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In 2011 the Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked Japan as the third most peaceful country in the world. This paper studies how peace actors have worked for that peace by examining both their socio-political origins – the factors that shaped their environment – and how their work has evolved in response to the social and political changes throughout Japan’s 20th century history. In the second part of the paper I utilize narratives with current peace actors to illuminate what their concerns are and how peace is understood in Japan. I draw the conclusion that although Japan might be perceived as a peaceful country many problems nevertheless remain.

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Introduction

This paper is an inquiry about peace in Japan. It looks at how peace actors have struggled for peace and how this struggle continues. In turn it examines their socio-political origins, their work to attain conditions of peace, and how this work has evolved in response to the social and political changes of Japan’s history. Japan at the time of writing (2012) is the fifth most peaceful country in the world according to the 2012 Global Peace Index. Japan’s indicators of internal and external conflict remain low, as do its militarization indicators; Japan’s military expenditure is below one percent of its GDP.\[1\] Although Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF or Jieitai) is technologically advanced and militarily capable, the SDF remains tied to Article 9 of the constitution of 1946 written by the then-occupying power, the United States of America, which bans the maintaining of war potential. Article 9 remains a marker for Japan’s pacifist stance and discussion still continues as to its interpretation, its necessity and its origin. Japan has however followed an independent pacifist policy (ikkoku heiwa shugi) for the last sixty years and continues to do so irrespective of whether the international community is in sympathy with this policy or not (Hisae, 2002, pp. 52-5).\[2\] The reasons and actions that explain Japan’s peaceful conditions prove complex. They stem in part from the actions of citizens against inequitable conditions designed by elites to further their own interests often to the detriment of others; what Karl Marx, whose influence in Japan during its formative industrial years was considerable, referred to simply as “struggle”.\[3\] The origins of these peaceful conditions lie in part in the culture, the history, and the societal structure in Japan. Japan’s 20th century experienced periods of great conflict and how peace actors sought to wrest peace from this conflict as well as from the socially constructed systems that assisted this conflict – economic, educational, political, religious, and military – is the work of this paper.

Japan’s Historical Narrative: Socio-Political Conflict and Total War

Japan’s historical narrative is an important guide and indicator to Japan’s peace formulations; contained within this narrative are the socio-political origins of the peace actors. The critical juncture of the Meiji Restoration is key, followed by the short Taisho era, the early Showa era, encompassing the militaristic buildup to the Second World War and post-scripted by the Allied Occupation. The Meiji Restoration replaced the Tokugawa feudal regime in 1868 and instituted a belief system in the new constitution, advancing a new “imagined community Nippon” (Martinez, 2007, p. 4).\[4\] The Emperor became the symbolic head of state, a patriarchal “father figure”, and the country his family. Legal scholars at the time spoke of Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku kokka) with all members descended from Amaterasu the sun goddess.\[5\] A sense of nationalism was thus constructed, bolstered by the development of the national language kokugo and a national polity (kokutai).\[6\] Unlike the American and French Revolutions, the Meiji Restoration was not a revolution from below but a restoration from above, closely monitored by elites surrounding the emperor. As for the people, rural forms of social organization continued on from the Tokugawa period, due in part to the high population of these areas. With the introduction of a factory system in the 1880s, many families moved to the cities in search of work, but they retained strong ties with their rural counterparts (often returning to the country during times of unemployment).\[7\] These bonds were tightly observed by obligation and social mores and remained rigidly hierarchical, locked to the wider family state.

The Taisho period (1912-26) brought much social change, particularly in democratic activity and social debate (the so-called “Taisho Democracy Movement”).\[8\] Intellectuals translated the works of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx even before their western counterparts.\[9\] As Japan industrialized, tensions arose during the World War I economic boom with labour disputes in factories and mines,
as more people moved from agriculture to industry. Following the boom came a post-war slump. The shortage of rice production coupled with high prices set on rice caused urban discontent resulting in the Rice Riot of 1918 and its subsequent repression by the military. Other disputes, such as the 1918 Coalfield Riots where miners protested company indifference to their economic difficulties and the 1924 Miike Strike involving six thousand workers from Mitsui Manufacturing, Mitsui Mines and Mitsui Zinc Smelting, led to the government passing the 1925 Law for the Maintenance of Public Peace followed the next year by the Violence Control Act. Political demands from the emerging urban population resulted in the enactment of universal (male) suffrage in 1925 and election of eight proletariat candidates to the House of Representatives in 1928. However, groups of established party members formed and large business managers and owners (the zaibatsu) gained the political high ground even eclipsing bureaucratic power. As the underrepresented struggled for equality and justice, elite factions pursued greater political and social power. Kokutai expressed loyalty to the country and the state demanded loyalty in all spheres of an individual’s life. True individualism (the western liberal idea) was negated by this state ideology, manifested in laws such as those cited above. It was characteristic of the Taisho era that concepts like equality and democracy were discussed amongst intellectuals and workers, but were never enacted nor openly shared without state oppression; the paramount political and legal structure of Emperor and advisors (the Privy Council, the Imperial Household Ministry, the House of Peers and the genro – elder statesmen) remained immovable from the Meiji Restoration to the Allied Occupation.

The following early Showa period (Showa jidai) expanded rapidly into an age of militarism and ultra-nationalism. Their roots were already established in the Taisho era and now they achieved full fruit. Ian Buruma in his work Inventing Japan (2003) recounts how General Nogi, a hero of the Russo-Japanese War, had schooled the young emperor-to-be Hirohito, committing suicide with his wife on the death of Hirohito’s father, the Emperor Taisho. Following Nogi as Hirohito’s tutor was Admiral Togo, a keen follower of Ikki Kita the ultra-nationalist political philosopher and spiritual influence behind the 1936 failed coup d’état. In his writings, Ikki Kita promoted a restoration of the Emperor Showa (as Hirohito became known on his ascension) from the evils of political corruption between the old zaibatsu organizations and military and political leaders who kowtowed to western pressures. Military factions, like the protagonists of the coup, the kodo (imperial way) who shared Kitta’s beliefs, as well as in the case of the kodo his financial sponsorship, supported this move.

Ultra-nationalism emerged from the hierarchical ideologies promoted by factions of the military, politicians, bureaucrats, right wing groups, and monopoly capital, but this is not to say that these groups worked in tandem. For one thing, the military was answerable only to the Emperor according to the vague terms of the Meiji Constitution and, after a law passed in 1936, only actively serving officers could become the Army and Navy ministers in the government. Moreover, as seen above, different factions within the military were often opposed to their military commanders, the zaibatsu and the government, citing cronyism and corruption. As the military began to exert more political power (following moves into China in 1931), the social structure began to be positioned as an overtly “fascistic” state bent on expansionism. Monopoly capital became the main driver behind the expansionist movement into Manchuria. The military, the bureaucracy, provincial landlords, elite politicians, and monopoly capitalists thus combined in an uneasy alliance during the 1930s to create a system that would protect the capitalist structure in Japan from both the threats of an economic depression and a proletarian revolution. The collapsing economy in the late 1920s dictated that these groups were now faced with the problem of searching for outside resources with which to fuel Japan’s burgeoning industrial growth. The Establishment of the Manchurian Economy (Manshu Keizai Kensetsu Koyo) in 1933 was followed one year after by the creation of the puppet state of...
Manchukuo. The military then began to intensify its power through this constructed state.[15] It dominated politics, ably assisted by industrialists and elite bureaucrats working there, among them Nobusuke Kishi, who would later become prime minister 1957-60 (see below). After gaining experience in the political economy of Manchuria, these integrated groups went on to disseminate their expertise in mainland Japan, where they came to power in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

While further Imperial expansion continued into South East Asia, the militarists joined with the fascists in Germany under Hitler and those in Italy under Mussolini, the three powers signing the Tripartite Pact on September 27th 1940, forming the Axis Powers. The ideology of a privileged and exalted national identity in Japan peaked during this period, manipulated by patriotic education such as that prescribed by the ‘Imperial Rescript on Education’ (1890) through the ‘Essence of our National Polity’ (1937) (kokutai no hongi) published by the Ministry of Education. The militarist structure in the 1930s propelled both the economic direction of Japan as well as the path to war from its early beginnings with the Manchurian (Mukden) Incident in 1931 to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, which began the Second Sino-Japanese War and subsequently led to the full-scale Pacific War.[16]

Social and Cultural Formulations: The Social Stock of Knowledge in Japan

Turning to the social and cultural formulations of Japan, the family system in Japan was intensely patriarchal at the turn of the twentieth century, like so many other systems around the world. The position of women was designated as subordinate to men in institutionalized patterns of male dominance and female subordination and, according to anthropologist William W. Kelly, patriarchy aptly characterized Japan well into the postwar period (1991, p. 409).

The oligarchs of Meiji Japan inculcated filial loyalty and piety in the “family state” as well as loyalty to the father of the state, the emperor (Garon, 2010, p. 318). The Imperial Rescript of Education (1890), as part of the hidden curriculum of socialization in schools, pressed students to be “filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious”, but importantly “should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth”.

The authoritarian government that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century recognized the emperor as head of Japan’s “family” and firmly and vigorously promoted gender identities. Women were socialized to be virtuous, obedient and self-effacing. Self-denial was encouraged for the good of the country, and mothers had been forced to say “come back dead” when seeing off their children to war (Yamamoto, 2004, p. 192). Moreover, the imperial state systematically employed the family to inculcate patriotism while mediating a broad array of public policies. This positioning was also to be found in the military training of Japan’s soldiers and resulted in untold suffering both for the soldiers and for their opponents in war.[17]

The educational system created during the Meiji period (the first period of westernization) had a deep and influential control over the socialization process in Japan. The Restoration had sought to imbue a deep sense of national loyalty (and control) in Japan through its education system, which culminated with ultra-nationalism during the militarist period that ended with surrender in 1945.

The second wave of westernization (also known as the second period of educational reform, see Horio, 1986, p. 32) came with the Occupation, which resolved to eradicate the ultra-nationalistic and militaristic ideology in Japan. Determined to transform the indoctrination of pre-war Japan and the
“national morality” of the Imperial Rescript to an ideal of democracy and pacifism (ibid.), the Allied forces instigated the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education (FLE, Kyoiku kihonho). This defined the basic right of the people to receive education following the edict of the 1946 Constitution. Now there was education as right rather than duty, freedom rather than control, individuality over conformism, and egalitarianism replacing elitism. In pre-war Japan, fewer than seven percent of the population were college graduates, particularly from the Imperial University of Tokyo (Nakayama, 1989, pp. 39-40). US occupying forces, seeking to break down Japanese elitism, insisted that the government expand their higher education sector to include a university in each prefecture (Ibid.).

Although the Americans had viewed pre-war Japan as being too centralized, and sought to disband the Ministry of Education, the US nevertheless had to rely on a degree of Japanese bureaucracy post-war. This meant that they continued to maintain the pre-war civilian elites to a large extent and in so doing perpetuated the existing bureaucracy to implement reform programs (Garon, 1984, p. 441). The relationship was therefore an ambivalent one, but the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) within the SCAP administration and under the guidance of the American Mission of Education, recommended many educational reforms to counter the belief systems created before the war including the creation of the 6-3-3-4 coeducational system. Furthermore teacher training that had been conducted at pre-war normal schools was replaced by university-based education with a stress on liberal arts education. An open certificate system was thus created where colleges and universities could engage in teacher education without direct control from the Ministry of Education (Shimahara, 1994, p. 453).

Peace Actor Formulations

Non-violent struggle has always been a major part of peace action. The issues of inequality and violent conflict as well as the right for free expression and the challenges that stem from corruption and detached and indifferent government (as well as detached and indifferent people) forms the basis of the work of peace actors.[18] The historical narrative recorded above shows how any challenges to the ruling elites were vigorously and violently suppressed by means of arrests, torture, and sometimes death. The tenants and workers who had joined with intellectuals in the aforementioned “Taisho Democracy Movement” pressed for universal suffrage and democratic rights and freedoms, which were never fully realized. Community groups such as the Movement for Freedom and Popular Rights formed after the Meiji Restoration began these moves in their debates for democracy in Japan (Bowen 1980). Most of these actors, such as volunteer groups and intellectuals, were oppressed, disbanded, or imprisoned during the militarist period in the 1930s. However, positions changed after the war. While the roles of post-war volunteer organisations have been varied, they remain the medium wherein individuals meet to build trust and social capital as groups, and they act as a conduit between society and the state, relaying societal concerns to officials and public policies to citizens. Subsequently, the immediate post-war era of 1946 to 1959 was a period of great reflection and intellectual debate and discussion, the debate culture (rondan bunka) being created in part by the reforms of the Occupation forces. The effects of ultranationalism, militarism, and the devastation of Japan’s cities (most notably of course Hiroshima and Nagasaki) proved highly detrimental to Japan and its people. Together with the Occupation, the new Constitution, the controversial continuance of the Emperor, the onset of peace and the peace treaty in San Francisco, and Japan’s post-war resource constraints, these factors all gave rise to much reflection, discussion and action.
Trades Union Activism

Following from the policies of the Occupation, particularly those emphasized by General MacArthur that supported more union freedom to counter the post-war zaibatsu trend, there was a strong emergence of activist trade union groups. These groups included most notably Kokuro, (the National Railway Workers Union), Sohyo, (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) the umbrella labour organization that took over leadership of the labour movement from the Sanbetsu, (the Congress of Industrial Unions of Japan), Sanbetsu’s splinter group Sanbetsu Mindo, (the League for Democratization of Sanbetsu), and Shin Sanbetsu, (the National Federation of Industrial Organizations). Unions were involved in promoting rights for workers as well as being politically active in opposing many of the Occupation’s policies, particularly the Security Treaty with Japan and the involvement of unions (as well as the wider nation state) in the Korean War.

Peace movements originated mainly from post-war communist activists influencing union workers who were both hungry and war-weary and who themselves began to grow increasingly militant. The workers in these union groups were also variously allied by membership to the JSP (the Japanese Socialist Party) and the JCP (the Japanese Communist Party). Workers’ concerns became aligned to political concerns, particularly at the time of the Korean War when armed police supervised the Kokuro in conditions similar to those of the recent Pacific war. Japan’s railway infrastructure was much needed by the US for transportation of military material and workers were needed around the clock to cope with the tremendous workload.

Workers in other industries, such as shipbuilding, steel and automobiles were also pressured to work long hours for very little pay, often employed as contract labourers with few rights. Many anti-American sentiments arose at this time, as being forced to work again for a war cause led many workers to question war itself. This resentment about war joined with resentment about working conditions resulting in strong pacifist feeling and an increasingly politicized agenda. Many members of these unions in turn were severely constrained by the Occupation’s reverse turn and “red purge” of 1950, which marked a severe decline of union activism and a consolidation of conservative political power. However, peace action became a counter-rallying motivator for much union action from then on.

Non-communist members headed the trade union group Sohyo formed in July 1950 such as Minoru Takano, Secretary General of the Japanese General League of Labor Unions (although he was allied to certain Marxist thought). Its aim was to push for a democratic revolution and strive to form a society built along socialist lines. Sohyo supported the U.N. military plan in Korea and also advocated peace and a restoration of Japan’s independence in its opening conference. It also worked with religious groups in order to promote a peace movement. These groups together with Sohyo organized the Nihon Heiwa Suishin Kokumin Kaigi (the Japanese National Congress for the Promotion of Peace), adopting the slogans of protecting the peace constitution, overall peace and neutrality, opposition to rearmament, and safeguarding the freedoms of thought and association. Union leaders like Kaoru Ota of the chemical industry, Fumihiko Takaragi of the telegram and postal services, and Iwai of the National Railways, formed their own society called Rodosha Doshikai (Labourer Comrade Society). They held that they would follow the “Four Principles” and the struggle for world peace as well as support the wellbeing of Asian peoples (Igarishi, 1985, p. 353). The early 1950s were a turbulent period of change for Japan and Sohyo became one of the main opposition groups to the conservative powers as these powers regained their control of the state. Restructuring of the Steel Industry led to labour conflict in 1953-4, which in turn spread to farmers and other commercially interested groups as well. US bases, which had procured local land, furthered social
concern about the disruption of local resident’s lives and livelihoods. In particular, the “Lucky Dragon” tuna boat incident in 1954 (see below) provoked significant Nuclear Debate in Japan. These social issues consolidated Sohyo as a critical force for action against a perceived conservative support for pre-war conditions such as the suppression of rights and a belief in militarism and the union attracted many other social movements. Small business owners, grassroots groups and other non-labour concerns began to attend Sohyo’s annual conventions and activism spread through Japan (Yamamoto, 2004, p. 63-4).

Takano was ousted from his position in 1953 and replaced by Akira Iwai, a member of the left wing of Mindo unionists, the largest group within Sohyo remained involved with political action, however, supporting the protest against the Sunagawa military airfield in May 1955, of which many students also partook. Here the US had seized large areas of land from some 140 farms and in September 1957 promoted a people’s movement (kokumin undo) focusing on intervention by the government into education, nuclear weapons, price increases, the minimum wage, and military bases.

**The Anpo Toso (The Anti-Security Treaty Struggle)**

It was the Anpo Toso movement where Sohyo and general labour power peaked. This event also saw many grassroots groups join in protest against the treaty. The US-Japan Security Treaty was due to be revised in 1960 and the actions of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi had already given labour unions as well as many other citizens much to reflect on, particularly Kishi’s wartime career and his current political actions. After the Yoshida Cabinet fell, Kishi became Prime Minister and proposed the Police Duties Law in 1958, the aim of which was to strengthen the powers of the police. The law was opposed by union action and many saw Kishi and his law as a symbol of the pre-war repressive establishment, which had led the country into war. As 1960 drew close, a movement began (the Anpo Struggle) to protest its revision. Unions like the Tokyo Teacher’s Union and the Japanese Coal Miner’s Union moved to gather workers, and students joined the movement. The unprecedented mass movement in opposition to the signing of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty was a shock to the conservatives. The Kishi administration, however, was determined to place the revision into law. Kishi saw the ratification of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 as important to the nation. The revisions were crucial in that they would strengthen Japan’s sovereignty by placing limits on US military’s rights to intervention in internal disputes. Furthermore, the commitments to purchase US military hardware and provide infrastructure to the US would aid Kishi’s push to remilitarize Japan. In a snap vote that involved the police (on Kishi’s orders) ejecting all of the Diet members affiliated with opposition parties the treaty was approved on May the 19th. As a result, political unrest was widespread. On June 15th, protestors breached the south gate of the Diet, the riot police retaliated, and a Tokyo University student Michiko Kanba was killed. This caused seven newspapers to issue a joint statement imploing the people to stop the violence and restore democracy (a move that many took to mean that the media supported the government). The protests continued, however, and forced US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to cancel his planned trip to Japan and Kishi stood down. The US-Japan security treaty was renewed but the trade-off was that the leadership and authority of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) had reached a crisis point.

**Intellectual Groups**

Tokyo Imperial University attracted some of the finest minds in Japan, many of whom had great influence on Japan’s development. In the early 1930s, a group of students formed Kokogai as a means for independent historical research and an exchange of ideas. The group attracted similar minds from other universities and became known as Rekishigaku Kenkyukai or Rekiken in the mid
1930s. Disbanded in 1944, it came together again in late 1945, and was officially reformed in June 1946. [23]

While responding favourably to SCAP’s new constitution in 1946, which introduced a peace clause (Article 9) and important freedoms such as the sovereignty of the people Reikiken, the group was opposed to the continuance of the emperor system. They identified this system as detrimental to Japanese capitalism and a buffer to socialist revolution. The recent war had exemplified imperialist aggression and the constitution now linked the emperor with the new peace state, a paradox, as the emperor was viewed as at least partly responsible for the disasters of the war.

Reikiken also protested the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (both 1951). In light of the Korean War and internal issues, such as the rise of fascism, the peace problem (heïwa mondai) became synonymous with the lack of rights in Japan both of peace and civil freedoms. This in turn was applied to Reikiken’s opposition to the Ministry of Education’s (Monbusho) dictates for history education. The ministry still proposed the learning of facts and events, which Reikiken criticized, preferring students to critically think about these events. Reikiken members were also strongly opposed to the mythologizing of ancient history and the 1946 textbooks Kuni no Ayumi (The Country’s Progress) for elementary schools and Nihon no Rekishi (Japan’s History) for Junior high schools. The texts proposed no way of thinking about how events occurred but rather stuck to the old ways of disseminating facts to be learnt. In 1949, the ministry produced a Democracy (Minshushugi) textbook, provoking more protests organized by Reikiken and other groups who accused the ministry of gross distortions of democratic history and philosophy. Reikiken member Saburo Ienaga led a protest against the political control of scientific education in 1955 with his article “On the Open Defiance of Scientific Education in Japan”, he was also the co-author of Kuni no Ayumi and later a staunch opponent to the ministry’s history texts.

Another highly influential intellectual group was the Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyokai (Minka) formed on 12 January 1946. Adapting Marxist ideology to formulate their ideas of progressive democracy, a group of approximately 200 Japanese scientists in the Tokyo area developed within two years into a national organisation. Formed at the time of popular left-wing ideologies and the Japanese Communist Party’s (JCP) election success, Minka’s political and social stances were seen as synonymous with left-wing leanings and the JCP. Opposed to the hierarchical and feudal structures of society, including the universities, Minka advocated the importance of science in social change. Minka became more radicalized with the Occupation’s “reverse course” and the political turn in Japan to more conservative policies. Opposing the Anti Subversive Activities Law, Minka urged all democratic scientists in Japan to fight against restrictive policies. The encroaching Cold War and the risk of nuclear war rallied the scientists into calling for research into peaceful nuclear power rather than its military use. Minka subsequently supported the successful Stockholm anti-nuclear signature push, which was tied to the pressing concerns of the Peace Treaty and conditions of peace in Japan, and attracted six and a half million signatures.

Together with Reikiken, Minka also opposed the inclusion of the emperor system within the new 1946 constitution. The concerns raised by Minka were that the constitution had not been allowed public scrutiny, that the government were not representative of the will of the people and could therefore not carry out any constitutional revision and that no improvement of social welfare could be acted out in Japan without a drastic transformation of the political social and economic structure. The inclusion of human rights clauses were a misnomer unless the above were realized and the Article 9 peace clause merely negated national independence, the right of a nation to defend itself adequately or to fight a “just war” against fascism.
Peace issues such as the Peace Treaty and the Peace Problem were also central to Minka’s concern. At its 5th Annual Conference (April 1950) Minka opposed any aligning with the US over security issues, declaring that a partial peace as proposed by the Peace Treaty would jeopardize democracy, science, and the freedom to research for scholarly or creative purposes. Instead, research would be conducted for the purpose of war and thus the nation would be unfavourably and unremittingly linked with war.

The Peace Problem arose at the next annual conference as to how peace was related to the people of Japan. Eschewing an abstract view of peace, Minka proposed a peace treaty signing with the five major powers, asking for a government that would support independence and true peace with an end to conscription, re-armament, and a standing military. The National Railway Workers’ Union, with its adoption of a pacifist anti-war stance following the outbreak of the Korean War, enlisted the help of Minka to conduct a nationwide educational campaign for the newly created principles of peace.[24] Minka strove for democracy for the people, peace, and national independence in the early 1950s; its 7th Annual Conference slogans were Heiwa to dokuritsu no tame no kagaku, or Science for peace and independence and Kokuminteki kagaku no sozo to fukkyu, Creation and dissemination of natural science. Rekiiken Minka’s history section was also opposed to the Ministry of Education’s post-war textbooks.

The Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Heidankai, The Peace Discussion Group) was a movement of liberal, conservative and progressive intellectuals who formed to act as a voice for peace against the oppressive tensions of the oncoming Cold War. Genzaburo Yoshino, an editor working at Iwanami Publishing in Tokyo, had read a 1948 UNESCO statement prepared by eight intellectuals from Eastern and Western Europe. The document, which was to prove highly influential in Japan, as well as in Europe, inspired Yoshino to organize Japanese citizens who shared the document’s pacifist and humanist values. Yoshino gathered bunka jin (liberal men of culture), influential scholars and people in the public eye from many areas of society in preparation for discussion of the UNESCO declaration.[25] Seven committees were prepared based around politics, law, and economics with the inclusion of philosophers, historians, and sociologists meeting through November and December 1948 in Kyoto and Tokyo. The members convened at a joint meeting in Tokyo on December 12th 1948 to discuss a draft from all committees and issue a joint statement entitled Senso to heiwa ni kansuru Nihon no kagakusha no seimei (Japanese Scientists’ Statement on War the Problem of Peace) signed by thirty five scholars. They argued that the strictures of the San Francisco Peace Treaty aligning Japan to US Cold War security would create a separate peace from the rest of the world and could contribute to war. The scholars stressed cutting dependency on the United States (Dower, 1993, p. 9). The statement was subsequently published in Sekai in its March 1949 special issue on world peace and the peace problem. The statement, although compromised by the different committees’ interpretations of the UNESCO declaration nevertheless imparted the deeply felt commitment of the group towards peace.

Also in March, Heidankai became formally established with intellectuals such as Yoshishige Abe in Tokyo and Hiroshi Suekawa and Kyo Tsuneto in Kyoto. The group was extremely disparate, but joined by a common feeling that world peace would be far more preferable to its encroaching alternative, issuing three statements on comprehensive peace, the first in 1949 and two following in 1950. The third and longest statement criticized the realist bipolar worldview and argued that social-democratic reforms influenced by neither Soviet ideology or American cold-war objectives would promote peace and economic equity domestically.[26] The end of the Occupation in April 1952 preceded by the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty signings in 1951 that stationed US troops on the Japanese mainland was a frustrating blow for the Heidankai and although meetings continued
during the 1950s, the group disbanded in November 1959. The Heidankai supported Japan signing
agreements with former enemies of Japan and opposed the US military bases in Japan. The US base
problem was interpreted in two ways in the Heidankai. The older liberals who, along with Japanese
official policy, were disturbed by the Soviet presence and communism, thought that having the US in
Japan might make Japan a likely target by the Soviets. Conversely, the leftist liberals, particularly the
Marxists in Kyoto, held different views on the Korean War and were more concerned about capitalist
aggression towards the Soviets. Maruyama Masuo, a drafter of the three statements of peace
argued that neutrality was not a matter to be decided upon in accordance with international political
pressures, but rather a principle that Japan should abide by in so far as it desired the idea of world
peace and national welfare. [27]

During the Occupation, SCAP had tightly controlled information about the A-bomb attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki until this censorship was curtailed in 1949. [28] As the Korean War
progressed, SCAP pressed Prime Minister Yoshida for remilitarization. [29] This was unacceptable to
liberal and Marxist intellectuals who together with The Communist Party and the Socialist party
insisted on an “overall peace”. This would mean a peace settlement where the Soviet Union,
Communist China, and the East European countries would participate. Japanese conservative
politicians wished to preserve the security alliance after the peace treaty was signed, to the
detriment of their opponents mentioned above as well as those from the National Democratic
Party. [30] With the alliance, Japan could retain independence from conflict as well as their new
independence after the Occupation ended whilst still retaining US security and enjoying economic
benefit from the Korean War.

Grassroots’ Movements: The A-bomb and H-bomb Protests

Gensuikyo (The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) was the organizational centre
for Japan’s “ban the bomb” movement formed in 1955. Kaoru Yasui (1907-1980) was the chair
leader of this movement. [31] Gensuikyo’s origins lay in the Lucky Dragon’s misfortunes the year
before. [32] To commemorate the tenth anniversary of Hiroshima, the national council held a world
conference and established Gensuikyo, aimed at furthering petition action and publicizing the plight
of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the hibakusha. By the end of 1955, every prefecture in
Japan had a Gensuikyo. Although Gensuikyo continued to hold world conferences against nuclear
weapons, it failed to hold multiparty support and interest faded. Factionalism instead emerged with
the progressives urging opposition to the US Security Treaty and the conservatives withdrawing their
support (and funding). Conservatives formed their own anti-nuclear organisation in 1961, the
National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons, while leftist Socialists established the
Japan Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. This factionalism greatly upset Yasui who
saw any form of political schism as detrimental to the cause of the hibakusha and the anti-nuclear
movement. Nevertheless the anti-nuclear movement succeeded in voicing great opposition to
nuclear weapons as well as lobbying politicians not to allow the US to openly deploy nuclear
weapons on Japanese soil.

Okinawa

The legacy of war remains, however, and nowhere more than in Okinawa. It has been a host for
seventy five percent of US facilities and bases since 1945 and has played an important role for US
military operations as the “keystone of the Pacific” (Akibayashi & Takazato, 2009, p. 243). Okinawa
suffered immeasurably at the end of the Second World War with the Japanese command showing an
indifference to civilian lives during the conflict and the lives of the people of Okinawa under long-
term military occupation remaining neglected at the expense of power politics. The “typhoon of steel” (the name attributed to the Battle of Okinawa quoted in JICA, 2006, p. 16) caused the drafting of students and teachers into the “Emperor’s Blood and Iron Brigades”, and the Japanese military, in order to delay a US landing on the mainland, conducted a war of attrition, abandoning local residents without food or places to evacuate during heavy fighting, resulting in large loss of life (ibid., 16-17).

At the San Francisco conference in September 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida signed the treaty that restored sovereignty to Japan while the United States “retained its rights to maintain bases in Japan and kept full administrative control over Okinawa” (Jansen, 2000, p. 701). The treaty created great animosity towards Hirohito by the people of Okinawa who had suffered terribly during the latter stages of the Pacific War – “when the battle of Okinawa ended, ninety-five thousand civilians had been killed by enemy fire, by Japanese soldiers, by loved ones and trusted acquaintances, and by their own hands” (Dower, 1986, p. 45). At the time of the battle, 222 female students aged between fifteen and nineteen “were mobilized as battlefield nurses, along with 18 of their head teachers. 123 students and 13 teachers lost their lives” (JICA, 2006, p. 74).

Okinawa has seemingly been excluded from the ‘peace’ of Japan. Many crimes committed by US soldiers on the civilian populace coincide with periods when the US was engaged in war in Asia. For many of these soldiers, Okinawa was the final stop before troop deployment to the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam. As well as the continuing question of the bases, Okinawa faced considerable problems in rebuilding its education system after the Second World War. Okinawa was placed under US military rule for 27 years from 1945 to 1972 and schools faced significant difficulties in acquiring resources and funding. US rule “gave first priority to the functioning of the bases” which, contend JICA, became a major theme of peace education in Okinawa (JICA, 2006, p. 57). Traditional teacher trainer programs were only instigated in 1952 and sent 1,431 people to the mainland for training between 1958 and 1972 (ibid. 47). Moreover, in a movement that sought to come to terms with the harrowing experiences in Okinawa, parents and grandparents began to tell of their experiences at home, and slowly these stories started to be published.

Initially, books dealing with Okinawa were written by the military or state historians and followed the victor/defeated tract. However, the first books written by Okinawans themselves about their experiences during the Battle of Okinawa emphasized the civilians’ point of view. These were Typhoon of Steel published in 1950, followed by Accounts of the Battle of Okinawa in 1971. Both books detailed the horrific conditions of war but, as the preface of Typhoon of Steel explains, the people wished to speak of something deeper, in the wish to seek human understanding and friendship that transcends nation and race appealed for lasting peace. Peace education courses using the experiences of Okinawan civilians as a focus for study began to be taught with peace education taking many forms such as fieldwork, media presentations, plays and concerts. Peace museums also played a role in this work, which carried (and still carry) exhibitions of the conflict in Japan.

Many protests have continued around these bases by both Okinawan people and people on the mainland of Japan. The offshore base dispute concerning the replacement sighting of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS) from Naha to an offshore base at Nago of 1997 brought Prime Minister Hashimoto down to Okinawa to try to appease the anti-base coalition formed in Nago and Henoko in the winter of 1996. There had already been a huge protest (over 85,000 people) on the island in 1995 following the abduction and rape of a girl by three US servicemen the so-called Kin Town rape (Inoue, 2004, p. 97). The plan was defeated through popular mobilization, local elections, and the decision by Governor Masahide Ota to veto the Tokyo-Washington project. His move led to
Tokyo cutting off contact from the prefecture, effectively employing economic sanctions and forcing him out of office in November 1998 (McCormack, 1999, p. 4).

Other protests on Okinawa have taken the form of anti-war protests against US militarism. In April 2003, five thousand people and forty-five peace groups, including the Naha-based Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence took part in a ‘die-in’ around the perimeter fence of Kadena Air Base (Spencer, 2003, p. 139). Spencer notes in her article that the citizen protests against these bases have also incorporated a broader perspective into their protests such as environmentalism, feminism, anti-militarism, and even anti-globalization. [39]

The relocation of Futenma as a heliport in Henoko became the undoing of Prime Minister Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan at the beginning of 2010. Hatoyama and his party had made an electoral commitment that the Futenma base would not be relocated to Nago (as had been negotiated by the former LDP government). Unfortunately, Hatoyama folded under pressure from the US government and uncooperative Japanese bureaucrats and agreed to implement the 2009 Guam International Agreement on the 28th May 2010. Hatoyama further acceded to paying $7 billion towards the cost of relocation of 8,000 Marines and 9,000 of their family members from Futenma to Guam by 2014. Furthermore, the government of Japan would also construct a “Futenma Replacement Facility” near Henoko (McCormack, 2010, p. 1).

**Peace Actor’s Voices in 21st Century Japan**

I have outlined many of the concerns of peace within Japan through the passage of Japan’s turbulent 20th Century, and I now turn to peace actors in the 21st Century. My interviews took place over the autumn and winter of 2011 into early 2012 and followed work I started in 2009 (see Gibson 2011). Funding determined that I concentrated on the Kansai area of Japan but the peace actors that I interviewed have extensive connections with many other areas of Japan. Of the interviews I conducted, I chose to focus on two groups and two individual actors due to space strictures in this paper. These respective peacemakers nevertheless help demonstrate a comprehensive overview of what constitutes peace concerns in Japan.

*Shinfujin* (The New Japan Women’s Association or NJWA) founded on October 16 1962 have five objectives: to protect the lives of women and children from the danger of nuclear war, to oppose the adverse revision of the constitution and the resurgence of militarism, to work together for better living conditions, extend women’s rights and children’s wellbeing, win genuine national independence, support democracy and the emancipation of women, and to join hands with women in the world for building lasting peace. Granted Special Consultative Status by UNESCO in May 2003, *Shinfujin* has more than 150,000 members across Japan and publishes a weekly paper, the *Shinfujin Shimbun* with a weekly readership of over 230,000 together with a monthly magazine *Josei & Undo* (‘Women and the Movement’). The Kansai group interviewed saw it as important to deal with the abolition of nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and also were in solidarity with *Hibakusha*, many of whom receive only limited medical care and lack government recognition. *Shinfujin* have collected 1.7 million signatures in support of the Appeal for a Nuclear Free World and presented them to the UN in 2010 together with a further 7 million signatures collected worldwide (viewed by the organization as not a collection of names but a collective voice of individuals).

The organization also deals with the US military bases, especially in Okinawa, and petitions to cut military spending, arguing that this money would be effective if used for food, education, and health, particularly in support of the Millennium Development Goals. The March 11, 2011 earthquake,
tsunami and nuclear accident in the Tohoku region of Japan have also presented many concerns for peace; the group feels the government’s response has been slow and inadequate, and that the information supplied, particularly relating to the Fukushima power plant, has been duplicitous. The issue of democracy continues to be important because in the case of the nuclear accident people were not clearly informed of events as they were happening. Democracy issues also relate to the Japanese election system, which continues to be unrepresentative of the people and is in desperate need of revision. Minority groups are not reflected and minority candidates cannot be elected. As the organization points out, the improvement of women’s positions and equality between men and women can only be realized when there is peace, so without peace, it is not possible to attain gender equality. In the UN, gender equality development and peace are regarded as both important and interconnected, and Shinfujin actively pursue these issues both in Japan and internationally.

A smaller group interviewed was the Kyoto Mothers Movement (Kyoto haha oya renraku kai), but they share extensive ties with many similar Mothers groups all over Japan. Their organization has its origins in a mothers’ congress which, following the 1954 US hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll, was held in 1955 in Switzerland. Mothers from 14 countries assembled to share ideas of peace and began to organize internationally to protect children’s lives. During the Second World War in Japan, women could not speak out, but after the end of the war the new Japanese constitution was ratified and it became possible for a woman to have the right of vote. The purpose of this movement is to exercise that vote and demonstrate against war, as mothers and citizens. Every December 8th on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor (the date of the attack in Japan), the group distributes a flyer, an exact replica of the draft order that Japanese men received during the war, to over 200 elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools, and to special needs schools in Kyoto. Other Mothers Movement groups also distribute the paper all over Japan. They use the conscription order as a means to relay information about peace which is contained on the reverse side, and explain that December 8th was the day when Japan started the war, so please try to promote peace education at your school. Avoiding issues with the board of education, the mothers lobby the schools directly. They have been doing this nationally since 1980, not only on December 8th but also August 15th, the day that Japan was defeated (though the group notes that generally speaking in the mass media defeated is not used, the preferred term being the day that the war finished).

When questioned about their view of peace, the group described a world without war and where people can live with security. As for politics, the group opposes the US bases in Okinawa and the dispatch of the self-defense forces abroad. They also think that the reconstruction of the Tohoku area is very important. The group’s members are from organizations like teachers unions, NGOs, or less formal regional gatherings to promote the mothers movement. So, in effect, there is no formal membership but a collection of NGOs and individuals who share a common identity as “mothers recognizing mothers as the symbol of life”. A leading member of the Kyoto group explained that she was proud of Article 9 of the constitution, despite its being ignored by the members of parliament. As for the Mothers Movement’s influence on society, their movement has been repeatedly ignored in the media (a common complaint by peace activists in Japan) where for example last year in July (2011), a Mothers Congress was held in Hiroshima attended by 16,000 mothers but received no major media coverage. The Movement does its best to disseminate what they are doing but “the media choose to ignore this and that’s really terrible.”

Professor Ikuro Anzai is the honorary director of the Kyoto Museum for World Peace established in 1992. A graduate from the department of nuclear engineering at Todai (Tokyo University) in 1962, he specialized in radiological health sciences and states he had no direct relationship to peace at that time. However, it was in the 1960s that the Japanese people began to think about the social
responsibility of scientists and technology and so in 1965 an organization of scientists named the Japan Scientist Association (JSA) was established in Tokyo. Anzai was invited to join and later became a member on the board of directors, responsible for social activities relating to the nuclear policy of Japan as well as environmental problems stemming from technological development in Japan. During the 1960s and 1970s, the members of the JSA became critical of the Japanese nuclear power policy, arguing that it was promoted not in the name of safety for people, but in the name of economic growth. At that time, Anzai was an assistant lecturer at the University of Tokyo (in his words “hired by the nation” – Todai being a state university) and he was invited by the Japanese Diet to comment on the issue of nuclear power policy in Japan whereupon he criticized this policy and “invited some difficulties”, difficulties that were to continue. He explains that later on September 18th and 19th 1973, the Japanese government first organized a public hearing about the Fukushima power station relating to the safety issues of the reactor. During that hearing he was also one of the speakers and again criticized the Japanese power policy. As a result of his outspoken comments, Anzai experienced academic harassment from his department; nobody in his immediate faculty of approximately fifteen members were permitted to speak to him “from morning to night” and no one was permitted to walk side by side with him or have dinner with him or take a photograph with him. He was also refused research grants and lecture rights and prohibited by his “boss/professor” to attend or give presentations at academic societies (which Anzai duly ignored). This harassment continued from 1973 up to 1986 when he moved from Tokyo University to Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto.

Anzai was also deeply involved in the Japanese peace movement in the field of anti nuclear weapons. He was a board member of the Japanese delegation to the UN for the first Special Session devoted to Nuclear Disarmament (SSD1) in 1978 as well as giving many lectures and symposium talks on disarmament in the 1970s and 1980s. When asked how he perceived peace he reiterated Johan Galtung’s claim that peace is not just the absence of war but also the absence of structural violence. Making reference to Japan, he gave an example that in the first five years of the Iraqi war the number of civilians killed was 550,000 and in the same period, 200,000 Japanese people committed suicide. Anzai sees that “we have serious social violence”, noting also that Japan has US military bases and that, historically, during the 1960s the US could not have fought the Vietnam War without them. Because of social and structural violence, therefore, he does not think Japan is a peaceful country.

As well as being involved in nuclear issues, Anzai became deeply involved with the role of peace museums in the late 1980s. He sees their role as dealing with issues not just of how Japan was affected by war but also of how Japan affected countries in the Asian Pacific; what Japan did there, what kind of aggressive conduct the Japanese military forces carried out. Japanese peace museums in Japan, he feels, should focus more on this structural violence. As a way of reinforcing this idea, he acted as a mediatory between the Kyoto Museum of World Peace and the Nanking War Museum, after having been invited to the Nanking Museum in 1998. This came about due to the work of Dr. Peter van den Dungen of the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, who after organizing the first peace museum conference in Bradford in 1992, and then in Vienna, requested the third be held in Japan in 1998. Anzai invited people from China and Korea as a means of establishing peace dialogues on Japan’s imperial past. He thinks that it is very important to have communication between these museums even though “we have different points of view”. Anzai continues his work; last year he gave many talks at conferences on the Fukushima disaster, and he remains active as a member of the Article 9 movement, seeing it as necessary to talk not only to those who agree with Article 9, but more importantly, to those who oppose it.
Kazuyo Yamane is a translator, peace educator, a board member for Museums for Peace and author of Grassroots Museums for Peace in Japan. She, like Professor Anzai, has been deeply involved in the work of peace museums as a means for peace and reconciliation between Japan and the victims of its imperial past. As a child of an atomic bomb survivor, Yamane says that she originally possessed a “victim mentality” about the war, but this changed during the 1990s as she and others in the peace movement started to reflect more deeply on Japan’s aggression. Collecting research on peace museums for her PhD thesis, she became aware of the active movement by right-wingers and nationalists in trying to suppress exhibitions on Japan’s aggression in peace museums. They were reacting both against museums and the pressure from Asian countries, who were demanding an apology and compensation from Japan. Yamane views the latter as natural, but says that Japan should have apologized to other countries at an individual level as the US did to the Japanese Americans who were put into concentration camps during World War 2. This included her grandparents and relatives (he mother is Japanese-American and she was born in Washington) and later her aunt received a letter of apology from president Reagan and also as compensation of two million yen. Such a method by Japan, she feels, would have helped to assuage individual psychological suffering. Unfortunately, in the case of Asian victims of Japanese aggression, they are getting old, many people have died, especially the women who were forced to work sexually as slaves – but something should still be done. Yayori Matsui, who organized the comfort women trial in Tokyo, regrettably has passed away, while the media, among them the national broadcaster, NHK, have consistently refused (and currently refuse) to cover this issue.

It was Kazuyo Yamane’s work with Grassroots House that played a large part in altering her perception of “Japan as victim”. She visited China with members of the museum to learn what really happened in the war because the history of the conflict and especially Japan’s aggression had not been taught or discussed in Japanese schools or in the media until the 1980s, and then only in very limited discourse. In China, she investigated the case of germ warfare carried out by the Imperial Forces. She met Chinese victims, and it soon became apparent what had really occurred in China. In the Grassroots House, like many peace museums in Japan, the emphasis was placed on the atomic bombing or the US air raids on Japanese cities, but slowly, through the work in China, the members became more focused on Japanese aggression. This was made more immediate due to the fact that Kochi had sent many soldiers to China and their actions there were not what the city’s people had for a long time believed. Every year the city held an anniversary that celebrated the soldiers as heroes, and Grassroots House’s research had uncovered a different story – a story of Japanese bombers dropping pieces of cloth impregnated with germs on Chinese civilians. The Grassroots group published a testimonial of the victims as a booklet to inform students, which was also used as a teaching material in Kochi University. Grassroots House has also been active for peace and reconciliation in that members who went to China supported a Chinese lawsuit against the Japanese government, demanding their apology and compensation. Kazuyo Yamane recounts that at first “the Chinese people said ‘why did you come to China? We hate Japanese, go home!’” but Mr. Nishimori, who is a high school biology teacher as well as the director of Grassroots House, had brought a junior high school student with him and said “well, here is a Japanese junior high school students and he wants to learn what really happened’ and so the Chinese people began to change their mind and talk about their war time experiences, so that was the beginning…”

Peace Actor’s Concluding Remarks

When asked whether they thought Japan was a peaceful country, these peace actors all answered firmly in the negative. Although there is no war, there are many issues that negate “positive” peace. Young people are having a hard time securing work, contract labour is increasing and deteriorating
working conditions are causing terrible stress (see Professor Anzai’s account of suicide numbers). Following the 3/11 nuclear disaster, there was a dearth of effective, critical coverage by the media (the actors interviewed lamented the quality of the media overall in Japan, particularly in respect to peace matters), allowing political subterfuge over environmental concerns, especially on the issue of nuclear contamination (Anzai has given many presentations on this matter), and a lack of political will to deal with the survivors. As Yamane points out, while attention has been focused on the 3/11 disaster and its aftermath, there have also been subtle moves to change Article 9 and the Constitution, especially by Osaka’s Mayor Hashimoto. Yamane, together with the women’s groups, is relatively optimistic, taking comfort in the fact that women or mothers have been active for peace, and every year nationally and locally, mothers get together and discuss all kinds of issues: nuclear issues, peace and war, human rights, or children’s education, not only in Okinawa but all over Japan. Growing concern for the future of their children, especially after the nuclear accident, has brought many young mothers to the peace movement. However, many challenges remain. Politicians like Mayor Hashimoto and their nationalist or conservative supporters are trying to abolish peace centres or combine history museums and peace centres together in an effort to rid Japan of exhibitions of Japan’s aggression. Certain US politicians want to change Article 9, so that they could enlist the support of Japanese soldiers in military engagements overseas, as they have done with South Korea (in the case of the war in Vietnam, Yamane recounts, Korean soldiers were sent instead of Japanese soldiers because of Article 9). In Japan, therefore, there is an underlying conflict between those who want Japan to partake in Asian wars again of rulers, including international powers, and others, like these peace actors, who resist revisiting the dark past of war, and continue to struggle for a more just and peaceful future.

Conclusion

The first half of the twentieth century in Japan was a period of great struggle to attain political representation, justice, and equal rights. The rise of ultra-nationalism enabled by the rigid construction of the kokutai, elite factions, and the militarist push into South East Asia subsumed any voice of dissent. Post-war Occupation policies joined by many, suddenly empowered Japanese citizens allowed socio-political peace engagement on a massive scale. Protests against nuclear weapons, environmental damage, political corruption and subterfuge, US bases and compromising US/Japan security issues erupted and continue. In light of the concerns of the peace actors discussed in this article, however, we must conclude that Japan’s peace still remains illusive and contested.

References


**Notes**

[1] As John Dower notes critics have always found the one percent of GNP deceptive. Japan has often exceeded this figure by NATO style calculations which include such items as military retirement benefits and as far back as 1976 Japan’s military spending was ranked seventh in the world. Moreover one percent of a top ranking economy is huge by any standards with shrewd political players like Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro deliberately breaching the one percent mark in 1987. The SDF has the fifth largest navy in the world. Its current defense budget is nearly $50 billion placing it in the top seven worldwide with government funding for US bases in Japan running at more than $2 billion a year (Kingston, 2011, p. 129).

[2] Certainly around the time of the Gulf War of 1991 when the international community openly criticized Japan for not supplying “boots on the ground” politicians such as Masahiko Hisae claimed that Japan had no alternative choice because of the terms of its constitution. The international criticism proved unsettling for Tokyo. Ichiro Ozawa, the LDP secretary-general at the time famously stressed the requirement for Japan to become a “normal nation” assuming responsibility “not only as an economic power but as a political and military one as well” (Shinoda, 2007, p. 6). As to the origins of Article 9, Klaus Schlichtmann in his 2009 book *Japan and the World: Shidehara Kijuro: Pacifism and the Abolition of War* maintains it was Shidehara, Japan’s second Occupation-era Prime Minister who conceived the idea that a war-abolishing provision should be included in the Japanese Constitution. Dower 1999, citing McNelly 1982, refutes claims that Shidehara proposed Article 9 however, attributing “the basic decision” to MacArthur, p. 613.

[3] “The urge to criticize our social and political institutions is a fundamental feature of humanity ... a society where criticism has not a role is not just unrealistic, it is the dream of tyrants” (MacKenzie, 2004, p. 25).

[4] Carol Gluck’s *Japan’s Modern Myths* (1985) is perhaps one of the best studies to show that the rapid change following the 1868 Meiji Restoration after the Tokugawa (Edo) Period (1603-1867) was neither smooth nor unchallenged.

[5] See Garon, 2010 p. 318. Article 3 Chapter 1 of the new constitution proclaimed the Emperor as sacred a Manifest Deity (The constitution also ascribed the emperor military power. Article 11 of Chapter 1 proclaimed the emperor as commander-in-chief (daigensui) of the army and the navy the imperial force (kogun) (see Ohnuki-Tierney 1991 p. 205). In reality the emperor although defined as sovereign by the Meiji Constitution had no decision-making power and remained politically inactive; his role was to grant legitimacy to political decisions. The Han Clique elites advised the emperor on matters of emergency decrees, treaties, constitutional reinterpretation, martial law and international law in the capacity of a Privy Council (Hayes 2005, p. 22).

[6] However as the sociologist Tadashi Fukutake wrote the growth was carefully protected and monitored by the national government (part of the ruling bloc of Japan) and meant that no truly liberal tradition developed with it (Fukutake, 1974, p. 3). The Meiji ruling bloc consisted of government leaders who were descended from low-level samurai warrior classes. Cheung’s *The Political Economy of Japan* (2003) documents these processes together with the development of Japan’s economic systems. *Kokutai* (lit. "National body") was a semi-mystical construction of the Japanese nations as a form of authoritarian family state with the Emperor as father and stressing a dogma of the unique character and essence of a national community. *Kokutai* reached its ultranationalist zenith in the 1930s particularly with the publication of the *Kokutai no Hongi* or Fundamentals of the National Polity by the Ministry of Education in 1937.
Modern technologies were introduced from advanced nations in the West such as the US and Great Britain, these were combined with Japan’s own technology in the factories and the division of labour began. The government played an important role by investing in industrial infrastructures and establishing state owned enterprises. Their role declined however and the processes of industrialization were later passed from government enterprises to privileged merchants (called seisho or political merchants) with close links to government politicians and officials. Later these merchants formed zaibatsu large and highly influential family controlled establishments (Mitsubishi zaibatsu gained control of Mika Coal Mine and Tomioka Silk Mill, Mitsui zaibatsu ran Hagasaki Shipyard and Takashima Coal Mine shipyards and Kawasaki zaibatsu acquired Hyogo Shipyard). Moreover the government invited many engineers from the United States and Europe to build factories and facilitate industrial know-how (Nakamura, 1978). The factories continued to be run like large households with the main families at the head of the constructed household (ie) maintaining the cooperative spirit and strong ties of the rural communities.

During the Taisho period democratic institutions made significant developments and as peoples’ awareness of political systems grew so did mass movements of workers farmers, students and intellectuals. Much of the impetus behind these movements was government failure to control inflation and the labour unrest. The influence of Marxist thought after the success of the Russian Revolution also something these movements. Left leaning parties were formed, such as the communist party, in this period along with other socialist parties.

Students and intellectuals talked of ‘Dekansho’ (a shorted form to denote the works of Descartes, Kant and Schopenhauer), dress styles in the cities of Tokyo and Osaka emulated the western “jazz age” and much debate and discussion also ensured with people embracing the outside world (Buruma, 2003, pp. 65-9)

Largely created by munitions and war material orders from the Allies, together with Japanese manufacturers moving into markets abandoned by the blockade against Germany.

Rice was critical for the industrial development of Japan before1960 particularly before 1920 when labor-intensive light industries (such as textiles) predominated, especially in the manufacturing of export goods, to supply cheap rice to industrial workers to keep their living costs and wages low (Hayami, 1972 p. 20)

There were many labour disputes between 1919 and 1938. Statistical data from the Nihon Keizai Tohei Kenkyujo (the Japan Economic Statistics Research Bureau) reveals as many as 2,388 disputes in 1919, an increase of 417 from the previous year. The number of disputes continued high until 1938 when the Japanese economy transferred into a wartime economy (Nihon Tokei Kenkyujo 1958, p. 294).

The two main warring factions were the Kodoha (the Imperial Way faction) and the Tosieha (the Control Faction) comprising among its members Ishiwara Kanji and the future prime minister of Japan General Tojo Hideki. The latter group supported the idea of total war with the West and cooperation with the bureaucracy and business interests. The Kodoha favored the Showa Restoration path ridding the nation of the corrupt bureaucracy and big business (see Buruma 2003 chapter 4).

Monopoly capital was given as one reason to fight (the shortage of raw materials for manufacturing processes was a concern following economic crises like the Showa financial crisis of March 1927 and the Wall Street Crash of 1929). The emperor’s honor was another reason. See Toyama Shigeki, Fujiwara Akira, and Imai Seichi, (1945) Showa shi, 1st ed. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.

In October 1934, the Army Ministry published Kokubo no hongi to sono kyoka teishi (The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It). In this pamphlet the Ministry denounced the ideologies of liberalism, individualism and internationalism viewing these as neglecting the nation. It urged for national mobilization to prepare for a future war and further denounced the capitalist system, and called for a “basic reconstruction in public finances, the economy, foreign relations, political strategy, and the education of the people in order to organize and control the great potential spiritual and physical energy of the imperial nation for the sake of national defense and to administer it in a unified manner.” Prominent leaders of the largest
socialist party in Japan, the Social Mass Party (Shakai taishuito), soon endorsed the army’s program (Fletcher, 1979, p. 47).

[16] Although by no means unopposed even by factions within its own institution – Colonel Kanji Ishiwara although the instigator of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 later opposed the push towards Shanghai and Nanjing citing that resources would be overstretched, a view that proved prophetic.

[17] Japanese soldiers were “socialized to sacrifice themselves for the emperor and the state” according to Dower (1986, p. 68) and “ordered not to surrender by their commanders... Japanese fighting men also died simply because their country or sovereign called upon them to do so. Still others fought to the bitter end, because they believed, with good reason, that surrender would bring ostracism upon their families.” See also Gluck, 1985, p. 248 of how the emperor was “invoked to inculcate a soldierly spirit of loyalty and bushido.” It could also be posited that many citizens were similarly socialized. Following the Emperor’s announcement of surrender on August 15 (the famously euphemistic line translated as “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage” was insisted on by War Minister Anami, according to Frank, 1999, p. 320) Doctor Hachiya working at a Hiroshima hospital that day observed that many bomb victims in the wards voiced, “expressions of anger... and the hospital turned into an uproar, and there was nothing one could do. Many who had been strong advocates of peace and others who had lost their taste for war following the pika [the Japanese word that here described the ‘flash’ of the atomic bomb] were now shouting for the war to continue...The one word – surrender had produced a greater shock than the bombing of our city” (Hachiya quoted in Frank, 1999, p. 321, see also Frank, 1999, pp. 101-116 for both Japanese and foreign embassies’ decrypted analyses of Japan’s readiness to engage in a mainland war.)

[18] See Thomas Pogge, (2010). Politics as usual: What lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric? Cambridge: Polity Press. Pogge posits that the indifference of the majority of people to the claims of those affected by poverty negates the fact that we are all responsible for poverty and indifference is no excuse.

[19] In light of the discussions of the immanent peace treaty, in March 1951 the union adopted the “Four Principles of Peace” (1) overall peace, (2) neutrality, (3) no offer of military bases in Japan and (4) opposition to rearmament. The day after the peace principles were adopted, Robert T. Amis, who headed the Labor Division of SCAP, summoned Takano and others warning them that their adoption of the “Four Principles on Peace” violated SCAP’s policies (Minoru, 1977, pp. 89-90).

[20] This was the first major Zengakuren (All Japan Federation of Student Governments) protest since the 6th Party Conference of 1955. As the JCP became increasingly marginalized by its adoption of military tactics in the early 1950s, base protests led by Sohyo and the faction JSP spread to take over the JCP-led mass movements. By breaking its links with the JCP Minoru Morita the student who took the lead of Zengakuren’s protest at the Sunagawa base the student union was able to secure a mass base it had not had leading up to the Anpo Toso protests (Hasegawa, 2009, p. 118).

[21] Kishi had been a key player in Japan’s pre-war China and was an architect of the Five-Year Industrial Plan (Manshu Sangyo Koihatsu Gokanen Keiakoku). Bureaucrats brought in from Japan like Kishi and aided by Japanese private enterprises had created this plan. Later Kishi had also been part of the so-called military-bureaucratic coalition and served as Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1942, together with Hideki Tojo, Chief of the Kwantung Army General Staff and wartime prime minister from 18 October 1941 to 22 July 1944. Kishi had been part of Tojo’s cabinet that declared war on the United States and had been arrested as a suspected Class A war criminal spending three years in Sugamo Prison while being investigated. He was eventually not charged and was released. With the advent of the Cold War many conservatives in Japan like Kishi were given a new lease of life under the “reverse course” policy – the purging of all communist thought and actors by the allies. Conservatives regardless of their wartime careers were gaining political ground.

[23] Rekiken’s modus operandi was to adhere to absolute scientific categories such as fact and truth and to follow normative values as responsibilities and duties recognizing the failure of pre-war historians to withstand ultranationalist and imperialist ideology. The society promoted activism about what it perceived as the correct role for the public intellectual and moral responsibility acknowledging the passivity of past responses to state authority. The members protested perceived losses to freedom in the late 1940s such as the 1949 University Law, which threatened to remove autonomy at university together with the Anti Subversive Activities Bill (*Hakai katusdo boshiho*) of 1952, which restricted the right to public protest. A sub groups of Rekiken the *Gendaishi* was particularly aware of the development of fascism being composed of historians concerned with contemporary Japanese history and applied this to the criticism of current political acts that signaled signs of absolutism, denial of democratic rights or centralized bureaucracy. Prominent members included Shigeki Toyama, Kiyoshi Inoue, Bokuro Eguchi and Eiichi Matsushima, who came under the tutelage of Goro Hani the *koza* faction historian and chair of the new executive committee.

[24] Historical debate still surrounds who were directly responsible for the peace principles that stemmed from the San Francisco Peace Treaty discussions. Many historians cite the *Sohyo* adopting the principles from the JSP (who began this work around the same time as *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*) but others have the *Sanbetsu Mindo* in 1948 and later the *Shin Sanbetsu* (formed July 1949) working for democratic peace and initiating these principles before the newly founded *Sohyo* under its increasingly left wing leader Minoru Takano could finalize its stand around the beginning of January 1951, see Yamamoto, 2004 chapters 2 and 3.

[25] The translation is taken from John Dower’s *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience*, 1979, p. 363. Yoshino first contacted Ikutaro Shimizu, a prominent sociologist requesting him to be in charge of managing such a group as secretary. Yoshino also asked Yoshishige Abe, President of Gakushuin University, Hyoe Ouchi, Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo, and Yoshio Nishina, Chief of the Institute of Physical Science, to recruit members to form the Tokyo branch of the group. Kyo Tsuneto, President of Osaka City University, and Hiroshi Suekawa, President of Ritsumeikan University, were asked to select a Kansai group (*Igarishi 1985, p. 343.)*

[26] See Dower, 1993, p. 10. Dower argues that the wording of this third statement appeared reminiscent of Japan’s pan-Asian rhetoric in the Second World War, referring to the “Asian people’s historic position and mission” while also formulating a “victim” construct of the war – nurturing anti-war sentiments that appealed to the suffering of the Japanese “fatherland” in the recent war (and ignoring the suffering that Japan had imposed on South East Asia) that was to continue in Japan.

[27] See *Igarishi 1985 p 347.*

[28] SCAP censorship during the occupation meant that no media discussion of the bomb or its effects on the populace of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was publicly allowed (see Braw, 1991). The occupation forces relaxed this censorship in the beginning of 1949; however for almost six years after the war scientific information and data on radioactive poisoning that, according to Braw, might have assisted bomb sufferers was suppressed within Japan.

[29] Yoshida resisted this pressure but the encroaching Cold War together with the Korean War underlined Japan’s nervous security alliance with the United States. During discussion on the peace settlement from 1950-1952 and taking their cue from John Foster Dulles “Yoshida and the conservatives were willing to conclude a ‘separate peace’ in which the peace treaty was linked to a military agreement with the United States” (*Igarashi 1985, p. 324)*

[30] The multinational peace treaty and bilateral US-Japan security treaty were signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, China a victim of Japanese aggression during the previous fifteen year war with Japan (from the Mukden Incident in 1931 to the end of hostilities in 1945) was not invited and the USSR subsequently objected to the treaty and refused to sign as did Poland and Czechoslovakia. Japan would agree to US bases stationed in Japan.
[31] James Orr notes that as Professor of International Law at Tokyo Imperial University in the 1930s and 1940s, Yasui contributed to the formation of official cultural policy in occupied China and called on intellectuals to support Japan’s wartime government (Orr, 2000, p. 1). He was purged by the occupation in March 1948 allowing him a certain reflection of his prewar actions. Orr notes that peace activism had been marginalized as a left-wing interest at the time of the Korean War but Yasui was instrumental in establishing political approval of anti-nuclear feeling particularly by those on the right. He guided opposition to nuclear weapons away from anti-Americanism by adopting a conciliatory stance within the movement and pursued an emotional attachment of a shared atomic victimhood. He thus helped return pacifist sentiment to the center of discourse on Japanese national identity in an era of significant conservative pressure for remilitarization, as symbolized by the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces and the implementation of the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) in 1954” (ibid., 2).

[32] On March 1st 1954. The tuna boat had come under a cloud of radioactive ash from the Bikini Atoll Hydrogen bomb exploded by the United States at 3:45 in the morning. Returning to their port in Yaizu, Japan the crew reported the first signs of radioactive poisoning which resulted in the death of the radio operator Aikichi Kuboyama that September. Following Yaizu city’s formal protests the Japanese Diet and other assemblies followed in April 1954 with the Suginami Ward assembly in Tokyo under Kaoru Yasui initiating an appeal that collected 270,000 signatures calling for a ban on the hydrogen bomb. The tuna boat had returned its catch to local markets setting off a scare of radiation-contaminated food that caught press interest. Other petitions arose around the country and a national council was formed in Tokyo with Saburo Yamada, president of Japan’s Academy of Arts and Sciences and Nobel physicist Hideki Yukawa as co-directors. Yasui became general secretary with the total number of petition signatures rising to 30 million by August 1955 (See Orr above and also Yasui, 1955, pp. 64-7).

[33] Jansen, 2000, p. 665. And indeed Okinawa continues to suffer, given the numerous attacks on women by US military personnel stationed in Okinawa. REICO (Rape Emergency Intervention Center Okinawa) has documented police reports on reported rapes (many rapes go unreported). Stars and Stripes Tuesday, April 27, 2004, Marine gets 3 ½ years for rape, records how Marine Lance Cpl. Jose W. Torres was sentenced to 3 ½ years in a Japanese prison for a sexual crime. Prosecutor Tsuyoshi Satake argued that the May 25 attack was a “heinous and vicious crime that could not be forgiven” (Stars and Stripes Tuesday, April 27, 2004). See also JPRl Occasional Paper No. 23 (September 2001) Of Sex, Okinawa, and American Foreign Policy by Sheila K. Johnson for a carefully argued analysis of military violence in Okinawa. Johnson also comments, ”[i]t is the contention of Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence that military training itself instills in soldiers an approved propensity to act violently and that rape is often part of this”.

[34] Okinawan residents suffered terribly during the latter stages of the Pacific War – “when the battle of Okinawa ended, ninety-five thousand civilians had been killed by enemy fire, by Japanese soldiers, by loved ones and trusted acquaintances, and by their own hands” (Dower, 1986, p. 45). At the time of the battle 222 female students aged between fifteen and nineteen “were mobilized as battlefield nurses, along with 18 of their head teachers. 123 students and 13 teachers lost their lives” (JIICA, 2006, p. 74). Figal’s discussion on the Okinawa Heiwa no Ishiji (The Cornerstone of Peace war memorial) relates that, “the memorial represents an unprecedented Okinawan initiative, and boasts the reputedly unique characteristic of memorializing all casualties of the conflict: combatants and noncombatants, Okinawan, Japanese and non-Japanese”. This memorial is especially notable says Figal given “Okinawa’s modern history of discrimination and virtual colonial subjugation by the Japanese state [and] its especially bloody sacrifice in defense of the mainland in the Asia Pacific War” (Figal, 1997, p. 747).

[35] Jansen also notes the emergence of a more confident emperor Hirohito who became an “astute spokesman for the Japanese conservative establishment” suggesting to MacArthur in private, “that the United States might want to retain custody of Okinawa after the peace treaty as a base for its military forces, while granting Japan’s residual sovereignty over the island” (ibid., 700).
One Vietnam Marine Corps veteran Allen Nelson recalls that the training became more realistic after arriving in Okinawa, where targets were shaped like human figures and used for live ammunition training. Nelson also noted that young soldiers’ behaviour towards Okinawan people showed a marked lack of respect or feeling. Although US personnel have committed many felonies perpetrators have rarely been identified (Akibayashi and Takazato, 2009, p. 251). One of the reasons the authors suggest is that rape victims and victims of crime fail to come forward fearing stigmatization from their communities.

This was seen particularly with the A-bomb museums at Nagasaki, established in 1996 and Hiroshima, created in 1955.

Nago is in the northern or ‘Yanbaru’ region and is home to the 27,000-hectare Yanbaru sub-tropical forest housing many rare species of plant and wildlife as well as the dugong found only in Japan off the coast of this region (Spencer, 2003, p. 129).

These groups include the aforementioned Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence, the Association to Protect Life (Inochi wo mamoru kai) the umbrella group of anti-military base community groups, unions, and political parties in Nago (including the Association to Protect life) called Helipato kensetsu no zehi wo tou shimin tohyo suishin kyogikai [Citizens’ Committee to Advocate a Referendum Concerning the Construction of a Heliport (Suishin kai)] and the Nagoshi kushi chiku no futami juku no kai [Nago City, Kushi District’s Futami Ten Ward Committee (Ten Ward Committee)] (Spencer, ibid., 127-9).
The Concept and Perception of Peace Education in Gilgit Baltistan Pakistan:  
A Comparative Case Study  
Abida Begum*

In the geographically remote culture and context of Gilgit Baltistan Pakistan, this study explores the perceptions and practices of peace education by two secondary school head teachers (one in a relatively urban area and another in a rural area), as well as three additional teachers from each school. A qualitative, interview-based research approach is employed. The concept of peace education is related by the interviewed teachers to the inculcation and development of positive thinking and positive attitude among students. This positivity is seen as instrumental for the holistic development of the children, and ultimately, for the cultivation of a peaceful society.

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Introduction

Pakistan is currently a prime example of a country that lacks peace; its culture is fragmented by differences of class, economics, politics, ideologies, religion, language, territory, caste, and color. The younger generation, particularly the school-going children, are influenced by this kind of turbulence. They experience this culture through their families, schooling education, and the societal channels of communication, such as the mass media, and other cultural agencies and products (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). Williams (2004) states that violence affects schools at multiple levels by attacking individuals, communities, and systems, and “weakening their sense of agency” (p. 471). Murithi (2009) maintains that:

The type of world that we as human beings create in the future will depend on our ability to reject violent and militaristic approaches to solving problems. Peace education should therefore be a central pillar to improving human relations in the family, in schools, at the workplace, within countries and across borders. (p. 223).

Arguably, in order to improve the future human relations in all walks of life, the young generation has to play a pivotal role. This is the generation which has to lead in the future and can be expected to cultivate a peaceful world environment. Hence, the kind of knowledge and experience received by this generation at their schooling age today will exert a huge influence on the visualization of a peaceful world society in the future. Dewey (1900) is of the opinion that:

When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious. (P. 29).

As an integrated human society, we need to acknowledge our differences but to look past them and find common ground with the entire world’s people. In this critical situation, it should be our paramount priority to understand how to minimize, prevent, or eliminate violence. Furthermore, if we wish to concentrate on peace, we must learn how to suspend ourselves in the present and focus on the future we ultimately wish to work on together. The current consensus among peace theorists is that peace is not a state of being to be found somewhere in the future or at any time, but a reference to processes and qualities regarding our relationships with self and others, manifesting themselves in perception, reaction, affection, and action.

Therefore, the importance of peace education at the school level is unequivocal for the cultivation of a safe and prospering future for the world. Peace education in classrooms aims at equipping students with necessary knowledge and attitudes through respectful, tolerant, participatory, and cooperative techniques and methods (Deveci, Yilmaz, Kardag, 2008). Through peace education, students are encouraged to shoulder their own responsibilities. So, peace education should be regarded as an opportunity to improve the social well-being and responsibilities of both teachers and students. It starts with an honest willingness to engage teachers and educators in the learning process, which is an essential and powerful way to transform their selves individually and collectively. It fosters real self-learning and breaks up cultural generalizations (stereotypes) that fossilize our own perspectives, beliefs, and assumptions (Morton, 2007).

“Peace education” has recently gained attention all around the world (Yilmaz, 2003). As technological developments have squeezed our world into an interdependent global village where
each part is in a position to influence the others in a blink of the eye, peace education studies and initiatives at the school level are increasingly relevant and necessary. In economically developed societies, school leadership is increasingly involved in the initiation of policies and structures for peace education in their schools. Comparably, in developing societies like Pakistan, peace education at the school level seems crucial under the prevailing socio-political circumstances but so far, less effort has been made at the school level.

Gilgit Baltistan of Pakistan, which is the research area of this study, is situated in the middle of the world’s mightiest mountain ranges of Karakoram, Himalaya, and Hindukush. The majority of the local population resides in the scattered villages alongside the various glacier waters and pasture lands. Elaborating on the peculiar socio-cultural environment of this region, Baig & Shafa (2011) explain that:

In the overall societal culture a high premium is placed on ethical and moral values firmly grounded in religion, kinship, clans and linguistic identities. Mass education, only came within reach of the contemporary generation for this multi dialectic, and multi-cultural mountain community (p.1).

Though mass education came to the region very late, it has flourished at a considerable pace. Efforts of school improvement and enhancement of quality in education are being introduced and practiced. Research works in the field of education development in general (for example, Baig, 2010; Baig & Shafa, 2011) have also started addressing peace education, although it is a comparatively new initiative in the region.

In this geographically remote culture and context of Gilgit Baltistan Pakistan, this study sought to explore the perceptions and leadership practices of peace education through in-depth interviews with two secondary school head teachers. In addition, this study explored certain guiding principles and good practices of peace education which may serve as a starting point for further studies and practical steps for peace education in the region. Therefore, this research entered the field with the major goal of determining how head teachers and teachers perceive “Peace Education” as part of the teaching and learning process of the school and what practical steps they exercise to foster peace education in the school. Related questions of this study focused on understanding how these head teachers perceive and define peace education, what policies and practices they have initiated to foster peace education in the school and what (if any) structures have been developed in their schools for the facilitation of peace education.

**Literature Review**

*Definitions of Peace Education*

The Peace Education Working Group at UNICEF provides a concise and comprehensive definition of peace education as the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to bring about behavior changes that will enable children, youth, and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national, or international level (UNESCO, 2002).

Precursors to this include Hicks’ (1985) definition of peace education as activities that develop the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to explore concepts of peace, enquire into the obstacles to
peace both in individuals and societies, to resolve conflicts in a just and non-violent way, and to study ways of constructing just and sustainable alternative futures. Others have suggested that the focus of peace education is (or should be) to develop an appreciation for the global connection of all humanity and our interdependence on the finite natural resources of the earth (Baker, Martin and Pence, 2008). Bekerman (2005) maintains that peace-building focuses on cultivating harmonious relationships based on mutual respect and social justice, and therefore suggests that long-term peace education should focus on building mutuality among all citizens and teaching them the competencies, attitudes, and values needed to build and maintain peace in society. Some researchers and academicians lead by Opotow, Gerson, and Woodside (2010) have defined peace education as a process of “moral inclusion”. From their point of view, moral inclusion is a fundamental and strategic principle of peace education because it stands for the willingness to extend fairness to others, allocate resources to them, and make sacrifices for the well-being of others.

In an early declaration on a culture of peace, UNESCO called for an approach to education that is “directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations [...] or religious groups,” and furthering “the activities of United Nations for the maintenance of peace” (UNESCO, 1945). The declaration further defined peace education as a humanizing process of teaching and learning, which facilitates human development by counteracting the dehumanization of poverty, prejudice, discrimination, rape, violence, and war. Harris (1988) adds to this “humanizing” approach by bringing in the concept of “empowerment”. He maintains that peace education is the process of empowerment. The students and community members are engaged to resolve their own problems and conflicts. This kind of empowerment is expected to enable underprivileged groups to learn, feel, and use their power and influence. He identifies the following stages for empowerment: (1) overcoming feelings of powerlessness, (2) confronting deep-seated fears of violence, (3) increasing awareness of public affairs, (4) leadership training, and (5) taking action. Finally, for Salomon (2002), the primary concern of peace education is the reconciliation of society, protection of human rights, and development of peace skills.

**Peace Education and Pedagogy at the School**

Baldo and Fumiss (1998) argue that peace education is most effective when the skills of peace and conflict resolution are learned actively and are modeled by the school environment in which pupils are taught. Of course, teachers (and school administrators) are the crucial actors for taking the responsibility of achieving these values. Teachers must be able to foster positive social interactions among children, and establish and maintain positive collaborative relationships with families and the larger community to support students’ learning and well-being (ACEI, 1997). That is why teachers should be prepared with universal values, such as freedom, justice, human rights, gender equality, tolerance, and respect for the right to live. They should also develop an understanding of peace and a desire for an internalized peaceful culture (Deveci, Yilmaz, Kardag, 2008).

In order to achieve the objectives of peace education, a school system has to be prepared for drastic changes including setting new educational objectives, preparing new curricula, (re)writing school textbooks, developing instructional material, and training teachers to create a school climate that is conducive to peace education (Bar-Tal, and Rosen, 2009). Researchers further argue that teacher education programs need to provide opportunities for collaborative and interactive learning so that teachers can make the peace values part of their own personality. Similarly, Brock-Utne, (1989) argue that the peace educator who works with students to develop a more positive and detailed
concept of peace, plays a pivotal role in peace pedagogy. Bretherton, Weston, & Zbar, (2010), while developing their “Peace Education Kit”, focus on the use of child-centered, innovative, and participative pedagogies. They emphasize combining pedagogy with curriculum content and creating a teacher resource that is easy to use and written in plain language. They argue in favor of working in line with the existing systems rather than attempting to bring about change by working against the prevailing systems.

Deutsch (1993) argues that families and schools are the two most important institutions that influence children’s concepts of hate and love. He argues that a cooperative learning environment, conflict management initiatives, the constructive use of controversy, and establishment of resolution dispute centers in schools will enhance a constructive relationship which will ultimately help prepare children to live in a peaceful world. Salomon (2002) suggests providing maximum opportunities of speaking and expressing their views to children which may in turn boost their moral courage and be part of their personality for their later life. Weigert (1999) argues that the pedagogy of experiential learning can be instrumental for enhancing the knowledge about peace and violence, developing ideas, motivations and skills for making this world a better place to live. Hettler, Linda and Johnston, (2009) illustrate a more comprehensive and direct link between peace education and experiential learning. They argue that experiential learning can help in reorienting the school culture towards peace, provide the youth an opportunity to influence and educate the public, and practice conflict resolution and violence prevention programs. In their view, participants of such an experiential program enjoy the opportunities of reflecting on their own position in connection with the earth, building peaceful relationships with others, and taking on responsibilities for the wellbeing of communities.

It seems that one has to consider the strategies to be followed carefully when we want to foster peace education in schools. It is the responsibility of every teacher to introduce experience-based learning, group work, and discussion methods in classroom lessons. Teachers should not dominate the teaching-learning situation, but rather promote an open climate for discussion in which pupils feel free to participate. Pupils should learn to take up independent viewpoints and to make a contribution towards solving problems and resolving conflict situations. Teachers thus take the role of facilitator of learning, rather than the transmitter of knowledge.

Elaborating on the importance of schools for peace education, in the views of Harris, & Morrison (2003), the pedagogy of peace education should be “a philosophy and a process which caters to the skills of listening, reflection, problem-solving, cooperation and conflict resolution. The process should aim at empowering people with the skills, attitudes, and knowledge that are instrumental in the creation of a safe and sustained world. More specifically, Bar-Tal (2002) argues that peace education stands to achieve the objectives which are distinct from traditional educational objectives and therefore require a different pedagogy. He delineates the following implications for peace education pedagogy: (1) peace education is an orientation, more a philosophy than a subject matter; (2) peace education has to be open-minded to avoid becoming doctrinaire; has to embrace contrasting perspectives and alternate ways of seeing rather than reinforcing dogma; (3) peace education has to be relevant; it has to deal with the real problems lived by real people; (4) peace education requires experiential, active learning that increases internalization and reflection more than traditional didactic approaches can achieve; (5) peace education is teacher-dependent; without a teacher who understands and can model peace education, the enterprise will not succeed.

The pivotal role played by the cultural and contextual realities and differences in peace education has been frequently highlighted in the contemporary research literature. Windmueller, Wayne and
Botes (2009) report on a comparative case analysis in Tajikistan and demonstrate that the competences and pedagogical approaches for peace education are influenced by local culture and context. Likewise, Abu-Nimer, (2000) studied the perceptions of the educators, their role, and the obstacles they face as the outcome of the Oslo settlement in an Israeli context. He found that in both Arab and Jewish communities, the sets of needs are very much different and contextual.

Hence, this study intended to explore the perceptions and leadership practices of peace education by two secondary school head teachers in the particular multi dialectical and multi cultural context of Gilgit Baltistan Pakistan. The participant head teachers were from two different districts with different socio cultural backgrounds thus providing useful insights into the influence of cultural and contextual influences on peace education.

**Methodology**

**Research Design**

In order to obtain in-depth and descriptive data about the perception and practices of the head teachers about peace education within the natural setting of the school, the study demanded a research approach which is scientifically rigorous but still sensitive to the complex life-world (Sergivoni, 2000) of human beings. Therefore, a qualitative method of gathering descriptive data from the natural context and meaning making through participant perspectives (Bogdan and Biklen, 1998; Yates, 2004) was adopted by this study. This qualitative approach, through intensive semi-structured interviews and observations, created an opportunity to cultivate a long-term interaction with the research participants and their respective school contexts, and ultimately allowed us to acquire rich data about peace education.

Within the qualitative research paradigm, the comparative case study method was adopted, in which “[...] two or more case studies are done and then compared and contrasted” (Bogdan and Biklen, 1998, p.62). This research study is comprised of two case studies, corresponding to the interviews with two head teachers from two different schools. After analyzing the individual cases, this study presents a comparative view of both in order to reach more investigative and thorough conclusions.

**Research Context and Participants**

This study was conducted in two girls’ secondary schools, which provide education to the children in two different districts of Gilgit Baltistan Pakistan. Keeping in view the cultural and linguistic diversity of the region, one school from each district was selected and the head teacher was taken as the primary research participant. The purpose of selecting participants from two different districts was to explore the possible similarities and differences in their perceptions about peace education in their particular settings. Selection of participants was based on their willingness, experience, and commitment.

In order to gain rich and in-depth data, three teachers from each school who had been working at the same school for at least three years were selected as secondary participants. While selecting the secondary research participants, I also took qualification and experiences into consideration. I wanted the participants to have experience and be professionally developed because of my assumption that experience and academic qualification can affect teachers’ perceptions and beliefs about their roles.
The purpose of selecting the schools from two culturally diverse districts was to obtain rich and in-depth data about the perception and practices of peace education by the head teachers in their respective regions.

Data Generation

This study employed semi-structured interviews as the main tool of data collection. In order to ensure that the interviews comprehensively collected the perspectives of the principal participants, this study employed three rounds of specifically designed sets of semi-structured interviews. Each interview lasted around one to one and half hours. Similarly, a two round semi-structured interview was conducted with each of the six secondary participants of this study. The interview language was Urdu and each interview was audio taped and personally transcribed by the researcher and later translated into English.

Research Methodology

The process of organizing, general sense making, coding, drawing themes, and, finally, interpreting and making meaning out of the collected data (Cresswell, 2003) was followed in this research. The details about the nature, purpose, time and methods involved in the study were provided to the participants before the data collection and participation was entirely voluntary. In addition, the participants enjoyed the right to see the interview transcripts for any clarification or adjustments to the views they expressed in the interview. For confidentiality, pseudonyms for each research participant, and their respective school related data, have been used.

Analysis and Findings

The Concept of Peace Education

In the urban district, the concept of peace education was attributed by the participants to the inculcation and development of positive thinking and positive attitudes among the students in order to attain the ultimate goal of a better, more peaceful society for the future. While defining peace education, the head teacher maintained that “Positive behavior for each other by the teachers and students help the school move forward. With a negative behavior for each other by children and teachers, a school can never succeed”.

In addition, teacher B highlighted the deeply rooted connection between a child’s holistic development and the future society. She argued that the holistic development of a child helps to acquire a peaceful personality which ultimately leads to the cultivation of a positive and peaceful society for the future generations. To use her words:

As you know, children have to play different important roles tomorrow in the society. Therefore, if children are taught from the very beginning about peace education it will have a positive impact on their future behavior and the role they play in bringing about positive changes in the society.

In the rural district, a high premium was placed on relationship mechanisms. Healthy relationships, a friendly environment, the absence of fear, and feelings of safety were marked as the prominent features of peace education in the school. Defining the concept, the head teacher maintained:
[peace education] means we should have good attitude and behavior for each other. My behavior with my teachers and students should be positive and work friendly. I think this can be peace education. In other words, we can say that peace education means providing an environment to the students in which they feel safe and secure to learn.

Teacher C highlighted the importance of nourishing teacher-to-teacher and teacher-to-student relationships that are constructive and friendly. She explained that “Peace education means living in peace, improving our relationships, and sharing our learning with each other”.

School and Classroom Environment

In the urban district, the overall school and classroom environment emerged as a prominent influencing feature for initiating and strengthening peace education. The head teacher explained that:

The internal environment of the school is very important. It should be one of the main responsibilities of the teachers to cultivate a friendly environment in the school. In this regard they can demonstrate little things like first greeting the children with a good mood and encouraging them to do so with each other.

Similarly, teacher C related peace education with the absence of fear in the school environment. She maintained, “For me it is a peaceful environment where there is no fear for the children to come and learn”.

However, in the rural district, friendly relationships, a fearless environment, and democratic traditions were considered to be the prominent features of a school environment that is helpful for peace education. The head teacher in this regard maintained that:

We should have a friendly environment in our school and classes. We do things on democratic principles and make a friendly atmosphere in the overall school. I feel, first of all, our relationships are very important, and secondly, it is essential that there is no fear for the children to come to the school.

Practical Strategies

In the urban district, the head teacher and teachers elaborated on various strategies for initiating, strengthening, and sustaining peace education in a school environment. The head teacher quoted an example of a successful group encounter which helped her in improving teacher-to-teacher relationships:

There were two groups of teachers who were reluctant to sit and interact with each other due to some socio-political reasons. To improve this situation I made one staff room for all the teachers to bring both the groups at one place so that they will start talking and interacting with each other. I was very successful in this regard as these teachers started talking and interacting with each other.

Encouraging self-reflection was pointed out as another important tool for peace education in the school. In this regard, teacher A explained:
Whenever I get a chance, I always try to encourage my students to think. I try to make them understand that we all are same and equal and there are no differences among us, so we need to create an environment of peace and friendship for ourselves.

In the rural district, the head teacher emphasized the role of the community for peace education in the school. The head teacher made it clear that:

Whenever we face problems or issues harming the peace of our school, we sit together and try to find out a solution. Also we call the community elders and the members of the school management committee and seek their support to resolve the issue.

Teacher A highlighted some more strategies she employs in her classroom for peace education:

I always keep a close eye on which students do not like each other. Once I find out some students I give them pair work and encourage them to work together and help each other. This helps in creating positive relationships among the students.

**Influence of Societal Culture**

In the Urban district, the head teachers and teachers seem struggling to balance their relationships with the societal culture. The head teacher maintained,

We need to keep the school environment clean from political and other influences from the external environment which are harmful for our unity and friendly environment. Because, our job is teaching and learning and nurturing the students, so political and other influences should not come into the school.

Teacher B turned the table around by demonstrating enthusiasm and courage for influencing the societal culture through peace education rather than only being influenced. To use her words,

You know as teachers we play the role of change agents and we can bring about positive change in the society through our students. We can help in bringing peace in the society by teaching peace education to our students. Children always tell their parents what they learn in the school, so in this way the message of peace can reach out to the society through children.

Whereas, in the rural district, the deep rooted influence of the societal culture on the discourses, processes, and activities within the school milieu emerged as a strong factor. In this regard the head teacher argued,

In our context, the community plays an important role in the school life. The problems, politics and other influences come into the school from the community. Therefore the community is in a better position to resolve such issues of the school which permeate in from the societal culture.

**Comparative Analysis**

Perhaps, the strategies for peace education identified by the urban school participants reveal more depth and complexity as compared to the rural school. It reflects that the culture and context of the
urban school is more prone to socio-cultural and political unrests therefore the participants are more sensitive and cautious about formally initiating peace education in their school and its implications. In this regard teacher B maintained,

> Everyone wants peace and friendly environment. But initiating peace education and talking about peace can create troubles. People can give it a different meaning and you can face problems. I feel it is because of political influences in the school which makes peace education a challenging task.

Similar thoughts were shared by teacher A in the following lines,

> Our societal culture is full of turbulences based on economic, socio cultural, political and religious grounds. This culture definitely exerts a huge influence in the school through teachers and students. This also creates a problem for peace education and cultivation of a peaceful and friendly environment in the school.

Indeed, the overall data reflect that these strategies for peace education are employed whenever the teachers and head teachers feel a need. These strategies are employed in an unorganized way and in both the schools there is an absence of formal support structures for peace education. Teacher B of urban school mentioned about the need of teacher professional development for initiating and sustaining peace education in the school. She maintained,

> I think teachers need training. If they understand what is peace education and how to make it part of their daily lesson then they will be in a better position to implement their learning in the real classroom set up. So teacher training is very important at the first stage.

She suggested that teachers should be given awareness through training programs about how to integrate concept of peace education in their existing curriculum and daily teaching lessons.

As mentioned in the analysis portion, both the rural and the urban district school participants positioned a strong emphasis on the prevalence of a cooperative and enabling school environment for peace education. They considered friendly relationships, fearless environment, and democratic traditions as some of the prominent features of a school environment which can help initiate and strengthen peace education. The views of the participants are in line with the declarations of The association for childhood education international (ACEI, 1997) who in their position paper emphasized on teacher candidates to be able to foster positive social interactions among children, and establish and maintain positive collaborative relationships with families and the large community to support students’ learning and wellbeing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Concept of peace education</th>
<th>School/classroom environment</th>
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<td><strong>Context and participants</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban head teacher</td>
<td>Positive behavior for each other by the teachers and students in Peace education.</td>
<td>The internal environment of the school is very important. Teachers should cultivate a friendly environment in the school.</td>
<td>successful group encounter helped her in improving teacher-to-teacher relationships.</td>
<td>Need to keep the school environment clean from political and other influences from the external environment which are harmful for our unity and friendly environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban teacher A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Encouraging the students for self-reflection was important tool for peace education in the school.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban teacher B</td>
<td>Deeply rooted connection between a child’s holistic development and the future society. The need of teacher professional development for initiating and sustaining peace education in the school.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>we play the role of change agents and we can bring about positive change in the society through our students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban teacher C</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>peace education with the absence of fear in the school environment.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural head teacher</td>
<td>Peace education means providing an environment to the students in which they feel safe and secure to learn.</td>
<td>A friendly environment in our school and classes. We do things on democratic principles and make a friendly atmosphere in the overall school.</td>
<td>To resolve the issues of harming peace we call the stakeholders of the school and seek their support to resolve the issue.</td>
<td>The problems, politics and other influences come into the school from the community. Therefore the community is in a better position to resolve such issues of the school.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
which permeate in from the societal culture.

Rural teacher A

Our societal culture is full of turbulences based on economic, socio cultural, political and religious grounds. This creates a problem for the cultivation of a peaceful and friendly environment in the school.

I give them pair work and encourage them to work together and help each other. This helps in creating positive relationships among the students.

Rural teacher B

-  -  -  -

Rural teacher C

Peace education means living in peace, improving our relationships, and sharing our learning with each other.

Implications

This small scale study enfolds quite a few contextually significant implications for the donor community and nongovernmental organizations working in Gilgit Baltistan in particular, and those working worldwide more generally. There are quite a few non-government organizations contributing to the development of this remote mountainous region in the areas like agriculture, housing, business, education, and health. However, none of them has specifically paid attention to the area of peace education and peacemaking in this socio-culturally and politically diversified region. Particularly, for the younger generations at the school level, an organized and planned effort of peace education by any organization could not be found visible. Though the teachers seems to understand the concept of peace education and explained some ways that you are exercising in the school yet they were unable to show some evidence of their practical work in a planned and organized manner. Therefore, such organization may consider it as an opportunity and need for a peace education intervention.

In the light of the study, it is suggested that the government education department Gilgit Baltistan may revisit its educational strategy to incorporate and integrate a planned and organized component of peace education at the school level. The head teacher and teachers were seemed to be unsatisfied with the societal culture and try their level best to avoid the communal culture and create their own environment in the school. Without taking the parent community in loop, the efforts of peace education may not give the desired results. Therefore it is suggested that particularly, the integration of peace education and parental involvement in the comparatively urban school may give fruitful results. Therefore, the local teacher education institution of the region may include the parental involvement in peace education in their training programs for the teachers of the urban context. However, such a program will be beneficial and easy to install if it is
integrated as part of the existing educational practices rather than aiming for drastic changes. Literature on peace education in socio-cultural and politically diversified regions has also suggested in favor of working in line with the existing systems rather than attempting to bring about change by working against the prevailing systems (Bretherton, Weston, & Zbar, 2010).

The initiation of planned and organized peace education at the school level involves a range of preparations such as setting up objectives, developing a contextual peace educational content package, training teachers and providing awareness to the parent community. Therefore, the scale of this study is not large enough to provide rich insights for such a comprehensive peace education planning for the overall region of Gilgit Baltistan. For that reason, a major study, widened over all the seven districts of the region, may be conducted to gain more in-depth insights into the development of a comprehensive peace education plan for Gilgit Baltistan.

References


Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency

Simeon H. O. Alozieuwa* 

The current challenge posed by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is not only about the viciousness of its terror campaigns, nor the sect’s avowed mission to impose Islamic law on the country, it is also about confusion regarding the exact cause(s) of the violence. Several theories have emerged to explain the problem, broadly revolving around socio-economic, political, and religious themes, all of which are treated in detail in this study. This paper argues that while none of the perspectives may exclusively explain the problem, analyses that consider the political context deserve particular attention, especially in relation to President Jonathan’s contestation of the 2011 presidential election and the coming election in 2015.

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Introduction

One of the outcomes of the security challenge imposed by the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian society has been the emergent preponderance of theories that attempt to explain the motive of the Islamic group. Unlike the Niger Delta militancy which preceded it, and which predicated its desire for a separate state from Nigeria on decades of conspiratorial neglect by the Nigerian state and multinational oil prospecting companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances, apart from its declared desire for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria. The confusion also grows out of the changing dynamics in the operations of the sect. For instance, its terror campaign, which initially targeted security formations and personnel, has expanded to include civilians and non-government targets, and the Nigerian public generally.

The theories are divided into two broad spectrums. One views the problem essentially as internal. The other blames external forces. The former looks at socio-economic factors, as well as deep-seated political, religious differences in the Nigerian society. It also includes vengeance over the death of the sect’s leader, Ustaz Muhammed Yusuf. The external forces argument has two planks: one characterizes the problem as part of global Islamic jihad and focuses on the sect’s links with international terror groups such as al Qaeda or its affiliates as al Shabaab or the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM); the other views it as conspiratorial – a grand strategy to achieve the predicted disintegration of Nigeria by 2015, (See “Africa in 2020 Panel” Report). Within the conspiratorial thesis is the sub-theme that Nigeria is being targeted by envious and troubled neighbours. This aspect also links it to the now ‘unemployed’ war-hardened returnees from the Libyan crisis and the assorted arms streaming out from that tumult.

How relevant these theories are to the explanation of the current crisis is the question to which this paper addresses itself. Is Nigeria merely convulsing from her many internal contradictions that successive leadership has been unable to manage or resolve, or are external forces actually at work to undermine Nigeria; if so, how and for what purpose? While each of the competing perspectives indeed may offer some valid approximation of the real cause(s) of Nigeria’s security challenge, the multiplicity has tended to frustrate a clear understanding of the problem and articulation of appropriate response to it. This paper set out to examine the entire gamut of the theories with a view to clearing, rather than adding to the confusion. But we can expect that, as the Boko Haram challenge persists, more theories will continue to evolve.

An Explanatory Note on the Origin and Activities of Boko Haram

The apparent confusion generated by the plethora of theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram challenge also characterizes the origin of the sect. The confusion not only reflects in the narratives about the exact date, and who the actual founder was, but also as to the true source of these expositions. For instance, Adibe (2012), has observed that while the popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002, Madike, he notes, traces the date to as far back as 1995, and argues that, one Lawan Abubakar, who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, actually founded the Boko Haram sect. Under Abubakar, the sect was known as Sahaba, (Madike 2011 cited in Adibe, 2012: 50). Elsewhere, these expositions are credited to Shehu Sani, a civil right activist in northern Nigeria, who helped broker the first peace deal with the sect with these revelations, which failed (Businessday, online, February 1, 2012). While Uzodike and Maiangwa on the other hand acknowledge the Lawan Abubakar angle, they attribute their source to Ujah et al. (see Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012: 100). They also acknowledge Gusau (2009) version which traced
the origin to an evangelical group formed by Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, who reportedly felt dissatisfied with Western education (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012: 100).

Muhammed Yusuf, to whom the formation is now generally ascribed, according to the competing narratives only assumed leadership after Abubakar’s departure and “indoctrinated the sect with his own teachings, which he claimed were based on purity” (Adibe, 2012: 50). Yusuf’s notion of “purity” and teachings were inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth century legal scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East (Johnson, 2011), after whom Yusuf named his mosque in Maiduguri (The Nation, May 23, 2012). But just as the sect itself may be less concerned about whom to credit for its formation than waging its war against the Nigerian state, the state too may be less concerned with the origin than it is with the threat that the group now poses to society.

The obscurity surrounding its true origin perhaps informs why initially, the sect “had no specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perception of the local population” (Okereke, 201: 450). Such names include Taliban and the Yussufiyyah. The sect soon became formally identified as Ahulsunna wal’jama’ah Hijra – ‘Congregation of Followers of the Prophet Involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle.’ The name Boko Haram, to which it is now commonly referred derives from the sect’s anti-Western posturing, literally meaning ‘Western education (book)/civilization is sin.’

In the early stages, the Boko Haram sect was widely known to have mobilized its membership from women and children, school drop-outs and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates, most of who tore up their certificates; student members withdrew from school. Okereke posits that “these recruits were indoctrinated by Yusuf to believe that their state of hopelessness was caused by government which imposed Western education on them and failed to manage the resources of the country to their benefits” (ibid). Although from the outset, the sect’s mission was to impose the Shari’a on Nigeria, the leadership went about its preaching peacefully, but not without attracting attention among other Islamic preachers who saw the preaching and interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to constituted authority (ibid:457). Although incidents of violence have earlier been recorded against the sect, (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012: 102), serious concerns over its violent tendencies grew only after the open confrontation between the sect and the government in July 2009 following the death of Yusuf while in police custody, as well as his father-in-law and sect financier, Ustaz Buji Foi, and the incarceration of members by state authorities.

Although Yusuf allegedly drew inspiration from radical Islamist, Ibn Taymiyya, he reportedly resisted some of followers relentless advocate that “an Islamic state was realizable through preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers”; “Yussuf was said to be against any form of violence, saying it was against the teaching of Islam” (Suleiman cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012: 101). It is, therefore, yet uncertain whether the sect’s current level of radicalization is a function of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the State or the accession to its leadership of the taciturn psychopath, Abubakar Shekau, a Kanuri native, who boasts that "I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill – the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams," (BBC, online, June 22, 2012). Along with two other top leadership, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi, Shekau in June 2012 recently made the United States’ list of international terrorists.
Until the June 16, 2011, bombing of the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja, the sect had restricted its terror campaign mostly to the North East part of Nigeria. Remarkably, the attack on the Police Headquarters came barely after then Inspector-General of Police, IGP, Hafiz Ringim returned from a duty tour of Maiduguri where the sect had just carried out some terror campaign and stated he would soon smoke them out. The sect followed up that attack with the bombing on August 26 of the United Nations House, also in Abuja, a place Shekau described as a “forum of all the global evil,” (Thisday, September 19, 2011). Since then, Boko Haram has either claimed responsibility for or has been credited with most terror activities in the north of the country. Its operations have also grown in scale and sophistication.

Theoretical Considerations: Deeply Divided Society, State Failure and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria.

Sociologically, most African countries are multiethnic societies with populations that are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious, and similar cleavages. Most are composed of several and some, of many different traditional societies, each with distinctive institutions to which members of other traditional societies are not only detached but also disinclined, if not actually opposed (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:36). Politically, from the perspective of the European colonial powers, a colony was not arbitrary. But from the perspective of subject Africans, colonial government was essentially arbitrary. It was imposed from outside and worked in accordance with alien and unfamiliar rules and regulations in disregard, often in ignorance, of indigenous institutions. Guenther Roth (1968) sees the divided plural society as an impediment to the realization of modern, rational-legal institutions (cited in Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:36). Therefore, the African state rather than being a public force tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite (Ake, 1996: 42). Thus according to Chabal and Daloz (1999), “its formal (rational-legal) structure ill-manages to conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power” (cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012:96). In the words of former Senegalese leader, Leopold Sedar Senghor, politics no longer is “a question of the art of governing the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations. It is a question of politician politics – not even ideological tendencies – to place oneself, one’s relatives, and one’s clients in the cursus honorum that is the race for preferment – ‘the image of personal rule’” (see Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:17).

The inherent complexities in the states forged by European imperialism made less feasible the prospects of the new states modelled after the Western types (Roth, cited in Jackson and Rosberg, p. 36). Although the African states have come a long way down the road of nation-building process, with many heterogeneous or multinational states having to resort to varying ways of resolving their inter-group relations (Elaigwu, 1997:58), many of the states still convulse from one shock after another resulting from those sociological and political divergences; so much so also because “the African state is hardly ever coextensive with a common society” (Ekeh, 1989:5) and “the society in which it [the African state] exits is typically segmented into small rival political communities, often with strong localized identities, competing to capture and exploit state power or at least prevent it from oppressing them” (Ake, 1999:42). According to Professor Peter Ekeh, “The political history of Africa has become a tale of drift and instability…. Standing above, and set aside and apart from society, the African state has turned out to be arbitrary, because it operates outside societal rules” (Ekeh, 1989:5). The arbitrariness of the African state has conferred on African political culture, attributes of negativity, so that “African political culture has become characterized by a vast array of negative elements such as corruption, violence and mistrust” (ibid).
With the tendency to blame every of the continent’s woes on the incidence of colonialism, it remains debatable, however, whether it was the nature of the state inherited at the end of formal colonialism or the neo-patrimonial and particularistic orientation of the competing power elites who inherited the post-colonial state that is the problem. Whichever, the African state remains characterized by huge disconnect with the society.

Those negative elements identified by Ekeh, and much more, have all combined to make the African state irrelevant to the citizenry, thus eroding its legitimacy. Additionally, the state becomes prone to economic dislocation and political instability – all which are indices of state failure (Rotberg 2002: 86 cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa). Here, Rotberg’s articulation of the characteristics of a failed state in economic and political terms is illuminating. According to him, the economic sphere is characterized by deteriorated standards of living, a lack of public goods and services, the flourishing of corruption and rent-seeking, and a pervasive economic stagnation (ibid. p.96). In the political sphere, some leaders and their allies readily work to subvert prevailing democratic norms by coercing legislatures and bureaucracies into subservice, compromising judicial independence, stifling the emergence of civil society or space, and abusing security and defence forces for parochial ends. Moreover, the political sphere is dotted with ethnic discrimination and resultant discord. Governments that once appeared to operate for the benefit of all the nation’s citizens are perceived to have become partisan. Corrupt ruling elites invest their ill-gotten gains overseas, building lavish residences and palaces with state funds (ibid. pp.96- 97).

Rotberg further argues that in the last phase of failure, the state’s legitimacy will collapse:

> Once the state’s capacity to secure itself or to perform in an expected manner recedes, there is every reason to expect disloyalty to the state on the part of the disenchanted and aggrieved citizens. Logically, many transfer their allegiances to their clan and group leaders, some of whom gravitate towards terrorism as they strive to secure communal mandate. Mobilizing support from both external and local supporters, the terrorists seek out havens in the more remote and marginalized corners of failed states where they blend in, more comfortably in the prevailing chaos associated with state failure (ibid).

The various theoretical constructs that attempt to mirror the Nigerian state point to a deep gulf between state and society or in Ekeh’s (op.cit) term “the difficult relations between state and society” - from Wale Olaitan’s ‘Hanging State’, Hamza Alavi’s ‘Over-developed State’, to Terisa Turner’s ‘Entrepot State’, Gunnar Myrdal’s ‘Soft State’ and Claude Ake’s ‘Irrelevant State’. In the realm of theory, such disconnect is not only capable of eroding legitimacy but also inducing state failure and the subsequent repercussions that emanate from it such as violent conflicts or terrorism as Rotberg’s postulate suggests. Empirically, Uzodike and Maiangwa have articulated the various conditions and features of a failed state as pertaining to Nigeria, ranging from the Failed States index in which the country ranked 14 in 2011, Terrorism and Political Mapping (2010-2011), which ranked her fifth and the Human Development Index Trend (2011), where Nigeria emerged 156 out of 186 countries. On these basis they assert that the chaotic and anarchic situation in the Nigeria of 2012 exemplifies the characteristics of a failing or weak state that is degenerating into full failure (Uzodike and Maiangwa, op.cit. p. 97).

Amidst the overwhelming symptoms of state failure, as the Nigerian State vigorously contest the classification, such economic sabotages occurring on daily basis in Nigeria, committed by the citizens such as breaking of oil pipelines to siphon oil, cannibalization of vital infrastructures such as electricity, railways, bridges etc, go beyond ordinary criminality to mirror citizens’ sense of exclusion.
from and lack of ownership of the common patrimony. On the political front, Nnamdi Obasi’s ‘Ethnic Militias, Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria’ and Tunde Babawale’s ‘The Rise of Ethnic Militias, De-Legitimization of the State and the Threat to the Nigerian Federation,’ among others, all provide theoretical and empirical proofs that even if Nigeria has not totally collapsed, it has met the necessary requirement of a weak state. Indeed if Karl Maier’s political biography of Nigeria, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis (2000), is dismissed as the cynicism of a foreigner, renown Nigeria novelist, Chinua Achebe, apart from decrying the leadership problematic of the Nigerian State some decades back notes that “Nigeria is an example of a country that has fallen; it has collapsed (Achebe, 1983:1 cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012:97).

The Boko Haram challenge in the final analysis seems to reflect the deeper crisis bedevilling the Nigerian state, which the various theories, to which we shall presently focus on attempt to explain. Adibe (2012) captures the depth of the challenge when he argues that:

[…] the Nigerian state, contrary to the media hype, is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram’s bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while reveling in moonlighting, organized labour, inducing university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept ‘brown envelops’ to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy (cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, op.cit. p. 98).

Methodology

In examining the various perspectives that have attempted to capture the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency since the outset of the problem, we looked at general theoretical frameworks that have been employed universally to explain similar crisis. In this regard, we made reference to foreign and local (Nigerian) sources. At the same time, we paid critical attention to the diverse views provided by the broad spectrum of the Nigerian society. In doing this, adequate consideration was given to all the shades of opinions representative of the various divides of the Nigerian society. This was in view of the complexity of the Nigerian society, the tenuous relationship among its disparate social groups and the implication of the Boko Haram insurgency on the continuing existence of Nigeria as a single corporate entity. The idea is that resolving the Boko Haram challenge and forestalling a resurgence of the sort in the future may to a large extent depend on a national consensus on what the problem really is and how it will be tackled as was the challenge posed by the Niger Delta militancy. Apart from the dangers it constitutes to Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, Nigeria’s position as a strategic country in global consideration also warrants that even non-Nigerians share concerns over what may have gone wrong. The paper accommodated such views. We also considered perspectives provided by persons with security backgrounds. Indeed the contemporariness of the problem is such that as the violence escalates and the State intensifies efforts towards finding solution, fresh perspectives emerge, and the media relay these developments. Reliance on these media sources is a function of this contemporariness. Generally, the historical-descriptive method of inquiry was adopted in the study.
The Relational/Vengeance Theory

Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, (religious) and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination, (Faleti, 2006:54-55). The differences in value invariably creates the “We” and ‘Others” dichotomy: “The fact that ‘others’ are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of […] values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other” (ibid,p.55). Okereke notes that sect members “attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perceptions of the local population […] In some communities, where it existed, the sect and its members were described as terrorists and persons with psychiatric challenges” (ibid.p.450).

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram’s violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect’s penchant for blood-letting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in this context the “We” and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the “Others”, the Boko Haram members. On the other hand, the latter group bond either by the common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” for Allah, or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining members of the Nigerian society as the “Others”. In the circumstance mutual antagonism exists and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, killing of members by government security forces- the “Others” attracts reprisals from it, the “We”. The retaliatory attacks against Muslims in the Gonin Gora area of Kaduna state by an irate mob following the multiple suicide attacks on churches in the state on Sunday June 17, 2012, also highlights the vengeance thrust of the “We” and “Others” psychology. In this instance, the avengers, presumably Christians now constituted the “We”, while Muslims became the “Others.” The establishment of Alfurqan Islamic School, solely dedicated to the teaching of ethics opposed to Western civilization in Jalingo, capital of Taraba, a North Eastern state in Nigeria (ACSRT Journal, 2(1), December 2011), exemplifies an effort to institutionalize the “We” and “Others” dichotomy. In parts of the North, some segments of the northern Muslim population are allegedly unhappy with the compromise of state-level shari’a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system (Lengmang, 2011:101).

The cogency of the relational/vengeance perspective is such that for a long time, it remained the plausible explanation for the terror campaign by Boko Haram as the death of Yussuf in the police custody, and the hunting and incarceration of the members by the Nigerian security forces were seen to have fired the “we” and “others” psychology, and have been a major factor in the sect’s resolve to avenge its members through the terror campaigns (Daily Sun, online, January 23, 2012). Jail-break operations to rescue incarcerated members and marrying of dead members’ widows by living members, all sustain the theory. But the reported killing of members who decline suicide missions on the orders of Shekau, the killing in September 2011 of Babakura Fugu, an in-law to Yussuf, for allegedly accepting blood money from the government (Thisday, September 19, 2011) which signifies existence of faction within the group, all widen the sect’s targets, blur the line between the “We” and ‘Others”, and so challenge this perspective.

Similarly, to the “Others”, the sect is identified by the “prohibited name,” Boko Haram, (Western education is sin), whereas to the sect itself, the “We”, “our name is Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda Awati Wal Jihad” (Saharareporters, online, January 22, 2012). Beside its pejorative connotation, in the sect’s perspective, the name does not capture its objective and has been be a motivation to
violence. Its spokesman, Abu Qaqa offered this, in particular, as reason for the sect’s targeting of the Nigerian media (Saharareporters, online, May 1, 2012). Somali’s Al-Shabaab also exhibits this tendency (BBC Somali, online, June 21, 2009).

The Human Needs/Socio-Economic Perspective

The socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria, essentially attempts to de-emphasise the interpretation of this being a particularly Muslim or northern crisis (Kukah, 2012). The perspective which blames social conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfil and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict (Rosati et al, 1990 cited in Faleti, p. 51). The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266). According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction – defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally – relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emanating from it (Midlarsky, 1975:29).

Unlike the relational/vengeance theory, the perspective goes beyond the trigger to focus on the underlying factor(s) that could have bred such groups. It has its largest proponents from the intelligentsia, and is particularly viewed by some foreign governments such those of the United States and Britain as explanations for the problem. Nigeria’s socio-economic indexes seem to validate the assumption of human needs theory. The Human Development Index Trend, for instance, ranked Nigeria 156 out of 186 in 2011. The socio-economic factors being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the north. But perhaps its relevance in the interpretation of the Boko Haram problem is that while its proponents admit of endemic poverty and hopelessness generally in Nigeria, they note its severity in the north. Hence for Professor Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York, to whom “it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness,” the government must address socio-economic deprivation, which is most severe in the north (Herskovits, 2012).

Indeed the very high incident of poverty in Nigeria is generally seen as a northern phenomenon. A study by Professor Charles Soludo, shows the three northern regions having an average poverty incidence of 70.1% compared to 34.9% of the south’s three. Ten states in Nigeria with the highest incidence of poverty also are all northern states, whereas the ten states with the lowest incidence of poverty are all southern states, (Lukman, n.d.). Thus, “70% of the people living in the north live below $1 per day, which is equivalent to N129 per day,” (ibid). The high conflict potential of the developing areas could indeed be a function of frustration caused by economic deprivation, (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate, Jr. 1990: 266). Frustration-aggression tendencies often also manifest misplaced aggression. This trend has featured in the series of violence inflicted upon the ordinary citizens of Nigeria, most of who have no direct connection with political and economic elites whose mismanagement of the country’s resources engender the unemployment, poverty and deprivation that breed frustration and foster violence. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr. have rightly noted, hostilities in such instances, are directed “toward someone or something not responsible for the original frustration” (ibid).
A more profound explanation of the north’s socio-economic crisis lies in a perspective that sees a nexus between its depilating patrimonial economic system, which dis-empowers women, and the dysfunctional state system that places distribution above production (Aregbesola, 2012). The governor of the south-western state of Osun, Rauf Aregbesola, a Muslim, who is credited with the idea, argues that while the economic disempowerment of women does not itself lead to violence, it means that about or less than one-third of the adult males sustain that society; much of the population, especially the elite, have been socialized into sustaining a lifestyle out of sync with economic productivity. He posits that the anomaly has been encouraged for a long time by the dysfunctional (state) system, which places distribution above production. Sustaining that lifestyle has increasingly become difficult, especially with the north having lost control of the centralized power structure. This means that the elites are no longer satisfied, not to talk of the crumbs that come to the masses. This, he strongly contends, is largely responsible for northern unrest (Aregbesola, 2012).

Perhaps of further interest about this perspective is its politicization by the northern elite, which tends to becloud the real issue. Rather than focus on its merit in relation to solving the problem, it has become the basis for some elements among the northern elite to seek to expand their frontiers of accumulation, which with a history of unconscionable criminal appropriation to the detriment of the poor masses, offers no prospect for a better deal for the latter. The idea of a “direct link between the very uneven nature of distribution of resources – the 13 per cent derivatives going to oil producing states of the south and the rising level of violence – Boko Haram’s insurgency” (Financial Times, January 27, 2012), as espoused by CBN governor Lamido Sanusi, a scion of Northern establishment, clearly raises the resource distribution issue, which Aregbesola (op.cit) has identified as fostering the endemic poverty of the north. It also agrees with the submission that competition for scarce resources may be of greater importance in explaining political violence in the developing regions (Oberschal 1969; Nelson 1969). Chairman of Northern Governors’ Forum, (NGF) Aliyu Babangida has also decried an “unfavourable federation allocation structure in which the Northern states are at great disadvantage amidst rising illiteracy, poverty, ignorance and general backwardness in the region, (Daily trust, online, February 24, 2012).

This perspective has encountered severe criticisms recently, even from the north. Senate President David Mark argues that poverty and unemployment no longer offer a cogent explanation for the insurgency as these adverse socio-economic conditions are not exclusive to the north, (Peoples Daily, online, June 26, 2012). While socio-economic deprivation could be most severe in the north, except for the north-east where it originated, no such violent group as Boko Haram is known to have sprung up in states in the north-west and north-central. Hordes of beggars who line Katsina streets reflect the poverty in that north-western state, yet it has neither bred nor harboured such a violent group. Evidence pertaining to Latin America and Sub-Saharan African urban settings similarly challenge the relevance of the theory of the “revolution of rising expectation” (Midlarsky 1975: 30).

The Political Feud Perspective

_The crux of the problem is the overpoliticisation of social life [...] We are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political power_. Claude Ake

In political terms, the Boko Haram phenomenon is perhaps more interesting because of the specific historical context in which it is occurring. First, while other Muslims may want to disassociate themselves from its activities, Boko Haram remains an Islamic movement. It is also occurring in a
multi-religious political setting in which religion itself is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power (Kukah, 1993: x). Second, its emergence was preceded by intense political bickering between some, mainly Muslim political actors in the north and their counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and southerner. In a political environment in which the power of incumbency is a major factor in determining electoral success, the fact that the victor in the contest superintended over the machinery of the state at the time of the election is a critical variable in conveying a sense of fair play or otherwise to the losing side. Importantly, Jonathan’s electoral victory came barely three years after power returned to the north, from an eight-year sojourn in the south, where the north grudgingly ceded it to in 1999 following the tumult that resulted from the annulled 1993 presidential election, which Moshood Abiola, a southerner was acclaimed to have won. Through ingenious political engineering by the Nigerian power elite, a power-sharing arrangement was devised which rotates central power between the north and south. After eight years in the south via Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency (1999-2007), power had returned to the north in May 2007 via the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s presidency and was supposed to remain there for another eight years. Despite the constitutional provision that guarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, the north was sour for having ‘lost’ power again to the south by virtue of Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010 barely three years into office. The sense of loss, which ensued from Yar’Adua’s death manifested in the tension in which Nigeria was soaked in the pre-2011 general election period.

Attention needs to be paid, however, to the general misconceptions about the north as a monolithic political entity. Apart from the Hausa language as a lingua franca in the north, the Hausa-Fulani who constitute the region’s dominant population are predominantly Muslims and as Uche (1989:8) has rightly noted, “the Moslem religion united the vast areas of the North to the extent that Southerners erroneously refer to all Northerners as Hausas and Fulanis, without regard for the other minority tribes that have been eclipsed by the Hausa-Fulani majority.” Thus what in reality to the northern minority was Hausa-Fulani hegemony, which in Reverend Mathew Kukah’s calculation held sway between 1966 and 1979 (Kukah, 1993:36), was to the southerner, a northern hegemony. This perception may have been reinforced by Kukah’s observation that the ascription of leadership qualities by British colonialism to the Fulanis, later took root in the latter’s minds and made them unresponsive to the quest of other citizens for a place in the power ladder in Nigeria (Kukah, 1999: 98). Added to this was the role played by those minorities in perpetuating the myth of the monolithic political north. A few examples deserve attention. On January 15, 1966, led by a Southern army officer, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu not only terminated the country’s political leadership headed then, as it were, by a northerner, but also resulted to the death of top northern leading political figures, most of who were of Hausa-Fulani extraction. Following the inability of the coup-plotters to form government, however, the most senior military officer at the time, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, a southerner, assumed power. The subsequent fear by the north of power slipping from its hands led to what Billy Dudley referred to as the “Return Match of 29 July, 1966” (cited in Kukah, 1993: 39), which was marked by the assassination of Ironsi and many southern military officers, mostly of Igbo origin. It latter degenerated to a pogrom against the Igbos living in the north, and finally led to the Nigerian civil war. Not only was the leadership which emerged in the country after the ‘Return Match’ led by a northern minority, in the person of General Yakubu Gowon, a Middle-Belter, citing (O’Connell, 1971) Kukah reports that it was “the Middle-Belt (Northern Minority) non-commissioned officers and soldiers that put Gowon in power,” (Kukah, 1993: 39). Alan Feinstein’s observation as cited in Kukah (1993: 93) is quite illuminating in this narrative:
[...] the ruling (Hausa-Fulani) ruling class was quick to sense the dangers that loomed towards its interests, and it acted decisively and pragmatically. The northern ruling class may have beaten back that threat of southern domination, but could not have done all that only to surrender power to those it had ruled and used as political cannon fodder all these years. It worked behind the scenes, scheming and plotting its political interests on the canvass of northern interests. To strengthen their cause, a major move was made by bringing together three erstwhile political enemies, representing the three power blocs in Northern Nigeria. They were brought together and made to tour the North as symbol of northern solidarity. Known as the Leaders of Thought, the group comprised of Alhaji Aliyu Makaman Bida (leader of the defunct NPC), Alhaji Aminu Kano (NEPU) and Mr. Joseph Tarka (UMBC) (pp.39-40).

Gowon’s nine years in power (1966-1975) remains the longest any one ruler has occupied Nigeria’s presidency. Again, although General Ibrahim Babangida, a Gwari who ruled Nigeria from 1985 to 1993, hails from the Minority Middle-Belt as Gowon, his eight-year rule was marked by robust obsequious to the Sokoto Sultanate which symbolizes (Muslim) spiritual and (northern) political authority. Babangida’s choice of Sambo Dasuki, (Nigeria’s new NSA) as his aide de camp after his a successful coup against General Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani, could be seen not only in the light of forestalling a backlash from the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, which installed the latter to power (Olukoshi, 1993) but also as an appeasement gesture towards it.

Beneath the façade of northern hegemony, however, the resentment against Hausa-Fulani hegemony over the rest of the north among other northern political blocs persists. Perhaps the boldest expression of this resentment was the expulsion of the five northernmost and predominantly Hausa-Fulani Nigerian states from Nigeria by army major Gideon Orkar in the coup against General Babangida’s regime in 1990. With Babangida (IBB) viewed generally as a proxy for the Hausa-Fulani, Major Orkar, who was of the Tiv ethnic minority group of northern Nigeria, had accused the Hausa-Fulani of seeking to perpetuate their rule at the expense of the predominantly Christian peoples of Nigeria’s Middle-Belt. The age-old resentment of the old Kanem-Borno Empire towards the over-arching influence of the Sokoto Caliphate in the north also remains. When the late General Sani Abacha, a Kanuri, assumed the leadership of Nigeria in 1993, he retired several top military officers, many of whom were regarded as ‘IBB Boys’ and were mainly Hausa-Fulani. Abacha’s later deposing of the Sultana of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, and concomitant prominence accorded the Shehu of Borno by his regime, was perhaps the climax of a revived age-old rivalry between old Kanem-Borno and Sokoto Caliphate. That interlude, however, did not redeem the peripherality of the Kanem-Borno axis in the northern domination of Nigeria’s political power trajectory.

It is against this backdrop that the political feud theory has generated more interest than any of the perspectives that attempt to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon as it also further exposes the deep division among Nigeria’s disparate social groups. Professor Wole Soyinka view on the problem perhaps captures this scenario most succinctly:

Much play is given, and rightly so, to economic factors – unemployment, misgovernment, wasted resources, social marginalization, massive corruption – in the nurturing of the current season of violent discontent in Nigeria. To limit oneself to these factors alone, is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in the face and give it its proper name – and response. This horde has remained available to political opportunists and
criminal leaders desperate to stave off the day of reckoning. Most are highly placed, highly
disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes,
resort to the manipulation of these products of warped fervor. Their aim is to bring society
to its knees, to create a situation of total anarchy that will either break up the nation or
bring back the military, which ruled Nigeria in a succession of coups between the mid-1960s
and the late ’90s [...] Again and again they have declared their blunt manifesto—not merely
to Islamise the nation but to bring it under a specific kind of fundamentalist strain
(Newsweek, January 16, 2012).

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that while the extra-judicial
killing of the leadership of the Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with
the state, the severity that the violence has now assumed is the fallout of a fierce political battle in
2011, which we have already referred to. The outcry at that time resonated around forcing Jonathan
to give up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north and had pitted
some formidable political forces in the north against similar forces in the most of the south –
especially from Jonathan’s minority ethnic Ijaw nationality of the south-south of Nigeria who saw in
Jonathan’s ambition an opportunity to placate the restive region over perceived decades of political
and economic marginalization in the Nigerian Union. The post-2011 election violence in parts of the
north, therefore, did not only symbolize a rejection of the polls result and/or Goodluck Jonathan/a
Christian southerner’s presidency, but was also a precursor to the current mayhem.[1]

Midlarsky (1975: 28) defines an act of political violence “as an attempted or actual injury (ordinarily
not sanctioned by law or custom) perpetrated on persons or property with the actual or intended
consequences of effecting transformations either within structures of political authority or within
economic and/or social system.” In the general context of the theory of northern loss of power, for
the Nigerian political system, notorious for its prebendalism, patronage system, and cronism, the
stakes for the control of political power can be quite high, and loss of central power could prompt a
“highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals” or group towards bringing
the country “under a specific kind of fundamentalist strain,” even if illegally (Joseph, 1991; Sklar,
1998).

Very significant in the campaign of violence by the Boko Haram is the corresponding intensity which
marked the post-2011 election Nigeria. Apart from anger against Jonathan for violating his party’s
power rotation arrangement, while international observers viewed the April 2011 general polls in
which Jonathan emerged victorious as credible, “many Nigerians, especially in the north, did not”
(Herskovits, 2012).

To interpret the terror attacks as orchestrated attempts to undermine Jonathan thus qualifies them
as political violence intended for the “transformations either within structures of political authority
or within economic and/or social system” (Midlarsky, 1975). With the ultimatum issued by the Boko
Haram sect in early January 2012 to southern Nigerians residing in the north to return to their
region, the contention that “Boko Haram [is] out to end 1914 amalgamation,” (Saturday Sun, online,
January 21, 2012) of the northern and southern protectorates, which formally created the political
entity known as Nigeria, approximates Soyinka’s thesis that the perpetrators are indeed anarchists
who, having lost power, are bent on dismembering Nigeria.

The political feud perspective has acquired more dimensions as it also reveals emergent dynamics in
Nigeria’s power relations. Jonathan’s Ijaw ethnic group claims Boko Haram is a northern attempt to
undermine the president’s power. At the same time, there is an emergent school of thought that the
specific focus of the terror campaign is the 2015 presidential election, an attempt to ensure that power returns to the north by 2015, especially amidst speculations that Jonathan may yet contest the presidency at that time. Senator Uche Chukwumerije, who has canvassed this view, links Jonathan’s accession to power from the vice-president in 2007 to the elected president in 2011, to the Niger Delta militancy spear-headed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, MEND from the late 1990s. Obasanjo’s emergence as Nigeria’s president in 1999 to him also owed to the militancy by the Yoruba ethnic militia, the Oodua People’s Congress, OPC as an aftermath of the 1993 presidential election annulment. Thus his suggestion to his ethnic Igbo nationality to mobilize its own militia, Movement for the Sovereign States of Biafra, MASSOB, to “devise a means of constructive engagement with the youth” (Vanguard, online, 29 September 2011) towards 2015. Chukwumerije’s call for the mobilization of the Igbo militia should be seen within of context of the mobilization of ethnic militia for political ascendency in Nigeria, which forms the central thesis of our essay in a forthcoming volume. [2]

Professor Bolaji Akinyemi’s conceptualization of the Nigerian military from July 1966 to 1999 as an ethnic militia is quite functional in understanding our argument in the essay under reference. In doing so, he has argued that referring to the Nigerian army as an un-classical and unusual case of ethnic militia does not mean that it was made up of only one nationality. Instead, while it is composed of representatives of many of the nationalities of Nigeria, it is only the northern Hausa-Fulani military representatives who have a sense of collective interests to advance and protect (Akinyemi, 2003: 21). Since 1999, certain fundamental changes have taken place in the command structure of the Nigerian military-security institutions to the extent that certain offices, hitherto the exclusive preserve of the north or the Hausa-Fulani, are now occupied by personnel outside of these areas. For example, for the first time in post-civil war Nigeria, an Igbo became the chief of army staff in the person of Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika. Similarly, a southerner became the national security adviser (NSA) in the person of General Andrew Azazi. The appropriation of the Nigerian military as northern and/or Hausa-Fulani militia was perpetuated by that monopolization. Thus, the loss of such monopoly has obviously removed the appropriation of the Nigerian army as the ethnic militia by the north and/or Hausa-Fulani. Significantly, in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sagir Mohammed, formed a northern militia, the Arewa People’s Congress, (APC) to “protect and safeguard the interest of the North wherever it is” (Obasi, 2002:43). Outside of the north, the APC is perceived by some as “the maintenance of [northern] hegemonic control in national politics” (ibid). As Akinyemi (2003: 22) has argued: “ Unlike the other ethnic militias who seek change, the Arewa People’s Congress seeks the maintenance of the status quo, irrespective of its crises of marginalization”. Although the APC appears to have now disappeared, in the general context of Northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko Haram may be conceived of as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group.

There remains a need, however, to examine the Boko Haram crisis in terms of its implications for the 2015 presidential election in specific historical and contemporary context, given the changing dynamics in northern politics. Beginning with the north-west and north-east blocs, after becoming president on May 5, 2010, following Yar’Adua’s death, Jonathan had chosen Namadi Sambo as his deputy, a Muslim and then governor of north-west Kaduna state. In the 2011 presidential poll, Jonathan also nominated Sambo as his running-mate, who went on to become the vice-president. By those choices, Jonathan was able to assuage to some extent the north-west and Hausa-Fulani over the loss of Yar’Adua. [3]
We have earlier mentioned the Kanuri resentment of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony. That resentment grew from the historical rivalry between the North-West or the Fulani and the old Borno Empire. The rivalry derives from the fact that the old Borno Empire was never really conquered by the Fulani jihadist movement. Garba Shehu notes that the entire areas covering the old Borno Empire “do not only take pride in this but also the fact that they contacted Islam much earlier than what is today’s North-West geo-political region on Nigeria” (Tribune, online, June 27, 2012). These areas are largely made up of Borno and Yobe States in Nigeria and the parts of Niger, Cameroon and Chad Republics. Interestingly, nationals of those neighbouring countries account for foreigner elements among the Boko Haram operatives. We did also state that but for the General Abacha period 1993-1998, the Kanuri ethnic nationality had maintained, a marginal quotient in the Northern domination of central power in Nigeria.

While Southerners, therefore, may erroneously refer to all northerners as Hausas and Fulanis (Uche, 1989:9), to the Kanuri, both Atiku who contested against Jonathan in the January 2011 PDP presidential primary and General Muhammadu Buhari who contested against him in the subsequent presidential election under the Congress for Progressive Change, (CPC) are Fulanis.

Their electoral victory would invariably perpetuate the Fulani hegemony. A closer examination of the Boko Haram terror movement thus reveals it clearly as a Kanuri revolt – it is “dominated by Kanuri boys, despite the recruitment of volunteers from areas outside Borno and Yobe States” (Tribune, online, June 27, 2012). Outside of its core old Borno versus Fulani context, a statement by Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa, the Chief Whip of the House of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the north-east caucus in the House, further underscores a general north-east angst. According to him, “We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is responsible for insecurity in North-East” (Sunday Trust, online, February 12, 2012).

In the context of the age-long rivalry between the Caliphate and old Borno Empire, a group has emerged, which is believed to be the Caliphate response to Boko Haram. Known as the *Jamaatul Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladin Sudan* meaning the ‘group that dedicates itself to helping Muslims in Africa,’ and led by someone who goes by the pseudonym Abu Usamatul Ansar, it states its mission as ‘to correct the concept, meaning and purpose of Jihad in Islam.’ The group claims it will neither attack innocent persons, including security personnel nor non-Muslims because “Islam forbids killing of innocent people including non Muslims” (Desert Herald, online, June 2, 2012). The replacement of General Azazi, Nigeria’s first ever non-northern national security adviser, with Col. Sambo Dasuki, a scion of the Caliphate, whatever purpose it supposed to serve, raises the question of the likelihood of the appointment worsening the old animosities between the Sokoto Caliphate and old Borno Empire, which may affect the war on terror itself. The sect’s rebuttal of Dasuki’s claims to have secured its telephone contact for possible dialogue (Xinhua online, July 10, 2012), does not project a disposition to Dasuki’s gestures.

In the north-central, or Middle-Belt area generally, two developments have combined to change whatever cohesion which existed in the northern region. One, although religious extremism in Nigeria has been a northern phenomenon, re-occurring ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, Plateau state which has pitted Hausa-Fulani Muslims particularly against the predominantly Christian indigenous population has helped to bolster common consciousness among the minority Christian ethnic groups in the region. This common consciousness is defined by shared Hausa-Fulani hegemonic burden, and re-enforces the resentment towards that hegemony. Two, Kukah (1993:xiii) has noted that “the Middle Belt, with its clusters of Christians and traditional religious worshipers, remain central to the
geo-political calculation of both the ruling class in the North, and those of the South, with each laying claims on a different basis. While the Muslims in the North lay claim to the area on the basis of geographical congruity, the South lays claims to religious brotherhood.” Towards the 2011 presidential polls, this tendency was exploited to mobilize support for Jonathan. The patronage accruing to this region emanating from that support towards Jonathan’s electoral success, and the increasingly Christian brotherhood consciousness fostered by the ethno-religious conflict in Jos, have combined to rally strong support for the Jonathan administration within the region. Although the Plateau has been a site of violence of late, Boko Haram’s terror campaign in the area has spiralled in recent times including those of July 7 and 8, 2012 in the Barkin Ladi area of the state, in which over 90 persons died (Xinhua online, July 10, 2012). With Plateau counted as one of the north-central states most likely to support Jonathan’s speculated 2015 presidential bid (People and Politics, June, 2012, p. 26), targeting the area may just be a strategy to discourage Jonathan’s support ahead of 2015.

Boko Haram’s refusal to reveal its identity and table its grievances actually erodes the relevance of the previous theories in the explanation of the crisis in favour of the political feud perspective, whether in terms of Herskovits suggestion that while the original core of the group remains active, criminal gangs have adopted the name Boko Haram to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them (Herskovits, 2012), or Soyinka’s hijack thesis (Soyinka, op.cit). Indeed the importance of Islamic militant groups, especially those linked to al Qaeda or their affiliates, making known their leaders has lucidly been explored. According to the Nigerian essayist Ocherome Nnanna, “the suicide fighters need their ‘inspiration’; and the disclosure of their identity is a statement in courage and defiance” (Vanguard online, September 1, 2011). The following examples tend to support the argument: the al-Qaeda Movement in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM) is founded/led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Algeria after a delink with Hassan Hattab’s, Salafist Group for Call and Combat, (SGPC); The Somali Al Shabaab militia, an affiliate of al Qaeda, is led by Sheikh Muktar Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys, with Mukhtar Abu Zubevr, leading a faction of foreign fighters. Ayman Zawahiri, former al Qaeda number two, took over from Osama bin Laden after the latter was killed on May 2, 2011 by the US Navy Seals. For the Nigeria’s Boko Haram, except for shadowy individuals making claims on its behalf, there has been no formally identifiable leader/successor since the death of Yussuf. Leadership has only been ascribed to Shekau.

The Islamic Theocratic State Theory

The Boko Haram sect has hardly masked its intention to bring down the Nigerian government, the Kufur system, and ultimately Islamize Nigeria. Lengmang (2011: 101) notes the allegation that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level shari’a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system. Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, “they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence (ibid). Lengmang attributes resentment to the shari’a coexistence with secular federal system to the view by many a northerner that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region, and so shares the fallacy of western education being incompatible with Islam (ibid: 99).

However tangential its link with al Qaeda or its affiliates, the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria holds the vision of global political Islam, which is the overthrow of all worldly government (Kufur system) and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state. Perhaps its reported rejection of President Jonathan’s invitation for dialogue and demand that he converts to Islam or hand over to a Muslim underlines this tendency (Peoples Daily, online, January 27, 2012). Mehrdad Mozayyan has traced
the rise of the radical Islam to three variables. One was the 1979 Iran Revolution that ushered a widespread rejectionist philosophy, changing the Muslims’ view of themselves and their position in the world, as well as their approaches to daily life and politics. The second was the anti-western feelings in the Middle East traceable to the effect of European colonization. The third and most recent is the American presence in the Middle East with claims that it brought a corrupting influence (Mozayyan, 2009: 241). In a related way, corrupt and ineffective local political leadership espousing Western ideologies and failing to improve people’s well-being remain a major stimulus to political Islam. Eventually, the Islamists’ gaining and holding power in Iran produced the wake-up call throughout the Muslim world and led to widespread Islamic resurgence. Thus,

New standards were now set and a new discourse gained currency that targeted the “enemies of Islam” through revolutionary, militant, and martyr-oriented strategies. Life became readily expandable, especially if it hindered the advancement of Islamic agendas. Islam thus became a means and an end for the frustrated masses, giving rise to leaders who spoke in terms of Islamic communities, and pushed the need to restore Islam to its former position of power by removing the corrupting Western influences (Western Civilization is sin) that hinder the promotion of their own millenarian beliefs (Mozayyan, 2009: 242).

Despite its debt to the Islamist regime in Iran for the Islamic awakening, the current radical or jihadist Islamic movement, was founded by the late Osama bin Laden and has its origin in the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. There, the “links among individual and different national groups were forged” (Crenshaw, 2009:403). It is most unlikely that any of the Boko Haram’s operatives in Nigeria ever fought in Afghanistan. But the triumph of the jihadists in Afghanistan has had a bolstering universal effect on jihadists across the globe, so that as Crenshaw rightly observes, “other men [and women] who were too young to have fought in Afghanistan […] emulated what they saw as the jihadist model,” (ibid: 404). Lengmang reports further that as a way of identifying with the Taliban, during one of its violent attacks on a police station in Kanamma, Yobe State, members of Boko Haram briefly flew the black Taliban flag, a gesture symbolizing commonality of cause (Lengmang, 2011: 98).

Professor Fernando Reinares has also argued that political influences such as events in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East generally, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc. could motivate the jihadists (BBC, online, April 29, 2006). For the Boko Haram sect, the inspiration derived from Afghanistan, for instance, may not be limited only to the victory of the Mujahedeen over the Soviet, but rather symbolizes the triumph of Islam over secularity. It derives essentially from the fact that the victory was scored with the primitive and improvised arms (Mozayyan, 2009: 242) as compared to the modern weapons of the Soviets. Boko Haram started its campaign of terror in Nigeria with comparatively primitive weapons, but it has moved to Improvised Explosive Devices, (IEDs) and the chaos in Libya has been of great value in terms of weapons and training, (Reuters, January 26, 2012). There is yet a sense in which the Nigerian Mujahedeen can feel up-beat. Mozayyan invokes a religious imagery:

Presently, the war is cast in religious terms, where the likes of David and Goliath are evoked, and true believers are directed into action by being reminded of the unexpected outcome of that lopsided confrontation. David had contributed his faith, devotion, courage and selflessness, just as Muslims are called to do. God did, and will do the rest. In such instances, it is critical that God be seen “as a personal participant in the fighting process.” It is God that grants victory so that “truth” may “nullify falsehood.” Similarly, when Muslims won […] it was not you who slew them, but Allah (Mozayyan, 2009:244).
Boko Haram has invoked the name of Allah severally to explain why it carried out its terror campaigns to media sources. The sect’s operatives undoubtedly are imbued with the mind-set elucidated by Mozayyan: it believes it can defeat the Nigerian state notwithstanding the sophistication and quantity of weapons at the latter’s disposal. Successful attacks on security formations across the north tend to bolster this feeling.

Reinares’ idea of political influence could also extend to the development in Sudan and could be an incentive to the Boko Haram sect. In July 2011, after prolonged bitter conflict that included over two decades of guerrilla warfare, Sudan was split into two countries, essentially along religious lines. Although the Shari’a is yet to be imposed in the Sudan, Islam remains the state religion, while the government run by the Arabic north presses on to institute the Islamic legal system. Sudan is predominantly Muslim, while South Sudan is a mixture of predominantly African Traditional religion and minority Christian populations. The Boko Haram sect may have focused on this model, just as its ambition may have been bolstered by the Islamist rebels declaration of northern Mali as the AZAWAD republic.

But the Aristotelian counsel may suffice here. In his *Politics*, Aristotle warns that in framing our ideals, we may assume what we wish, but must avoid impossibilities. Nigeria’s geography does not make a clear-cut distinction between a Muslim north and Christian south. Apart from the fact that a great number of the indigenous population of the south-west region are Muslims, a large chunk of the population of the north central and to a some extent, the north east areas of Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi and even Borno, are Christians. Former military President Ibrahim Babangida, a Muslim, puts this aspect in perspective thus:

> There [are …] no such phrases like Muslim North and Christian South. Where ever you go in this country, you will find out that there are Muslims and Christians living peacefully together. You will find out there are Christians in the North and it is the same in the South (Daily Trust, online, January 27, 2012).

The idea is also bewildering to Christians in the north. For instance, Bolarinwa Yussuf, a Christian from Kogi, a state in the north central wonders where the Boko Haram sect wants him to go. He stressed that he had been born a northerner, like his forefathers, and has no apologies to any one for being a Christian (interview, January 24, 2012). The sect’s position, therefore, raises the following questions: are the south-west Nigerian Muslims no longer part of the global Islamic family; are the northern Nigerian Christians no longer northerners simply for professing different religious beliefs other than Islam? Perhaps as has been demanded of President Jonathan, they too are expected to repent and convert to Islam.

The Boko Haram sect remains a fringe group and antagonizes mainstream northern Nigerian Muslims. It must, therefore, evolve in its campaign, a broad coalition that will accommodate not only a large chunk of those mainstream northern Muslims but also its elite corps. Whereas the Mujahedeen are focused on Islam’s days of glory or great piety, which to them assure the true believer of spiritual salvation and an eternally joyful existence in the world beyond (Mozayyan, 2009:241), however, the average Nigerian Muslim political elite is most likely uninterested in Boko Haram’s version of Islam. He may, in the words of Mozayyan, be more interested in a “future that guarantees independent thought, social liberty, modernity and economic remuneration in this world” (ibid. p. 243) – progressive Islam. Nigeria’s oil wealth (upon which the Nigerian elites rely for primitive accumulation) is a major disincentive to the evolution of any broad coalition that will involve mainstream northern Muslims. For instance, an Estimated seventy-five per cent of oil
reserves in former Sudan went to the South after July 2011 (cited in Haile, 2012). All of Nigeria’s oil reserves are located in the south. Despite talks about the north being capable of surviving without southern oil, efforts to find oil in the north have intensified over the years. The point here is that, while the Boko Haram Mujahedeen may not care about the earthly economy, the northern political elites do. Allegations of complicity of elements from among northern politicians with the Boko Haram sect have been rife (Daily Sun, January 23, 2012), but governors of the North’s 19 states, out of which only four are Christians, denied the charge off any collusion with the sect or any plots to disintegrate Nigeria. Babangida words perhaps, sum up what could pass for the feelings of the Northern Muslim political cum economic elites to the threat to Nigeria’s corporate existence:

You see in this country we fought the war for almost three years for the benefit of living together. I have a bullet in my body, so nobody will talk to me about secession or breaking away. If you do, I would always say yes, get my tailor to take my measurement, get on my khaki and I go back to fight a war to keep this country together (Daily Trust, January 27, 2012).

In the same report, Babangida named what he called the ‘Doctrine of Nigeria’s Settled Issues,’ which according to him cannot be compromised. They include, the country’s unity, her republican constitution, the states as federating units and the capitalist orientation of the economy. Babangida was a veteran of the Nigeria civil war fought to keep Nigeria as one Order (Turner, 1980: 74).

Conspiracy Theories

The conspiracy theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram crisis can be marked into two broad categories: one focusing on machinations of internal actors, the other on external actors. Internal actors may include the disgruntled northern power elite who, having lost power, are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership, as well as the Jonathan administration itself, which may be sponsoring the crisis in order to rally southern support behind his administration, and there is also the perception that Boko Haram may be a secret society controlled by some ‘invisible’ hands that seek to destroy the north ahead of 2015 so as to forestall or weaken its bid for the presidency at that time (Adibe, 2012:58). External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western states like the United States, or neighbouring African states envious of Nigeria’s progress and stability.

For the first hypothesis regarding internal actors, which we have treated in great detail under the political feud theory, our position is that its merit probably lies in the profound feeling of marginalization emanating from the north-east, either in terms of perceived denial of socio-economic infrastructure and/or the Kanuri sense of marginalization from central power. The second hypothesis also contends that part of the support mobilization strategy was to portray Islam in bad light by hitting Christian targets. This hypothesis perhaps draws from instances where attempts or actual attacks on Southern and Christian targets both in the north and south, which were blamed on Boko Haram, but were traced to Christian southerners (Blueprint, Tuesday January 31, 2012). Similarly, in November 2011, the State Security Services (SSS), also paraded a syndicate that circulated terror messages, which prompted some foreign diplomatic missions to issue warnings that emptied Abuja’s high-brow hotels. The group was comprised southern Christians and not Muslims nor northerners. From a northern perspective, these cases “suggest that Boko Haram is now the new weapon used by various interest groups to cause violence, mislead and confuse Nigerians in order to achieve their selfish agenda” (ibid). It is difficult to comprehend how Christians who continue to fall victims of attacks on their places of worship and Southerners who are being asked to flee to part of the country, from where most have spent the greater parts of their lives and built multi-million naira...
businesses, and who have asked Jonathan to quit if he cannot lead (Leadership online, May 1, 2102) will rally behind a government which has proved incapable of protecting them.

Although the United States continues to deny predicting Nigeria’s disintegration by 2015 – pointing out that a private agency, not the US government carried out the survey upon which the report is predicated – those who emphasize this aspect of the external conspiracy theory point to a 2008 war game conducted by the US army which was designed to test its response ability to probable state failure in Nigeria in relation to US energy needs. The oil-rich Middle East has historically been unstable, and resurgent Islam has compounded the problem. Nigeria’s far north is contiguous to the troubled Sahel and Maghreb regions, which also are contiguous to the some Middle East states in the grip of Islamism. The US interest in Nigeria’s oil does not predispose it to be comfortable with such proximity to this potentially Islamist enclave. At a one-day symposium on ‘international conspiracy: towards Nigeria’s disintegration,’ in Kaduna, North-West Nigeria, the Association of Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria (AMBON) noted that “there were reasons to believe that the peace and security of Nigeria were being threatened by the western world powers for their economic gains; that the western world threatens the peace of the country in order to protect their economic interest in Nigeria’s oil region” (Daily Trust, February 3, 2012). In the opinion of one member of Nigeria’s National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the US might be aiming to sever the oil-rich Niger Delta or the south from the far north in order to insulate the former from the emerging Islamist activism in the north with the ultimate goal of securing the vital oil resources in the south (private discussion with source, January 4, 2012). It would be preposterous to assume, however, that the US military could guarantee America’s energy interest in Nigeria within the context of a failed Nigeria balkanized into several fiefdoms.

Sentiments such as these have led to reservations over state efforts to collaborate with foreign powers to combat the Boko Haram. According to Professor Tam David West, Nigeria’s former minister of petroleum, “When they come ostensibly for security, they have their own agenda to penetrate our system and subjugate the sovereignty of the country; not only that, they become a powerful force within the country to dictate the political direction” (The Nation, online, January 29, 2012). A member of Nigeria’s security forces, Uche Nwogu, shares this concern. Without naming any country in particular, she notes that “by the time these people come in the name of helping us fight Boko Haram, they would have understudied their modus operandi and would themselves start bombing us while we assume it is still Boko Haram” (Discussion with source on the subject, Monday January 30, 2012).

The scenario in the Arab states tends to validate these musings. According to Professor Michel Chossudovsky et al., in the Global Research Online Interactive Reader Series (GR1S), Western powers used "Political Islam" – including the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups – to pursue their hegemonic objectives. Covert operations, they note, were launched to weaken the secular state, foment sectarian violence, and create social divisions throughout the Arab World. In Libya, they contend, “the "pro-democracy" rebels were led by Al Qaeda affiliated paramilitary brigades under the supervision of NATO Special Forces. The much-vaunted "Liberation" of Tripoli was carried out by former members of the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). “Destabilization of sovereign states,” the authors contend, “is closely coordinated with military planning” (GRIS Book No.1, online, November 2011).

The 2005 report was followed by a February 2011 version prepared by US military experts which stated as follows:
Although inherited and chosen layers of identity will be as “authentic” as conventional categories of citizenship and nationality, one category possibly will continue to stand out. Islam will remain a robust identity. Sectarian and other differences within Islam will be a source of tension or worse. The challenge of Islamic activism could produce a more intense backlash of Christian activism. Nigeria, Ethiopia, and other places in Africa will remain battlegrounds in this sectarian struggle. In 2025, notions of multiethnic integration and the value of “diversity” could face a combination of challenges from nationalists [and] religious zealots.

A pattern in Boko Haram’s insurgency – targeting ethnic and religious fault-lines – appears designed to enact the 2025 scenario described above. Hundreds of deaths of members of the Igbo ethnic nationality in the terror attacks in the north, for instance, have precipitated a ‘return home’ by the easterners and a warning that no ethnic group in Nigeria has monopoly of violence. Amid escalating violence, Igbo leaders have warned that the violence inflicted on their people residing in the north approximate the sequence of events that culminated in the tragedy of the Nigeria civil war (Punch, online, January 29, 2012). On the one hand, there is a perspective that links the attacks on the Igbos to the group’s overwhelming electoral support for Jonathan in 2011, which amounted to over 98% of the votes cast in the eastern region (Daily Sun, online, February 6, 2012). On the other hand, leaders of Jonathan’s Ijaw ethnic nationality also warn against “subterranean moves, to destroy the fabric of unity of this country, at a time the leadership of the country is entrusted to our son [and] that no ethnic nationality is a sole repository of violence” (Tribune, online, January 10, 2012). From the North, the Arewa Youth Development Foundation, spoke about “recent remarks by South-East (Igbo) and South-South (Ijaw) leaders” and warned that should the tendencies continue, “We would be left with no option than to tell other regions that feel like disintegrating, that the North welcomes it too” (Blueprint, online, January 31, 2012). On the other plane, although the Nigerian Muslim leadership maintains that Islam and Christianity are not at war in Nigeria, (Tribune, online, December 28, 2012), the Christian leadership urges adherents to defend themselves against attacks (ibid) while a leading Pentecostal cleric, Bishop David Oyedepo claims God has anointed him “to lead a revolution against the jihadists. [And that] If the church should arise, Nigeria will no more be a nation,” (Tribune, January 23, 2012).

Allegations of conspiracy by envious neighbours to undermine Nigeria remain highly speculative, especially when considered in light of the military cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries in the war against transnational terrorism, and their common interest in regional stability.

Conclusion: Any Hope for Optimism?

This study has examined various theories attempting to explain the driving forces behind the Boko Haram phenomenon. Our position is that each of the perspectives offers some degree of insight into the problem, as well as the general patterns of political tension and social violence in Nigeria, which Boko Haram merely epitomizes.

In any case, it is clear that Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a strictly religious movement to one espousing a political agenda. While acknowledging the difficulties in getting to the root cause of the problem, the government must at least address the issues related to Jonathan’s decision to contest the 2011 presidential elections against the power rotation principle designed by his political party, the PDP, and his speculated 2015 presidential ambition. Irrespective of the constitutional provisions on individual political rights and aspirations, solemn attention needs be paid to professor Ekeh’s postulate that, “The historical condition in which the Nigerian state emerged has precluded
its integration into a composite society” (1989:8). Any efforts at effecting enduring stability in Nigeria, therefore, must recognize her complex plurality, respect the sensitivity of the component parts, and refrain from acts of political impunity.

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Notes

[1] At a public function shortly before he was removed as National Security Adviser, General Andrew Aziza in reference to the acrimony over Jonathan’s decision to go against his party’s zoning policy that could have prevented him from contesting the 2011 presidential election, referred to Boko Haram was a creation of some disgruntled members of the President Jonathan ruling party, who angered by his emergence, appropriated the group to destabilize his government. Many believe Azizi owed his sack to that statement.


[3] The voting pattern in the 2011 presidential primary of the ruling PDP made certain significant statements: whereas the Hausa-Fulani appeared to have been appeased by choice of Sambo as Jonathan’s running mate, he lost Sokoto state, the seat of the Caliphate as well Zamfara and Kebbi states, which were carved out of former Sokoto state to former Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, a Fulani. Atiku also won in Niger, the home state of former military president General Babangida, who not only like Atiku was a member of the Northern coalition that opposed Jonathan’s 2011 presidential ambition but is known to defer so much to the Hausa-Fulani. Atiku however lost Borno state, the home stead of the Kanuris to Jonathan.
This paper is concerned with the challenges and dynamics of state policing in contemporary Kenya. The popular transition to multi-party democracy in Kenya in 2002 came with a great hope and expectation of reforms in the political, economic, and security spaces. In particular, it was envisaged that reform in the security sector would, among other things, end the dismal paradigm of policing for regime security and replace it with a new dispensation of popular policing oriented to the general protection and security of the citizens.

For about eight years into the new multi-party republic, the Kenyan police force was hardly reformed. The outbreak of the infamous post-election violence of early 2008 with its horrifying incidents of ethnic massacre and police incapacity and brutality graphically reported by the international media served as a reminder to security specialists and observers alike that the Kenyan security sector crisis, which reached a crescendo during the dictatorship of Daniel Arap Moi, is far from over. This study analyzes the transition from state policing to multi-choice policing in Kenya, including its underlying structural and empirical impediments, externalities, challenges, and opportunities.

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Introduction

This study investigates and analyzes the problems and challenges encountered by the Kenyan Police Force in their function of delivering effective policing services as required by law and expected by the public. The KPF has evolved from a pro-imperial colonial police (founded to subjugate the colonized ‘native populations’) to what it is today. Originally formed as a colonial constabulary, the institution was not created as a people’s police, but as a reactionary instrument of conquest and repression with the aim of achieving the imperial objectives of resource extraction and political domination. This peculiar history of pro-imperialist coercion and anti-locals disposition is what preponderantly shaped the institutional character and operations of most African police forces, including the KPF.\[1\] It is in this historical context that one can properly understand the role of KPF in the crackdown of the anti-colonial struggle and brutalization of activists in the nationalist movements for independence, such as the famous Mau Mau freedom fighters.\[2\] One of the greatest but rarely appreciated challenges of independence in Kenya and Africa was the need to transform the inherited colonial police force from an anti-people to a legitimate national police protective of, and owned by the people.

Sadly, the necessary transformative reform of the police force has been mostly elusive in the majority of the post-colonial states of Africa, not least in Kenya. Evidence from the 24 years of President Daniel Arap Moi’s regime reveal that the KPF was instrumental to a catalogue of human rights violations, including politically motivated disappearances and targeted killing of many perceived opponents. Many leading pro-democracy activists that campaigned for the expansion of the political space were repeatedly harassed and brutalized by the KPF. Unlawful and prolonged detention of opponents without trial was rampant. The media houses were not spared as a number of critical private media were banned.\[3\] Also, owing to the prolonged undemocratic rule by President Moi, the police institution became highly politicized with the result that recruitment and promotion of officers were for the most part based on cronyism and clannism. The police was seemingly dominated by hegemonic ethnic groups. Corruption became widespread even as violent crime soared. The 1990s witnessed an astronomically high crime rate, especially in the Nairobi area.\[4\] The image and reputation of the police was at its lowest ebb in the post-independence history. Moi presided over a highly regimented one party state largely sustained by an unprofessional police force that many critics likened to the Gestapo (secret state police) of the defunct Nazi Germany.

The return to popular democracy in 2002 following the election of President Mwai Kibaki came with rekindled hope and great expectation in the security sector that KPF would among other things be reformed and professionalized to be able to deliver efficient and productive policing. A number of progressive steps seemed to have been made since 2002 such as the emergence of preventive action through community policing of various neighborhoods. Community policing, which is the main plank of state policing service in Kenya and many modern democracies worldwide, is literally a bottom–up approach that aims at policing in partnership and with the consent of the people. Community policing adopts various strategies to build trust and partnership with the policed including reaching out to community stakeholders to ascertain their needs, public involvement in intelligence and neighborhood surveillance, the creation of police posts and liaison offices within short intervals in residential neighborhoods, sensitization of the public to the needs, difficulties and challenges of the police with a view to eliciting understanding and sundry supportive actions, etc. Since it was introduced in Nairobi under the Kibaki regime, community policing has been extended to various parts of the country. Ostensibly, there has not been independent impact evaluation of progress made and problems and challenges encountered in community policing in Kenya.\[5\] This
practical gap in research becomes more compelling against the evidence of growing crime rates, coupled with allegations by many local and international NGOs and human rights watchdogs that KPF perpetrates egregious human rights violations with impunity. Hence, even though the return to multi-partyism in the post-Moi era created a great opportunity for reforms and transformation, this seems to have rapidly slipped away as evidenced during the 2008 post-election violence. The incapacity of the KPF was palpable during the violence as they seemed overwhelmed and unprepared to tackle the situation. [6] This project is therefore a significant inquiry that investigates the capacity deficits and challenges of the KPF.

From a Weberian perspective, the Kenyan state does not have the monopoly of the legitimate use of force required to maintain law and order, as well as to guarantee internal and external sovereignty in a modern state. One of the hallmarks of state sovereignty in the contemporary international system is the ability to guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. [7] The concept of state security is both fuzzy and problematic, and more so in Africa given the historical diversity of states as political units with a considerable proportion of them derogating from the Westphalian benchmark. There exist multiple networks of power within and beyond the geo-spatial state boundaries in many African countries with the result that some of the African states have been differently described as weak states, quasi-states, fragile states, pseudo states and shadow states. [8] From available empirical indicators, the Kenyan state ostensibly fits into the mould of states in Africa categorized as weak or fragile, given the fragmented nature of policing and security domains in the country. Apparently, the Kenyan state, like many in Africa and elsewhere in the developing regions, can scarcely guarantee security for its citizenry.

New security governance models seem to be taking shape in Kenya. At the heart of the new security governance architecture is a plethora of self help efforts and the privatization of state security. This emerging security architecture, which seems to be the trend in many parts of the developing world, has been conceptualized as multi-choice policing, [9] which includes a mixed bag of both functionally responsible public and private security providers on the one hand, and a subterranean network of uncivil and dysfunctional groups that provide alternative but too often menacing security. Some of the alternative security providers that pose threats to state security in Kenya include militia and vigilante groups that have partly emerged in response to the apparent incapacity and failings of the Kenyan state. The re-introduction of multi-partyism in 1991 brought with it the dissolution of the state monopoly of violence by heralding the emergence of ethnic militias. These militias were consequently mobilized as forms of extra-state violence. With time, these militias assumed a life of their own and the Kenyan state could no longer control them. [10] It has been observed that the Kenyan militia groups are in many instances filling a security vacuum left by the state. But in reality, the diffuse security arrangements constitute a threat to the KPF that has the sole mandate of maintaining law and order as is typical of state policing agencies elsewhere. The KPF officials interviewed for this study claim that the underlying challenges of state policing in Kenya have to do with the growing incapacity of the state to provide the necessary infrastructure for policing, such as operational equipment and facilities. The magnitude and intensity of “structural violence” [11] in the Kenyan society have also aggravated the propensity of criminal and organized violence in the country, and by corollary, the policing challenges.

Our empirical findings suggest that poverty levels have a correlation with increased crime in Kenya. In the study, we came across narratives suggesting that the breakdown of social order predisposes the youth to crime, and this tends to be in line with major sociological discourses of violence, such as the social control theory in criminology. The underlying assumption of social control theory is that individuals are potential law violators, and it is primary social bonds such as family and friends that
keep them in control. Without such supportive social bonds, theorists argue, many vulnerable folks, especially (but not exclusively) those on the margins of society, become prone to criminality and deviant behaviour. Hence, from this sociological perspective, criminality in the society is linked to the weakening of ties that bind people to the supportive networks that hold the society together. The correlated links between poverty and crime mentioned above is a trend supported by the apparent shift from conventional security paradigm (national security, national interests and military power) to human security, a shift which in the post-Cold War international order seems to have justifiably taken center-stage in national security strategies, especially among developing countries. The human security debate was advanced by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report that defined human security in terms of freedoms. Freedom from fear (of violence and conflict) and freedom from want (hunger and deprivation) is a simplified way of capturing human security. In Africa, non-military dimensions of security, such as environmental degradation, poverty, resource scarcity, and so forth threaten both societal security and national security. Human security concerns are thus among the contemporary challenges to the provision of state security by KPF.

Methodological Imperatives

This study is based on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The study made use of both primary and secondary data. With regard to secondary data, the following types of data were collected: official statistics and information about the rate, diversity and the nature of crime in Kenya; budgetary allocation to the police force - how it is disbursed and utilized, as well as the general information about the dynamics of security and law enforcement in Africa. All secondary data and information were sourced from academic and policy literature (especially, books and journals); and publications of governments, international organizations and civil societies.

Regarding primary data, this study adopted the use of semi-structured interview method of data collection for the police, civil society, and specific catchments of the public. Choice of study locations and selection of respondents were based on a simple non-probability method of purposive sampling, implying that territorial locations and fieldwork respondents were selected on the basis of their considered relevance to the study, as well as the logistical convenience of the researchers. Primary data collection was done in Nairobi and Nakuru in the Rift Valley between October 2010 and March 2011.

The project interviewed police officers of various ranks from the two fieldwork locations. The researchers specifically targeted to interview officers that worked in the police headquarters where crimes are recorded and investigations instituted, as well as those that were deployed to potential tinderbox areas inhabited by low income people where there are high levels of unemployed youth, social deprivation, poverty-related crimes and recurrent offenders, including large sections of people who are easily mobilizable for political violence. The study interviewed 41 police officers of various ranks drawn more or less proportionately from the two study areas. With regard to civil society, the study interviewed 13 key officers of 10 different human rights and security sector NGOs based in the two project locations and 40 members of the public purposively drawn from the high density, potentially violent–prone residential communities. The two field study locations were chosen because they are notorious for high levels of crime based on the annual crime statistics for recent years. Secondly, the two cities were among the most affected by the post-election violence of 2008. Empirical data was analyzed interpretively using relevant conceptual themes.
A Brief Summary of Factors That Account for Insecurity in Kenya

Fieldwork interviews with police officers of various ranks, civil society and grassroots citizens indicate that a multiplicity of factors account for insecurity in the country. The factors mentioned by respondents include unemployment among the youth, poverty, police collusion with criminals, drugs and peer influence, the growth of vigilantes and ethnic militias, corruption and political machinations in the police force, collapse of the family institution, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons attributed to conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region, etc. Below is a typology of crimes handled by the Kenyan police developed from our fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Manifestations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic and Commercial Crimes</td>
<td>Banking fraud, money laundering, among others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transnational Crimes</td>
<td>Terrorism, cyber crimes, drugs trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, illegal immigrants, money laundering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gender-based Violence</td>
<td>Rape, defilement, sexual assaults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Traffic Offences</td>
<td>Accidents, breach of traffic rules and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Organized Crimes</td>
<td>Lawless devices and activities of unlawful ethnic militias and vigilante groups (e.g. extortion of public service vehicles and people living in certain residential suburbs compelled to pay protection fees, instigating and prosecuting ethnic clashes, and indulgence in political thuggery at the behest of some local politicians).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Resource Conflicts</td>
<td>Cattle rustling, conflicts over land and pastures, among others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Robbery, General Stealing and Kidnappings</td>
<td>Violent robbery, street mugging, car-jacking, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork Interviews with Police Officers in Nairobi and Nakuru Fall 2010.

Policing Challenges

From our fieldwork, the Kenyan police face several deficiencies that in varied ways hinder their effectiveness in implementing their broad mandate of maintaining law and order. This part looks at various challenges that the police force faces in the discharge of their duties.
Transport Deficiencies

Our fieldwork indicates that the Kenyan police are critically challenged with regard to transport facilities. The policing needs far outweigh the transport resources at their disposal. Whereas there are minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, the few available resources are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled. The fieldwork team was informed by some of the police respondents that each police vehicle has a quota of 10 litres of fuel a day (i.e. every 24 hours) regardless of the jurisdiction. The lack of reliable transport means therefore that the police will be slow to respond to incidents of crime. Similarly, it also minimizes police presence in certain crucial localities, making it possible for criminals to have a field day. The police acknowledge that their mere presence in various localities is in itself deterrence to crime. The poorly serviced vehicles also mean that the police cannot match the speed and efficiency with which criminals often escape from crime scenes. The interviewed police officers therefore see a correlation between their response to crime and their transport infrastructure. As one officer noted:

In this station, we for instance have one vehicle. It looks like a ‘Mamba’ (Swahili for crocodile) because it is neglected; it is not serviced regularly and keeps breaking down so often. In a word, it is dysfunctional. Tell me then how is it possible to handle our responsibilities if transport is a challenge? It means that we may not respond adequately to crime issues. [16]

Human Resource Capacity Deficits

The Kenyan police are understaffed and therefore the country is under policed. There are estimates that the Kenyan police have a total population of about 40,000 personnel (figures as at end of 2010). The public - policing ratio can be deduced therefore to be roughly in the ratio of 1:1000 going by the 2009 national population census figures of roughly 40 million citizens. This is far below the UN recommended police – public ratio of 1:450. [17] But the Kenyan public – policing ratio referenced above is only in theory. Our fieldwork data reveals that a quarter of the Kenyan police are engaged in office administration duties, guarding the political elites or serving as drivers to top government officials. Hence, the active number of police officers engaged in crime prevention and real public service is about 30,000 personnel. It is instructive that a staggering number of 2,500 officers are permanently deployed to the personal service and protection of top political office holders (President, Prime Minister, Vice President, Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, etc). The President and his family alone are guarded by 200 elite squad drawn from the general service unit; the Prime Minister and the Vice President each has 45 armed guards at their disposal. [18] This lends credence to the view that post-colonial policing philosophy in Kenya has hardly been transformed. The KPF is still overly concerned with regime security as opposed to citizen security. [19] One of the officers interviewed on the matter commented as follows:

[...] the police force needs some reorganizing of sorts in terms of deployment of officers. There are some non-essential services carried by the police that would be left out to other government departments. For example, police drivers assigned to top government officials would be more useful in general policing as opposed to their current duties. [20]

There are still other factors that affect the capacity of the police. Natural attrition, physical injury, resignation for greener pastures elsewhere and dismissal on disciplinary grounds also contribute to reduced capacity of the police. The last population census figures suggest rapid growth and changes in the country’s demographic structure. However, it is apparent that government policy makers have
not responded progressively to address the policing needs of a state with rapidly changing demography. For instance, the Kenyan police had a three year recruitment freeze that lasted between 2008 and 2010. The annual recruitment process was resumed again in early 2011. Our research team gathered that the recruitment freeze was instituted to wait for the government to establish a Police Service Commission in line with the recommendations of Ransley Report (The National Taskforce on Police Reforms). This commission will oversee police conditions of service, recruitment and training among others. A new police training curriculum that involved the participation of various stakeholders has been recently completed. Under the new curriculum, police recruits will now train for nine months as opposed to the previous six months while graduate officers will train for 21 months after which they are appointed to the rank of assistant inspector of police.[21] The Kenyan Police Strategic Plan of 2008 - 2012 envisages to have expanded enrolment to possibly meet the UN recommended police - population ratio of 1:450 by 2012.[22] As at the time of writing in the Spring of 2012, the bridging of this capacity deficit was yet to be met.

Poor Terms and Conditions of Service

Dominant opinions of police officers suggest that their terms and condition of service are inadequate. A cross section of police officers interviewed noted that they are not adequately compensated for their services. They also observed that housing is a challenge for junior officers as they are compelled to share living units of two or three bedroom flat accommodation with other families. The police also lack adequate health insurance given the life threatening dangers they are exposed to in their law enforcement duties and fight against crime. The poor conditions of service are also evident in their operational and logistical facilities. They have minimal IT infrastructure and in many instances have to do with manual recordings and filing of information. All these factors contribute to their low morale at work and also predispose many officers to a professional lifestyle of corruption. The majority of police officers interviewed noted that due to their inadequate pay, they are prone to engage in corruption to meet their subsistence shortfalls. The lowest ranked police officer, a constable, earned about Kshs 4,645 (US$60) per month prior to 2004. This was increased in January 2004 to Ksh 10,000 (US$125). In 2009 the Kenyan Internal security minister announced a pay increase for police officers, a process that would be implemented in phases. In the first phase the police would get a 28% pay increase in which a constable would earn Ksh 21,205 (US$265), an additional increase of Ksh 2,400 on their present monthly wage of Ksh 18,805 (US$235).[24] A typical mid-income salary in Kenya would be about Ksh 50,000 (US$600) per month. The category of people that would earn this range of monthly income includes bank clerks and middle-ranking government employees. Corruption in the police force further aggravates the state of insecurity in the country through such tendencies as officers taking bribes to release offenders or to abet such crimes as drug trafficking.

In terms of communication, the police are deficient in a number of ways. The first is that their communication equipment is susceptible to being tapped and in the past, criminal elements have used this sort of subversion to gain access to confidential police communication. The communication gadgets are also highly limited in number relative to the communication needs of officers. The result is that they have in many instances used their mobile phones at their own expense to carry out their official duties. Another issue that many serving officers expressed disenchantment about with regard to their conditions of service is promotion and transfer. Respondents contend that the police promotions and transfers are not handled in a transparent manner. The following excerpts drawn from our fieldwork data are illustrative:
The conditions of service are poor. For example, the police work for long hours whereas they are supposed to work for eight hours. The promotion system is not based on merit but on nepotism. There is no health insurance and there is shortage of housing.

On a general scale, I think the conditions of service are below standards. One, we work a lot beyond the normal 7-8 hour schedule and we are paid little and this hinders our effectiveness. Housing is also a challenge. Police officers at the junior levels live in shared single unit houses, such as a two bedroom flat. We are Kenyan citizens and our private lives should be taken care of; we have children who ought to feel they are decent citizens. A police officer’s child grows up in an environment that has no provision for privacy. Adequate housing should be a priority in the force. We also lack medical and insurance cover for officers and if one is injured in the course of duty, officers or their families are not compensated in good time and this demotivates the force. Some of these issues impact on the way officers do their work and even breeds corruption in the workforce.

Police promotion is in many instances based on nepotism and favoritism. You could be diligent in your duties, perform at the top of your class in a course but you have to ‘know’ someone at the top to push your case. We need a proper promotion scale like in the military where there is consideration, for example, for the number of years an officer has served, among other factors. In the police one could spend 10 years in a particular rank without promotion.

The communication gadgets we use are inadequate and defective. These gadgets work partially ... In towns, such as Nairobi, the police communication can be tapped by criminal elements. These gadgets have in the past been in the wrong hands such as ex-officers who have been sacked. This does compromise on police operations.

Budgetary Deficits

The dominant opinion of police officers interviewed suggests that the annual budgetary allocation of the Kenyan police is hardly enough to ensure that they discharge their duties effectively. A cross-section of the interviewed officers alleged that the allocation the force receives is also subject to misappropriation by top commanding officers, thereby further impeding their service delivery. A considerable percentage (30% or about 12 KPF interviewees) further argue that in budgeting, priorities are often misplaced and available resources are not utilized in a prudent manner partly because most policy makers and implementers are civilians who may not have the experience of where financial resource allocation are most needed. These sentiments expressed by a section of the police interviewees suggest their willingness to serve the citizens but they seem to be hindered by lack of involvement in budgeting of public finance. The tension here is that the bureaucratic civilian component of policing seems to be more primarily concerned with regime security (and by extension serve the top echelon of the state apparatuses) with the result that citizen policing and security are substantially compromised. The over-concentration on regime policing is a common phenomenon in most developing countries, not least in Kenya. The disproportionate preoccupation with regime policing in Kenya is reinforced by the fact that the state policing agencies in Kenya are not independent agencies, but are subject to political control and direction under the Office of the President. The Kenyan police force does not have an independent vote in the national budget and receives its allocations from the pool allocated to the Office of the President.
A comparative analysis of the recurrent expenditure in the Office of the President (OP) between 1999 and 2004 revealed that allocation to the security services (KPF, Administration Police, and General Service unit) accounted for the highest disbursement of 64% to 79% over the period. Whereas KPF received the highest allocation (an average of over 30%), their allocation fluctuated downward when there were emergencies, such as drought and natural disasters, which are administered by the OP. Furthermore, development expenditure for the police stood at 9% of the OP’s allocation. For instance, in 2003/04 financial year, the OP received 6.72% of the national budget and in that same period KPF’s recurrent expenditure accounted for 35% translating to Ksh 8.7 billion, while Ksh 517 million went towards capital expenditure. The implication therefore is that many of the KPF’s development projects remained under-resourced. This is far below the budget allocation that was anticipated to actualize the Police Strategic Plan of 2003-2007 as parts of efforts to modernize the force. In the above Strategic Plan, the police envisaged to spend about Ksh 15 billion to facilitate acquisition and rehabilitation of suitable police offices, cells and residential accommodation. In a nutshell, it is discernible that the police expenditure on capital development projects is significantly curtailed by other competing demands and emergencies within the OP. The development expenditure approved by the National Assembly for the 2009/10 financial year for the provincial administration and internal security under which the police services fall had a budget of Ksh 3.6 billion or 1.4% of the total vote of the OP. The inadequate budgetary allocations are further evident in the observed infrastructural deficits (notably transport and housing) narrated by many of interviewed police respondents.

Policing Transnational Crimes

Traditionally, transnational crime has “referred to criminal activities extending into, and violating the laws of two or more countries.” In recent times, the United Nations in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime has defined transnational organized crime a bit more broadly to include any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state but perpetrated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill over effects into neighbouring jurisdictions.

Transnational crimes are not a new phenomenon in modern international history as organized crime groups have existed in the past. Examples include the relations between the Italian and American Mafias since the 1950s, and the smuggling operations by the Chinese triads, among others. Since the 1990s, however, there has been an upsurge in transnational crime globally. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this state of affairs. Firstly, the proliferation of these crimes can be explained in part by the increased transnational flow of people, goods, and money in the second half of the twentieth century, a process referred to as “globalization” and which has contributed to the growth of both licit and illicit economies operating transnationally. Secondly, the spread of free market economies and democracy in most of the non-western world has contributed to increase in these crimes as a result of their undermining state authority.

A significant number of interviewed police officers observed that policing transnational crimes such as terrorism, money laundering, cybercrimes, banking frauds, and drug trafficking is posing significant multifaceted challenges. On a general scale, there are significant challenges in terms of personnel capacity gaps and operational infrastructure needed to police these crimes. The legal framework of these growing crimes has a couple of challenges mostly with regard to formulation and enforcement of regulatory laws. For instance, on 30th April 2003, the government introduced the suppression of terrorism bill (through Supplement No. 38 of Kenya Gazette). The anti-terrorism bill was abandoned midway as anti-lobbyists of the bill perceived that if enacted, it could be perceived as calculated to stereotype and victimize the Muslim population. Critics of the bill argued
that it was a reproduction of the US PATRIOTS Act. Opponents of the bill, such as sections of the civil society organized rallies countrywide to educate Kenyans on the evils of the bill. Indeed, the US and Britain had issued travel advisories to their nationals against visiting Kenya until the anti-terror legislation was enacted. One of the claims made against the bill was that it allowed problematic police searches and extra-judicial actions against suspected terrorists who would have no recourse within the law.\[35\]

The secrecy concerning the training and equipping of the special units of the police for counter-terrorism operations have in the past heighted the chances of repression and unaccountability by a police largely perceived to be incompetent, corrupt, repressive and alienating the public that it serves.\[36\] As one interviewed police officer put it, the fight against terrorism is viewed as being discriminatory to the Muslim community in Kenya:

Curbing terrorism is, however, challenging because the Muslim population claim the efforts put in place are discriminatory to them.\[37\]

Terrorism continues to pose significant challenges to the police. The interviewed Kenyan police officers have “securitized” terrorism as a major threat issue that needs to be addressed urgently. The interviewed police officers perceive terrorism threats as emanating from the lawless state of Somalia that has lacked a central governing authority since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. There are striking narratives of interviewed police officers to the effect that terrorist threats abound from the famous Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab said to have clandestine recruitments and training centers in Kenya.

Terrorism is a transnational crime that goes beyond the purview of the state police. It has increasingly become a global problem that requires concerted action by the comity of nations. Kenya has been a target of terror attacks in the past. On August 7th 1998, the US Embassy in Nairobi was attacked in which over 200 lives were lost. Apparently, the anti-terrorism debate in Kenya is dominated by the regional policy agenda of the US government in which the Kenyan government is considered an important ally given the country’s geographical and historical proximity to the Middle East and the Arab world believed in Western security agendas to be the principal source of contemporary international [Islamist] terrorism. Hence, with regard to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) championed by the US government, there appears to be a convergence of interest between the Kenyan state security apparatus and the US foreign policy goals on security.\[38\] From a purely Kenyan state-centric position, this relationship is arguably beneficial because international cooperation and support may assist the Kenyan state to overcome capacity deficits in terms of policing terrorism. Police officers interviewed, cognizant of the fact that they cannot effectively prosecute the anti-terrorism campaign alone, advocated the need for partnership with international bodies, such as Interpol.

In the Post-9/11 international order, the global war on terror has been waged by the US government and its allies. Increasingly, the US has securitized aid to Kenya by the deployment of their Civil Affairs team to the Muslim-dominated North Eastern Province and Lamu in the Coast Province as a counter-terrorism strategy to secure its interests and those of its allies. The threats are perceived to emanate from several sources. For instance, the North Eastern Province is believed to be a soft underbelly of Al-Qaeda in East Africa. The Lamu area of the Kenyan Coast is perceived as a permissive “ungoverned” area in which terrorists fleeing violent clampdown from the Middle East and North Africa take advantage of weaknesses in the state’s governance capacity to flourish undetected. The other threat emanates from the high levels of social and economic deprivation and grievances
among Kenya’s Muslim population, which is believed to make large sections of the youth sympathetic and vulnerable to the course of Islamist militant groups. [39] Analysts like Hills, [40] while acknowledging that Kenya is reputed to host Al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers, further argues that terrorism seems to matter less to the ordinary Kenyans when compared to the high rates of common crime manifested in such incidents as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, use of narcotics and the flow of illegal weapons.

A cross section of interviewed police officers of various ranks in both Nairobi and Nakuru fieldwork locations allege that terrorist organizations operating from Somali have established a range of secret training bases in Kenya and that this is a challenge to their provision of internal security. The following excerpt from one of our fieldwork respondents is illustrative:

The hub of terrorism in East Africa is Somali and we have in the past heard or gathered intelligence that the recruitment of terrorists and training is done in parts of Eastleigh—a Somali suburb in Nairobi [our emphasis].’ [41]

Regarding law enforcement, some of the interviewed police officers cited the lack of a comprehensive legislation as an impediment to curbing the growing threat of new crime waves such as those that operate through modern technologies like cyber crimes, identity impersonation and theft, copyright infringements, and so forth. They noted that the Kenya Communications Amendment Act of 2008 in which cyber crimes are defined is not sufficiently comprehensive as there are a number of new crimes that are not covered by the Act. For instance, respondents observed that over the past two years there has been an increase in fraud involving mobile phone money transfer services that is not adequately addressed in the 2008 legislation. Interviewed police officers stress the need to constantly review legislations to make them more responsive to changing crime trends, especially cyber crimes.

According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy report entitled Money Laundering and Financial Crimes 2011, Kenya serves as a major hub for money laundering. The laundering of funds is attributed to Somali piracy, corruption, misuse of casinos, and narcotics proceeds. Further, Kenya’s financial system is said to be laundering over US$100 million each year. The report argues that the unregulated networks of the Hawala money remittances (mostly used by the Somali refugees in the country) are largely untracked by the government. [42]

Drug Trafficking

Interviewed police officers of various ranks in the two fieldwork locations of Nairobi and Nakuru indicate that policing drug trafficking poses significant challenges. Respondents posit that Kenya serves as a transit point of narcotics transported to various quarters of the international market with some finding their way into the local market. The officers cite a number of challenges in addressing the narcotics trade in the country. Whereas the police have a specialized anti-narcotic unit within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), respondents still point to a number of hurdles. One of the challenges is the fact that the drug traffickers control enormous wealth and are allegedly insulated by top echelons in both the police and the upper levels of government. The following narrative is illustrative:

Drug traffickers have a lot of money and could influence the termination of cases that we investigate if they see significant inroads being made into their territory. There is therefore the issue of interference in our work. Sometimes officers could be prepared to raid a certain
place but then they suddenly get orders to stop such a raid. In the past some top leaders in
the government have been connected with drug lords and when such crippling orders are
given we comply [...] you could be out investigating and a senior police officer intervenes in
the case and the consequence could be your immediate transfer to extremely backward
areas such as Turkana or North Eastern Province. [43]

The criminal justice system is apparently rendered inefficient in dealing with drug trafficking because
of the powerful connections and immense wealth of drug lords, allowing them to easily circumvent
the process. Another challenge in addressing drug trafficking offences, as interviewed police officers
noted, is with the law itself (the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act No. 4 of
1994). Police officers cite the above law as having loopholes, especially with regard to bailing of
offences and this implies that police can let go of drug suspects in their custody and who, for obvious
reasons, will go underground and never turn up for their pending cases. Yet another challenge is that
of operational infrastructure. Police officers interviewed argued for the need to have extra
equipment to detect drugs in various ports of entry to mitigate transmittal of drugs. There is also the
challenge of keeping up with the constantly evolving criminal devises of drug traffickers. Drug
traffickers devise desperate and creative methods that make the detection of drugs difficult. The
following narrative of an interviewed police officer tries to capture some of these devises:

Cocaine is for instance carried in a person’s stomach and so it is not easy to detect it unless
you suspect that the trafficker has swallowed the wrapped drugs and then you can detain
the person somewhere and observe them. Other drugs such as heroine are placed in the
interior linings of briefcases and then sealed. Some traffickers put drugs in their shoe soles.
Tender babies are also made to carry drugs in their napkins. In that case, it would be
embarrassing to undo a child’s napkin to detect the drugs. [44]

In early 2011, the Minister of State in charge of Internal Security and Provincial Administration, Prof
George Saitoti, tabled the names of alleged masterminds of high profile drug trafficking in Kenya in
the Kenyan Parliament. The suspect’s list included four sitting members of parliament and a
businessman. The police were thereafter mandated to investigate these allegations. The police failed
to link the five persons mentioned in allegations of drug trafficking in a preliminary report handed
over to Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere. The report states that despite “efforts to conduct
investigations, it proved elusive to secure substantive evidence with which to implicate, let alone
prosecute any of the mentioned suspects.” [45] The detectives cited lack of informers to give
evidence on the levelled allegations. The report identifies Vanga, Shimoni, Kilifi, Malindi and Lamu as
major entry points while Kijipwa, Ukunda, Lunga Lunga and Voi airstrips were found to be favoured
routes for drug smuggling because of minimal police presence. The detectives established that drugs
mainly enter the country through the Kilindini Harbour in containers disguised as rice, sugar, second
hand clothes, and used motor vehicles. They are then repackaged and exported as tea or fish. The
report also established that privately owned container freight stations were also being conveniently
used by drug traffickers to smuggle in and offload narcotics. “Drug dealers are believed to convert
their proceeds into other forms of property to conceal the same. Investigations of personal assets of
suspected dealers therefore become relevant to expose the illicit trade,” the report says. [46]

Refugee Militarization

Some of the interviewed police officers contend that refugees have increasingly militarized the
society and that they pose significant threats to the stability of the country. Dominant narratives of
police officers indicate refugees, especially those from Somalia as key drivers of insecurity in the
country due to arms trafficking. The police have thus “securitized” the refugees as constituting key security threats. These arms are said to find their way to Eastleigh suburb, a major hub of economic activities largely dominated by the Somali in the capital city of Nairobi.

Analyzing the case study of Somali refugees in Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, Murunga critiques the dominant view that Somali refugees are to blame for increased insecurity in the capital city, and argues instead that the proliferation of small arms in the country should be understood in a variety of contexts. He posits that in the intricate arms trafficking business there are crucial factors like the complicity of Kenyan law enforcement agencies, collusion with Kenyan businessmen, and inadequate policing of the Kenya-Somalia border stretching to over 1,000 km. He further argues that part of the reason why illicit arms find their way into Eastleigh is because the suburb is largely chaotic and neglected in terms of social services and public infrastructures (especially roads, drainages, and refuse collection) which inhibits accessibility and aids crime of all sorts in which Kenyans are equally complicit. He also faults the government for failure to address the internal security conditions and the demand for the flow of small arms in the country.

Our fieldwork indicates that arms smuggled into Eastleigh easily find their way to other parts of the city and beyond where robbers use them for various types of violent crime. According to one of the interviewed police officers:

 [...] Eastleigh is just but a base for the smuggled arms. These guns are used to commit crimes; they find their way into areas such as Jericho [This estate is about 7km east of the capital city of Nairobi]. There are many guns in Jericho which is part of our operation areas. Some of these criminals don’t operate from these areas; the areas become the bases for planning their criminal activities. [48]

Our fieldwork data generally indicate that the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force is in doubt for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons is the inability of the state to adequately police its long porous borders, especially the border with the failed state of Somalia. This implies that illicit firearms can easily flow into the country. The capacity deficits in terms of state policing personnel indicate that the state security agencies cannot be effective in policing crimes like arms trafficking. The various armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa have left the region awash with small arms and light weapons. Another reason for the inflow of illegal weapons is the logic of local community-driven demand and supply. In Northwestern Kenya, for example, the demand for weapons among the pastoral communities is high and this is attributable to minimal or no provision of state security at all in this volatile region notorious for inter-communal feuds over farm and grazing lands. [49]

Policing Illegal Immigrants

According to the interviewed respondents, police officers find it challenging to police illegal immigrants, defined as “aliens” under Kenyan law. The majority of illegal immigrants are from the neighbouring failed state of Somali. The major challenge officers’ face is a difficulty of differentiating between the Kenyan “Somali” and the “Somali refugees” both of whom are the same ethnic Somalis. The Somalis have often been described as a “transnational state” and have in the past posed a threat to national sovereignties in the greater Horn of Africa through their irredentistagitations and campaigns. A few years after Kenya’s independence in 1963, the government of Kenya led by President Jomo Kenyatta waged a vicious battle with segments of the Somalis residing in North Eastern Province who wanted self-determination for their region, also known as the Northern Frontier. Their separatist efforts did not succeed but apparently as a result of it, the area was largely
neglected in terms of development infrastructure and of social service provisions such as schools, health clinics, roads, etc.\[50\]

From the fieldwork interviews, the police believe that many “aliens” such as the Somali refugees participate in crimes such as forgery, producing fake identity cards and passports to claim they have “acquired” status of Kenyan citizenship. Contrary to Torpey’s assertion that the state ideally ought to have decisive control and enforcement action over movements in its territories, including issuance of travel documentations, the situation is different in Kenya.\[51\]

Murunga\[52\] argues that a number of factors are responsible for the influx of Somali refugees into the country. The first is that the Kenyan government lacks the capacity to police the country’s vast north-eastern borders coupled with the fact that the security forces themselves are unable to adapt to the harsh ecology of the semi-desert environment - a condition that the traditionally nomadic Somalis are naturally adapted to and which criminal elements amongst them easily exploit for cross-border crimes. The second factor is that many of the refugees have Kenyan Somali relatives, which in part contributes to their invisibility once they cross into the Kenyan side of the border. Continuing violent conflict and instances of drought in war-torn Somalia merely exacerbate the outflow of people from the country. Kenya hosts more than one million Somali refugees, a figure that has added a daily influx of more over 1,000 during the first half of 2011 due to the intensified scourge of drought, famine, and war.\[53\]

Our fieldwork investigations illustrate that some officers within the rank and file of the police and immigration departments complicitly facilitate and allow illegal immigrants access into the country without adhering to the due process of law. This is an affront to Kenya’s sovereignty and it has serious consequences for the country’s security as the majority of interviewed police officers in the two fieldwork locations link illegal immigrants with such crimes as human trafficking and money laundering. As one of the interviewed police officers summarizes it: “the Somali refugees are involved in the smuggling of small arms, the printing of fake money, passports and fake documents, forgeries and assembling of materials used in terror attacks.”\[54\] It is difficult to obtain any independent empirical confirmation of these allegations.

Kenya’s Criminal Justice System

The Kenyan police are a critical component in the larger criminal justice system that also includes the courts that are in charge of the judicial process, and correctional facilities such as prisons. The police’s role in the criminal justice system is to investigate and present suspects to the court with supporting evidence for prosecution. Interviewed police officers reported that the criminal justice system is faced with significant challenges. One of the challenges has to do with aspects of the new constitution promulgated on August 27th 2010 and specifically on Article 49 subsection f (i) on the chapter on the Bill of Rights. This clause enumerates and guarantees the rights of an arrested person. Under the constitutional dispensation, a police officer is required to take a suspect to court within 24 hours of being arrested. Officers argue that 24 hours is insufficient to prepare and produce evidence for court prosecution. The implication of this is that, at times, suspects hurriedly charged to court can be set free by a lack of evidence.

The second challenge the interviewed police officers pointed out is the issue of corruption and inefficiency both by segments of the police and officials in the judicial and correctional facilities. Inefficiency in the criminal justice system is also partly attributed to poor investigative skills and facilities within the police force. Narratives from our fieldwork indicate that crime suspects
frequently offer huge sums of money to bribe police officers, thereby influencing them to compromise investigation and have the suspects set free before the time they are expected to be charged to court. Even after conviction by a court of law, suspects or their relatives could bribe the police to have convicted offenders released. By this malpractice, criminal elements are unduly released back to the streets and community to continue their deviant acts. This observation is corroborated by Gimode[55] who argues that the apparent failure of the police and the courts to guarantee justice has in turn led to the culture of mob justice among the citizenry. The public prefer to hand out “justice” by either stoning suspects or burning them to death. “The criminal justice system,” argued a female officer, “is not fully efficient because at times they frustrate efforts by the police to have suspects prosecuted in court; the system is compromised by corrupt individuals who use their power and wealth to pay their way out.”[56]

The Kenyan police have been repeatedly charged with extra-judicial killings ostensibly perpetrated or aggravated by officers’ frustrations with the ineptitude of the criminal justice system in reining in hardcore violent criminals. Significantly, the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Prof Philip Alston, in his address to the UN Human Rights Council in 2009 on extra-judicial killings in the country, noted that the Kenyan police were culpable in these respects and recommended that action be taken by those that were responsible to safeguard the human rights of all.[57] Prof Alston’s account is corroborated by a report released in 2008 by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR) entitled The Cry of Blood: Report on Extra-Judicial Killings and Disappearance. The report details evidence of alleged execution of civilians by squads within the Kenyan police force. The report alleges that these killings were sanctioned by both the political leadership and top police leadership. This report was compiled between 2007 and 2008, when the human rights body began investigations into complaints of alleged executions and disappearances of civilians – crimes that were attributed to the Kenyan police. In 2007, the KNHCR had released a preliminary report indicating that the Kenyan police could have been complicit in extra-judicial killings of close to 500 people between June and October 2007 and their bodies deposited in various mortuaries or dumped in forests among other locations.[58] These allegations suggest that contemporary policing philosophy has hardly changed. The alleged human rights violations were sanctioned for purposes of regime security.

These alleged human rights violations also point to issues of accountability deficits in policing. The policing agencies in Kenya are hardly accountable and easily get away with impunity. The violations further have served to widen the gulf and distrust between the police and the citizens. Similarly, a Human Rights Watch report released in March 2008 observes that the three branches of the police: the General Service Unit, Kenya Police and the Administration Police were culpable in acts of extra-judicial killings and, by extension, use of excessive force in quelling the violence following the December 2007 presidential elections. The police are accused of unwarrantedly using lethal force against unarmed protesters, women and children.[59] The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) Report of 2008 avers that the heavy handedness of police response resulted in the death of 405 persons across the country.[60]

The 2008 CIPEV Report also documents witnesses’ accounts of how the security forces engaged in sexual violations of girls and women at the height of the post-election violence. In the course of their investigations, the Commission (CIPEV) received various accounts of how some security officers (notably KPF) deliberately refused to record sexual violence crimes at their work stations.[61]
Political Interferences

Dominant opinions of the interviewed police and civil society officials indicate that in carrying out their duties, the Kenyan police have been subject to interference by the top political leadership in their work. This is in part explained by the wide ranging powers the executive arm of government, especially the President wielded under the old constitution. Previously, the President had the sole authority to appoint and to dismiss the Police Commissioner who served at his pleasure. This meant in practice that previous office holders had to toe the regime’s line or risk being dismissed. Among other things, political interference, which has not been significantly changed by the promulgation of a new constitution, impairs the rule of law and law enforcement. This is particularly so with cases involving drug trafficking and other high profile crimes. The interviewed police officers argued that they had to toe the line of their superiors or risk far-reaching consequences, including dismissal from work.

Images of Corruption and Laxity in the Police Force

Our fieldwork data indicates that the dominant images the public has of the Kenyan police are those of corruption and laxity. As recurrent subjects of public discourse, the police are associated with such abuses as lax disposition to duty, extortion of common citizens and bribery, extra-judicial killings and collusion with criminals, and human rights violations, among others. Evidently, police officers are not in complete denial of the incidence of institutional corruption and serving officers’ wanton abuse of office, as the following narrative by an interviewed police officer illustrates:

[...] We have police officers who are less committed to policing duties. Some of these officers have been brought to the force by senior officers or the ruling elite and they essentially regard police work as their last career alternative. Some of these officers are not genuinely committed to professional work ethics and this is a demotivation to the loyal officers committed to their jobs. It is a scenario that hampers the work of the police and therefore means the public do not get adequate services from the police force. [62]

Members of the public interviewed noted that the police may sometimes require to be bribed to take action or respond to distress calls. As one Mathare resident in Nairobi observed, “at times you have to bribe them (the police) to take action and at times they are reluctant to take action immediately when a crime is reported.”[63]

A majority of the interviewed police officers, however, argued that their slow response to crime incidents should be evaluated in the light of their prevailing logistical and operational shortcomings, notably the lack of sufficient infrastructure, such as vehicles. As one interviewed police officer pointed out: “When it comes to transport, it is a very huge challenge. We have one station vehicle that keeps breaking down so often and which hinders our ability to respond to crime situations in a fast and efficient manner.”[64]

Another form of corruption in the police force is that of alleged police collusion with criminals. According to a crime victimization survey carried out in Nairobi city in 2002, respondents had strong perceptions that criminals were increasingly collaborating with law enforcement agencies, thereby deteriorating the delivery of policing services.[65] Similarly, there are claims that the police form part of the chain of traders and other government officials that facilitate the flow of illegal weapons across the Kenyan’s porous borders. [66] A resident of Huruma, a low income area of Nairobi
remarked that “the police being corrupt, they at times collude with criminals by hiring out their firearms.”[67]

According to the findings of the East African bribery index conducted by Transparency International Kenya, Transparency International Uganda, and the Tanzania Transparency Forum, the Kenyan police was ranked the most corrupt institution in East Africa in 2009.[68] Dominant interview narratives from members of the public and the civil society indicate that the police institution in Kenya is perceived to be notoriously corrupt. Many respondents mentioned that they often used bribes to access police services.

The interviewed police officers link their bribe taking to a number of factors. The first is inadequate remuneration, which officers said predisposed them to sometimes demand and collect bribes to augment their meagre income. Consequently, the institutionality of corruption often requires that junior police officers on external duties make significant returns from bribes they have collected to their senior line manager and commanding officers. Without such regular returns, a junior officer could be redeployed to a perceptibly unprofitable or remote duty post. The budgetary constraints under which the Kenyan police force operates cannot be over-emphasized. Commenting on the issue, a Nakuru-based civil society official made the following revelation:

The police have problems with transport. A police officer once told me that due to inadequate fuel allocations, they had instances where they would mount roadblocks to extort money for fuel. This case illustrates the infrastructural challenges they operate under. [69]

Bribe taking and extortion by the police is not unique to Kenya. It is a phenomenon that is known to be widespread in the developing world. Elsewhere in Nigeria, for instance, the police often mount illegal toll gates along the highways to extort money from motorists. The modes of extortion used are threats of violence, torture or actual arrests. The approach adopted is the use of junior officers who often have to take part of their proceeds to their seniors, an approach similar to what is reportedly practiced in Kenya. Even the few cases of officers arrested for mounting illegal roadblocks in Nigeria remain largely suppressed and uninvestigated by the police authorities and government. [70]

*Difficulties in Managing Ethnic Relations and Violence*

The Kenyan police are significantly challenged when it comes to managing ethnic relations and violence. This is in part explained by the nature of divisive politics practised in the country. Ethnic-related violence is more prevalent during election periods (prior to and after elections). This is what Ajulu terms as “political ethnicity,” which he defines as a “tendency among political elites to mobilize ethnicity for political ends.”[71] Election-related violence is not a new phenomenon in Kenya, as it has been recurrent in the modern history of the nation. The reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1991 saw the return of ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley Province. The high level of organization of the clashes, which the state security agencies appeared incapable of surmounting, heightened the speculation about the involvement of the state and some top politicians in the clashes.[72] The 2007/2008 election violence was particularly overwhelming to the police who appeared unable to contain it.[73]

Ethnic conflict in Kenya tends to be exacerbated by the proliferation of militia gangs and vigilantes in the country such as the *Taliban, Baghad Boys, Jeshi la Mzee, Mungiki, and Jeshi la Embakasi* which
some analysts see as a response to youth marginalization by the state. These militia groups, exponents argue, are formed for economic survival and are mobilized around ethnic identities. The other motivation for the rise and mutation of these militia groups has to do with the growing incapacity of the state to provide security. They thus emerge to help fill the security vacuum created by the state’s abdication of its responsibility in security provisioning. These militias operate as ‘shadow states’ in urban slums. As part of their strategies for survival, these militias extort a protection levy from residents of informal settlements in addition to charging for use of illegal water and electricity connections.

Conclusion

It is evident from this study that the KPF faces far-reaching problems and challenges that fundamentally affect the performance capacity of the force. The problems and challenges analyzed in the study are, for the most part, institutional and operational capacity deficits and they altogether encumber the police force in their responsibility of law enforcement and crime control.

Prominent among the observed problematic issues are the unacceptably poor conditions of service and operational facilities within the force. The highly unfavourable terms and conditions of service of the police, as we have observed in the study, should be addressed if the country is to have a modern and efficient police service. There is also the need for the police force to adopt democratic credentials and shift their emphasis from policing for the regime in power to policing for the citizens. This will require a gradual social engineering of the current policing strategy to a more responsive, citizen-centered philosophy. The restructuring should of necessity include wide ranging reforms in training curricula for new entrants and retraining of serving officers. This is a strong challenge because the police in Kenya have, since the colonial days, been used as a tool of oppression and guarantors of regime security. It is envisaged, however, that with the adoption of a new constitution in August of 2010 and the enacting of new reforms proposed by both the constitution and the Kenyan Police Strategic Plan 2003-2007 (Draft 2) will help to address most of the identified problems and also transform the Kenyan police to a modern, professional, and accountable force – a force for public good. Constructive reforms will also help to improve the police-policed relations in the country. Police reforms are presently taking place, albeit at an incredibly slow pace.

Apart from the internal factors and conditions, the protracted conflicts in Somalia have an aggravating impact on Kenya’s security nightmare and the challenges facing the KPF. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Kenya is partly as result of the country’s largely unpoliced borders with war-torn Somalia. There is also the correlated dimension of refugee influx and all the associated crimes. This Somali imbroglio calls for a concerted regional and an international effort that should, among other things, help to terminate the continuing carnage by warring factions in Somalia, establish a coherent state structure, and prioritize the peaceful repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees.

The actions and inactions of the state, as this study observes, are partly to blame for the challenges of state policing. The case of the rise and mutation of militias and vigilantes and which constitute a key security menace is indicative. As our findings indicate the Kenyan state and, by extension, the political elite encouraged the formation of militias in the past to meet partisan political objectives. With time, these militias have acquired a life of their own and operate as ‘shadow states’. The militias have illegally taken over some urban slums in the national capital Nairobi and elsewhere in other peri-urban areas. They run extortion rings where they charge levies for provision of security, as well as for water and electricity that are connected illegally. One of the fundamental reasons for the
thriving of these militia groups is the inability of the state to provide comprehensive security and hence their rise as alternative security providers.

This study observes that the high levels of structural violence in the Kenyan society further complicate the security situation in the country. It is imperative for the state to address human security concerns, such as poverty and the equitable distribution of national resources to ensure a more stable polity. Addressing these concerns would, among other things, minimize the prevalence of militia and vigilante groups that presently constitute key security challenges.

The study also observes a crisis of public confidence in the KPF related to allegations of police engagement in a variety of violations including extortion, torture and extra-judicial killings. The KPF has a great need for confidence-building if they are to win the hearts and minds of public. This study thus recommends greater accountability mechanisms on the part of the police, and stronger oversight by parliament or government in general. There is a need for greater vigilance by civil society and other actors to ensure that the KPF is held to account and that they discharge their duties in a professional way.

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Notes

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20. Interview with male Superintendent of Police in Nakuru on 21/10/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
25. Interview with male Police Constable in Nakuru on 21/10/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
26. Interview with female Police Corporal in Nakuru on 21/10/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
27. Interview with male Police Sergeant in Nairobi on 19/10/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
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37. Interview with male Police Chief Inspector in Nairobi on 15/10/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
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63. Interview with a male resident of Mathare Nairobi on 23/11/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
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67. Interview with male resident of Huruma, Nairobi on 23/11/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
69. Interview with a civil society official in Nakuru on 17/12/2010. Interview was conducted by a member of the project team.
72. Ibid.
Elise Féron discusses the difficulty of achieving “social peace” in Northern Ireland, 14 years after the political peace agreement. She focuses on what has been the core issue of many years of political negotiations and policy-making: the issue of violence. The latter has not disappeared, as if by magic, but has been transformed and has found new ways and actors through which to express itself. Its impact on the people of Northern Ireland continues to be vivid and leaves ahead the real challenge of social reconciliation.

The book is divided into three main parts, successively studying the problems arising from the peace process, new expressions of violence, and the potential evolution towards a post-conflict era.

The first part lays the foundation for a better understanding of the current situation and argues that an “hyper-politicisation” of the conflict has led to the freezing of two communal cultures and community referentials. Social institutions such as family, school, and church underpin foundations of identity culture, and their actors foster and implant conflict. Stemming out of this is a situation characterised by high spatial segregation, high endogamy, no public space that would allow some confrontation of ideas, and a community identity that is socially constructed by the influences of religious and political organisations. Elise Féron explains that the 1998 Agreement implied a consensual – but unsatisfactory – political trade-off that communities were not yet ready to accept. Facing a gradual fracture between political organisations and their respective communities, the political peace process turned to be unable to eradicate social representations of conflict and powerless to achieve social reconciliation.

The conflict remains the same indeed, but it has travelled from nationalists’ to unionists’ dissatisfaction, from political elites to communities, with new forms of community and intra-community violence, and from a clear communal opposition to a focus on “internal enemies” within each community. Transition from Direct Rule – when Northern-Irish political organisations had no structural attachment to policy-making networks and whose only mission was to symbolically represent a community – to democratic dialogue is not easy. New political leaderships remain highly dependent on symbolical features (and then, to a certain extent, on the perpetuation of conflict) while being strained to seek for accommodation in the new political system. Elise Féron argues that the issue is no longer manifestations of violence so much as on-going justifications of this violence, which make ongoing conflict profitable to political and social actors.

At this point, broader, conflict-reinforcing features become evident: influence of communal identities and their social echo, historical roots of violence (which often imply that past violence legitimizes present violence), protracted poverty, and the unchanging goals of some paramilitary groups. In this context, “peace” must be considered as the outcome of a cumulative process, which would aim at reversing the balance of risk and the actors’ belief that the game is actually not worth the candle.
The second part of the book studies physical and symbolical community separation. Separation allows the “social memory of the conflict” to spread and violence henceforth holds a true social utility for the actors. It is expressed in daily-life sectarian attacks and intimidations, often following vendetta logic. Political leaders’ legitimacy still depends on their capacity to handle violent situations, to protect “their” community, and in doing so, to distance themselves from members of the “other” community. High levels of violence near “peace lines” illustrate as well, to Féron, an increasing community demand for separation and a new form of “leisure violence”, particularly for the youth of socially disadvantaged areas.

To Féron, paramilitary groups also mirror divisions of the province. These groups have kept their own specific structures while reforming their activities around local criminal misdeeds and social control in some nationalist neighbourhoods. They echo Northern-Ireland society’s factionalism, which ingrains fear of mixing and of “the other”. Criminalisation of violence and drifts towards Mafiosi-type organisations seem then to lessen the political dimension of violence but do not stop its use as a traditional means of action.

Finally, rituals and commemorations are of high social importance in Northern Ireland, as they reassure communities about their own cohesion, collective memory, and legitimacy. Inter-community confrontations have become ritualised, parades have gained in importance for both communities and the symbolical use of territory has increased. The communal dimension of territory encapsulates the Northern Irish population into a geographical scheme that offers only few possibilities (“mixed areas”, “ghettos” or “peace lines areas” for example), and little hope for flexibility within political and social relations. Segregation inexorably remains a more favourable option for communities.

The last part of the book inquires into the evolution of national and international contexts, where “liberation wars” are no longer legitimized, democratic processes are favoured, and British/Irish relations are normalised. Both unionists and nationalists need to assert their uniqueness, but the former have to face the uncomfortable position of “colons” whereas the latter have to face recent theories on “the end of nation-states” and the limits of nationalism. These paradigmatic evolutions, the international condemnation of violence, and the influence of European integration have positive political and economical consequences: elites’ cooperation and economic exchanges between the North and South of the island. The problem is that such integration does not seem to be mirrored at the community level. Within the national context, reintegration of former paramilitaries remains a thorny and controversial issue, with destabilising consequences on the local level, and bitter feelings towards political actors.

Building trust is far from being an easy task: Elise Féron argues that a decrease in inequalities and discrimination cannot be enough to reach reconciliation if local communities do not appropriate this goal. The author’s main point is that local intercommunity dialogue must be complementary to the more general discussions on the province’s political future, and that political leaderships must operate some changes at the local level: they are often accused by social workers of rekindling tensions and favouring community cohesion (on an exclusive basis) to fulfil vote-catching ambitions. Social workers, political actors, former paramilitaries, and representatives of the police forces need to be part of dialogue initiatives, organisational rules need to be discussed beforehand, and daily-life problems (that can be linked to the conflict or not) must be at the core of discussions. Depoliticisation at the local level, security and justice in neighbourhoods are necessary to allow empowerment of the population and their active participation in the negotiations process.
Elise Féron is led to the conclusion that military pacification and political agreement in Northern Ireland have not implied, or even triggered, social reconciliation. On the contrary, the community level is now the main grounds on which the conflict is expressed. To the author, it highlights a deep disassociation and lack of understanding between political parties and their communities, and more generally, between a political level that advocates intercommunity dialogue and a local one that prioritises a social-type approach to conflict.

The great insight of the book is that it explores the impacts of violence, in all its traditional and new ways, and in so doing – in a transversal way – emphasizes the importance of communities’ attitudes and those of political actors. While never pinning the entire responsibility for the current situation on one group or the other, it does raise some key questions: who holds, or is willing to hold responsibility for reconciliation? Following political peace, what is necessary to the success of “the next step”?

Within a political system where many actors, including political parties, have no interest in the end of communal division, where communities are not attached to the reconciliation goal, Elise Féron argues for a culture of democracy against a culture of violence. She explains that the province needs to develop deliberative practices to counter the lack of public space and the lack of citizens’ involvement, and a process of “un-tribalisation” to escape community-based social and political patterns. It would finally allow the spread of common values within Northern Irish society. Along with local intercommunity dialogue, this culture of democracy may provide Northern Ireland with the opportunity to restore – even create a new – dynamic towards peace and a break with traditional and new uses of violence.

The book offers new insights on reconciliation and conflict resolution: the issue of actors’ leeway is once again dramatically ambiguous as it does seem that conflict in Northern Ireland is still trapped into structural and cultural schemes that have simply found new (or reinforced existing) ways of expression. Easing this gridlock is a challenge that must be tackled: drawing a parallel with the literature on failed states, which asserts that “elections do not make democracy”, this book offers convincing evidence for the argument that political agreement does not mean de facto social reconciliation.
**Warfare in Independent Africa**
Reviewed by Floor Keuleers


With his new book *Warfare in Independent Africa*, William Reno joins the many authors trying to better understand intrastate war. A large proportion of that literature looks for macro-level variables that are linked to the incidence of conflict, through their impact on rebel motivation. This results in claims ranging from the omnipresent greed-grievance debate -with Paul Collier (2000) as a prominent proponent of the greed hypothesis and Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequalities (2002) offering perhaps the most nuanced grievance story – to alternative accounts like Homer-Dixon’s work (1994) on resource degradation and population growth.

*Warfare in Independent Africa* differs from this body of work in its choice of both dependent and explanatory variables. Rebel motivation is not at the core of its explanatory framework, as Reno argues that

> [...] individuals who make up rebel groups [...] usually exhibit a broad range of motives for fighting [...] These motives are consistent in their appearances in conflict after conflict, but this analysis focuses on the more important processes that shape how fighters end up fighting and how they get socialized into privileging some motives over others. (p. 34)

In this sense Reno echoes Collier’s shift towards a focus on the feasibility and financial sustainability of rebellion (2001). Collier’s work however, like that of Stewart and Homer-Dixon, is still geared towards explaining the incidence of conflict. By contrast, Reno’s aim is to “examine the history of armed conflicts in Africa to explain how and why the groups that fought in them have evolved” (p. 3).

This focus on the nature of rebellion reminds us of Weinstein’s *Inside Rebellion*, which sought to explain “why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts” (2007: 6). But where Weinstein deemed the key variation to lie in the type of rebel recruited (‘committed investors’ versus ‘consumers’), Reno repeatedly refutes the assertion that potential rebels have fixed attributes of that kind, arguing for example that ‘some of the 1990s warlord rebel recruits could have become distinguished liberation fighters in different circumstances’ (p. 170). The key to understanding the evolving nature of rebellion then lies in understanding how different circumstances enable different kinds of potential rebel leaders to start and sustain different kinds of rebellion. According to Reno, the two crucial variables within that context are the nature of African state politics and the nature of international support for rebellion. The book’s key contribution is thus that it takes the unit of analysis of the authors mentioned above –the rebel group with its various motivations- and places it firmly in a broader political context.

Reno further substantiates this central claim in two ways. Empirically, he seeks to provide an almost encyclopaedic overview of more than 30 rebel movements in 20 African countries. Discussing rebellions throughout the entire continent save North Africa and spanning 7 decades, this book is an ambitious and admirable attempt at discerning patterns in what is a relatively long and above all very eventful period in African history.

On a conceptual level, Reno delineates five categories of rebels, which – though not mutually exclusive – are deemed to represent the evolution of rebellion since independence. Starting from the early anti-colonial and majority rule rebels, he goes on to discuss the reform rebels of the 1980s...
and finally the currently dominant types, warlord and parochial rebels. Despite this fairly detailed typology, however, the image the book essentially conveys is that of an underlying dichotomy, distinguishing between the first three types of rebels and the latter two. The turning point in that dichotomy is said to have come around 1990, and – in line with the central argument of the book – to have been the result mainly of changes in pre-war state politics. In trying to maintain power, regimes relied heavily on multiple security services and extensive patronage networks. This deprived potential ideological rebel leaders of the “fields of leverage” and “social spaces” that enabled their predecessors to create states-within-the-state, typified by the administration of liberated zones. Rebel leaders of a different kind, however, flourish in this political environment. Instead of genuine challengers to the regime, they are insiders, occupying important positions in pre-war patronage politics. Once the patrimonial government starts to collapse, they are in a perfect position to make their own bid for power (and the patronage resources that come with it). Apart from the ultimate aim of capturing state power, these warlords have very little in common with earlier rebels, as they disregard the welfare of non-combatants and do not try to change the system. This lack of a broad vision is shared by parochial rebels, who mainly fight in ‘service to a politician “godfather”’ (p. 208).

Though appealing in an intuitive way, it is also the recurrent focus on this dichotomy that takes away some of the power of Reno’s book. Juxtaposing again and again the purposefulness of the ideologically motivated ‘wars that made states’ (Tilly quoted in Kaldor 2007: 2) of the past with the predation, intricate patronage networks and lack of hierarchy characteristic of current rebellions, Warfare in Independent Africa at times reads as but a specifically African version of the ‘New Wars’ thesis (for a seminal work, see Kaldor 1999). And unfortunately, it does not wholly succeed in avoiding the oversimplification this literature has already been criticized for. It would not do justice to the subtlety of Reno’s argument to reduce his description of contemporary Africa to that of a continent devoid of ideology. As discussed, he stresses that ideological rhetoric remains popular and potential ideological leaders still exist, but that ideological rebellions have simply become impracticable. However, when it comes to his description of the conflicts that do (and did) actually take place, a number of questions should be raised. Were “international ideas” (p. 14) and “universal notions” (p. 34) really that much at the core of the rebellions before 1990? Kalyvas convincingly challenges the way in which “many scholars implicitly hold that old civil wars were motivated by broad, well-de?ned, clearly articulated, universalistic, ideologies of social change”, pointing out that “actors in old civil wars … have often engaged in criminal activities, large-scale looting, and the pronounced coercion of the populations whose grievances they claimed to represent” (2001: 102-106). Similarly, we can wonder whether today’s rebellions are truly as devoid of ideas as Reno contends. In the introduction to his book The New Wars, Münkler states that

[...] although special attention will be paid here to the economics of war and force, this does not at all mean that ideological factors should be neglected. Ethnic-cultural tensions, and increasingly also religious convictions, play an important role in the new wars. (2005: 1-2)

These ideological elements may not be readily visible to Reno, however. His rather narrow conception of ideology as revolving around broad nationalist narratives that are recognized internationally might wrongfully exclude from the realm of ideas more local and ethnic claims.

Reno would likely refute these rebuttals by pointing out that they focus on the –according to him rather inconsequential- motives and behavior of rank and file rebels, not their leaders. This, however, should lead us to question a key assumption of the book. How meaningful is it to characterize the nature of an entire rebellion based on the aims of its leader(s)? Reno makes a valuable contribution in pointing out that the motivations of fighters are too constant over time to
explain the emergence of certain kinds of rebellions, and that we should therefore look at the important role played by leaders. But once a rebel movement exists, it seems rather unlikely that the large mass of rank-and-file members will behave exactly as planned by the top. Reno’s assumption that rebel leaders have a very high degree of control over not only the actions of their fighters but indeed even over their minds (‘socializing them into privileging some motives over others’ p. 34) is another reason for his overstating the differences between past and present rebellions.

A third source of Reno’s bias in favour of past wars might lie in his methodology. Recounting the story of anti-colonial and majority rule rebels, he relies mainly on works written several decades ago—a period in which “coherent conceptual categories along the familiar left-right axis” (Kalyvas, 2001: 108) were readily available. In contrast, Reno’s description of warlord and parochial rebels is based on a combination of his own research and recent works by others. It seems quite plausible that the discourses on new wars and the economic agendas of rebels have been important (though not necessarily intended) conceptual lenses in such recent analyses, while being much less present at the time the other accounts were written. Change is not only to be found in reality itself, but also in the frameworks used to describe that reality (Newman, 2004: 185).

In sum, while laudable for its attempt to ‘bring the state back in’ as an explanatory variable and very rich in empirical material, Warfare in Independent Africa insufficiently transcends the by now well-known old-new wars divide.

Bibliography


