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Empathy and Barriers to Altruism

Doug Contri

Concerned people respond generously to local human needs, while the needs of the extreme poor are neglected. The affluent do not contribute more due to poorly managed empathy rather than indifference. Specifically, the plight of the poor arouses anxiety and guilt among the affluent, who deploy cognitive distortions that protect them from these uncomfortable emotions. These defensive distortions masquerade as rational arguments against donating generously to the extreme poor. The guilt and anxiety of the affluent can be diminished by connecting them with their empathy rather than defending against it. This will relieve the affluent of these psychological burdens and likely increase aid to the extreme poor.

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I. The Puzzle of Affluence, Poverty and Indifference

The United Nations estimates that each year 10 million children die of preventable diseases, 800 million people are under-fed, and 1 billion are without safe water (Human Development Report 2000; Human Development Report 2002). In 2002 98% of all childhood deaths before the age of 5 occurred in the developing world (World Health Report 2003).

For the last several decades the suffering of the extreme poor has been regularly publicized in Western media. The steady stream of television and internet information has been punctuated by songs such as “Do They Know Its Christmas Time” (1984) and “We are the World” (1985); Live Aid (1985) viewed by over a billion people in 150 countries (CNN 2005, BBC 2006); charitable efforts of celebrities such as Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, Madonna, Sean Penn and Bono; advertising by NGO’s seeking to increase awareness and raise money; and news of disasters like the 2005 Tsunami and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

However, as awareness of the world’s destitute has increased, donations among Western nations has remained low. Governmental aid for the extreme poor is substantially less than 1% of Gross National Income among European nations and the US, and private aid is provided at a similarly low level (Hudson Institute 2006). Rather than being understood as an emergency requiring action, the plight of the extreme poor appears to have become simply another gruesome fact of modern life to which we have become inured, similar to nuclear weapons, AIDS and terrorism.

Nevertheless, the inaction of affluent peoples is puzzling because were these problems local the response would be immediate and generous. Moreover, the extreme poverty that kills so many can often be remedied with negligible sacrifices by the rich. Research indicates that many life-saving interventions can be implemented for exceedingly nominal sums.

For example, Peabody et. al. (2006) note that saving the life of someone with pneumonia, the leading cause of death in children (2 million in 2004) in the developing world (Wardlaw et. al.2006), can cost as little as $132, and treatment for diarrhea, which kills 1.5 million young children annually (UNICEF/WHO 2009), can cost as little as $25. Nets preventing malaria, a disease that claimed 781,000 lives in 2009 (World Health Organization 2010), can be purchased and delivered for as little as $10 (Nothing But Nets), and have been found highly effective in saving lives (Abdullah et. al. 2001), particularly when combined with anti-malaria drugs (Schuftan 2000). Easterly (2006) notes that curative TB medications cost about $10, and preventative medications about $3 annually per person.

Of course, not all the problems of extreme poverty are so easily remedied, and many find their roots in political, cultural and structural arrangements that are more difficult to correct (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Nevertheless, millions are dying yearly from easily treated illnesses that cost very little to prevent and cure.

That lives could be saved for sums of money that the rich use for dinners out, soft drinks, and other incidental amenities highlights the negligible sacrifice needed to save lives among the extreme poor. Indeed, the magnitude of the tragedy, juxtaposed with the ease with which much of it could be alleviated, and the prompt action that would be taken if it were local, raises an important question: Why do otherwise generous and concerned people among the affluent offer so little to those lacking life-saving necessities?
II. The Origin of Attitudes Towards Third World Charity

Attempting to understand attitudes towards charity inevitably raises philosophical questions about peoples' obligations to one another. On the one hand, virtually every spiritual tradition exhorts its followers to give charitably to the poor and be of service to others. Indeed, the desire to give to others is often understood to be both a means and end of salvation.

On the other hand, libertarian philosophers assertively deny that charitable obligations exist among individuals. For example, Ayn Rand’s John Galt asserts, “Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality” (Rand, 1957, p. 936).

Settling the philosophical question of people’s obligations to one another requires an investigation into ontology, such that one affirms or denies that embedded in the universe is some type of moral prescription relevant to how humans interact with one another. Compelling as such arguments may be for intellectuals, most people’s attitudes are determined by more prosaic considerations; they are usually influenced more by psychology than ontology.

Given that the plight of the extreme poor is well known, reasons for inaction regularly find their way into casual social conversation. Based upon informal observation among affluent peoples, there appear to be several attitudes, so-called barrier attitudes, which prevent them from taking action.

III. Common Barrier Attitudes Towards Third World Charity

One barrier attitude can be called the “Magnitude View” (MV), which asserts the problems of the developing world are hopeless. This view claims the scale of the problems in impoverished societies are so enormous and complex that no solution is possible, thereby rendering assistance futile.

A variant of MV that takes a more individual perspective might be called “You can’t help them all” (YCHA). Similar to MV, this attitude holds that even were one to successfully help someone, there still remain a seemingly endless number of others needing help, which again leads to despair of solving the problem of poverty.

A third barrier attitude might be called “Help at Home First” (HAF), which asserts we should help others in our own communities before looking beyond our borders. Unlike MV and YCHA that believe third world charity is futile, HAF asserts that charity should be directed toward our country where we have our own needs, and greater obligations. Thus HAF does not necessarily despair of the feasibility of third world charity, so much as it places it at a lower priority than local needs.

Yet another barrier attitude could be called the “Responsibility Position” (RP), which asserts it is the responsibility of the people in developing societies to solve their own problems, and as such, affluent persons have no obligation to offer them charitable assistance, though we might acknowledge such responsibility to our own society. Basically RP rests on an assertion of who owns the problems of a society. Is it entirely the members of that society, usually according to national or ethnic boundaries, or does it extend beyond them? RP asserts that responsibility does not extend beyond national borders, and in this manner is similar to HAF.
A fifth barrier attitude closely related to RP might be called the “Logical Consequences” (LC) perspective. LC asserts that the problems of a given society are the consequences of their collective actions or those of their leaders. To intervene in a manner that prevents these consequences merely perpetuates the problem, and may even compound it. RP asserts that malnutrition, starvation and disease become adaptive or even necessary to those societies by teaching people to live and reproduce within the boundaries of available resources. Eliminating these consequences risks exacerbating them by creating future generations of even more sick and malnourished people.

Collectively, these barrier attitudes contain a mixture of rational argument and psychological dynamics. While intellectuals may be persuaded by purely rational grounds, most people adopt attitudes based upon a mix of reasoning, experience, and emotional needs. Before evaluating the rational merits of these positions, a brief detour through the psychology of empathy will be useful.

IV. Empathy and Human Identity

One of the hallmarks of human psychology is the capacity for empathy, usually understood as the ability to understand emotionally the experience of others. It is feeling sad in response to another’s sadness; joy in response to another’s joy; fear in response to another’s fear, and so on. So conceived, empathy transfers others from external objects into parts of ourselves; “different” consciousnesses not only interact, they interpenetrate. In this way empathy expands our identity to include others; what happens to them, in some measure, happens to us.

So conceived, humans are not entirely separate beings; nor would it be sufficient to say they are simply “connected”, like links of a chain. Instead they interpenetrate, like partially overlapping photographic slides. As such, there is ultimately no such thing as an individual person, or individual human consciousness to be more precise; there are only greater or lesser degrees of interpenetration with other human consciousnesses.

This phenomenology of empathy and human consciousness has recently found empirical support with the discovery of mirror neurons, neurons that are activated in response to observing the actions or emotions of others (Gallese 2001). While systems of mirror neurons are firmly established in monkeys, there is reason to believe they also exist in humans (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto 2006). For example, Botvinick et. al. (2005) found that subjects viewing facial expressions of pain in others had increased activation in their own pain centers, as measured by fMRI. Similarly, Wicker et. al. (2003), also using fMRI, found activation in the same neural structures for subjects who either directly experienced disgust or observed facial expressions of others that expressed disgust.

V. Consequences of Empathy: Community and Love

Empathy, the interpenetration of different human consciousnesses, is what binds humans to one another. Each person’s experience, rather than being solely private, includes, in some measure, the experience of others to whom they are exposed. Empathy is what makes human communities genuinely communal rather than mere associations of individuals.

Empathy is also what makes love, in the broadest sense, possible. Without empathy, love does not extend to concern for others, except for how our needs may continue to be gratified. Without empathy, love for others is reduced to the pleasurable feelings they create within us; loved ones become nothing more than tools serving our own desires, hardly love as ordinarily conceived.
Thus, empathy makes possible our greatest joys, our love for family and friends, and general connectedness to others.

VI. Consequences of Empathy: Anxiety and Guilt

While empathy forms the basis for communities and love, it has other, less desirable consequences. The capacity to experience others’ experience creates opportunities for anxiety. Not only do we fear for ourselves, we fear for others whose suffering we also experience (Botvinick et al. 2005). In this manner, the possible avenues of our suffering, like our joy, are multiplied by the number of people with whom our consciousness interpenetrates. Just as we have an interest in taking measures to reduce our own suffering, we have a similar interest in reducing that of others, which we share, and as our possibilities for suffering expand so does our anxiety.

The interpenetration of selves, empathy, also forms the foundation of guilt. Because we know experientially the suffering of others, our failure to ameliorate it induces guilt. Thus, we experience guilt when we injure others or treat their suffering with indifference. The role of empathy in guilt can be seen when reading accounts of vivisections performed hundreds of years ago. Vivisection involved scientists dissecting live animals without anesthesia (Descartes 1996), and often entailed nailing their paws to a board to render them immobile. Accounts of these procedures induce horror in modern minds. However, at the time investigators believed that animals were incapable of feeling pain; instead they understood their cries, howls and protests to be mere “reflexes” without the concomitant experience of suffering.

Today most people believe deeply that the external manifestations of suffering exhibited by animals are accompanied by commensurate mental states, mental states not much different than our own. Laws against animal cruelty are based upon this belief. Therefore, to require someone to perform a modern vivisection would create significant anxiety and guilt, both based on an empathic understanding of the animal’s experience.

Empathy then places humans in a conundrum. It gives rise to our deepest longings and most dreaded fears. How can it serve our desires without inducing anxiety and guilt? How can we enjoy its advantages without its liabilities?

VII. Cognitive Theory and Psychotherapy

Many psychological phenomena are clearest when manifest in their most extreme form; the abnormal makes plain the normal by magnifying it. When considering the effects of empathy, one would expect criminals to suffer from tremendous anxiety and guilt by virtue of their victimizing actions. Indeed, criminal behavior results in intense anxiety and guilt in most people, which is why the majority refrain from such acts despite their ability to do so without detection.

Commonly we attempt to understand the motives and experiences of others by seeing them through the lens of our own. Accordingly, people unfamiliar with criminals commonly ask questions about them: Do they feel remorse (guilt)? Do they worry about being caught (anxiety)? Curiously, the answer to these questions is almost always “No”. What does this say about normal empathy, anxiety and guilt? Understanding criminal psychology as an extreme form of normal psychology sheds light on these psychodynamics in more normal minds. To fully understand why criminals are usually bereft of guilt requires a brief explanation of the theory of cognitive psychotherapy.
Cognitive psychotherapists (Ellis & Dryden 1997, Burns 1980) usually identify 4 components in any behavioral sequence. First, some event, an activating event, occurs (1), which then initiates a thought, or interpretation of the event (2). Based upon the thought, or interpretation of the meaning of the event, a person experiences a feeling (3), which then initiates a behavioral response (4). According to cognitive theory this linear sequence moves through time, with each step occurring after the other. The model is pictured below:

What is most significant for understanding the empathy of altruism is the model’s distinction among the different components, and particularly between “thoughts or thinking” on the one hand, and “feelings” (affects) on the other. “Thoughts” are descriptions or interpretations of the observable world; they are empirical assertions. Whereas “feelings” are some type of affective response engendered by the “thought”; feelings are subjective.

Yochelson & Samenow (1976) and Walters (2002) have identified thinking patterns characteristic of criminal offenders. Indeed, their extensive research reveals consistently distorted patterns of thinking, patterns that are empirically false or logically fallacious. Accordingly, they are called “criminal thinking errors”.

VIII. Cognitive Distortions as Defenses:

Cognitive psychotherapy is principally concerned with correcting erroneous cognitions via empirical tests, and fallacious logic via Socratic dialogue. In this manner, thinking errors are usually conceived as mistakes in learning or reasoning that simply need correction (Clark, Beck & Alford 1999).

On the other hand, an entirely different model of mental functioning was proposed by Freud (1923) and the subsequent tradition of psychoanalytic theorists who conceive psychopathology to be a failed attempt by a dynamic system to maintain an acceptable equilibrium among internal drives, external prohibitions and interpersonal needs. This equilibrium is principally maintained via a system of defenses (A. Freud 1936) that function by altering or denying some feature of reality; they do this so that we can avoid, or at the least diminish, anxiety and other negative emotions. However, unlike cognitive theory that also posits distorted thinking, psychoanalytic theorists assert that distortions are not accidental or random mistakes in learning; instead cognitive distortions are strongly motivated so that the person can attenuate anxiety and other uncomfortable feelings.

The crucial point for the analysis that follows, which marries cognitive theory’s emphasis on distorted thinking with psychoanalytic theory’s focus on motivated defenses, is that the cognitive distortions of criminals are integrally connected to their criminal behavior. Criminals are motivated to deploy and persist in their distorted thinking because of its supreme utility in meeting their needs. Specifically, criminals deploy cognitive distortions that diminish empathy so that their anxiety and guilt are attenuated. Otherwise they would be inhibited from their victimizing criminal acts, an impediment they resist because of the gratification crime provides.
Note that criminals do not entirely lack empathy. Instead, their deployment of cognitive distortions to attenuate anxiety and guilt confirms the existence of empathy, without which there would not be the need for defensive distortions. This is one solution to the conundrum created by empathy; view the world in a distorted manner that diminishes the anxiety and guilt associated with empathy. There are numerous criminal thinking errors with different names (Yochelson & Samenow 1976; Walters 2002). However, two are particularly relevant for understanding barriers attitudes towards altruism among regular people.

**IX. Defensive Cognitive Distortions Characteristic of Criminals: Mollification**

Perhaps the most common distortion among criminals is termed “mollification”, which Walters (2002) defines as “Justifying, rationalizing, making excuses or externalizing responsibility for criminal actions” (p. 57). Mollification might be considered the father of all criminal distortions because it encompasses virtually every other criminal thinking error. In this manner, it is analogous to repression among defensive operations identified by psychoanalysts (A. Freud 1936).

A common example of mollification is found among bank robbers who assert that robbing banks is not really stealing because the bank’s assets are insured. Insurance companies, by their nature, assume risks, and therefore paying claims is simply part of their business. The bank robber dismisses the fact that he is leaving the bank with someone else’s money that he has taken by intimidation or force, instead claiming that he is operating within an insurance system designed for such occurrences; he mollifies. This explanation permits him to rob without guilt.

Another example of mollification was articulated in response to New York’s “Central Park Jogger” who was brutally beaten and raped (Wolf 1989) while jogging through the park. He asserted that she was jogging in a dangerous area and should not have gone there. He stated, “It was like she committed suicide”. Common sense would dictate that one avoid dangerous areas, but to place culpability upon her, rather than the assailants, is an example of Mollification. In essence, he is arguing that traveling in a dangerous area eliminates the culpability of perpetrators of violence, and instead places it upon the victim. The criminal “reasons”, “She knew it was a dangerous area, so I can do what I want”.

To understand the central park jogger’s fate in this manner allowed the speaker to avoid guilt and anxiety. There is no guilt but her own, and she paid for it dearly; thus justice was realized. Moreover, his anxiety was attenuated given that her actions led to her fate; therefore, to avoid a similar fate himself, he simply has to avoid her actions. To suggest that her fate was random or could not have been avoided renders everyone vulnerable, and would engender anxiety too uncomfortable to tolerate.

**X. Defensive Cognitive Distortions Characteristic of Criminals: Absolutes and Cut-Off**

Another common defensive cognitive distortion is “Absolutes” or more accurately “All or Nothing Thinking” (ANT) (Samenow 2008). As its name suggests, rather than permitting shades of gray when understanding a complex world, ANT bifurcates reality into discrete categories, a model rarely describing reality with much accuracy. Absolutist language such as “all”, “always”, or “never” often signifies ANT.

Like other cognitive defenses, criminals commonly employ this mode of thinking to reduce their guilt or anxiety. Commonly criminals will vehemently asserts that all police officers and
politicians are corrupt. This assertion permits justification of criminal behavior because, the criminal “reasons”, “If even the police and elected representatives are corrupt, how could my actions be reprehensible given that those who should be models of society act similarly (guilt reduction)?” ANT also permits the criminal to feel more comfortable with his own failures (anxiety reduction). It permits him to blame society for his failings rather than himself, thereby relieving him of the anxiety his failures would engender were they owned rather than projected. It also permits him to maintain his anger, which he may find empowering, rather than confront his own inadequacies and powerlessness.

ANT gives rise to a cognitive and behavioral interplay called the “criminal cut-off”, which Walters (2002) defines as “Rapid elimination of common deterrents (fear, sanctions) to crime.” (p. 56). Using ANT as a cognitive foundation, when angry, discouraged or fearful, criminally minded people will sometimes utter “fuck-it” as the prelude to dismissing all rational considerations impeding a desired course of action. This propensity rests on ANT in that the criminal “reasons” that because he already feels bad, or has encountered obstacles, he might as well act as he wishes, dismissing the fact that his actions will multiply his problems. In essence, the game has been lost; therefore, further mistakes, or criminal behavior, of any type cannot affect the outcome and I may as well do as I please. This is ANT.

To summarize, empathy connects humans such that their identities interpenetrate. Strictly speaking, to characterize an individual as an independent entity is a phenomenological and empirical mistake that misunderstands human consciousness. The interpenetration of selves gives rise to love, friendship and community, as well as anxiety and guilt. Empathy thereby creates the conundrum of how to maintain its desired consequences while eliminating, or at least diminishing, its negative ones. To understand one solution to this conundrum criminal psychology and defensive cognitive distortions were examined. Using this background, barriers attitudes among regular citizens become more comprehensible.

XI. Defensive Distortions Examined: Magnitude View and You Can’t Help Them All

Recall that the “Magnitude View” (MV) and “You Can’t Help Them All” (YCHA) assert that third world poverty is so vast and complex that useful intervention is impossible. Indeed, the scale of the suffering defies comprehension. Data from the World Bank, which defines extreme poverty as income insufficient to meet needs for health-care, food, clean water, medical care and education, indicate that 1.4 billion people subsist without these necessities (Chen and Martin 2008); 1.4 billions people “live” on less than $1.25 per day.

Commonly, affluent people wonder about the purchasing power of this sum in impoverished countries. We know how little it could buy in the first world, but perhaps it buys more in other countries? This is a fair question. The World Bank computes $1.25 per day based upon a daily consumption of goods and services comparable to those that could be purchased in the United States for this sum (Chen and Martin 2008). Certainly, any effort to substantially improve the lot of 1.4 billion impoverished, and often sick, malnourished, and illiterate people leads to despair. This is the empirical basis for MV.

However, MV can be examined from another perspective. Consider that in 2008 alone 3.4 million people in the most affluent nations died of cancer or cardio/cerebrovascular disease (World Health Statistics 2011). Now imagine that the United Nations began discouraging aspiring doctors in the developed world from pursuing residencies in cardiology, oncology and neurology because these
diseases are so prevalent and complex that they probably cannot be cured. Would anyone consider this a rational course of action? Would those asserting MV transfer their logic to the epidemic of vascular disease and cancer that kills the majority of the first world’s citizens?

Perhaps a personal example might reveal the distorted framing of the problem of extreme poverty entailed by MV, and in particular YCHA. Imagine you go to a physician for a suspicious lump in your neck. The physician performs a biopsy, and confirms you have cancer, but refuses to treat you. He asserts that in the richest nations alone over 1 million people die annually of cancer (World Health Statistics 2011), indicating the disease is epidemic, and therefore cannot be adequately addressed. He cannot cure everyone, so good luck and good-bye. Would this be considered rational?

The dubious framing of the problem by MV and YCHA entails failing to acknowledge that each person is an end in himself, rather than simply a means. Specifically, each person is NOT a means towards eradicating all poverty, or curing cancer or vascular disease in its entirety, such that each person’s cure is only valuable as it pertains to a total population cure; instead each life improved or saved is valuable in itself.

To return to our hypothetical cancer patient above, if every person who consulted that particular physician died rather than achieve a cure, would the cure achieved by our patient would be any less meaningful to her or her family. Can anyone really imagine seeing a physician for a serious illness and refusing a cure for oneself until the doctor can also cure all of his other patients? This is the type of reasoning asserted by MV and YCHA. How do thoughtful people assert such a logically unsound position with respect to third world poverty as if it is self-evident? To answer this question we must examine psychology.

The problem with MV and YCHA is that it employs a thinking error described above; it is all or nothing thinking (ANT). It asserts that if you cannot help all the people there is no value in helping any of the people. Curiously, this line of reasoning is never asserted among professional and lay helpers in affluent nations. Requests for dental, medical and psychological care, financial guidance, education and so on are never rejected on grounds that everyone cannot be helped so no one will be helped, which is the ANT that is asserted as the reason for inaction in the face of extreme poverty. But now the question shifts away from why intelligent affluent people assume obviously unsound arguments regarding charity for the extreme poor, to why to ordinary citizens assume thinking patterns commonly used by criminals?

That the MV contains ANT is almost certainly not accidental; to the contrary, when expressed, there is usually a subtle, yet discernible, investment in its correctness. Rather than being blandly stated and rued, a certain energy usually animates the speaker. This investment signifies the defensive purpose the view serves; it must be asserted because of its psychological utility. It reduces anxiety and guilt, which is why it resembles criminal thinking patterns.

Remember that by way of empathy our consciousnesses interpenetrate one another. Thus, to the extent that we are exposed to the suffering of others we will feel anxiety and/or guilt. The ANT contained in MV and YCHA reduces guilt by framing the problem in a manner that renders one powerless; once one is powerless, there can be no responsibility, and therefore no guilt for failing to act. Significantly, those asserting MV are not genuinely indifferent; instead the assertion of MV reveals the empathy and guilt they are defending against by means of a defensive cognitive distortion.
XII. Defensive Distortions Examined: Help At Home First

A close cousin of the Magnitude View (MV), Help At Home First (HAHF) objects to sending money to the extreme poor because our first obligation is to those in our own country. Why send money abroad when local needs are so great? It is important to note that responsible charity of any kind should never be discouraged. Accordingly, those whose needs for charitable giving are most deeply met by giving locally should be encouraged and supported.

However, the assertion by citizens in the developed world that charity should be directed at home usually contains an implicit assertion of parity of need. It claims that local needs are equally urgent, and sending money abroad somehow fails to acknowledge, indeed neglects, these needs. Certainly, peoples in the developed world, like all peoples, have tremendous needs. In the United States for example, family discord and divorce, substance abuse, chronic disease, and violence are epidemic, and rightly deserve attention. However, none of these problems are economic; none are problems of extreme poverty; none admit of easy solutions based upon increased funding.

Indeed, there is barely an American alive who has no access to education, health care, clean water, housing or sufficient food. To the contrary, not only is education free, it is compulsory; not only is there enough food, there is an obesity epidemic; even prisoners have basic health care; no one voluntarily lives without shelter; and one is hard pressed to find an American anywhere who has been sickened from drinking the water. Moreover, research indicates that of 37 million Americans classified as “poor” by the US government, 80% have air-conditioning; nearly 75% of such households own a car; 97% of households have a color TV; 62% have cable TV or satellite reception; and 89% have a microwave oven. In fact 43% of “poor” households own their own home (Rector 2007). On what grounds does an educated person in the information age assert that domestic American problems are comparable to those of the 1.4 billion who live in extreme poverty?

Remember that the objection embedded in HAHF is some type of protest that sending money abroad is insensitive, or even offensive, because it ignores local problems. In essence, people object that sending money abroad ignores how hard life is in the first world. This objection has truth to it; life in the developed nations is hard. But life everywhere is hard; life is just plain difficult. But if we acknowledge how hard it is in the first world, how much harder must it be without education, food, clean water, medical care or adequate housing? How much harder must it be living on $1.25 per day?

This erroneous assertion of parity is an example of mollification. Again, we must ask: Why would ordinary citizens adopt a thinking pattern characteristic of criminals? The answer again lies in the psychology of empathy. Affluent people purposely distort reality via mollification with respect to world poverty for the same reason that criminal use mollification: it reduces guilt born of empathy. Specifically, mollifying using HAHF permits the affluent to focus on their own personal concerns more heavily than upon the troubles of others, because they are of a relatively equivalent magnitude, and of course our first obligation is to ourselves. Like all mollifications, it diminishes responsibility and thereby attenuates guilt, which is engendered by empathy.

Because of our own difficulties, we are capable of experiencing, via empathy, the difficulties of others. If our own obstacles challenge us, imagine how much greater would be our distress were we to acknowledge the magnitude of oppression experienced by the extreme poor. To avoid being overwhelmed we assert parity between the needs at home and those abroad. We mollify.
XIII. Defensive Distortions Examined: Responsibility Position

Another barrier belief to third world charity is the Responsibility Position (RP). Remember that RP holds that affluent persons in the developed world have no obligation to assist the extreme poor. Instead it is the obligation of those who live in those societies to solve their own problems. Embedded within this position seems to be a premium on holding people accountable for their actions. It contains within it the oft noted Western assertion that we make our own bed and then we lie in it. In this context the extreme poor as individuals, their governments and/or their leaders, have created the circumstances of their lives and reap the benefits; it is no one’s responsibility but their own.

Insisting that we are each responsible for our own actions is a powerful philosophy with impressive results. But it rests upon the assumption that people have the skills and resources to make something of their lives. In a context of sufficient skills and resources, failure to do so reveals the weakness of character that RP protests against, and explicitly rejects as an obligation. In this context, RP is clearly the soundest philosophy on which to build a society.

However, it is precisely this context (skills and resources) that is absent in societies of extreme poverty. The extreme poor have been without this context for generations, perhaps forever. Return for a moment to living on $1.25 per day without clean water, medical care, schooling or adequate food. How many people anywhere can cobble together a successful life in such circumstances? And while some very few adults may be able to do so, how does one insist that children are responsible for themselves in such a context? A hypothetical example can clarify the distorted moral calculus asserted by RP.

In the first world, the nuclear family is usually viewed as the fundamental micro-social unit, just as the nation state is viewed as the fundamental macro-social unit. Imagine that the single father living next door is mentally ill and regularly beats and terrorizes his children. According to the logic asserted by RP, no one would have any responsibility to intervene to help the children because it is the responsibility of the family to solve its own problems. Of course, many would object to such a denial of responsibility by asserting that the children cannot solve their problems because they lack the skills and resources; they are victims powerless to change their situation. Though the impetus to act in this example is more compelling because of its geographical proximity, the moral logic is no different than that pertaining to the extreme poor. Can this position be deemed “moral” in any conventional sense of the term?

Though RP is weak from a rational perspective, it is very powerful as a psychological defense. Indeed, its power is noted by Lerner (1980) whose “just world” theory asserts that people are motivated to believe others have either earned their deserts or incurred their own punishments; the world is “just”. This is mollification. Why do regular citizens adopt this criminal thinking error vis-à-vis the extreme poor?

As noted previously, the guilt created by empathy for the extreme poor who live far away, and represent an abstraction, can be overcome by mollifying, by asserting RP. However, no amount of mollifying can surmount the cries of terrorized children next door. Logically speaking the cries of the extreme poor are no different; emotionally, empathically if you will, they are made different by geography that permits mollification to succeed.
Like other philosophical positions that are most usefully understood as psychological defenses, RP often contains a note of psychological investment on the part of the purveyor. An example, is Jan Naverson’s article entitled, “‘We Don’t Owe Them a Thing!’ A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Faraway Needy” (Narveson 2003). How often does one find an academic paper whose title contains a protest against an obligation the author claims does not exist? This is not dispassionate philosophy, but motivated psychology.

Moreover, RP contains within it ANT. By holding all people in poor societies equally responsible, including children, it conceives of society as a monolithic unified entity. However societies are comprised of individuals. To assign blame collectively is ANT that renders all guilty of irresponsibility, which serves to reduce guilt and anxiety among those who fail to act; without doing so one would be tacitly permitting others to be victimized. After all, if the entire society is irresponsible, the consequences of their choices justly fall upon them. However, to speak of an entire society as being responsible, as if it is a single entity, undercuts the very notion of personal responsibility that RP champions.

Even if one claims that adults are capable of living a decent life under the extreme poverty conditions described, how does one dismiss the suffering of children? One could argue that the children are the responsibility of the adults. Though unfortunate that they are cared for by irresponsible adults, it is ultimately their parents who are to blame. Does this argument seem plausible for the terrorized children living next door?

XIV. Defensive Distortions Examined: Logical Consequences

The Logical Consequences position (LC) might be best understood as an elaboration of RP. In its strong form LC asserts that extreme poverty and its consequences are part of a feedback loop operating between humans and their environment such that poverty is engendered by the environment’s inability to sustain human life at a certain population. For example, insufficient food and clean water are a natural consequence of too many people relative to available resources. The solution would then be to limit the number of people living within any specific geographic region. Nature does this through famine. Moreover, if the natural environment cannot sustain the population currently, injecting resources so that people continue to live, and then reproduce, risks an even larger catastrophe once assistance can no longer be sustained. In essence the ratio of resources to people will become even more precarious and ultimately result in greater tragedy.

LC rests upon the well known Malthusian argument that populations grow faster than available resources, eventually leading to catastrophic shortages. Certainly, the earth’s resources are finite, and as such its capacity to sustain human life has limits; this is undeniable. However, to suggest that famine during the past 50 years has been due to human populations exceeding the earth’s limits is at variance with the facts, which indicate that food shortages in the twentieth century, when human populations have been at their historic highest, have been due to episodic disasters such as political crises, wars, corrupt and dictatorial governments, genocides and droughts (Sen 1983; Devereux 2000). Indeed, were famines due to unchangeable limits in the earth’s capacity, they would be chronic and increasing as the world’s population increases, which is exactly what we do not observe (Devereux 2000). On the contrary, India and China have reduced the size of their hungry populations significantly in the last 30 years despite enormous population growth (Devereux 2000). Given these facts, it is hard to argue that food scarcity and malnutrition are due to a natural law operating through a feedback loop.
While it is true that almost any problem of scarcity can be relieved by reducing a population, it does not follow that all problems of scarcity are created by overpopulation. It has been readily established that there is more than enough food to feed the world’s population (Food and Agriculture Organization 2002). Indeed, even if famines emerged because populations exceeded our current food production, they could be remedied by consuming as food the grains fed to livestock to produce meat. For example, in 2007 756 million tons of grain were fed to livestock rather than humans (Food and Agriculture Organization 2008), and in 2009 in the United States alone, over 100 million tons of corn were converted into bio-fuel, enough to feed 330 million people (Larsen 2010).

But even if we were approaching the earth’s limits (however that would be determined), since when does a fact of nature become a moral prescription? How did this (rather dubious) “fact” transform itself into a “value”? Has anyone used the logic of natural feedback loops to seriously propose that we discontinue inoculations against infectious diseases or permit those unable to care for themselves due to disability to perish? Isn’t saving the sick and disabled subverting the natural feedback of biological systems? Doesn’t saving them risk they will reproduce and create more sick and disabled people by passing along genes that are less likely to be healthy? These would hardly appear as humane policy prescriptions.

Curiously, during the worldwide financial meltdown and high unemployment of the past several years, no one has suggested that unemployed workers in the first world should simply perish because the economic feedback loop is in play, and apparently, the balance of workers relative to jobs must be restored. No one seriously claims that the reason for unemployment is simple overpopulation, though significant population reduction would certainly ameliorate the crisis. On the contrary, a host of variables associated with insufficient regulation and risky financial practices are widely believed to have caused the crisis, a confluence of events arguably not much different than episodes of hunger and famine overseas caused by political corruption and wars. Why do thoughtful, compassionate and intelligent people in affluent nations consider first world unemployment, which amounts to little more than an inconvenience for the affected, to be a crisis, and then blandly accept the deaths of 27,000 young children daily due to extreme poverty as a fact of nature to be accepted?

Asserting that there is in operation some natural law regarding the relationship between humans and their environments virtually compels inaction, because intervening would contravene a process larger than all of us, and whose violation would lead to greater future suffering. This is mollification. Why do ordinary citizens begin thinking like criminals?

LC eliminates responsibility and reduces guilt and anxiety born of empathy. It permits us to assert that the plight of the extreme poor can be avoided by acting in accordance with natural laws, and virtually prohibits intervention by labeling it as short-sighted or even injurious. However, LC fails to acknowledge that there is no action any individual has taken, or could take, to avoid being born into extreme poverty. Each of us has no control over where we are born, an act of fate that is perhaps the most critical determinant in the outcome of anyone’s life. Acknowledging the capricious nature of life induces anxiety. Though one’s birth was long ago a fait accompli, other vicissitudes of life are no less random; this renders us all vulnerable. To avoid this anxiety we devise a tortured conception of responsibility that keeps us safe from a similar fate.
XV. The Puzzle Solved

This discussion sought to understand the insufficient action of the affluent on behalf of the extreme poor. How can the relative indifference among the rich towards the emergencies of the poor be explained, particularly when saving lives costs less than an American typically spends each year on soft-drinks? While self-absorption and indifference probably explain a portion of the inaction, several commonly proffered attitudes, so-called barrier attitudes, were also examined.

These attitudes were found to be so weak from a logical perspective that explanations for their force were sought in the psychology of empathy. Analysis of empathy revealed its many effects, to include love, community, anxiety and guilt. Armed with this understanding, barrier attitudes were examined and found to contain thinking errors commonly found among criminals, errors whose chief purpose is to reduce anxiety and guilt, and which appear to be the explanation for these logically implausible postures. Barrier attitudes are one method for resolving the tension created by empathy. They allow for empathy’s positive effects of love and community while reducing its liabilities of anxiety and guilt.

Thus, the lack of ameliorative action towards the extreme poor, when expressed by the attitudes noted above, appears to be due NOT to indifference. On the contrary, it appears to be a reaction to empathy, caring if you will, a way to protect against the suffering compassion inevitably produces. So conceived, the barrier attitudes examined (MV, YCHA, HAHF, RP, LC) are a solution to an internal conflict for those who hold them; they are suffering in response to their empathy for others. While barrier attitudes are one method for resolving the tension created by empathy, these defensive cognitive distortions are not precise surgical instruments; rather they are blunt in their effects, such that their attenuation of anxiety and guilt also risks reducing connection to others generally rather than specifically. Stated plainly, though defensive cognitive processes reduce our dysphoria, they also reduce our connectedness, which is a principle foundation for happiness. They have side-effects; they are not free. For most of us there is a better solution to empathy’s conundrum.

Rather than deploying defensive cognitive distortions, most of us would be better off embracing our empathy in all of its ramifications. Of course, fully embracing empathy carries risks. However, it also carries enormous benefits. Recall that empathy is the basis for love and community, and that its expansion carries the possibility of deepening these experiences. Often, exposure to the extreme poor, and others in need, gives rise to greater connection and satisfaction than would have otherwise been attained.

This is exactly the experience reported by Edmund Hillary, Paul Farmer, and other philanthropists who did not plan on assuming such a role, but once exposed to the poor made it their life’s work to assist them. They did so not in response to an abstruse ontological argument or some grim fidelity to duty. They did it because of the love and joy it brought to their lives. Rather than fearing their empathy and defending against its consequences, they enlisted it, and found it to be the vehicle for their happiness. In the process, they improved and saved countless lives. Could anyone ask for a better solution?

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This paper makes two key points about the relationships between insurgent organizational structure, decision-making processes and organizational effectiveness. First, organizational structure and decision-making evolve organically, influenced by how insurgencies resolve five key dilemmas and deal with a range of contextual factors. Second, I argue that in a modern, post-9/11 context, the most effective organizational structure for an insurgency is internationally networked and decentralized. Conclusions will focus on the implications of the key points for both understanding and responding to insurgencies.

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In April of 1965, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, hero of the Cuban revolution, travelled with a group of Cuban fighters to eastern Congo to support the rebellion against the American- and Belgian-backed government. He intended to share his experiences from the success of the Cuban revolution with Congolese fighters by deploying experienced Cuban fighters alongside inexperienced Congolese recruits. He hoped the Congolese would learn by example, through a process he called ‘Cubanization’, and take on the Cuban fighters’ technical skills and revolutionary mentality. The Preface to his account of his time there, however, begins, ‘This is the history of a failure.’ Guevara very quickly realized that the context of the Congolese revolution was dramatically different from the one he had known in Cuba. The lessons he had learned in the mountains of the Sierra Madre were not always relevant to the Congolese context, and instead of the ‘Cubanization’ of the Congolese soldiers he had hoped for, he observed a ‘Congolization’ of the Cubans, as they adapted to the new environment and began to emulate their Congolese colleagues (Guevara, 2001).

In this paper, I argue two key points similar to the ones that Guevara observed, both oriented towards understanding the relationship between organizational structure and other aspects of insurgency. First, I argue that insurgent organizational structure and subsequent strategic decision-making evolve organically, as a natural result of the organization’s short- and long-term goals, economic and social resources, observations and responses to the enemy’s behaviour, and other contextual factors. Second, I argue that the relationship between structure and organizational effectiveness is a product of context, and that in a post-9/11 global context of weak borders, wide-reaching media, centralized counter-terror networks and easy transportation and communication, a decentralized, international network is the most effective structure for an insurgent organization.

This paper is divided into two sections. In the first section, I identify, explain and analyze five key dilemmas of insurgent organizing: (1) action versus secrecy; (2) growth versus control; (3) recruitment versus retention; (4) success versus longevity; and (5) resources versus constituencies. Dilemmas are a widely used tool in organizational economics and psychology to understand the complexities of decisions that organizations face. They emphasize that choices are not binary and highlight the organization’s agency in negotiating the various challenges they face.

In the second section, I discuss two different insurgencies and analyze their actions quantitatively to determine their ultimate organizational effectiveness. Insurgent organizations exist along a spectrum, from hierarchical to network structures. I introduce a second spectrum along which networked insurgencies can be classified, from local to international structures.

**Definitions**

It is impossible to discuss in significant depth the topic of insurgency without a thorough understanding of the terms involved, particularly the distinction between ‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’. Since 11 September 2001, and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT), the terms have taken on new meanings in popular usage. In the academic literature, and therefore in this paper, ‘terrorism’ is considered a strategy of insurgency rather than a separate organizational type, defined by its strategic choices: the targets it attacks, and the weapons and tactics it utilizes. Goodwin, McCarthy and Yukich, in an unpublished paper on terrorism in the Irish Republican Army, state it perfectly when they say:

[...] the label ‘terrorist’ does not usefully describe a type of political organization per se, nor a type of state or individual. Rather, it points to a distinctive political strategy that political groups, states, or individuals may or may not choose to employ. (Goodwin et al, 2008).
Their opinion is shared by many scholars in a wide range of literature on the topic of terrorism, including Tilly in ‘Terror, Terrorism and Terrorists’ (2004), Richardson in ‘What Terrorists Want’ (2006) and Merari in ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgence’ (1993). Even Guevara sees terrorism in a similar light, calling it a ‘valuable tactic’ for assassinations, but warning against harming innocent civilians (Guevara, 1985). State terror, while similar in its short-term effect on civilians, is a fundamentally different phenomenon and will not be considered in this paper.

The term ‘insurgency’ encompasses a very broad span of ideas, and depending on the context in which it is used, can have a range of meanings. For the most part, the use of the term insurgency implies an organized, armed resistance movement, and so for the purposes of this paper will be defined as:

A non-governmental organization working to affect social and/or political change through violent means against existing power structures and in a way that deliberately challenges the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

It is also important to differentiate insurgencies from organized criminal groups, whose orientation is primarily towards profit-making. Insurgencies are often heavily involved in illicit profit-making ventures to raise funds for their endeavors, and the distinction between organized crime group and insurgency lies in the group’s ultimate goals. Financial gain can be a goal in itself, or a means to achieve a larger political agenda. For the purposes of this paper, only organizations with the stated primary goal of political change are considered.

SECTION ONE: FIVE KEY DILEMMAS OF INSURGENT ORGANIZING

The literature on insurgent and terrorist organization contains within it a number of existential questions about the founding of organizations, their maintenance, and their ultimate victory or demise. Those questions have been framed here as five key dilemmas of insurgent organizing, to convey the range of the choices the insurgent organization has as it faces each dilemma. Each dilemma represents a challenge that a nascent insurgent organization must resolve if it is to survive and achieve some measure of success, and portrays the spectrum of available options. How it resolves these dilemmas, however, is effected most by the context in which the insurgency operates. The five key dilemmas are: (1) action versus secrecy; (2) growth versus control; (3) recruitment versus retention; (4) success versus longevity; and (5) resources versus constituencies.

DILEMMA ONE: ACTION VERSUS SECRECY

Simply put, any insurgency has two complementary operational goals: to carry out attacks, and to avoid getting caught. The inherent paradox of implementing those goals, however, is that the more attacks an organization carries out, the less secret the organization will be and thus the higher the likelihood they will be defeated. Heightened secrecy can also have a detrimental impact on an organization’s ability to carry out attacks, as higher levels of secrecy can weaken internal communication and make it harder to coordinate operations. McCormick, Horton and Harrison, writing about how civil wars end, point out the inverse of that relationship: as organizations emphasize easier internal communication, they become less secure and open themselves up to infiltration and leaks (McCormick et al, 2007). Organizations must decide whether to be more active and therefore less secretive, as with a separatist insurgency that attempts to take and hold land, or more secretive and less active, as with an urban terrorist sleeper cell like those preparing for the 9/11 or 7/7 attacks, who were only able to carry out a single attack.
In discussing terrorist organizations, or other insurgencies for which publicity is a major operational goal, we must make a distinction between internal and external secrecy. While a group may be seeking publicity through its actions and consciously disregarding external secrecy, it must still be very resistant to infiltration and protective of its internal secrecy. An Al Qaeda training manual for undercover operatives advises caution when using technology:

It is well known that in undercover operations, communication is the mainstay of the movement for rapid accomplishment. However, it is a double-edged sword: It can be to our advantage if we use it well and it can be a knife dug into our back if we do not consider and take the necessary security measures. (Al Qaeda, date unknown).

Ultimately though, communication within an organization is key, and is facilitated by technology. Zakaria Zubaydi, former commander of the Palestinian Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade in Jenin, explained that although its members were not financially remunerated for their participation, the organization did supply them with mobile phone credit because they spent so much time on their phones (Zubaydi, 2011). Johnston, similarly, states that technology has been one of the key determinants of modern insurgent organizational structure. He argues that the advent of more sophisticated and less expensive communication technology has accelerated a shift towards more network-oriented, decentralized organizations; with cell phones and the internet, the semi-autonomous sub-groups of a multidivisional organization can reduce the information asymmetry that Johnston says is one of the primary weaknesses of that organization type and become even more effective (Johnston, 2008).

**DILEMMA TWO: GROWTH VERSUS CONTROL**

As an organization grows in membership, geographical area and diversity and number of activities, the leadership must decide when and how to relinquish the high degree of control they exercised when the organization was smaller. Insurgent organizations, like business corporations, need more people if they want to engage in more activities.

As organizations grow, their structures also become formalized and fixed. Sanin and Giustozzi describe a spectrum of insurgent organizational structure. At one pole of the spectrum, they place an ‘army’ structure: hierarchical and separate from civilians. At the other end, they place a ‘network’ structure: integrated with civilians and based on existing social hierarchies. They present the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as a classic ‘army’ and the Afghan Taliban as a classic ‘network’ (Sanin & Giustozzi, 2010).

Along similar lines, Brafman and Beckstrom make a similar claim. They outline two opposite organizational structures: the spider, with a central ‘head’ and many subordinate ‘legs’, and the starfish, without a ‘head’ and with the ability of the ‘legs’ to operate independently and even reproduce themselves when severed. They emphasize that when centralized or decentralized organizations are attacked, each organizational form tends to become more extreme. In a centralized organization, further centralization can make it more vulnerable as the decision-making capacity become concentrated in fewer individuals. In decentralized organizations, a greater degree of decentralization allows the organization to spread to avoid irreparable organizational damage, continue to operate as smaller sub-groups, and to regroup after the attack has ended (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006).

Johnston argues that the key determinants of insurgent organizational structure are technology and geography. He describes a causal chain in which their interaction influences the type of organization that develops, which has an impact on the organization’s effectiveness. Johnston
illustrates two ideal types of organizational structure, grounded in new institutional economic theory: the unitary form, and the multidivisional form. He argues that the unitary form, similar to Sanin and Giustozzi’s ‘army’, is created explicitly, while the multidivisional form, similar to the ‘network’, is created organically. He defines military effectiveness as the group’s ability to translate resources into power. As insurgencies grow, recruit more members and occupy more territory, unitary organizations become less effective, and the successful ones shift organically to become multidivisional organizations. Explicit, unitary organizations are intrinsically less flexible than multidivisional organizations, and in the modern context, that makes them less effective (Johnston, 2008).

The role of charismatic leadership is also important in understanding how insurgent organizations grow and change. Jordan, writing about leadership by analysing the assassination of insurgent leaders, finds that although charismatic leadership is key to the creation of a strong insurgent group, it does not determine the group’s ultimate survival and can actually be a hindrance as the group develops over time (Jordan, 2009).

Langdon, Sarapu and Wells, also writing about the effectiveness of targeting insurgent leaders, focus specifically on the role of charismatic leadership in the formation and development of insurgencies. They argue two points relevant to the debate on insurgent organizational structure. First, they find that groups with charismatic leaders may resist bureaucratization and growth, and may even resist, at least implicitly, achieving organizational goals. If the leader feels that victory will force the organization to grow beyond his/her control or will remove the organization’s raison d’être, s/he may actually work to ensure that victory is not achieved. Second, they draw a distinction between groups that resemble armies and those that with semi-autonomous squads. They say that in the army-style groups, a loss of leadership always results in the group either being strengthened or collapsing, the group never stays the same or weakens (Langdon et al, 2004). Their findings speak to the relationship between flexibility and effectiveness, as more flexible, network-style organizations are more resilient to the loss of their leadership.

Oots draws the comparison between terrorist organizations and non-violent political groups, adding to the school of thought that terrorism is a rational political decision. He argues that groups are founded when charismatic leaders have a set of goals, and when the benefits of membership outweigh the costs for potential recruits. He also agrees that a major function of a terrorist organization is maintaining its own existence, and illustrates that an organization’s leadership needs to sustain the organization overall in order to sustain its privileged position.

DILEMMA THREE: RECRUITMENT VERSUS RETENTION

The recruitment-retention dilemma is a particularly pressing one for insurgent organizations, but which receives mostly perfunctory treatment in the literature. Recruitment is described as an extremely difficult endeavour, and retention is treated mostly as a form of what organizational economics calls ‘contract enforcement,’ focused on convincing members to fulfil their commitments. Actually, the challenge of recruitment is often more related to a lack of quality rather than quantity of recruits, and the real challenge of retention lies not in preventing people from quitting, but preventing them from being killed. Gates, writing about the structure of rebel organizations, identifies three factors – geography, ethnicity and ideology, which he calls the ‘microfoundations’ of rebellion. He argues that they are key determinants of overall military success, and links them particularly to the recruitment and retention of group members. He posits that the central challenges for a rebel organization are the recruitment of new members and motivating them to kill and die for the group’s cause (Gates, 2002).
Although there are clear overlaps between recruitment and retention, namely, how to recruit people into an organization that may not believe in retaining them alive, the challenges to each are distinct, and so I will analyse them separately here.

**Recruitment**

Recruitment can be approached both from the perspective of the organization seeking new members, and the individual deciding to join an insurgency. There are three main, overlapping reasons that an individual chooses to join an insurgency: (a) because family members, friends, or other members of the recruit’s social network are involved; (b) because of personal trauma, including violence against the individual and/or his or her family members; and (c) because of deep religious and/or political conviction that inspires a willingness to fight and for a cause (Frisch, 2010).

Chai, writing in 1993, was one of the first academics to question the hegemony of the rational choice explanation for why people engage in political violence. Pre-dating the greed or grievance debate, he theorizes that the decision to rebel might involve more than a purely economic cost-benefit analysis, and argues that violence creates incentives to create more violence and that the people who choose to participate may have an intrinsic interest in perpetuating it. Ultimately, he argues that there are many, complex reasons that organizations and individuals choose to participate in political violence, and to assume that the decision is purely economic is overly simplistic and prevents a thorough understanding of it (Chai, 1993).

Attempting to understand the perspective of the individual, Weinstein and Humphreys, in a wide-ranging survey of former fighters in Sierra Leone, investigate why people joined violent factions in Sierra Leone’s civil war. They find that a complex blend of grievance, incentives, coercion and social pressures all interacted to motivate participation. Responding to the ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy in explaining insurgent participation, they argue that the debate should not be between the supremacy of one theory over another. Rather, they find that there are many simultaneous factors, the combination of which may be different for different groups and individuals, and those differences may help account for a group’s behaviour. (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).

Kuznar, in a wide-ranging psychological and sociological analysis of the reasons people engage in terrorist activities, highlights the significance of a sense of material inequality and lack of fairness as important motivators. He links those sentiments to deeper psychological feelings of resentment and humiliation, which both fuel the motivation to act violently, and create important social bonds with others who share those feelings. He also proposes that, because of their awareness of economic inequalities, those in the middle-upper echelons of their social rank are particularly prone to risk-taking (Kuznar, 2007).

Kuznar also emphasizes the importance of social networks as an important factor in an individual’s decision to participate in terrorism. He highlights the social isolation from mainstream society often felt by migrants, specifically Muslim migrants in Europe, and theorizes that participation in terrorist activities may stem from a psychological impetus to be a part of a supportive group after migrating to an unfamiliar and alienating environment. His conclusions about the role of social networks in recruitment to commit violence is widely supported across the literature, and provide some insight into the non-economic reasons that people choose to participate in terrorist activities (Kuznar 2007).
Retention

Much of the literature on member retention focuses on avoiding desertion and splintering within insurgent organizations. This, however, does not seem to be as much of a challenge as the literature implies; people choose to stay in organizations for many of the same reasons they choose to join them in the first place. The factors that contribute to recruitment, like strong social networks, grievance, and incentives also contribute to retention, and do not diminish with membership. Within insurgent organizations, the more pressing problem is not how to keep members from leaving, but how to keep them from dying. On one hand, very limited resources must be expended on recruiting new members, while on the other hand, their survival (and thus, their retention) is very difficult to ensure, as they participate in violence on behalf of the organization.

More importantly, access to recruits is a resource in itself, and one that is finite. If recruits are being slaughtered with no evidence of progress, the flow of recruits will dry up as the calculus for potential members changes to incorporate the higher risks involved with joining the organization. Another particularly difficult aspect of retaining group members is that the highest value recruits are also hardest to retain, both because of opportunities outside the insurgency, and because they often have more dangerous positions within it, including making bombs and attacking higher-value and more dangerous targets.

The onus is also on the organization to build loyalty. Akerlof and Kranton find that non-economic motivations are key to fostering loyalty and group identification, particularly in military contexts. A sense of group identity and inclusion, they argue, is more important than financial incentives as a motivator for group members. Members of military organizations are particularly susceptible because their physical and emotional distance from society, their proximity to each other, and their exposure to crisis and trauma all serve to cement a sense of belonging that monetary incentives alone could never induce (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005).

Attempting to understand how the use of suicide bombing fits into the literature on member retention, Pedahzur and Perliger, write about networks of Palestinian terrorists and find that suicide bombers are usually not central figures in the networks. More often than not they are peripheral members, whose sacrifice will not be a major blow to the organization (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006). Zubaydi, speaking from his personal experience agreed, saying that the suicide bombers he approved were rarely regular members of the Al Aqsa’s fighting force (Zubaydi, 2011).

Dilemma Four: Success versus Longevity

Another widely agreed-upon idea in the literature is the critical importance of organizational survival in decision-making. The predominant understanding, as discussed by Oots and others, is that insurgent organizations are primarily rational actors, and that the use of violence, including against civilians, is an effective political tool. Abrahms disagrees with this conventional wisdom and criticizes the assumptions that underpin it, particularly that terrorist organizations engage in violence with the primarily political goals. He points out seven ways that terrorist organizations contradict the widely held assumption of strategic rationality. He argues that organizational survival and social connections, rather than the achievement of political goals, are the most important factors in the decision-making of terrorist organizations. (Abrahms, 2008).

Langdon, Sarapu and Wells also support the widely held claim that the first and foremost goal of any insurgent group is its own survival. The survival of the group and its leadership may be inextricably linked, as is the case with small insurgencies based on a cult-of-personality style of
leadership, or it may be a completely separate issue, as in larger, more structured organizations (Langdon et al, 2004).

Harmon argues that terrorist organizations are not mindless, and that they carefully choose targets and tactics to advance a complex agenda of short and long-term goals that allow for greater organizational longevity (Harmon, 2001). Ultimately, insurgent organizations respond to this challenge by setting both easily attainable short-term goals, like spreading fear among a civilian population through terrorist attacks, and virtually impossible long-term goals, like the establishment of a global Islamic Caliphate, in the case of Al Qaeda, or the eradication of the state of Israel, in the case of Al Aqsa.

**Dilemma Five: Resources versus Constituencies**

Olson, writing about bandits in ancient China, presented one of the key choices facing all armed actors with an interest in resource extraction. He presents the ‘roving bandit’ as an armed group that attacks a village, steals as much as they can, and then leaves to do the same to the next village, and the ‘stationary bandit’, a group that establishes itself in a specific area and extracts a smaller, regular tithe from its residents. The stationary bandit will make less money in the short term, but ensures a steady flow of income over the long-term (Olson, 2000).

Modern insurgent organizations often face a very similar dilemma. Weinstein outlines the link between resources, recruitment and organizational structure and behaviour. He argues that insurgencies are dependent on both social and economic endowments, the nature of which influence the organization’s recruitment, structure, goals, and leadership. The crux of his argument rests on the idea that an organization’s methods of resource extraction influence the individuals who choose to join and the way the organization behaves. An organization that depends on the local population for support will employ a ‘stationary bandit’ approach, and attract high-commitment recruits who believe in the organization’s ideology and will employ violence selectively. An organization with access to natural resources or external funding will attract low-commitment recruits who are primarily interested in profit and who have little regard for the lives or livelihoods of civilians, or in establishing a stable system of long-term tax collection. He also argues that the relationship between endowments and an organization’s leadership is mutually reinforcing: endowments shape the leadership’s behaviour, but the leadership can shape endowments as well (Weinstein, 2006).

The risk of constituent alienation, particularly among organizations that use indiscriminate violence, must be considered. Byman cites Al Qaeda’s steep learning curve after popular opinion in Saudi Arabia turned against them when early attacks killed Saudi Muslims as well as Westerners (Byman, 2011). Kydd and Walter describe terrorism as a form of costly signalling, and argue that terrorist groups use violence to signal their strength in the hope that it will produce not only concessions from enemies but obedience from their supporters as well (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Organizations, especially those using terrorism, must be very careful in their application of violence to ensure that the message they send pressures both their enemies and their supporters to act in certain, albeit different, ways.

From a slightly different perspective, Findley and Young write about the challenges of counterinsurgency. They claim, as do many others, that an insurgent organization depends on civilians for supplies, protection and recruits. When a counterinsurgency succeeds at its goal of winning the support of those same civilians, the insurgency will ultimately collapse because of a lack of new recruits and other forms of civilian support. Aslan agrees, theorizing that Al Qaeda’s violent tactics have prevented their acceptance among young Muslims. ‘It was not the invasion of Iraq, or
nation-building in Afghanistan, or Bush’s ‘freedom agenda,’” she writes, ‘that deafened young Muslims to al-Qa’ida’s call. It was al-Qa’ida’s bloodlust in Iraq and Afghanistan.’ (Aslan, 2011).

**CONTEXT AND THE RESOLUTION OF DILEMMAS**

It is clear from the dilemmas discussed above that insurgencies need to be dynamic and malleable organizations. They are influenced by a host of contextual factors, which determine the way they negotiate the five dilemmas discussed here. Ultimately, flexibility and responsiveness to changes in context will determine how they resolve the challenges of the five dilemmas, and ultimately their survival as an organization. Zubaydi states that the single most important aspect of leading Al Aqsa was the ability to shift strategy and structure regularly to pre-empt and respond to the actions of the Israeli military (Zubaydi, 2011). Crenshaw concludes that although organizations usually form when goals are identified and an organization is created to achieve them, the organization will continue to grow and change as internal dynamic impact its strategies and tactics (Crenshaw, 1987). That flexibility, which is key to survival, is most often found in organizations with structures that evolve organically, and are responsive to changes in how they deal with the dilemmas they face. Sanin and Giustozzi also conclude that the organizational differences in different contexts are evidence that organizations evolve organically rather than explicitly (Sanin & Giustozzi, 2010). Johnston argues that while hierarchies are structured explicitly, networks are organic. Organizations that expand will naturally become more networked and make fewer explicit decisions about structure (Johnston, 2008) and thus remain flexible even as they grow.

The distinction between organic and explicit organizational structure and decision-making is important for two reasons. From a policy and particularly counter-insurgency perspective, the conclusion that context is key to the evolution of insurgencies would imply that lessons learned in one context should only be very carefully applied to another. The challenges represented by the dilemmas can be used to frame how an insurgency deals with its context. It also implies, therefore, that if the context in which an insurgency is forming can be changed, so too can the formation of the insurgency. It may be possible to track, or even predict, how those changes will take place if we know how the organization has resolved these dilemmas over time. As such, they can be a useful framework to guide counter-insurgency strategy towards an understanding of the importance of context and the ways it can influence organizational behaviour.

**SECTION 2: A NEW SPECTRUM OF INSURGENT NETWORK ORGANIZATION**

In this chapter, I discuss a new dimension of the hierarchy-network spectrum described above. I then define the parameters for a discussion of network effectiveness, and through two brief case studies, illustrate the different ways that local and international networks are effective. Through the lens of the five dilemmas discussed above, I highlight similarities and differences between the organizations, and discuss how those differences are related to the ways they negotiate the dilemmas.

Throughout much of the literature on insurgent organizational structure, there is widespread agreement on the hierarchy-network spectrum of organizational types as discussed by Sanin and Giustozzi, Johnston and others. That spectrum, however, is becoming a less and less accurate way of describing the reality of insurgent organizations in operation today. Classic examples of long-term, largely effective hierarchical insurgencies, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, are being defeated through conventional military means, or are shifting towards a network-oriented structure to survive, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In a modern, post-September 11th context, the strict hierarchical structure has become a liability rather than an asset to an insurgent organization. A number of factors have contributed to this shift, stemming
both from the policies and practices related to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and broader trends of the globalization of travel and trade.

The GWOT policies have contributed to a centralization of counter-insurgent strategy and given greater access by historically weak governments to the training and material resources of conventional military operations. Local conflicts, like those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, Somalia and elsewhere have been incorporated into a broader GWOT narrative and the governments fighting those counter-insurgency campaigns have been able to strengthen their conventional military capacity exponentially as a result, through support from the United States, Great Britain and other governments, as well as from international institutions. As the military capacity of the state has grown, their ability to confront and defeat hierarchical insurgent groups with structures are similar to their own has grown as well.

Simultaneously, insurgent groups now have unprecedented opportunities to decentralize. Chief among them is the ease of communication, both short-distance, through mobile phone technology, and long-distance, through the internet. As discussed above, communication has always been key to an organization’s efficiency. With easier methods of communication available, insurgent cells within a network are able to maintain strong communication links without rigid, hierarchical structures. Also important is the opening of borders for travel and trade. This has allowed insurgent groups, particularly those with international goals like Al Qaeda, to broaden the scope of their actions and attack targets far from their bases. The planning and implementation of the Madrid train bombings and the September 11th attacks, as well as other unsuccessful attempts at violence, including a recently thwarted attack using explosives shipped commercially from Yemen to the United States, are evidence of the ways that open borders are being exploited by insurgents.

Finally, the wide reach of the media, both in sourcing stories and in reporting them, has created clear incentives for a strategy based on perpetrating a small number of high-profile incidents. Older, hierarchical models of insurgent organization tend to emphasize a long-term strategy based on guerrilla tactics and attrition, whereas modern, networked insurgencies can capitalize on the international media echo to project power and presence through fewer, very public attacks.

Consequently, to be able to accurately analyze the organizational structure of modern insurgencies, it is important to introduce another measure in addition to the hierarchy-network spectrum. As discussed above, hierarchies are becoming less viable as insurgent organizational structures, so the new measure will focus on those organizations closer to the network pole of the spectrum.

The new measure is a spectrum as well, with the ‘local’ network at one pole, and the ‘international’ network at the other. Networks are by definition loose and flexible, and so the local-international spectrum can be applied not only to the way that organizations are structured internally, but also the ways they work with other like-minded organizations.

A local network is one based on an orientation towards short-term, tactical goals, in which insurgent cells within an organization share an operational orientation foremost, and an ideological agenda second. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, active in the West Bank during the second Intifada, is an example of a local network – the organization overall was comprised of individual, autonomous units in different cities, and each unit was made up of smaller, semi-autonomous cells with complementary responsibilities, all with the same goal of fighting the Israeli occupation. The organization also partnered with other groups fighting Israel, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Al Aqsa did not share the Islamist ideologies of those organizations, but did share their
short-term goal of ejecting Israeli troops and settlers from the West Bank and Gaza, and even the longer-term goal of the eradication of the state of Israel.

In negotiating the five dilemmas discussed in the previous section, local networks tend to prioritize action over secrecy, as they can retreat into hiding among the population in urban centres, or in geographical features like jungles or mountains; control over growth, as they work within a limited area and ideological scope; retention over recruitment, as they may not have access to many new recruits; success over longevity, as they try to achieve specific, locally oriented goals; and constituencies over resources, as their primary sources of funding may be from local populations or sympathizers abroad in their diaspora.

At the other pole of the spectrum is the international network. Within international networks, broad ideologies and some long-term goals are shared, and the tactics used to advance them may even be similar, but they are implemented in different contexts with different operational goals and agendas. Al Qaeda is a prime example of an international network. The organization’s leadership and membership is spread between a number of different countries, their attacks have taken place in still other countries, and they work closely with autonomous subsidiary networks in a number of other countries and contexts. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are the organizations with the closest links, but they have also partnered with Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and other organizations in other countries with shared ideological goals but different immediate, operational goals.

In dealing with the five organizational dilemmas, international networks tend to prioritize action over secrecy, carrying out single missions in which the individual perpetrators are caught or killed; growth over control, as they spread to carry out different short term goals in different contexts, or to work with partners with wide-ranging ideologies and operational styles; recruitment over retention, as they build more cells in the various contexts in which they operate, and longevity over success, as they aspire to practically unattainable long-term goals while advancing other, shorter-term agendas. It is important to note that in responding to all five dilemmas, most international and local networks behave differently from each other.

**Methodology**

As we compare the effectiveness of local and international networks by looking at two fairly ideal cases, it’s important to establish a definition of effectiveness as it pertains to the strategies and tactics of insurgent organizations. Data for the case studies has been drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), housed at the University of Maryland, which uses a wide variety of sources to include all terrorist incidents globally since 1970. They define terrorism very broadly, and in a way that encompasses the definition of insurgency discussed above, as well as the parameters of both the hierarchy-network spectrum and local-international spectrum. Their definition is unique in that does not mention civilians or attacks on civilians (START, 2011). That omission has enabled it to work for the purposes of this paper, as it aligns very closely with the definition of insurgency described above.

Based on the GTD’s parameters, effectiveness will be defined by: (1) the frequency of attacks, (2) the sophistication of weapons used, (3) the number of casualties, including injuries and fatalities, caused by individual attacks, (4) the percentage of successful attacks, which are those where law enforcement officials were unable to prevent the attack as it occurred or immediately prior, (5) the defensive capabilities of the target, as the choice and ability to attack military and police targets implies a higher level of organizational effectiveness than attacking civilian or commercial targets, (6)
the average number of attackers per incident, because the ability to coordinate more people implies greater organizational effectiveness (7) achievement of their stated goals, and (8) ultimate survival of the organization today.

CASE STUDY: AL Aqsa MArtYRS’ BRIGADE

The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was a network of West Bank-based militants that was active during the second Intifada, from 2000 to 2010. Affiliated with the Fatah political party, the link was initially denied until a BBC report in 2003 uncovered evidence of monthly payments from Fatah to Al Aqsa cells, at which point Fatah and Al Aqsa admitted their close relationship.

Al Aqsa was comprised of small, autonomous units throughout the West Bank, many of which pre-dated the establishment of the organization, and which were united under its banner. As an organization, they often partnered with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, although they espoused a secular ideology and did not share those organizations’ Islamist goals. Zakaria Zubaydi, the commander of the Jenin cell of Al Aqsa, said that he often served as a media spokesman not only for Al Aqsa, but for Hamas and other West Bank militant groups, indicating high levels of cooperation between different organizations (Zubaydi, 2011).

Tactically, Al Aqsa was involved in primarily three types of operations: suicide bombings on targets within Israel, suicide attacks using guns on Israeli military targets within the West Bank, and hit-and-run attacks on Israeli military units in urban areas of the West Bank, particularly refugee camps. Zubaydi argued that defence of the refugee camps was always Al Aqsa’s primary goal, and attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets were always ultimately defensive. The organization’s stated preference in suicide attacks was to use guns rather than explosives, both because of the ability of the attacker to choose targets more carefully, and because it was seen as a more honourable and courageous way to die. Suicide attacks were carried out at the initiative of the attackers themselves, with organizational approval and weapons, although without organizational involvement in planning the operation or choosing a target. Zubaydi insisted that the organization did not recruit people for suicide attacks, and would only endorse an operation after someone had volunteered and been turned down repeatedly over the course of at least six months to a year (Zubaydi, 2011).

He described the organization as being divided into small cells, each with a specific role. Most cells were made up of soldiers, but others were dedicated to making and placing bombs, using computers and the internet for research and communication, transporting money and guns, or keeping watch for Israeli incursions into Al Aqsa-held areas (Zubaydi, 2011).

The main challenge the organization faced was not a lack of volunteers, but a lack of weapons. Zubaydi stated that there was only one gun for every five insurgents. To acquire guns Al Aqsa militants would climb on top of Israeli armoured vehicles with tools and detach mounted heavy machine guns while the Israeli soldiers inside were powerless to stop them, or pull smaller personal weapons from the hand of Israeli soldiers as they aimed them out through slits in armoured personnel carriers (Zubaydi, 2011).

The Intifada ended in 2004, but Al Aqsa continued to be active through 2010, although it was effectively crippled in 2008, when Zubaydi and many other high-level members accepted amnesty offers from Israel in exchange for their resignations. Zubaydi expressed frustration with Israel’s approach to counter-insurgency operations, and blamed their use of overwhelming force on the ultimate defeat of his organization. The Al Aqsa fighters did what they could with limited resources,
he said, but when Israel retaliated with bulldozers, tanks and helicopters, and displayed a willingness to utilize excessive force, they were unable to put up a significant resistance (Zubaydi, 2011).

Over the course of the 10-year period between 2000 and 2010, Al Aqsa was involved in carrying out 164 incidents, alone or in collaboration with other Palestinian insurgent groups. Figure 1.1 illustrates the frequency of Al Aqsa attacks from its creation in 2000 through its dissolution in 2010.

Figure 1.1: Al Aqsa Frequency of Attacks, 2000-2010

At its height in 2002, attacks were very frequent, especially in the early part of the year – there were 14 attacks in March alone. In response, the Israeli military attacked the Jenin refugee camp, widely suspected to be a source of many of the attacks. The camp proved harder to conquer than they expected, and fierce fighting raged for 11 days. The Israeli military, unable to defeat the insurgents in house-to-house fighting, flattened large areas of the densely populated camp and arrested hundreds of suspected militants. The Israeli response dealt a severe blow to the organization’s capacity, reflected here in the sharp drop between the frequency of attacks in 2002.

Figure 1.2: Weapons used in Al Aqsa attacks, 2000-2010
and 2003. In 2008, the Israeli government signed an agreement offering amnesty in exchange for a ceasefire with many members of Al Aqsa’s leadership. That agreement is reflected here in the severe drop in frequency between 2008 and 2009.

As is clear from Figure 1.2, Al Aqsa’s weapons of choice were bombs and firearms. Bombs were homemade, using agricultural fertilizers and other locally available chemicals. Guns were mostly AK 47 and M 16 assault rifles, which were largely either purchased illegally in Israel and smuggled into the West Bank, stolen from Israeli soldiers, or purchased under the auspices of Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The use of explosives speaks to a certain level of expertise within the organization, as they require skill and practice to assemble and detonate. After the Battle of Jenin, there was a sharp drop in the frequency of explosive use, after which point there seems to have been a reverse correlation between firearm and explosive use; when the frequency of explosive use increases, the frequency of firearm use decreases (see Figure 1.3). This implies that the organization was operating at full capacity in terms of human and material resources, and had to prioritize the use of one type of weapon over the other, based largely on availability.

Figure 1.3: Al Aqsa weapons use, 2000-2010

![Graph showing the use of firearms and explosives from 2000 to 2010. The frequency of explosives drops sharply after 2008, while the frequency of firearms use increases.]

Firearms: pink line, Explosives: red line

Figure 1.4: Casualties per (number of incidents) in Al Aqsa attacks, 2000 - 2010

![Bar graph showing the number of casualties per incident from 2000 to 2010. The highest number of casualties is in the category of 1-10 incidents.]

In Figure 1.4, we can see that most of Al Aqsa’s attacks had fewer than ten casualties, and very few had more than 50. This speaks to the tactics used in many of the incidents: hit-and-run attacks with firearms on Israeli soldiers and settlers, roadside bombs in areas Israeli soldiers would pass through, and suicide bombings against civilian targets within Israel. The attacks with the most casualties were all suicide attacks, most carried out with explosives but some with firearms. The generally low number of casualties also implies fairly primitive bomb-making capabilities. Explosives made with agricultural fertilizers are very unstable, and were probably manufactured in small quantities for specific attacks.

Figure 1.5 depicts the frequency with which Al Aqsa attacked different categories of targets. As is clear from the graph, the overwhelming number of attacks targeted private citizens and property, particularly settlers in the West Bank. Zubaydi, when asked about his choice of targets, claimed that neither he nor the organization was aware of the intended targets for suicide attacks beforehand. The organization supplied the bomber with explosives, and left the decision about where to detonate them in his or her hands. As such, we can deduce that since the bombers received no training or guidance, they chose the least well defended targets, namely civilians. Zubaydi also expressed the view that because all Israelis are required to serve in the military, Al Aqsa fighters saw all Israelis as soldiers, regardless of whether they were in uniform, and as such had no qualms about striking targets that were ostensibly civilian.

Al Aqsa’s attack teams were small, with an average of 1.89 insurgents per attack. Their largest attack involved 17 insurgents, who attacked and held a European Union office in Gaza for approximately 30 minutes to protest the publishing of cartoons in Danish newspaper that they believed were offensive to Islam. The high number of suicide attacks, 25% overall, which were perpetrated by single individuals also brings this figure down, as suicide attackers are able to do more damage and cause more casualties than a single non-suicide attacker.
Al Aqsa’s attacks were mostly operationally successful: 92.7% of attacks were not prevented as they were being carried out. The 12 attacks that were prevented were unremarkable, and were due either to a technical failure on the part of the bomber, random checks on people and vehicles by Israeli police officers, or the fast action of Israeli civilians, including a bus driver who pushed a bomber off the bus before he could detonate his explosives.

Al Aqsa was ultimately unable to fulfil their goals of the establishment of a Palestinian state and the eradication of the Israeli state. The organization had limited manpower, as evidenced by the negative correlation between firearms and explosives uses in Figure 1.3, limited access to firearms, as the interview with Zubaydi made clear, and to explosives, as most of the bombs made were small (between 8 and 12 kilograms) and rudimentary, sometimes even failing to detonate. They attacked weakly defended civilian targets out of necessity. Most of their members received little or no training; only those who had previously served in Fatah’s police force, a small percentage, received any formal training at all. The Israeli military had better weapons and equipment, including armoured vehicles, helicopters and other military aircraft, state of the art communication technology, and more and better-trained soldiers. It is, however, a testament to Al Aqsa’s flexible, locally-oriented network structure that they survived as long as they did, and only admitted defeat when the Israeli government displayed an unwillingness to keep fighting. The Israeli military was surprised at how well organized the Al Aqsa-organized resistance it encountered was, and the battle lasted much longer than they had expected. In fact, Israeli estimates before the battle predicted it would last no more than 72 hours, far short of the 11 days that it ultimately took to subdue the camp (Rees, 2002).

**CASE STUDY: AL QAEDA**

There is some debate about whether Al Qaeda actually exists as a cohesive organization in itself, or whether it is merely a name shared between otherwise unrelated organizations. It seems that the confusion comes from Al Qaeda’s non-traditional structure and geography, as it is not attached to a specific territory like most other insurgencies. Despite that, it is in fact an organization that both works with other local insurgencies and retains its own structure, leadership, and operational capacity.

Al Qaeda was founded in the late 1980s by Osama bin Laden to provide logistical support to Muslim fighters against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, he established extensive training camps in Sudan for newly recruited *Jihadi* fighters, who then went to fight for Islam in their home countries or elsewhere. In the mid-1990s, because of international political pressure on the Sudanese government, the organization moved back to Afghanistan. Until 1996 or 1997, bin Laden is thought to have focused solely on supporting fighters in internal *jihad* conflicts in Muslim countries. In 1997, however, he is believed to have decided that internal *jihad* had failed, and decided to reorient the organization to undertake external *jihad* as well (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). Al Qaeda’s first act of external *jihad* were the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, 1998, followed about two years later by the U.S.S. *Cole* bombing in October, 2000, and a year after that by the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington DC.

It was not until 2003, though, following the American invasion of Iraq, that Al Qaeda formalized its strategy of sponsoring local affiliate organizations. Associated groups are thought to communicate with organizational leadership for tactical as well as for ideological guidance and for approval of their operations. The global leadership balances the organizations own internationally-oriented operations with hands-on support for local operations with affiliate groups (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010).
Al Qaeda’s leadership is centred in a Command Council with subsidiary Committees: Political, Religious, Military, Administrative and Financial, Security, and Media. The Amir, a position until recently held by Osama bin Laden, and his Deputy, convene the Council and make high level decisions, but the day-to-day running of the organization is done largely by the Council and its Committees. As this paper is focusing on Al Qaeda’s insurgent activities, the emphasis here will be on the Military Committee, which is divided into four Units: the General Section, which focuses on training and fighting within Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Special Operations Unit, which focuses on planning and executing external operations, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Sub-Unit, which oversees research into non-conventional warfare, and the Library and Research Section, the exact work of which is unknown (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010).

Osama bin Laden, the organization’s founder and leader, was assassinated by U.S. Special Forces in May 2011. His former deputy, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, has ostensibly replaced him although at the time of this writing it is too soon to tell what impact the assassination has had on the organization.

We will measure the organization’s effectiveness over the course of the decade between 2000 and 2010, the same time frame in which Al Aqsa was observed. Over the course of that time period, Al Qaeda was involved in carrying out 102 attacks. This is also the time frame in which Al Qaeda embraced its role as an international insurgent network and executed some of its most significant operations.

Particularly interesting about Al Qaeda’s frequency of attacks is the dramatic spike and fall from 2001 to 2005. Even after their base in Afghanistan was significantly destabilized with the invasion in November 2001, the organization not only survived but appears to have thrived. Most of the attacks that took place from 2001 to 2003 took place in countries with significant Muslim populations and compromised security situations, including Afghanistan, Tunisia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iraq, showing not only Al Qaeda’s resilience in Afghanistan but also their broad international presence even at that fairly early stage.

Figure 2.1: Al Qaeda frequency of attacks, 2000-2010
Harder to account for, however, is the sharp drop in frequency of attacks from 2003 to 2005, and the resurgence in 2008. The American invasion of Iraq in early 2004 attracted much of Al Qaeda’s attention; of the 15 attacks in 2004, nine were in Iraq and the others, except for the final attack of the year on the 29th of December in Saudi Arabia, were in Pakistan near the Afghan border. In 2005, the focus broadened once again, and each of the four attacks that year took place in a different country. The 2008-2009 spike marked a shift in tactics that began in late 2007, and involved a number of incidents focused on attacking local civilians in Algeria and Iraq, and destroying or stealing their property and livestock. It is unclear if these incidents were related to resource extraction, intimidation, both, or a third dynamic that is not apparent from the data on the attacks.

Al Qaeda’s choice of weapons represents a clear strategic focus on the use of explosives, both remote-detonated and suicide bombs. Given its explicit goal of creating fear among its enemies, it is not surprising that the organization has chosen such a high-profile and indiscriminate weapon. The wide range of sizes and types of explosives being used are also indicative of the diverse range of people involved in the organization’s operations. Some of the explosives used were quite large and sophisticated, a testament to the skills of its members. By the same token, many of the bombs were small and fairly crude, evidence of the organization’s growth and decentralised nature, as it recruited new members with a wide range of skill levels but is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient training and materials to all of them.

Figure 2.3: Weapons used in Al Qaeda attacks, 2000-2010

It is interesting to note in Figure 2.4 is that there is an approximately equal number of incidents in every casualty bracket. Al Qaeda does not seem to have particular strengths or weaknesses related to the magnitude of their attacks, despite the fact that larger attacks with more casualties are more difficult to execute.
Al Qaeda’s attacks were largely successful. 90.2% were not prevented during or immediately prior to the attack. The attacks coded as unsuccessful all came very close to succeeding but ultimately failed because of the quick actions of other people or the mistakes of the attackers. Six were assassination and kidnapping attempts in which the primary target very narrowly escaped, two others were bombings that missed their targets, and the final two were the hijacking of the 9/11 plane that crashed in a Pennsylvania field, and the December 2001 attempted shoe bombing of a transatlantic flight. All were logistically sound on the part of the organization planning them, and so barely count as failures as there was little the attackers could have done differently.

Al Qaeda attacked a fairly diverse cross-section of targets, with private citizens and property being the primary target, and military targets a not-too-distant second. Also interesting in Figure 2.5
is the fairly constant level of incidents targeting symbols of local and international economic and political power: airports and airlines, government, aid organizations, tourists, transportation, and religious institutions. The attacks listed here encompass a wide range of contexts as well, mostly in the Middle East but in Western Europe, Southeast Asia and West Africa, as well as others.

The average number of attackers was 4.08 people per incident, the mode was one attacker per incident, and the highest number of attackers in a single incident was 60. In this case, though, the data is unreliable as over half of the incidents are not coded for a specific number of attackers. A significant number of attacks (approximately 40%) were suicide attacks, which suggests that there was only a single attacker although there are a few cases of simultaneous double suicide attacks.

In terms of achieving its operational goals, Al Qaeda has largely failed. There is, if anything, a larger Western presence in Muslim countries than when the organization was founded, and there are fewer Islamist states. On the other hand, bin Laden’s stated goal of driving the United States into bankruptcy is fast coming true, although the extent to which Al Qaeda can take credit for it is questionable (CNN, 2001).

Finally, Al Qaeda does seem to have survived, despite the conquering and occupation of its base country and the surprise assassination of its leader. Warnings of a potential attack in New York City or Washington DC on the 10th anniversary of the September 11th, while ultimately misleading, dominated the American media in the days leading up to the event. Regardless of Al Qaeda’s actual operational capacity, the American government, press and public still regard them as a serious threat.

**MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS**

Ultimately, the juxtaposition of Al Aqsa, a local, mostly homogenous, chronically under-resourced and ultimately failed network with Al Qaeda, an international, diverse, wealthy and at least at the time of this writing, fairly successful network makes some interesting points about the nature of networked insurgencies. Both were young organizations, less than a decade old in their current form. Both used religious and cultural identities, foreign occupation-related grievance, and charismatic leadership to recruit new members and find non-monetary incentives for participation. Neither has explicitly achieved its goals, but Al Aqsa has admitted defeat and Al Qaeda has not. For that reason, as well as more adept use of weaponry, the ability to coordinate larger teams to attack more difficult targets in a more spectacular way and to cause more casualties, it would seem that Al Qaeda is the more effective of the two organizations.

Many of Al Qaeda’s local affiliates are very similar to Al Aqsa, and are benefiting from their associate with a diverse and sophisticated international network. Not every organization has to be an Al Qaeda to survive, but connecting to international networks to traffic in resources, ideologies, personnel and experience make modern insurgent organizations exponentially stronger and more effective. One of the cornerstones to Al Qaeda’s success has been avoidance of a traditional geographical base, and it is Al Qaeda’s international reach that has allowed it to carry out complex attacks, escape capture and dominate Western media outlets, and which has encouraged local organizations to align themselves with its rhetoric and resources.

**CONCLUSION**

Overall, through a discussion of the five dilemmas of insurgent organizing, I have demonstrated the ways that contextual factors drive insurgent organizational structure and strategic decision-making. As it faces a decision to overcome each dilemma, the insurgent organization is
influenced by a myriad of factors: its own short- and long-term goals and ideologies, the economic and social resources at its disposal, its enemy’s behaviour, and its geography, among others. The parallels drawn between the successes of Al Qaeda and the failures of Al Aqsa further highlight the importance of context, but they also emphasize the diversity of options that organizations face. None of the dilemmas is binary, and each represents a range of choices an organization can make. However, in a modern context of weak borders and easy international transportation, wide-reaching and hyperactive international media outlets, centralized counter-insurgency operations, and inexpensive, reliable means of communication, it would appear that the most effective insurgencies will resolve the dilemmas by evolving an internationally-networked and decentralized organization built of semi-autonomous units with shared goals, ideologies and tactics.

It is impossible to research insurgent organizational structure and growth without arriving at conclusions for counter-insurgency policy. Ultimately, especially given the political climate in the Middle East at the time of this writing, one cannot help but draw parallels between the violent politics of insurgency and the non-violent protests that have, in a matter of months, affected widespread change in ways that insurgencies were never able. All of the ingredients of insurgent participation have been present, in the strong social networks through which people join, the charismatic, young leaders rallying their peers, the deep-seated grievance, and not least of all the allure of economic, political and social opportunities under a new form of government.

My recommendations to counter-insurgency strategists in government in the United States and Europe are these: harness the energy of insurgency into non-violent political activism, and support and protect the people who choose that route. Development projects aimed at addressing grievances, and at creating economic and social opportunities for potential recruits, could fundamentally change the nature of an insurgent organization before it grows large enough to pose a threat.

In the framework of the five dilemmas, that would entail: encouraging non-violent action over violent secrecy; supporting the growth of movements working to bring about productive social change; recruiting new members and retaining veterans by strengthening social networks and encouraging the use of new means of communication; prioritizing constituencies over resources. In a non-violent and inclusive organization, success and longevity are not mutually exclusive – one success can be the foundation for the next, to construct an organization that is strong enough to resist defeat and flexible enough to recognize and exploit weaknesses in its enemy. The protests in Syria, in particular, have turned the accepted wisdom about peaceful protest on its head. There, government violence has, up to this point, not been met with violence from the protestors. The protesters in Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world have realized that just as the perpetration of violence does not define a revolutionary organization, neither does a dedication to peace make them weak.

What remains to be seen, however, is their flexibility to resist continued repression. Based on the findings in this paper, the key to their success will be their flexibility, and their connection to international networks. The internet has been lauded for its role in coordinating the revolutions thus far, and should be used now for sharing experiences across borders and revolutions. Recent reports from Syria have painted the protestors as wildly decentralized, but also very adept at using cell phones and the internet to communicate with each other and with sympathizers internationally (Shadid, 2011). Given the findings of this paper, complete decentralization and skilful use of communication may be the best strategies for the ongoing protest movement.
Just as Al Qaeda is a non-traditional insurgency, the product of a unique modern context, the collective movements of the Arab Spring are a non-traditional counter-insurgency, led and populated by people who are defeating the potential for insurgency by rejecting its use of violence, by choosing protest over violent resistance.

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An Overview of the History and Theory of Transformative Justice

Anthony J. Nocella II

This article is dedicated to the historical overview, political development, and philosophy of transformative justice, with a primary focus on the United States. Core principles of transformative justice are synthesized from various theorists, activists, and institutions. The article begins with critical criminology, a sub-field of criminology, in order to discuss peacemaking criminology, compare restorative and transformative approaches to justice, and draw connections to the field of conflict transformation. Transformative justice is recommended as the best pathway toward a new criminal justice system in the United States, and as an integral part of a wider social justice philosophy for peace.

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This article addresses the need for a new criminal justice system within the United States – a criminal justice system that is not grounded in a retributive structure based on punitive discipline such as the death penalty and life prison sentences. Similar to activists today, in the 1960s there was a radical social movement against the establishment. This rebellion included many students who, disgruntled with the government, law enforcement, and social norms, pursued careers as community organizers, politicians, lawyers, and professors who promoted a new system void of punitive punishment and repressive forms of social control and discipline. That system is transformative justice, and this article is dedicated to the historical overview, political development, and philosophy of transformative justice. The article first introduces critical criminology, a sub-field of criminology, in order to provide a context to discuss peacemaking criminology, compare restorative and transformative approaches to justice, and draw connections to the field of conflict transformation. Transformative justice is recommended as the best pathway toward a new criminal justice system in the US.

A Critical Criminological Perspective

Critical perspectives on social control, discipline, and punishment are studied within the field of critical criminology – a challenge to, as well as subfield of, criminology. Criminology’s roots go back to the mid-seventeenth century, most notably to Cesare Beccaria, an Italian jurist and author of *On Crimes and Punishments* (Beccaria 2009), and Jeremy Bentham, with assistance from his cousin, who designed the architectural blueprint of the panopticon, a powerful method of surveilling populations of people in prisons or in the public (Foucault, 1995), which was later adopted in the US. In 1958, George B. Vold, a conflict criminologist, wrote *Theoretical Criminology* (Bernard, Vold, Snipes, and Gerould 2009) to explain that crime is an outcome of political conflict between groups that have power versus those that do not and are disenfranchised. He argued that those that have power create laws to defend their interests, thereby maintaining and furthering their access to power. Conflict criminologists entrenched in the economic and social values of Karl Marx understood that conflict was a universal form of interaction among everyone; therefore, conflict is not to be avoided or denied, but rather embraced. They saw that relationships were fused by conflict, which could not be avoided.

Out of conflict criminology, with the aid of Vold, emerged critical criminology, which is now regarded as a subfield in the discipline (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006). Critical criminology is similar to and is sometimes wrongly interchanged with, radical criminology, which developed in the 1970s (Lynch, Michalowski, & Groves, 2006). Critical criminology began in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the same time as the prison reform movement and was founded on a Marxist critique of social order and power (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006). Critical criminology came also from the critical theory school of thought, entrenched in the neo-Marxist Frankfurt school. Critical criminology argues that crime is socially located and contingent on particular historical, cultural, and political norms. Further, critical criminology argues against punitive or retributive based justice systems and is for supportive restorative and transformative ones. Today, the field of critical criminology is highly diverse (Lynch, Michalowski, & Groves, 2006; DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006) with sub-fields such as feminist criminology (Renzetti, 2008), green criminology (Beirne & South, 2007), transformative justice (Morris, 2000), restorative justice (Zehr, 1995; Van Ness & Strong, 1997; Claassen & Claassen, 2008), anarchist criminology (Ferrell, 1997; Ferrell, 2002), and, most recently, queer criminology (Ferrell & Clinton, 1995). Critical criminology challenges domination and control of any sort, and therefore concentrates on examining issues of control and discipline (Fernandez, 2008). The first wave of critical criminology focused more on challenging and reacting than being proactive and establishing an alternative to lifelong incarceration.
As the field matured in the late-1970s, so did the time to transition from reactive critiques and criticisms of retributive and punishment-based criminal justice tactics and systems to more inclusionary and rehabilitative alternatives. As the 1980s came with President Reagan and left with George H. W. Bush, the war on drugs, with mass arrests and incarceration (aided by 1973’s New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws and the like), replaced rehabilitation (Hartnett, 2010). The 1980s in the US began with approximately five hundred thousand adults in prison, with the decade ending with more than a million incarcerated (“The punishing decade,” 2000, para. 1). In the 1990s, education was taken out of the prisons as it was too costly, and it was replaced with factory jobs which profited corporations (Burton-Rose & Wright, 1998; Davis, 2003). The substitution of jobs for education became a form of incarcerated slavery, was defended by the 13th Amendment, and reinforced the prison industrial complex with an overcrowded and unmanageable criminal justice system—too many cases dumped onto too few lawyers, judges, juries, and court rooms (Magnani & Wray, 2006). This soon made way for the development of the criminal industrial complex.

The 2000s were marked by George W. Bush as an era of Terrorism (Chomsky, 2002), characterized by war, violence, and economic and ecological crisis (Kahn, 2010). In 2002, under Bush, we saw that the prison population grew for the first time to more than two million in the US, overextending its bed limit (Davis, 2003). Consequently, the US’s criminal justice system has become grounded in a retributive punitive process that adopts everything from ankle bracelets, to surveilling convicts to the death penalty.

When prisons do not work, the power of surveillance (Foucault, 1995; Parenti, 2003) and stigmatizing labels are the favored methods of social control used to reinforce normalcy. If a group or individual threatens the dominate social order, they are commonly first surveilled, then questioned, and finally, if they do not align with the social norms as determined by the law, they are punished. The punishment can be as minimal as a fine to pay the government or as severe as the assassination of someone who challenges the government (i.e. Malcolm X). This process of promoting a dominate social order or norm is known in the fields of criminology and sociology as social control.

Peacemaking Criminology

Within the field of critical criminology, which argues against the currently dominant US criminal justice system, there are many subfields, one of which is peacemaking criminology, rooted in a faith-based and holistic approach to addressing crime and justice (Magnani & Wray, 2006). Peacemaking criminology “regards crime as the product of a social structure that puts some groups at a disadvantage, sets people against one another, and generates a desire for revenge” (Conklin, 2007, p. 5.3.2.1). Peacemaking criminology has a long history grounded in social movements and was influenced by such individuals as Martin L. King Jr., Fred Hampton, Mahatma Gandhi, Dorothy Day, Leo Tolstoy, Malcolm X, and many other peace activists throughout history from, environmentalists to anti-war activists. Even with this long history, it has not been adopted or even accepted by the larger field of criminology or criminal justice: “The problem with the peacemaking perspective’s lack of acceptance by criminal justice practitioners and the general public is the boundaries of peacemaking have not been staked out, and its many facets have not been clearly articulated and fastened by criminologists” (Fuller, 1998, p. 54). Furthermore, it has not been accepted because it challenges the dominant ideology within the field and US society on such basic values as capitalism, retributive justice, and institutionalization.
Peacemaking criminology challenges critical criminology for not relating to the field of peace and conflict studies, which stresses the relationship values such as collaboration, respect, forgiveness, accountability, and responsibility. Morris, Lederach, Zehr, Claassen, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), and others involved with the peace churches provide both social services and activism which, while protesting systems and institutions, they work within to reform at the same time.

This mode of action of working as a social service group and an activist group confuses many within the criminal justice system and activist community. Mennonites and Quakers, for example, often work with judges, lawyers, probation officers, politicians, law enforcement officers, and bureaucrats to create reform, while protesting the institutions that they are working in. Because many times the criminal justice system and activists are not sure where AFSC (1971) and MCC locate themselves on a particular policy, these peacemakers are forced to work among themselves as praxis-oriented people writing theory and conducting practice.

Restorative Justice

In the late 1970s, peacemaking criminology, an alternative to the US retributive criminal system, emerged from peace churches—Mennonites, Quakers, and Brethren. Peacemaking Criminology, co-founded by Hal Pepinsky, is rooted in the area of radical criminology. Pepinsky is the author of Peacemaking: Reflections of a Radical Criminologist (2006). The most well-known theory within the field of peacemaking criminology is Restorative Justice (RJ), co-founded by Howard Zehr (1995), a Mennonite who teaches at Eastern Mennonite University and worked for many years prior with the MCC around the world as a mediator, peace educator, and community organizer. Zehr working with others, developed RJ out of aboriginal and Native American practices in North America and New Zealand, which use community circles to bring victims and offenders together to heal, forgive, and take accountability. Ron Claassen, author of Restorative Justice - Fundamental Principles (1995), stresses the following points about RJ:

- RJ is grounded on the belief that punishment hurts relationships, the victim(s) and the offender(s).
- RJ views crime as wrong and after it occurs, there exist dangers and opportunities.
- RJ believes that crime should be addressed as soon as possible to make things right again.
- RJ includes the victim and their friends, family, etc. into the process of justice.
- RJ believes that, after everyone is safe, the event should be made a teachable moment and to have the offender learn new ways of acting in the community.
- RJ promotes volunteer involvement in the justice process and not coercive measures.
- RJ promotes a collaborative and cooperative process.
- RJ recognizes that not all offenders are willing to cooperate; therefore, there is a need for outside authority to decide for the offender in a coercive manner.
- RJ considers that, while prison should not be used as a result of the process, prison might need to be used in situations where the offender is a risk to him/herself and/or others until the time comes where s/he is willing to voluntarily meet with the victim(s).
- RJ stresses following up with those involved in the crime in order to know if all parties are holding to their agreements.
RJ stresses the role of religious institutions in aiding in justice among people and to promote moral and ethical values within communities. (Claassen 1996a)

Here, Claassen (1996b) explains the difference between restorative justice and retributive justice:

I think that our whole system could be based on the purpose of restoration of victim, community, offender, families, friends, restorative justice officials and any other individuals or relationships that might have been damaged by the crime. In a restorative system, the primary focus would be on the human violations and need for healing and restoration of individuals and relationships. Focusing on the violation of law would be a backup for those unwilling to be cooperative ... A Restorative Justice System would use cooperation as much as possible and coercion as little as possible. A goal of the use of coercion would always be to encourage the offender to decide voluntarily to become cooperative.

Therefore, restorative justice praises nonviolence, cooperation, and only uses coercion in rare situations to encourage the offender to participate in resolving the conflict. RJ was meant to be a peacemaking, cooperative, and voluntary alternative to retributive criminal justice systems void of punishment.

Transformative Justice

In the late 1990s, Ruth Morris, a Quaker in Canada, challenged restorative justice because it did not address issues of oppression, injustices, and social inequities within conflicts. Coker (2002) notes that the terms “transformative” and “restorative” justice have erroneously been seen interchangeable. However, Morris argues that while restorative justice challenges the retributive justice system and brings people together, it fails to recognize the socio-political and economic issues addressed by transformative justice (Coker, 2002).

For instance, if a 14-year old boy who is queer and from a poor neighborhood robbed a store when it was closed at 2:00 a.m., transformative justice would not only look at the crime of burglary, but why the boy did it. Was the boy kicked out of his home by a father who was homophobic? Did the boy need money for food, clothes, and shelter? While restorative justice only addresses the specific conflict between the victim and offender, transformative justice strives to use the conflict as an opportunity to address larger socio-political injustices.

Further, “restorative justice processes threaten to create a deeply privatized criminal justice process” (Coker, 2002, p. 129) by constructing a victim vs. offender relationship which makes absent the issues of social oppression. It is for this reason that many prison abolitionists and feminists working with domestic violence issues critique restorative justice for its limitation in addressing oppression (Coker, 2002). Because society oppresses those who are poor and queer, there are (at least) two victims; therefore, the conflict must be addressed using larger community-based approaches rather than interpersonal mediation.

Restorative justice stresses that the system is flawed, overworked, and retributive, but does not address why it exists, how it is racist, sexist, abelist, and classist, whom it benefits, and how it was developed. Transformative justice, on the other hand, is explicitly opposed to helping someone get arrested, imprisoned, fired from their job, repressed, or oppressed. It is about looking for the good
within others, while also being aware of complex systems of domination. If the world is to transform, we need everyone to transform and everyone to be voluntarily involved in critical dialogue together.

Theories of transformative justice have their roots in transforming power, coined by the internationally-respected Alternative to Violence Project (AVP), a Quaker based organization, established in Green Haven Prison, New York, a project that is now in hundreds of prisons in the US, more than twenty different countries, and on four continents (AVP/USA, 2005). AVP is dedicated to providing a specialized nonviolence group-building, community building, and conflict transformation workshop oriented for violent communities, regularly in adult male and female prisons. Transforming power is the core philosophy of AVP. Transforming power:

Is the force in the universe which can burn away the crud. And it always begins within. I cannot burn away crud that hides your jewel. What I can do is allow Transforming Power to do its work within me, to burn away the layers of fear and prejudice and pain which hide my shining core, and then let my light shine forth as an invitation for you to do the same.

When I can free my soul of the layers of crud which over it (which I must continually do, day after day – for the business of living in this world, has a tendency to lay down new layers by the hour), and I let the light shine forth, that light stretches out to those around me and reaches for its mirror in their soul: reaches – and with that reaching the jewel in the soul of the other person answers, through all the crud, and reaches back.

Being connected is the true state of being human. Transforming power is that force in the universe which shows us how to do that. (AVP/USA, 2005, p. c-5). Further, transforming power is about changing a negative or violent situation into a positive and peaceful one. It is about looking for the good within a conflict and searching for peace within oneself and others; “Every person has an inner wisdom that knows what’s right and wants to do what’s right, and it can be called forth, as Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, ‘There are laws of harmony at work in the world’” (AVP/USA, 2005, p. c-6).

AVP has created “four basic principles” (AVP/USA, 2005, p. c-6):

1. Everyone has an inward goodness. Realize that people’s actions and words are sometimes mistaken, wrong or violent. People themselves are good. In your understanding, separate the person from the behavior. There is goodness within. Look for it. Find it. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and other religions all teach this.

2. We can start out realizing a violent reaction is only one way of responding in a conflict. Somewhere in every conflict situation there is the possibility for a nonviolent solution. [...] 

3. To change situations in positive ways, start with ourselves, our attitudes, beliefs, manners of speaking, tone of voice and behavior. [...] 

4. Non-violent conflict resolution is a skill. [...] There can be a win/win outcome – no one is the loser.
After being an AVP facilitator for seven years at Auburn prison in New York, I decided to begin working with youth in secure detention facilities. With the support of AVP, Syracuse Quaker Meeting, and the men at Auburn prison, I began to do AVP workshops at Hillbrook Youth Detention Facility in 2007. In 2009, at Hillbrook, I, with a few other adults and a group of kids in Hillbrook, created an organization the kids named “Save the Kids.” Save the Kids, an organization dedicated to fostering a national movement to keep kids away from violence and out of incarceration, is grounded in transformative justice. Save the Kids works with children who are targeted by the juvenile justice system and who are incarcerated. Save the Kids works with all youth who are targeted and oppressed including, but not limited to, kids who are LGBTQ, of color, with disabilities, immigrants, and poor. Save the Kids performs its goal by providing education and mentoring programs that address oppression, domination, social justice, healing, accountability, forgiveness, and peacebuilding. Save the Kids’ Ten Point Principles are:

1. We believe that all youth need support, love, and skills in order to achieve their goals.
2. We believe that all youth are amazing and wonderful no matter their actions they have committed.
3. We make a clear distinction between actions and kids; actions can be bad, but not kids.
4. We are committed to helping youth because they are our future, and if we do not help them, we will not have one.
5. We believe in respecting all no matter their gender, ability, race, economic status, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, health, age, or nationality.
6. We hope one day all youth will be placed in community-based programs rather than incarcerated or institutionalized.
7. As a transformative justice based organization, we strive to promote alternatives to incarceration and methods of transformation of incarceration.
8. We believe in peace and nonviolence in resolving and transforming all conflicts.
9. We believe in not labeling, but rather being inclusive in all of our activities.
10. We promote that everyone in the community should work together in making a peaceful world and not to exclude anyone. STK will work with everyone and anyone in order to achieve that goal.

Only two years old, Save the Kids is now a leading international organization promoting transformative justice as its foundational philosophy.

Generation Five, a transformative justice based organization located in Oakland, California, is dedicated to ending child sexual abuse. Generation Five believes that transformative justice has three core beliefs; they include:

1. Individual justice and collective liberation are equally important, mutually supportive, and fundamentally intertwined—the achievement of one is impossible without the achievement of the other.

2. The conditions that allow violence to occur must be transformed in order to achieve justice in individual instances of violence. Therefore, Transformative Justice is a both a liberating politic and an approach for securing justice.
3. State and systemic responses to violence, including the criminal legal system and child welfare agencies, not only fail to advance individual and collective justice but also condone and perpetuate cycles of violence. (Generation Five 2007)

We can identify common principles among organizations such as AVP, Save the Kids, and Generation Five to emphasize what may be thought of as the core philosophy of transformative justice (TJ):

- TJ is against violence and punishment, institutionalization and imprisonment.
- Crime is a form of community-based conflict, where society and the government are also involved as possible offenders.
- TJ brings issues of identity back into the realm of justice by addressing socio-political injustices toward Women, People of Color, GLBT, Poor, Immigrants, People with Disabilities, and other marginalized groups.
- TJ believes in the value of mediation, negotiation, and community circles to transform conflicts.

When fighting along with the oppressed, social justice activists will often identify the oppressor as the enemy. Transformative justice, while addressing oppression and the role that groups, institutions, and agencies have in creating and maintaining oppression, does not view anyone as an enemy, but rather argues that everyone needs to be involved in a voluntary safe constructive critical dialogue where people take accountability, responsibility, and the initiative to heal. It means that law enforcement, judges, lawyers, prisoners, community members, teachers, politicians, spiritual leaders, and activists, among others, come together.

Conflict Transformation

In resolving interpersonal or group conflicts, conflict transformation, similar to transformative justice, addresses issues of inequities, injustices, oppression, and domination. Conflict transformation, unlike conflict resolution, requires larger socio-political concerns to be addressed, while conflict resolution is only about addressing the specific incident. John Paul Lederach, the founder of conflict transformation, began using the term after his work with his Latin colleagues in Central America. In *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (2003, p. 3), Lederach writes:

I soon found, though, that my Latin colleagues had questions, even suspicions, about what was meant by such concepts ["conflict resolution" and "conflict management"]. For them, resolution carried with it a danger of co-optation, an attempt to get rid of the conflict when people were raising important and legitimate issues. It was not clear that resolution left room for advocacy. In their experience, quick solutions to deep social-political problems usually meant lots of good words but no real change. ‘Conflicts happen for a reason,’ they would say. ‘Is this resolution idea just another way to cover up the changes that are really needed?’

Conflict transformation is about addressing all types of conflicts including interpersonal conflicts which influence socio-political and economic change, while also bringing socio-political and economic change to the dialogue of the specific interpersonal conflict. Conflict transformation is not meant only for social movement interventions or international disputes, but for all conflicts.
In recent years, conflict management and resolution, which are prominent in the liberal arts, have found homes in law schools and business administration departments. Peace and conflict studies, a growing academic field, has in its forty years or so of existence become institutionalized and lacks professors in given departments with direct connections to peace activism. With peace and conflict studies’ more recent departure from activism in the last decade or two, conflict resolution and management has been, as Lederach’s colleagues have noted, co-opted by academics with a lack of connection to the community. Conflict resolution has been a quick method of resolving a dispute with a legal contract; without going to the court system, mediators and arbitrators are the new peacemakers. In the business world, conflict resolution and management have been co-opted as a tool to “deal with others” rather than to develop communication, group-building, and team building skills or to foster accountability, responsibility, forgiveness, and healing.

The goal of the business sector in adopting conflict management and resolution is to have a stable workplace within the professional environment. A stable environment is important within professional settings because it allows everyone to be efficient and effective in meeting the goal of the agency. Therefore, conflict management is not about caring and respecting those with whom you work, but rather having a method to tolerate, deal with, and, most importantly, manage your work relations and environment so you can do your job and make money for corporations.

Conflict resolution is commonly practiced and adopted in professional settings such as nonprofits, businesses, and the government because it addresses the individuals involved in the conflict as parties and not people. Conflict resolution, interchangeable with dispute resolution, has been adopted by the field of law, where contracts and agreements are employed, hence the reason why conflict resolution is result-based (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). Conflict resolution has begun to look at conflict not at as an opportunity, but as a problem to solve. Conflict management, on the other hand, is more concerned with process than with figuring out how to come to a contract agreement or resolution. Many scholars within the fields of conflict management and conflict resolution are concerned with culture, identity politics, and issues of social and political power (Avruch, 1998; Avruch, Black, and Scimecca, 1998; Castro and Nielsen, 2003) when analyzing a conflict. The largest difference that conflict resolution and conflict management have with conflict transformation is that conflict transformation is rooted in radical social movements and activism dedicated to social justice. This includes activism against prisons, the death penalty, and other retributive and punitive methods.

Transformation is larger than two individuals, stressing that all are connected in a complex relationship of oppressors and oppressed, only able to become free if we address and challenge all systems of domination and violations toward the individual. Transformation is not about destroying and building anew and a win-lose resolution such as a revolution (Skocpol, 1995; Tilly, 1978), but demands everyone in the world, systems, and structures to change as well.

It is with Morris (2000), Lederach (1995), and hooks (1994) that my work and interests in the fields of justice, peace and conflict studies, and education all come together under the umbrella of transformation. Within criminology, Morris (2000) promotes transformative justice; within peace and conflict studies, Lederach (1995) promotes conflict transformation; and within education, hooks (1994) fosters transformative pedagogy – together they inform and are interdependent on one another so social transformation can be possible. Lederach (1995, p. 19) writes:

I have found it useful to step back and look at the big picture related to Freire’s pedagogical framework. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) he uses literacy, learning to read and writing, which seems to be a uniquely individual and personal
agenda, as a tool for exploring and promoting social change. He [Freire] refers to this as conscientization, awareness of self in context, a concept that simultaneously promotes personal and social transformation.

Conclusion

Transformation, unlike resolution, restoration, management, reform, or revolution addresses very distinctive issues that these other approaches to conflict and justice do not. Transformative justice challenges all aspects of authoritarianism, domination, and control within society today. For this reason, transformative justice is more than an alternative to a criminal justice system, but a social justice philosophy for peace with tools to achieve such goals. Further, it is a non-dogmatic, process-based philosophy that allows for creative approaches in transforming conflict and addressing issues of brutality, racism, assault, abuse, accountability, responsibility, loss and, most importantly, healing.

References


1000 Peace Cranes: Exploring Children’s Meanings of Peace

Elizabeth Collardey

This article reports preliminary findings of an exploratory project of a peace education program piloted over the course of three months to a group of children ages 7-14 at a Boys & Girls Club in a Midwest city. Participating in a class structured in a curriculum of peace education, the group of children met weekly to discuss peace topics and to work together towards the goal of folding and putting on public display 1000 origami peace cranes. Profound meanings of peace emerged from children’s narratives that immediately involved experiences of food insecurity in their families.

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“Peace is when I stop thinking ‘bout food and start thinkin ‘bout livin.” Ten year old Timmie eloquently defined what peace meant for himself after participating in a peace education class in a Midwest city. At the end of a three month program sponsored by the Boys & Girls Club of America, a group of ten children, ages 8-12 years old, discovered their meanings and experiences of peace extended far beyond themselves to include unimaginable numbers of children worldwide.

Although the literature on what is known regarding children’s conceptions of peace and peacemaking is growing, a glaring omission is the absence of studies in the United States. Perhaps it is time to change this for the sake of the 75-90% (Gabarino, Dubrow, Kostelny, & Pardo, 1992; Kuther & Wallace, 2003; Samaan, 2000; Schwartz & Gorman, 2003) of children in America’s inner cities who, because of the exposure or victimization to community violence, live at-risk for various psychological and social problems not to mention academic problems and emotional consequences. This article reports on the 1000 Peace Cranes project¹ and the meanings children discovered about peace.

Literature Review

Peace, stability, and sustainability are at the forefront of the international development agenda, as set forth in the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (Ishaq, 2006, p. S27). Prevailing theories of peace are mostly Western, as the academic discipline of peace research/studies itself (Udayakumar, 1998, p.14). For many people, peace still exclusively means nuclear peace and is a security concern rather than a matter of bare existence. Johan Galtung’s theory of peace as the absence of violence has been commonly referred to in classical peace studies (Barnett, 2008). In this sense, peace has not been an issue of justice but more an interest in maintaining dominant Western status quo agendas. Thus, our conception of peace is shaped by our worldview—our view of reality, human nature, purpose of life and human relationships. If this is true for adults, what are children’s worldviews of peace?

Social movements emerging in the last decade attempt to demonstrate that children who have fewer ideas about peace than they do about war are the long-term consequence of a society that legitimizes violence (www.acei.org; www.atriumsoc.org). What about the United States? Peace educator and activist Colman McCarthy’s premise is that the United States is so violent because we are peace “illiterate” (www.articles.baltimoresun.com). For example, scholars such as Jones (2007) document how the rest of the world is engaging in critical and complex efforts to use conflict resolution education (CRE) to strengthen communities. Throughout global regions reported in the literature of peace studies, the attention to teacher preparation as a support for effective CRE initiatives is far more advanced than in the United States.

Yet, peace education as a paradigm is evolving and has yet to become established as a unified discipline (Danesh, 2006). A multitude of curricula of peace education exists with different foci. For example, peace education is commonly referred to as having an ultimate goal of the prevention or elimination of [i.e., absence] violence through various approaches (Daniel, Doudin, & Pons, 2006). Danesh (2006) stated that peace education is an “elusive concept” (p. 55). Grounded on the insights emerging from peace education research and lessons learned from five years of implementation of the Education for Peace (EFP) programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Danesh outlined four prerequisite conditions for effective peace education. These main components of

¹Research on this project received IRB approval from Clarke College, Dubuque, IA, where the principal investigator served as a full-time faculty member of social work.
peace education are: a unity-based worldview (versus conflict-based worldview), culture of healing (i.e., culture of reconciliation or forgiveness), culture of peace, and peace-oriented curriculum. The last prerequisite is perhaps the most challenging of all to achieve. This requires that peace education becomes the framework for all children’s educational activities. The literature noted by Danesh shows that peace is currently more an add-on than a foundation for children’s education.

Children and peace studies are found in the literature surfacing in the themes: creating peace (i.e., healing) through art media (McCarthy et al., 2005; Ishaq, 2006; Apprey & Howell, 2003; Anderson, 2000); treatment of children affected by war, particularly child soldiers (Cohn, 1999); parents as peace educators (Almon, 2008; Myers-Walls, Myers-Bowman, & Pelo, 1993; Vietze & Hildebrandt, 2009); and interventions/peace building between historically hostile and violent cultural/national groups (Gassin, Enright, & Knutson, 2005; Darvin, 2009). Peace education specifically in U.S. public schools can be identified under several sub-themes including: multicultural education (Andrea & Daniels, 1996; Kenan, 2005; Porter & Lorimer, 2005; Rennebohm-Franz, 1996), conflict resolution (Andrea & Daniels, 1996; Ashton, 2007; Boyes-Watson, 2005; Crawford, 2005; Garrard & Lipsey, 2007; Jones, 2007; Lane-Garon, 2000), anti-bullying and violence prevention (Hamburg & Hamburg, 2004; Johnson & Johnson, 2005; Greene, 2006; Morris, Taylor, & Wilson, 2000; Slee & Mohyla, 2007; www.atriumsoc.org; www.nationalpeaceacademy.us), community engagement through service learning (Porter & Lorimer, 2005), nonviolence and justice (Lane, 2000), and human rights education (Human Rights for Children Committee, 1993; Kopeliovich & Kuriansky, 2009; Langley, 1997; McGivern, 1975).

The existing literature on children and peace studies serves as a backdrop for this study which explored children’s experiences in a peace education program grounded in a curriculum focusing on strengthening children’s skills of cooperation, collaboration, group problem solving, and peaceful conflict resolution. One glaring limitation of the previous studies is the exclusion of low-income, limited educational background, and people of color. These studies open a dialogue pointing to the necessity of how society itself must become peaceful. Peace education should move beyond talking about war and peace to teaching peace by example. What one also notes is how educational tools for parents are similar to educational curricular materials encouraged by K-12 teachers. Out of all these studies comes the call for programs to move beyond just teaching peace to transforming spaces into peaceful learning environments where children feel safe and supported in their efforts to work cooperatively and resolve conflicts harmoniously.

Scholarship from a global lens has documented how children are drawn into lives as soldiers and terrorism as a result of their inability to obtain security, food, power, prestige, education, and positive life opportunities through civilian means. For these researchers, peace education is an essential element in a holistic approach to the reintegration of former child soldiers and to the prevention of youth’s engagement in violence and terrorism. Securing basic necessities for children in war parallels what children in economically disadvantaged urban areas experience, although the threat of violence does not bear clear political lines of demarcation.

Recent peace agreements in Sierra Leone (1999), Burundi (2000), and Liberia (2003) have drawn the world’s attention to the necessity and benefit of including explicit child rights provisions during and after peacemaking processes. Ilene Cohn (1999) provided an overview of war’s impact on children, a discussion of why peacemakers have tended to overlook children’s concerns, and an assessment of opportunities afforded by peace processes to improve child protection. Cohn’s scholarship sheds light on the shameful failure of child rights advocacy and program agencies to
assess the impact of interventions on behalf of war-affected children. We still know very little about the meaning of peace in children’s lives, locally or globally, past, present, or future.

**Program Description**

The primary goal of this creative, earth-friendly, and peace-teaching after-school program for children was to support, enhance, and strengthen peace making in local communities. Designed as a weekly class held during an entire academic year, children learned how to fold origami peace cranes, learned about human and environmental interdependence, and deepened their own evolving understanding about peace. Grounded in the principles of peace making, the program’s curriculum incorporated semi-structured discussions about children’s experiences of peace, experiential group-building activities, and the actual task of folding origami peace cranes. The culmination of the peace crane project was the creation of 1000 peace cranes which the participants assembled into an object of their design and placed on display to be shared publicly.

The specific objectives of this project, which were assessed to demonstrate the project’s effectiveness, were for participants to:

1. define what peace means for one’s self;
2. begin to describe diverse possibilities for what peace could look like for the individual, family unit, organizations (e.g., schools) community, state, nation, and world;
3. begin to identify what is necessary for one’s individual experience of peace;
4. begin to recognize the challenges to the presence and sustenance of peace as a consequence of diversity;
5. deepen sensitivity to the interdependence of human life and the physical environment;
6. increase acceptance of personal growth and change both as individuals and as members of a larger community; and
7. strengthen skills of collaboration in a group that shares a common goal.

**Research Design**

This study incorporated both exploratory and descriptive goals that intended to provide a richly detailed understanding of children’s meanings of peace. With a primary purpose of evaluating a peace education program (did it work?), the research relied on both formative (how was the program implemented, who was involved) and summative evaluation methods (how well did the program fulfill its objectives). An additional basic research question asked: What does peace mean to children and how do those definitions change after participating in a peace education program?

The research design included both quantitative and qualitative data gathering and analyses. There were two specific evaluation processes or measurements. Evaluation process #1 relied on qualitative observations of the affective dimensions of peace; data were gathered from pre-program and post-program interviews using open-ended questions and analyzed using grounded theory content analysis. Evaluation process #2 was a quantitative evaluation of group cohesion among the children participants using a pre-test and post-test Likert scale. The researcher also relied on anecdotal records of the program staff as well as serving as a participant observer in order to collect data and record field notes on the program’s implementation.
Research Sample

The sample in this study was purposively selected because of the population’s relevance to the research topic. Purposive sampling is a common sampling method in exploratory research or in field research (Babbie, 1998). Because recruitment of participants for the program evaluation paralleled recruitment of children for the peace education program, selection of child participants relied on the expert judgment of the staff of the Boys & Girls Club who identified children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds who might potentially benefit from participating in a peace education program.

Initially, seventeen children between the ages of 7-14 years old registered for the year-long program on a first come, first serve basis. Part of the program’s curriculum included establishing group norms and group-building processes from the very beginning. After the initial first few weeks, seven children withdrew from the program for a variety of reasons including lack of interest in the topic and lack of family support for regular, consistent participation. The final core group of ten children were between the ages of 7-14 years old; two were male (both white); eight were females (3 African-American, 1 Hispanic American, and 4 white); all children were living at or below the region’s poverty line established by their enrollment in the School Lunch/Breakfast program.

Data Collection and Analyses

Field notes recorded the children’s own words. Qualitative data were analyzed using grounded theory methods of content analyses. Open, axial, and selective coding were used to identify patterns and themes and relationships among themes in the children’s responses to open-ended questions (Creswell, 1998). Additionally, the researcher gave special emphasis on identifying themes focusing on changes in pre- and post-program meanings of key concepts.

Likert-scale items on both the pre- and post-program questionnaire were analyzed to detect changes in participants’ acceptance, and group collaboration skills. Additionally, the seven specific program objectives were operationalized into Likert-scale items for summative evaluation purposes. Because of the small sample size (N=10), Wilcoxon test of rank-ordered means was used to test for statistical significance in changes in the subjects’ quantitative pre- and post-test responses. The Wilcoxon test for paired samples is the non-parametric equivalent of the paired samples t-test. It was selected because the sample data were not normally distributed, and they could not be transformed to a normal distribution by means of a logarithmic transformation. SPSSx, version 17.0, (PASW) was used to perform all statistical analyses.

Qualitative Findings

Due to the early termination of the program, in-depth post-program interviews were not conducted. The discussion section addresses program implementation issues with the early termination of the program and the implications for research. Table One displays the program outcomes aligned with the specific open-ended interview questions. Typical responses from participants are given with the open coding of the data collected during pre-program interviews.
Table 1. Pre-Program Qualitative Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Question</th>
<th>Typical Pre-Program Responses from Participants</th>
<th>Open-Coding Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Outcomes #1 and #2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does peace mean?</td>
<td>“food, clothing, house, safety,” “food in the fridge,” “talking to each other at home,” “mom isn’t getting hurt,” “no wars;”</td>
<td>Presence of: good, open, positive communication; social connections; basic necessities; support for school success. Absence of: food insecurity, violence in the home, and violence in larger environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you feel, think, or do when you are at peace?</td>
<td>“I’m not hitting my [older] brother,” “I’m not getting in trouble;”</td>
<td>Ability to control one’s anger and/or behavior; ability to make good decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do families feel, think, or do when they are at peace?</td>
<td>“Family talked to me,” “no arguing,” “no yelling at me”</td>
<td>Presence of: Increased communication patterns. Absence of: what is “normal” (arguing, yelling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is life like when schools have peace?</td>
<td>“No fighting,” “no detention,” “no parent meetings”</td>
<td>Absence of: what is “normal” (fighting, detention, parent meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is life like in your neighborhood (the area where you live) when there is peace?</td>
<td>“No smoking,” “no bottles or cans everywhere,” “no cop cars,” “no sirens at night”</td>
<td>Absence of: what is “normal” (smoking, drinking, police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is life like in our country when there is peace?</td>
<td>“No wars and no bad news on tv”</td>
<td>Absence of: what is “normal” (presented by media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you need to have, to feel, or to do for you to feel at peace?</td>
<td>“food so I’m not hungry all the time,” “my mommy to get better, she’s sick a lot,” “help with my homework, my parents don’t know how to help me,” “quiet time, no tv that is so loud,” “have friends come over after school, parents don’t want no one over.”</td>
<td>Basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety. School support. Connections with others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Outcomes #3 and #4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens when people who are different from each other live, work, or go to school</td>
<td>“there’s arguing and fighting,” “no one talks to each other,” “people don’t get along,” “I think we’re afraid.”</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What are some ways that people who are different can live and work in peace together?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Outcome #5</th>
<th>Describe the physical environment or spaces that you live in.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“crowded cuz we have others living with us,” “hot in summer, cold I winter,” “no hot water, sometimes we boil water to drink,” no curtains, no locks on doors or windows,” “bugs and animals running inside and outside the building,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small spaces; extreme temperatures; lack of basic utilities; lack of privacy or protection; pest/animal infestation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are those things that you need for living that come from your environment?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you do to protect your environment from being hurt or destroyed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“We recycle paper at school,” “paper and plastic bags.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recycling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pre-program themes could be understood in terms of polarized experiences: the presence of certain attributes and the opposite absence of certain attributes. Children described peace as the presence of: good, open, positive communication; social connections; basic necessities and support for school success. In opposition to these, children described peace as the absence of: food insecurity; violence in the home; and violence in the larger environment. In defining peaceful actions, children situated peace within their ability to: control one’s own anger and/or behavior; and to make good decisions.

To gather information about what peace looked like in children’s environments or contexts, children were asked to describe what peace looked like for the individual, family unit, organizations (e.g., schools) community, state, and nation. In response to what do families feel, think, or do when they are at peace, children reported increased communication patterns and a lack of “what is normal” (no arguing, no yelling at me). In response to what is life like when schools have peace, children responded again with describing a lack of what is “normal” (no fighting, no detention, no parent meetings). In other words, the children’s normal environment at school involved fighting, detention, and multiple parent meetings.

In response to what is life like in your neighborhood (the area where you live) when there is peace, again, children described the absence of “what is normal” (no smoking, no booze bottles and cans everywhere, and no cop cars, no sirens at night). Finally, in response to what is life like in our country when there is peace, children responded referencing what they saw on the media: “no wars and no bad news on tv.”
For the program objective aiming to help children identify what is necessary for one’s individual experience of peace, children identified the following themes during pre-program interviews: basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety; school support; and connections with others.

For the program outcome of participants recognizing the challenges to the presence and sustenance of peace as a consequence of diversity, children’s pre-program responses fell under a theme of conflict where the behaviors of arguing, fighting, or lack of communication were predominant responses. The open-ended questions intended to elicit children’s understanding of the effects of diversity were poorly written for the children’s developmental stages and as a result, yielded vague responses that could not be interpreted. This is addressed as a research note in a future article.

For the program outcome of participants deepening sensitivity to the interdependence of human life and the physical environment, children’s pre-program responses described the spaces in which they and their families’ lived. Common characteristics of those spaces included: small spaces; extreme temperatures; lack of basic utilities; lack of privacy or protection; and pest or animal infestation.

In describing those things that are needed that come from a person’s living space, children’s pre-program responses identified basic necessities: food (refrigerator), clothing, shelter (out of the cold), safety (safe place from the street), water, and family love. To protect the environment from being hurt or destroyed, children readily identified recycling efforts at their schools. Additionally, children’s families re-used plastic grocery bags.

Personal circumstances compelled the researcher to end the evaluation prematurely in anticipation of a move. Because of the early termination of the program, in-depth post-program interviews could not be completed. Instead, a final meeting with the children was held and a focus group was used to find out children’s perceptions of peace upon completion of the peace education program. With the cooperation of agency staff, the researcher acquired informed consent from the parents for their children’s participation in the focus group held at the final meeting. Due to time constraints, the focus group could not engage in in-depth discussions and so, in addition to the original pre-program questions using a Likert scale for responses, only three open-ended questions were asked to find out the children’s perceptions and experiences of the peace class. Those questions were: What did you really like about the 1000 Peace Cranes Program? And why?; What have you learned about peace? or Peace is _______?; and What changes would you make to the 1000 Peace Cranes Program to make it better? Table Two presents the findings from the focus group.

The children’s responses identifying what they liked best about the class reflected their experience of group bonding and cohesion. In some ways, this theme overlaps with their responses about proposed changes to improve the peace class. The children responded with sharing their enjoyable experiences with others, a theme that parallels their pre-program response themes of connections with others as an aspect of peace. Children’s responses to the question of what is peace included the following themes: food for everyone in world; lack of violence in home, school, community, & world, and empowerment.
Table 2. Responses from Final Focus Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions for Final Focus Group</th>
<th>Focus Group Question</th>
<th>Typical Participant’s Responses (Data)</th>
<th>Open-Coding Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What did you really like about the 1000 Peace Cranes Program? And why?</td>
<td>“folded 1000 cranes together!” “teaching each other how to fold cranes,” “circle games”</td>
<td>Group Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What have you learned about peace? Peace is ______?</td>
<td>“everyone has food,” “No one is hungry—ever,” “no wars,” “people in different countries get along,” “I like going to school,” “I can go play outside at night,” “I can do something different than arguing or fighting,” “teaching others what I know”</td>
<td>Food for everyone in the world. Lack of violence in home, school, community, and world. Connections to others in the world. Empowerment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What changes would you make to the 1000 Peace Cranes Program to make it better?</td>
<td>“play more games,” “have more kids join,” “nothing”</td>
<td>Sharing the fun experiences with others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quantitative Findings

Quantitative data gathered and analyzed for program objectives #6 and #7 were analyzed to measure change in participants’ acceptance of personal growth and change both as individuals and as members of a larger community. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that children’s ratings of self-acceptance of personal growth and change were higher at the end of the program (Mdn=4.0) than at the beginning (Mdn=3.0), Z=2.27, p<.05, r=.72. A separate Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that children’s perceptions of how others people accepted their personal growth and change were higher at the end of the program (Mdn=5.0) than at the beginning (Mdn=4.0), Z=2.57, p<.05, r=.81. The last analysis conducted for program objective #7 revealed that children’s self-ratings of collaboration skills in a group were higher at the end of the program (Mdn=4.0) than at the beginning (Mdn=3.0), Z=2.33, p<.05, r=.74.

Discussion

A change in the staff of the peace crane class necessitated an unplanned early termination of the program. As a result, issues affecting the implementation of the research project surfaced. The immediate positive effect was, upon learning about the early termination, the children’s motivation to complete the folding of 1000 origami peace cranes was clearly increased. The researcher learned that the children completed their project one month later and displayed their 1000 origami peace cranes strung on an artificial tree in the public library which was adjacent to the agency. This enabled the children to share with their family and friends the outcome of their participation in the program.
Because the program ended during the nineteenth week of the 26 week curriculum, the findings of the program evaluation were incomplete. There were no post-program interviews with the children, no follow-up interviews with parents nor school data gathered to provide collateral data on the children’s changes. Despite the interruption of the original research design, meaningful data were gathered and yielded rich findings into the meanings of children’s experiences of peace.

Based on this study’s findings, one can begin to imagine children’s understandings of peace. The children in this study extended definitions of peace beyond the prevailing absence of violence as identified previously in the literature. Moving away from a conflict-based understanding of peace, the children in this study spoke of peace in terms of the presence of positive communication among family, social connections, basic necessities, and support for school success. They articulated an ability to control one’s own anger and/or behavior as well as good decision-making as essential elements in their definitions of peaceful actions. These themes were reiterated in the final focus group when children were asked at the end of the peace class to, once again, define what peace meant to them. Food security and basic necessities, connections to others in the world, and empowerment emerge as profound qualities of children’s definitions and experiences of peace along with the all-too-familiar absence of violence.

On a different note, informed consent issues emerged early in the evaluation where twenty percent of the children demonstrated trust issues with the researcher who was a stranger. In general, the children’s parents easily provided parental informed consent because of the established trusting relationship with the agency. It is understandable that some of the children would have difficulty in being interviewed privately with an adult stranger. As a result, the researcher invited agency staff to accompany children who were mistrustful of the research interview process. The staff were graciously present during the pre-program interviews with children who felt unsure about being interviewed by a stranger. Although this created a cost of time in the scheduling of research activities, the flexibility of the agency staff facilitated full participation of the child participants.

The children’s anxiety about being interviewed by a stranger raises an important issue concerning children as research participants. Social work, whose mission has historically led the way in minimizing “risk” with vulnerable populations in both research and practice, has an opportunity to inform empirical methods about how to treat children as subjects. This is a new topic that was initially explored in 2001 with Hall, Stevens, and Pletsch’s study of family focused qualitative interviewing. This study demonstrated that exploring and testing new methods of gaining child assent as well as the treatment of child subjects in research is necessary if the profession is to advance best practices of children’s programs. Hall, Stevens, and Pletsch found that interviewing families as whole units led to greater child participation in research as well as strengthened the protection of children as human subjects.

The two research issues emerging from this study of gaining informed consent and alleviating anxiety of children as research participants became a focus of a study that replicated the peace education program in a different region (Collardey, 2011, under review). This article analyzes the process of acquiring informed consent from poor parents of children ages 7-13. Weaving the experiences of gaining informed consent from parents of children living in poverty with the current literature on conducting research with children, Collardey highlights the unavoidable environmental conditions that impinge even more immediately in these times of economic crisis on the lives of people living in persistent poverty. Gaining an invitation into the lives of the most vulnerable living in poverty becomes a privilege that must be earned.
Implications for social work practice

Children’s perspectives have become an important focus for research in general (Christensen & James, 2000; Lewis & Lindsay, 2000; McCallum, Hargreaves, & Gipps, 2000). Recent research acknowledges children as “unrivaled experts in their own fields” (Cooper, 1993) who are active and knowledgeable participants with rights. This program evaluation shed a spotlight on the meanings of peace from the perspective of the experts—the children. The peace education class as well as the children’s meanings of peace hold important implications for social work practice.

The peace education class demonstrated that group work with disadvantaged children supports stronger bonds among the group, an increase in the relationships among the children’s social networks, and alternative strategies for problem-solving leading to a greater sense of self-efficacy. Both qualitative and quantitative data support this in the qualitative theme of group cohesion emerging from the focus group along with the quantitative significance of the improved change in the children’s ratings of group collaboration. Additionally the final focus group’s theme of empowerment reflected children’s ability to make choices in conflict-resolution that are different from their norm of violence and aggression. These findings parallel Nelson, McClintock, Perez-Ferguson, Shawver, and Thompson (2008) who similarly reported outcomes of prosocial achievement, positive peer experiences, and new skill acquisition.

This study also speaks to children’s understanding and experience of peace in their families. As D’Cruz and Stagnitti (2010) similarly found, children’s experience of peace became clearer and more accessible through affirming communication from their family members. As the children in this study reported, peace was present when there an overall general increase in interaction among family members. Future research could explore potential cause-and-effect relationships in frequency of family interaction and the quality of family interaction. This study hinted at how an increase in positive communication within a family correlates with the experience of peace in children.

Food insecurity and hunger were telling themes in the children’s meanings of peace. One knows that food insecurity is associated with poor behavioral and academic functioning in low-income children (Murphy, Wehler, Pagano, Little, Kleinman, & Jellinek, 1998). The children’s worry, anxiety, and sadness about their family’s food supply mirrors the findings in the literature on factors associated with child hunger (Connell, Lofton, Yadrick, & Rehner, 2004). Children bear and act out the fear and shame of being labeled as poor (Raine, McIntyre, & Dayle, 2003). Wehler et al., (2004) identified family size, housing stability, and the effect of violence as significant factors increasing the risk of child hunger.

The meanings children give to peacemaking have implications for how children will work toward achieving peace. Social interaction becomes the means by which children discover and create meaning. Asking young children about what they think they can do to make peace becomes an important first step in encouraging them in their peace-making efforts (Walker, Myers-Bowman, & Myers-Walls, 2008, p. 379). Timmie’s words in the beginning reflect the power of children to identify not only the problems they/we face but a power to shine light on society’s priorities for its children’s learning, development, well-being, and peace. The question becomes, if the children lead, will we adults follow?
References


Storytelling narratives: Social bonding as key for youth at risk. *Child Youth Care Forum*, 37, 127-137.


### Pre- and Post-Program Interview Schedule for Evaluation of 1000 Peace Cranes

#### Program Outcomes #1, #2

What does peace mean?
What do you feel, think, or do when you are at peace?
What do families feel, think, or do when they are at peace?
What is life like when schools have peace?
What is life like in your neighborhood (the area where you live) when there is peace?
What is life like in our country when there is peace?
What is life like in our world when there is peace?
What do you need to have, to feel, or to do for you to feel at peace?
How do you think you can make/create peace?
If you were boss of the world, what would you do to make peace?

#### Program Outcomes #3, #4

What happens when people who are different from each other live, work, or go to school together?
What are some ways that people who are different can live and work in peace together?

#### Program Outcome #5

Describe the physical environment or spaces that you live in.
What are those things that you need for living that come from your environment?
What do you do to protect your environment from being hurt or destroyed?
Who are all the important people in your life, right now?

#### For Program Outcomes #6, #7, and #8, respond using the following Likert scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Likert Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How often is this statement true for you?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0=never true for me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=true for me only once in a while</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2=true for me sometimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=true for me frequently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4=always true for me</td>
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</table>

#### Program Outcome #6

Because I am growing and learning new things, I feel good about how my friends and family see me.
Because I am growing and learning new things, I feel good about me.

#### Program Outcome #7

I know how to get along and work well with other kids.
I know how to help kids who are different from me feel accepted and that they belong.

#### Questions for Post-Program Interviews only:

What did you really like about the Peace Cranes and Peace Gardens Program? And why?
What have you learned about peace from the program?
What changes would you suggest to make the Peace Cranes and Peace Gardens Program better?
An Agenda for Peace Research in Japan after 3/11

Keynote Speech Delivered at the Opening Session of
The 2011 International Conference of
Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association

Ikuro Anzai* 

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Japan, welcome to Kyoto, and welcome to Ritsumeikan University.

My name is Ikuro Anzai, Honorary Director of The Kyoto Museum for World Peace of Ritsumeikan University. As I retired from Ritsumeikan University last March at the age of 71 years old, I established my personal office named Anzai Science & Peace Office, and plan to carry out a variety of activities for disseminating scientific ways of thinking about and building for a more peaceful future.

At 14:46 on 11 March 2011, a tremendously destructive earthquake occurred in the north-east part of mainland Japan, depriving approximately 28,000 people of their lives. More than 300,000 people took refuge from the quake, the following tsunami, and radiations originating from damaged nuclear power stations in the area. The magnitude of the quake was estimated to be 9.0, the biggest in the modern history of Japan. The earthquake was named “The Great East Japan Earthquake”, which was more than 11,000 times greater than the New Zealand Earthquake in Christchurch on 22 February 2011, and 45 times as great as the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake in the Tokyo area which killed approximately 140,000 people.

When I was told about the occurrence of this serious nuclear accident for the first time that evening, I felt very sorry for not having been able to prevent such a catastrophe, although I am a specialist in radiation protection who has been strictly criticizing governmental nuclear power policy since 1967 for more than 40 years. As a scientist who has been involved in the field of nuclear science and technology, I was ashamed of my incapacity for not having been successful in persuading our government and the people of Japan about the risks of nuclear power generation, such as the accident which happened in Fukushima.

I originally graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1964 as one of the first students of the Department of Nuclear Engineering in Japan. My graduation paper at the age of 23 was on the investigation into preventive measures against severe nuclear accidents although there were no nuclear power plants in this country at that time. As is well known among Japanese people, the 1960s began with the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This agreement deeply involved Japan in the Vietnam War by offering the U.S. use of many military bases throughout the nation, especially in Okinawa. In addition to various new types of weapons such as the pineapple bomb, the ball bomb, the nail bomb, and defoliants, the U.S. military even had a plan to use hydrogen bombs,

* Ikuro Anzai, Ph.D., Ritsumeikan University.
named B43, in Vietnam. Training for the dropping of these bombs was held in Okinawa. One of the mock-up B43 bombs used for training is now exhibited at The Kyoto Museum for World Peace, Ritsumeikan University.

The 1960s was also the period when the Japanese government was promoting a so-called “income-doubling policy” of rapid economic growth, which resulted in incidences of serious public harm such as industrial accidents, poisoning of mass-produced medical drugs, etc. Many people including workers, teachers, researchers, engineers, mothers, youth, and so on, were beginning to become aware of the social responsibility of corporations, technologists, and scientists. In 1965, a scientists’ organization named the Japan Scientists Association was established for the development of science based on the principles of independence, democracy and harmony. The association was affiliated with individual researchers and educationalists in the fields of not only natural science but also social science and human science. I joined the association in 1966, and became one of the board members responsible for the activities of watching governmental nuclear power policy. I learnt much more comprehensively about nuclear issues, not only about the scientific and technological aspects but also the political, economical, social and cultural aspects of nuclear power policy. I was also deeply educated by people in the local communities who invited me to their lecture meetings about nuclear safety issues, and threw at me a large variety of questions that were far outside my scientific field but vitally important for the life of their community. These questions were extremely difficult for me to answer at that time. A first and very significant opportunity came to me in 1972, 39 years ago, when I was requested to make a keynote speech at the first symposium on nuclear power generation organized by the Science Council of Japan (JSC), which is sometimes referred to as the parliament of Japanese scientists. JSC was substantially the official representative organization of Japanese scientists, and 210 members of JSC, 30 scientists in 7 different academic fields, were elected by a direct vote of about 300 thousand scientists all over Japan. I was 32 years old at that time, and it was very exceptional for a young scientist like me to be able to have such an opportunity to make a keynote address about such an important issue.

I proposed six fundamental check points about the healthiness or unhealthiness of Japanese nuclear power policy, which were (1) the independence of a national energy policy, (2) development not for economic growth but for safety first, (3) a national nuclear power policy that would not devastate the development policies of local communities, (4) the prevention of military use of nuclear energy, (5) safety assurances for the lives of nuclear power plant workers and residents, and proven safety measures against severe accidents, and (6) democracy of nuclear power administration. These check points functioned for some time as leading principles for the anti-nuclear power movement in Japan in the 1970s.

The next year, in 1973, I was invited to the National Diet as one of ten scientists in the field of nuclear science and technology who were requested to state their opinions and viewpoints about national nuclear power policy. I took this opportunity to sharply criticize governmental policy. I was then an assistant lecturer working for the Department of Radiological Health, in the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Tokyo, which is a national university. I was a national government employee who nevertheless strictly criticized national nuclear policy, which resulted in my experiencing a variety of harassments in my academic life, which I will introduce to you later.

In September of the same year, I became deeply involved in the anti-nuclear power movement in Fukushima together with the people residing in the vicinity of the nuclear power plants. The Government held a public hearing regarding Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant No. 2, which was the first official public hearing about nuclear power generation ever organized in Japan. But it was a
typical example of so-called “Yarase” in Japanese, which means a fake or insincere meeting. The majority of speakers and the audience of the public hearing were intentionally chosen from among the people who agreed with inviting nuclear power plants to Fukushima. Nevertheless, I collaborated with other scientists, lawyers and the people in the local community to send our delegates to the public hearing to raise questions about risks of nuclear power and to clarify the unhealthiness of the national nuclear policy. I myself had a chance to make a speech there by the efforts of the anti-nuclear residents who nominated me as a delegate speaking for them. However, the most astonishing thing I experienced there was a speech made by a pro-nuclear woman who was sent from the local community in the vicinity of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants which are now in crisis. She said, “We need not fear mal effects of nuclear radiation, because, in the 1973 All Japan Senior High School Baseball Tournament, the championship was gained by the high school baseball team from Hiroshima, the A-bombed city, where, it was once said, no grass or trees would grow for 75 years.” She seemed to suggest that radiation is not so harmful as actually feared by referring to the remarkable vitality of the young people who had grown up even in an area devastated by a nuclear weapon. Although it was very sad for me to witness such unscientific storytelling, unfortunately it had some effect on the public acceptance of nuclear power.

Now, let me introduce a brief history of nuclear power development in Japan.

Immediately after the end of the Pacific War, electric power in Japan was dominantly generated by hydraulic power plants, and there was only one electric power company named “Japan Electric Power Generation and Supply Company”. Japan was virtually ruled by the U.S. Occupation Army who adopted an administrative policy to rule Japan not directly but indirectly through the Japanese Government with Emperor Hirohito as a nominal symbol of the unity of the Japanese people. In 1951, the U.S. dismantled the Japan Electric Power Generation and Supply Company into nine regional power companies such as Tokyo Electric Company, Kansai Electric Company, and so on. It was done in the name of the democratization of Japan’s economic system by disorganizing the so-called “Zaibatsu”, which means intensive financial combines. But the real strategic intention of the U.S. was to make Japanese electric power production dependent upon the U.S. For instance, Kansai Electric Company was limited to serve the Kansai area covering big cities such as Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto. These cities needed vast amount of electric power in the process of reconstruction in the postwar period, but Kansai Electric Power Company did not possess enough hydraulic power resources within its territory which inevitably made the company dependent upon thermal power plants which can be built near an area which consumes much electric power. In the earlier stage, a considerable amount of coal produced in Japan was used for thermal power generation, but the fuel was gradually switched to petroleum which drastically and rapidly rendered Japan dependent on the U.S. energy strategy. Nuclear power development in Japan followed this same line, with Japan accepting the offer of nuclear technology from the U.S. and introducing nuclear power plants originally developed in the U.S.

On the other hand, Japan is the only nation that has experienced nuclear holocausts by the U.S. atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. More than 300,000 people were driven to death by the use of these classical nuclear weapons. But the international community were denied the opportunity to understand the terrible damage and aftereffects of the atomic bombings because the U.S. forbade writing reports and sending photos about the tragedy by press code and news censorship, and restarted nuclear testing from July 1, 1946. Three years later, in 1949, the U.S.S.R. succeeded in developing a plutonium bomb, which motivated the U.S. towards the development of a hydrogen bomb. On March 1, 1954, a Japanese tuna fishing boat, named “Lucky Dragon”, was exposed to lethal levels of radioactive fallout produced by a U.S. hydrogen bomb test carried out on
the Bikini Atolls, the detonation yield of which was 15 megatons, five times as great as the total yield of bombs used in the World War II including the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seven years later in 1961, the U.S.S.R. conducted a hydrogen bomb test nicknamed “Tsari Bomba” of 50 megatons, 17 times greater than all the bombs of World War II. The 1950s and 60s were periods when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were in the midst of a nuclear arms race based on the strategic policy of nuclear deterrence and the acquisition of a balance of power, which finally resulted in a policy known as "Mutually Assured Destruction" abbreviated as MAD.

The Japanese people activated an anti-nuclear movement in 1954, ignited by the U.S. hydrogen bomb test in Bikini Atolls on March 1. Two days after that, Japanese conservative parties, with the initiative of Yasuhiro Nakasone, later Prime Minister of Japan, hastily passed a budget of 235 million yen in the Diet for building a nuclear reactor. The figure 235 came from uranium-235. One year before, Nakasone took part in a seminar held in Harvard and had an idea to promote an “Atoms for Peace” project in Japan in cooperation with the U.S. Then, Matsutaro Shoriki, owner of the Yomiuri Newspaper Company, launched a series of traveling expositions to popularize the possibility of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I myself had a chance to see one of these expositions in Tokyo in 1959, where a genuine nuclear reactor was exhibited in the middle of the Tokyo Metropolis.

But it is significant to know that the first practical nuclear power plant of 5,000 kW was built and went into operation in 1954 not by the U.S. but by the U.S.S.R. in Obnisk near Moscow. At that time, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was prohibiting private enterprises from taking part in nuclear energy exploitation until its revision two months after the Soviet success in practical nuclear generation. The U.S. hastily developed nuclear power generation by making use of a nuclear reactor system developed for submarines, and managed to operate the Shipping Port Nuclear Power Plant in 1957. In that year, a report named WASH-740, titled “Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants”, estimated the possible effects of a “maximum credible accident” at 3,400 deaths, 43,000 injuries and property damage of 7 billion dollars, more than double that of Japan’s national budget in those days, which seemed to be too serious for a private electric power company to cope with. About half a year later, The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act was legislated, usually referred to as the “Price-Anderson Act”, by which private companies can be indemnified for any claims above approximately 12.6 billion dollars (as of 2011). This Act was considered necessary to create an incentive for private nuclear power production. Four years later, a similar act named “Act on Contract for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage Compensation” was legislated in Japan. It is obvious that the nuclear power industry cannot survive such catastrophic situations without the aid of the nation.

In Japan, this connection between the government and the electric power companies was further strengthened by involving local government. In legislating the “Act on Tax for Promotion of Power-Resources Development” it brought a vast amount of special subsidies, up to several billion yen for 3 years, if a local government accepts a plan to build an electric power plant. Every contractor must pay about 5 dollars (375 yen) per 1,000 kW-h of electric power consumption, creating about 50 billion dollars of tax income every year. The local community can be blessed with a special subsidy for three years, but infrastructures constructed during the period require persistent funds for maintenance, thereby more nuclear power plants are apt to be invited.

In addition, residents in the local community concerned were also mobilized to invite nuclear power plants. For example, in Futaba District, Fukushima Prefecture, where the nuclear disaster is now going on, a residents’ group named “Organization for Building a Bright Futaba District” was formed in early 1970s, which even put up a poster saying “Let’s Promote Construction of Nuclear Power Plant
by Our ‘Power’ and Open a Way to Build an Affluent Futaba District”. People in the local communities concerned were thus involved in a national mobilization structure for nuclear power.

Needless to say, many specialists in the field of nuclear engineering were officially requested to authorize the governmental judgment about the safety of nuclear power generation. Journalism could not play a sufficient role for criticism, and rather functioned as disseminators of illusions and mythical fallacies that nuclear power generation is safe and economical.

It is sometimes said that nuclear power generation in Japan has been promoted by a “pentagon” consisting of the central government, the nuclear power industry, local governments, specialists, and journalists. I personally feel that residents’ organizations inviting nuclear power plants to local communities should be added to this “pentagon”, thereby forming a “hexagon”, which is akin to the national mobilization structure that was constructed in war time. This hexagon forms a so-called “nuclear village” which is unusually closed, exclusive and ungenerous. I myself started my student life as a member of this “nuclear village” in early 1960s, but I was ruthlessly ejected from the village in 1970s when I was identified as a harmful criticizer of its policies.

Since I began to openly criticize the governmental nuclear policy in early 1970s, I experienced extraordinary harassment in my academic life at the University of Tokyo. I was excluded from the education system, and my research budget was completely cut. My lecture tours to various parts of Japan were often tailed by a power company staff member in charge of watching me. A medical trainee sent from Tokyo Electric Power Company sat next to me at the laboratory to record my ideas about the anti-nuclear movement. Nobody was permitted to talk to me from morning till evening. I experienced different types of obstruction or interference in the process of applications for a professorship at other colleges or universities.

I could narrowly survive this very difficult time, firstly by my own personal belief in life with dignity, secondly in solidarity with understanding people in the fields of science and public movements, and thirdly, maybe most importantly, through the support of my partner. Very interestingly, the human relationship between my boss and myself was ironically slightly improved after a severe nuclear accident in U.S. which took place at Three Mile Island in March 1979. He seemed to have understood that my warnings about the risks of nuclear power generation were not entirely false. But my position was frozen to an assistant lecturer for 17 years until 1986, when I moved from the University of Tokyo to Ritsumeikan University, which was a great happiness for me.

I must relate this unconstitutional suppression of freedom, which I personally experienced, in the background of nuclear power exploitation in Japan. This, I feel, is a significant element that has endangered Japanese society.

Now I would like to make some comments about the situation in the radiation disaster area of Fukushima. I visited the area three times (mid-April, early May, and early August) after the accident of March 11th for the following purposes: to visit my friends with whom I have been co-working with for a nuclear-risk-free community for about 40 years, to make several lectures for educationalists, citizens, workers, young mothers and specialists, to offer advice on radiation protection to the people who need me, and to measure radiation levels and to sample soils contaminated with radioactive substances.

The radiation levels have been and still are very high in the nearby areas and within so-called hot-spots, even in Fukushima City populated by about 280,000 residents some 60 km distance from the
nuclear power plant. I made a radiation survey between Iwaki City and Namie Town, about 80 km apart, the result of which is shown below. Radiation exposure rate was about 0.5 μSv/h in Iwaki, but it gradually rose up to 20, 30, or even to 50 μSv/h in the northwest area of nuclear power plant.

Radiation levels in different locations in Fukushima. Figures are radiation exposure rates expressed in micro-Sieverts per hour. Ordinary level in Tokyo is 0.06~0.07 micro-Sievert per hour. Shaded portion signifies the area where internal radiation dose of thyroid gland between 6 a.m. (March 12) and 0 a.m. (March 24) may have reached 100 milli-Sievert according to an estimation by the System for Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI).

Radiation levels in Fukushima City are different from place to place, but, on an average, the current exposure rate is about 1 micro-Sievert per hour at the height of 1 meter above the ground, which is roughly equivalent to 150-200 chest X-ray examinations per year.

The major cause of external radiation exposure is radioactive cesium-137 deposited on the ground. The total amount of cesium-137 released from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants has been estimated to be about 168 times greater than that released by the Hiroshima A-bomb, according to the evaluation by the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry. The majority of these radioactive substances now deposited on the ground were released during the first week after the hydrogen gas explosions in the plant, while the radioactivity freshly coming down in recent days is quite small. It is noteworthy to recognize that radioactive cesium is very tightly caught by several centimeters of the surface soil layer, and I myself verified in cooperation with Ms. Yoshiko Tanigawa that cesium-137 is not easily dissolved in water, even if we wash the contaminated soil with large quantities of water. This property is peculiar to the clay-like soil in Fukushima. This soil quality is the main reason why the levels of radioactive contamination of rice cropped this autumn in Fukushima were considerably low.
It also suggests that rainfall will not easily wash out radioactive cesium, and why sunflower may not effectively decontaminate the soil in the Fukushima case.

Therefore, in order to reduce radiation levels above the ground, it is quite effective to remove only several centimeters of the surface soil layer. During my second visit to Fukushima in May, I carried out an experiment in a kindergarten in Fukushima City to demonstrate the effectiveness of surface soil clearance. The radiation level was remarkably decreased by removing only 2~3 centimeters of the surface soil layer, and the administrators of the kindergarten made efforts to eliminate the contaminated surface soil thereafter, which enabled them to have an outdoor event for children in early October.

I am convinced that we should earnestly endeavor to carry out every possible measure to protect people, especially young children, from the harmful ionizing radiation that has resulted from the serious accident affecting the nuclear power plants upon which our generation has become dependent to an extent. Here in Kyoto, we are now unconsciously enjoying electric power generated by nuclear power plants only 60 kilometers from this conference venue. There are 14 nuclear power plants in Fukui Prefecture just adjacent to Kyoto, and a vast amount of high-level radioactive waste has already been accumulated, which will have to be taken care of by the future generations. Generations to come after us will have to manage to isolate such dangerous nuclear waste from civil life for thousands of years. They must expend huge resources for the disposal of nuclear waste which will not produce any value for them. We, the people of today, are enjoying nuclear power, and are going to leave a tremendous “negative fortune” to our children, grandchildren, and future generations over tens of thousands of year. We must ask ourselves whether or not this is ethically justifiable.

Now, as is expected by Professor Akihiko Kimijima, the organizer of this APPRA Conference, I think I must conclude my speech by raising several points as an agenda for peace researchers after 3/11. Based on my personal experience as a nuclear scientist specializing in radiation protection over 45 years and also as a peace researcher who has been confronting these unprecedented difficulties, I would like to suggest following 5 points:

(1)Regarding the definition of peace, I fundamentally agree with Dr. Johan Galtung, and understand peace not only as an “absence of war” but also as an “absence of violence” which can be categorized into direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. Although the enormous scale of the earthquake itself and the accompanying tsunami were of natural origin, we still observed a number of incidents of structural and cultural violence which aggravated the damage and pain of the sufferers in the devastated areas. It is the role of peace researchers to make investigations to explain how the effects of an original natural disaster are further aggravated by interconnections of
structural and/or cultural violence.

(2) We must construct a comprehensive aid system for the people in disaster areas by integrating useful potentialities in the fields of politics, administration, economics, science, technology, and culture, including efforts for the decontamination of the living environment, adequate control of radioactive contamination of foods, dissemination of literacy about radiation and radioactivity for eradicating social discrimination and prejudice against sufferers, and the establishment of a health check system to identify and treat the stochastic effects of radiation such as cancers and leukemia in the earliest stages. In order to integrate individual effort into an effective total system, a peace-minded general coordination system must be established.

(3) An agenda for peace research suggested from my own personal experience in academic life is to develop a method to sense dangerous social signs in the earliest stage, including signs in the fields of structural and/or cultural violence such as academic harassment, irrational policy execution without sincere attitude toward science, emasculation of democracy, etc. It may be of some help to develop some indicators such as the Global Peace Index which was developed by Institute for Economics and Peace (UK), or the Universal Human Rights Index by UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Such indicators, if possible, may be able to function to an extent for warning people to this latent danger in society.

(4) Another agenda for the peace researcher is to elucidate the whole story of the Fukushima tragedy not only from the short term point of view but also from a long term point of view in world history. Efforts should be made to clarify the direct and indirect reasons why such a catastrophic nuclear disaster occurred in Japan by comprehensively analyzing and synthesizing historical facts in the light of, for example, the subordination of Japan’s politics to U.S. strategy in the postwar period, a quite Japanese way of old-fashioned politics symbolized by the combination of the taxation system for promoting nuclear power, and “Yarase” culture, i.e. faking people’s opinion favorable to nuclear power. Lessons from such research, when combined with the sincere efforts of educationalists and journalists, may become crucially important for the Japanese people to choose a more peaceful and safer future.

(5) Finally I will add an agenda for the peace of future generations. This is the agenda in connection with the point I already referred to concerning the long-lived radioactive waste disposal. How can we build a consensus about the acceptability of technologies which may leave immeasurable potential risk as a “negative legacy”, such as the very long-lived nuclear waste which will be tremendously cost but will never produce any value for future generations? Peace researchers are expected to answer the question: Is it ethically acceptable for us to enjoy nuclear energy for our life while leaving behind hard to estimate risks to future generations with no possibility of obtaining their consent?

Now I will close this keynote speech by expressing my heartfelt welcome to you and my appreciation for your listening to my speech. The situation at Fukushima is truly serious, but we will continue to encourage the sufferers through their difficulties. And I hope all of you will be with us.

Thank you.

Who shall earn support, the savviest or the neediest? Most probably the savviest! I am not talking about corporate sector support, where the Darwinian norms rule, but the support of global civil society. Isn’t it astonishing? Most of us would like to consider the opposite to be true, that civil society support goes to the neediest not the savviest. Imagine a movement in great need, unable to draft proposals or communicate in international languages, unable to operate a website, with a profile that does not match the profile of a donor agency, and so on. Will it be supported by the civil society? Probably not. Why?

Effective causes, movements and insurgencies need resources, media projection, national and transnational support to challenge their opposition. The harsh reality is that the global civil societies have limited resources and choose to support the movements that are best suited to their own goals, objectives, and agendas, and have the potential to win their cause. In this process, a strict cost to benefit analysis of movements is done and only a handful movements are finally supported. In these ‘Darwinian Markets’, movements have to best prepare themselves according to the international demands and criteria and in doing so they need to market themselves aggressively, effectively and efficiently in order to gain major transnational backing by civil society and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Clifford Bob’s book, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism*, accounts several factors and strategies required by movements and insurgencies for gaining media attention and international support in contemporary world politics. Bob systematically compares two recent movements that won major support and NGOs backing: Nigeria’s Ogoni ethnic group and Mexico’s Zapatistas rebels. Both of these movements became global causes while other similar movements remained isolated and obscure. Through in-depth analysis, the author highlights two broad marketing strategies that made these movements superior and more receptive in the international community including: i) raising NGO awareness through targeted lobbying and diffuse consciousness-raising (primary using the media) and ii) framing of movements to match NGO’s goals, culture, tactics, ethics, and organizational needs.

In the first case of Nigeria’s Ogoni ethnic group, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) had a influential leader who had forceful command over English, broad understanding of the NGO and media scene and experience in advertising, television and journalism: Ken Saro-Wiwa. In the beginning, the movement failed to attract transnational support because of a failure to match themselves to Key NGO attributes, interests, and requirements, and an inability to grab the media attention. Learning from mistakes, the movement reframed its grievances and began lobbying specific NGOs. MOSOP adopted an environmental frame by playing the ‘Shell Card’ – highlighting the social and environmental impact of the Shell Company. This aligned the movement with the global dimensions of environment and indigenous rights, and thus attracted the support of NGOs and the

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media. The oppression of the government against minorities further attracted human rights organizations to back the movement. When we compare MOSOP to other movements, such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the importance of a non-violent strategy as a means of attracting NGO and civil society support also becomes clear.

In the second case, the Mexico Zapatista rebellion, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) made itself known to the world through diffuse consciousness-raising (primary using the media). In 1994, 2500 lightly armed Zapatista soldiers captured the city of San Cristobal de las Casas, and the Zapatistas proclaimed themselves to be the product of a 500 year struggle by Mexico’s poor and dispossessed. The Zapatistas developed printed and electronic materials, launched a website, and developed close contacts with the journalists of major periodicals such as the New York Times. Significantly, Marcos played a figurehead role in the promotion of the movement by his writings; his interesting and convincing style of communication eventually made him an ‘international icon of revolt’.

Like MOSOP, EZLN also changed its strategy according to international market demands, shunning military attacks in favour of armed non-violence and transforming their initially socialist orientation to indigenous rights. Moreover, they also opposed NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and Neoliberalism in order to boost the movement. In contrast, Bob argues, the EPR (Popular Revolutionary Army) in Mexico was unable to score significant support either inside or outside the country, primarily due to their inflexible policies, inability to attract the press, and retention of violent strategies.

To this end, Bob makes five arguments: i) international support by global civil society or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is neither easy nor automatic, but is instead competitive and uncertain; ii) the development and retention of support are best conceived of, not as philanthropic gestures, but as exchanges based on the relative powers of each party to the transaction; iii) competition for NGO intervention occurs in a context of economic, political, and organizational inequality that systematically advantages some over others; iv) despite these structural biases, the choices of insurgents (how they market themselves) matter; and v) because of these market dynamics, the effect of assistance is more ambiguous than is often acknowledged.

To expand on the latter argument, Bob demonstrates that although framing a movement according to international standards has its benefits, in most instances, it is a complete disaster for the movement’s original motives, goals, and objectives. Movements must, therefore, be very cautious if they are to frame their issue according to international concerns, without losing sight of the original campaign. As Bob mentions, even as the Ogani won world wide exposure, some of their friends in the indigenous rights community were shaking their heads at how movement’s original demands for political autonomy had been misunderstood abroad as environmental and human rights issues took central stage. In addition, the book paints a bleak picture of contemporary global civil society/ NGOs that is mostly unseen, finally recommending that global civil society itself should reshape its goals and tactics, so that support may reach the neediest rather than the savviest.

The book is written in simple yet interesting and eloquent style. The comparisons between the different movements and groups within two very different societies (Mexico and Nigeria) against very different opponents and the subsequent analysis of their successes and failures in a global context have made this book well worth reading. I highly recommend this book (and its lessons) for all those who are involved in social movements and seek international support for their cause.