that have moved towards nuclear weapons at some time or other, but that dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks and rolled back to non-nuclear status. He also reviews the explanatory power of realist assumptions and idealist perspectives, and concludes with a list of 16 propositions shedding light on what it may take to turn would-be proliferators back to non-nuclear status. These lessons are, in turn, used in analyses of the Iranian and North Korean problems.

Lodgaard also explores the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation. With his perspective in legal terms, the link between disarmament and non-proliferation is well established. More than anything else, the NPT review process has centred on the relationship between them, and the academic literature has excellent analyses of the subject. Therefore, the discussion in “The relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation” is not conducted in the legal framework, but focuses on the political and military dimensions of the disarmament and non-proliferation relationship and with a series of important questions: Is disarmament important to align the three outliers to the non-proliferation regime? Is it important for purposes of rollback? Does it matter for North Korea and Iran? The other way round, how important is non-proliferation for disarmament? How can the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) contribute to nuclear disarmament by making their non-nuclear status more convincing? Special attention is paid to the distinction between disarmament as a process and disarmament as a state of affairs, and to the concept of rank disequilibrium, which appears to have strong explanatory power in cases like Iran and India. Looking
ahead, the NPT is a regulatory mechanism for non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses all the way to zero. However, it says nothing about the precise meaning of zero and it is no more than a skeleton agreement, so new rules guiding the final approaches to a NWFW will be needed (pp.170-179).

The final Part “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world”, Lodgaard concludes with a review and discussion of the pros and cons of different versions of the vision and with this question, to what extent can a vision be a guide to action? All the way, due respect must be paid to the path dependency of nuclear disarmament. To him, it would be presumptuous to claim to know much about a world approaching zero at that stage, the issues will be seen through lenses that are different from the contemporary ones. However, some force constellations are more dangerous than others, and much is known about the conditions of military stability. He then takes a closer look at their relevance for the structuring of nuclear disarmament, concluding with a concrete proposition regarding the final steps to a NWFW (p.216).

The book is a valuable contribution to the literature. It contains well-researched papers from seasoned academic. Collectively, the author can be credited for bringing important lessons to the attention of their intended readership. However, there is no doubt that the book justifies its premise. Overall, I think all of the chapters are very good contributions to the main theme(s) of the book. As a researcher who has been involved in this aspect for some years, I found the book both helpful in getting me to think about what I am currently doing, as well as a trigger for some possibilities for the future. I recommend that anyone interested in teaching and learning about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, at any ‘level’, inside the academy or otherwise, read this book. And if future books are to be of this high quality, then I look forward to reading more of the contributions to the monograph series as well.